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
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
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
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
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




CHRISTIAN EXAMINER

AND

GENERAL REVIEW.



THE

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CHRISTIAN EXAMINER

AND

GENERAL REVIEW.

VOL. VIII.

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THE CHRISTIAN EXAMINER.

NO. XXXVII.

NEW SERIES—NO. VII.

MARCH, 1830.

ART. I.—*Memoirs of Scipio de Ricci, late Bishop of Pistoia and Prato, Reformer of Catholicism in Tuscany under the Reign of Leopold. Compiled from the Autograph MSS. of that Prelate, and the Letters of other distinguished Persons of his Times. Edited from the Original of M. de Potter, by THOMAS ROSCOE.* London. H. Colburn, 1829. 2 Vols. 8vo. pp. 347, 302.

THE history of the Catholics now awakens an unusual interest. In England, they have just been restored to some of those rights, of which vengeance rather than a sound policy had long deprived them. They have been made to understand that their emancipation, such as it is, is wholly a matter of favor, and that the most fervent gratitude on their part, can never repay the generosity of their masters. There is something offensive in the whole tone of discussion on this subject. Their claim is advocated by many, on the ground that they are too weak to do any harm; they are forgiven like the dead who can offend no longer; though released, they are not acquitted, but seem to be declared outlaws by the same voice that sets them free. The reason is, that Catholics were once oppressors, and held opinions in former times subversive of civil power. All this is true. But we are not justified in visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children; nor is it well to give the impression that the Catholics are the only usurping party, since the charge, word for word, and deed for deed, can be thrown back upon those who bring it against them.

The wiser part of the world have reached the conviction, that differences of opinion are not sufficient grounds of exclu-

sion ; that opinions, though important, are not all-important, and that peculiar religious sentiments exist in the mind with greater and more practical truths, which prevent their bearing upon the conduct ; so that if these sentiments are dangerous, which is not often the case, they are like certain poisons, harmless while united with other elements of nature. There is a wide and spreading conviction, that the great principles of Christianity may be found in every party, and where individuals or bodies of men are injurious members of society, the cause lies deeper than their peculiar opinions. This affords an encouraging hope, that Christians will at last meet on common ground, each enjoying his own faith without invading another's. It is so manifestly the last hope of union, that every one who cares for his religion should do all he can to extend this conviction, and to show that the greatest of all corruptions of Christianity, is the hatred and strife of its defenders.

We know not why Catholics should be denied the benefit of this construction of the heavenly law. And yet it seems necessary to say, that the Roman Catholics are a christian sect, entitled to all the rights and immunities of any other party. They have not been unvisited with the light of improvement. The same intellectual advancement which bears other sects away from the fashions and follies of past ages, has induced the Catholics, in enlightened countries, to cast off some of their worst pretensions. We may say that they should disavow their ancestry and disclaim the deeds of their fathers ; but it will be time enough to demand this, when we can point them to an example. Every veteran sect has something in its history to be ashamed of ; but each remembers such stains upon its annals with charity, rather than sorrow or shame. The Catholics, like others, have a natural veneration for old practices and opinions. They see many names shining as stars in their history, which the growing light of the world can never dim. If they see much to condemn in their system, they may say that there are provisions in the statute books of every country, brought into existence in ages of darkness and left standing like defences on some old limit of civilisation, serving to show where the boundary ran. Even if they maintained principles of pernicious tendency, it will not do to reason from their sentiments to their practice. We fear that a stranger to this world would hardly gather the character of christian nations, from simply reading the book by which they profess to be governed. They are wrought upon by other influences. A Catholic in this country,

is unlike a Catholic of Spain ; and the difference produced by three thousand miles of distance, is less than that produced by three hundred years of time. Catholics are not what they were some centuries ago.

We are not advocates of the Catholic faith, as it was professed in former ages, nor as it is altered and modified now. But we wish to have a distinction made between systems and those who hold them. We do not wish to charge the members of any party with the evils which seem to us to be natural results of their opinions. True, the zealous partisan receives as a personal insult, every argument brought against his sentiments. But his nervous sensibility need not affect this distinction which we are bound to make between the opinions and the characters of men. The Catholics will not believe that our wish to do them justice implies any approbation of their system ; for, excepting that both profess Christianity, there is no point, *form*, or doctrine, in which we entirely agree. When the treasures of the church were broken up, and other sects divided its garments among them, no part fell to our share. Still we think, and are ready to declare, that a right understanding of religious truth will show that the Catholics were not so destitute of it as is often supposed ; that all the corruptions of religion are not to be charged upon them ; and that at the time when their history began, error was almost inevitable.

By religion we understand a principle of love and duty to God and man. This definition no human art can alter. Christianity inspires and encourages this truth, by giving clear views of the divine character, by more than confirming what nature teaches of the tendency of virtue to happiness and of guilt to shame, and by making the startling disclosure that these results are immortal. Religion inspired by these religious truths, is christian religion ; and this principle has dominion over men, in proportion to the power with which the arguments, inducements, and persuasions of Christianity, act upon the soul. Evidently, this principle is not a self-existent thing ; it has no tendency to spread of itself ; it has no power in our hearts, except what we choose to allow it ; it is strictly personal ; it cannot reside in churches, nor be held in trust by any body of men. The question with respect to the Catholics, is, whether there was anything in their system which prevented religious truth from inspiring religious principle in their breasts ; and this question is answered by the lives of some of their num-

ber, who, while devoted to their system, were nevertheless as bright examples of excellence as can be found in the army of apostles, disciples, and martyrs; and they leave no doubt, that the great brotherhood of Christians in all ages, have drawn their inspiration from the same source of truth. So far as they were influenced by christian truth, their religion was pure; and how far they were so influenced, must be learned from their deeds—it cannot be learned by the doubtful process of comparing tendencies of different systems. Yet one would suppose from what has been said of the Catholics, that their *religion* was corrupt. We think it would not be difficult to show that the corruptions, instead of growing out of their religion, were the offspring of such passions as oppress and resist the religious principle in every heart where it dwells.

What, then, is meant by corruptions of religion? For the reply we look to individuals, and trace the process of corruption. Some one who beholds religious truth, is struck with its importance. He believes it, but he finds it hard to submit to its restraints, and though he dares not throw them off, determines to make them lighter. He provides himself with substitutes and evasions; and the more conscious he is of real unfaithfulness, the more he gives way to irreligious passions—the more strict he becomes in formal duties, the more anxious to keep up a solemnity of feeling, which passes with himself and others for religion. He is surrounded by others utterly indifferent to religious truth, who make a boast of those passions which he is ashamed of indulging. The general corruption is called in him religious corruption, because he has some sense of religious obligation, and endeavours to make truth speak a language favorable to his desires. If he is ambitious, dreading the bloody weapons of carnal warfare, he will aim at spiritual power. If he is sensual, his passions will assume the tones of religious feeling. If he is revengeful, he will persuade himself that his enemies are the foes of God.

This history of religious corruption, which we may find acted over to the life in every village, illustrates the corruption of religious men in all ages—in the present as well as all the past, in Protestant as well as Catholic churches; for we take it no one will deny, that men are still finding pleas for the indulgence of their passions, and substitutes for their pious and benevolent duties. Thus not only religious truth, but religious corruptions, are in all ages the same, and we are united to the Catholics by

a double sympathy—by our sharing the same truths and the same errors. If any think that the Catholics are more to be blamed for these corruptions, because their sect is ancient, because they received the truth from the earliest Christians, they have yet to learn, that religious truth is like all other. When it was fully proclaimed with its evidence to the civilized world, it was given to the care of men ; and what reason was there to expect, that they should bring a more enlightened understanding to the truths of Christianity, than to any other truths, from which these differ only in their importance? We might as well expect the last discoveries of astronomy from those who first steered their vessels by the north star. We might as well demand from childhood, the precision of thought on these subjects, which belongs to maturer years. It would have been strange indeed, if the unenlightened world could have comprehended the full extent of truths, which are doubtless meant to keep opening and unfolding to the eyes of men, when they become as the angels of God. If it be said that they could have read the truth in the scriptures, we could answer that there are truths in the scriptures, which the world even now does not know ; for example, the truth that they who do most in the service of others are the greatest. How long, we would ask, has the admiration of this kind of greatness, or the ambition of this glory, prevailed in the christian world?

It would seem to be the prevailing impression, that our Saviour was the author of a system, and that the corruptions of Christianity have arisen from a combination to set aside that system, and establish another ; which implies a daring defiance of the authority of God. But Jesus came to reveal facts to men ; facts, which they never could have known with certainty, without him. He was no more their author, than Herschel was the creator of his namesake star. His morality is the conduct and feeling natural to those who know that these facts are true. The errors arise from a want of clear discernment of these truths, which renders them less impressive, and lifts their restraint from human passions. The great thing, then, to be done to remove corruptions, is, to enable men to see these truths distinctly—to enlighten them, till they can discover their full magnitude and importance. If it be said, that we often find the religious principle strongest in unenlightened minds, we acknowledge it ; and at the same time have no doubt, that more knowledge would make them still better

Christians. But we do not mean that light alone, will make men religious; they must use their light in studying the nature of religion. Now we believe, that, as the ignorance of the world, rather than any great Catholic conspiracy, was the original cause of corruptions of religion, the only effectual way of removing them is to enlighten the world. True, if there exists an unprincipled despotism, it must be overthrown; and we honor the gallant spirits, who, by the Reformation, broke the chains which had eaten into the soul of Europe for a thousand years. But the result of that great enterprise shows, that, unless men are enlightened, as fast as one corruption is put down, another will rise and reign in its stead. We blame the Catholics for allowing that bondage which we bless the Reformers for destroying; but the usurpation sprang from common ambition, rather than religious errors. The Reformers hardly touched most of the errors that eclipse religious truth. They stood firm as ever, with new names and forms. The corruptions exist, though the Catholic yoke is broken; and they will continue to exist till the progress of light, and the use of that light in religious investigation, shall make men better acquainted with their own nature and their nature's God. Thus it appears, that the Catholics are not answerable for all the corruptions of Christianity, and are ready to move on with other sects in the way of improvement, where the uncharitableness of Protestants does not deprive them of every chance of reform.

We trust that we have shown, that the Catholic corruptions of Christianity were such as might be expected in an unenlightened age, and do not imply any peculiar guilt in those who maintained them, above all the rest of the world. We think the Catholics have reason to complain, that they are not tried upon the same ground with other religious parties. History, which we so often mistake for experience, has waged an unrelenting war upon them. While it fearlessly told their faults, it was bound to let us know how far others were liable to the same charges. This it has not done, and thus, without perhaps overstating the vices of the Catholics, it has failed to do them justice. It tells us of the cruel sacrifices made to Papal intolerance; of the thousands whom it baptized with fire into a better existence, till every heart burns with indignation. But the reader is obliged to search in black-letter volumes, for the list of those who suffered martyrdom from

the Protestants. That the Reformers were nothing in arrears, the fate of Grotius, Bolsec, and Servetus can declare ; but we do not see these, and similar enormities, paraded with exultation. History has told us of the licentiousness of priests and religious orders, till, in most men's minds, monk and hypocrite are convertible terms. But we cannot fix the measure of this reproach, because it does not tell us that the same sensuality which defiled the cloisters, was found in all the high places of the land ; that it had a dwelling in the courts of kings, from which it is hardly dislodged at the present day. Historians have poured out their souls in admiration of Elizabeth and reprobation of Mary—those sisters in character as well as birth, those twins in intolerance and every inhuman feeling. The unequal judgment given by history in this case, authorises us to discredit its decisions ; but its sentence is admitted and recorded against the Catholics, though it placed nothing in the opposite scale when it weighed them in the balances and found them wanting.

With how little impartiality it has decided, we may learn from a single example—the usurpation so justly charged upon the court of Rome. Far are we from defending it ; but who would not suppose, from the language of history, that the princes whom it endeavoured to control, were mild and gracious sovereigns, ruling by the consent of their happy people ? Who would suppose that they were ferocious tyrants, whose power was gained and held by the sword ; whose aims and interests were unsocial and unfeeling ; who, instead of blessing their respective nations, ground them to the dust ? We do not think that the church, compared with other principalities and powers, has reason to blush for its usurpations. We are inclined rather to sympathize with the authority, which, for whatever reasons, resisted military barbarism and threw its doors open to receive the oppressed. Doubtless it abused the minds of men. But is this less true of its military rival ? The military passion could never have triumphed over the feelings and interests of men, without a gross corruption of moral and religious sentiment ; without changing virtues into vices, and glory into shame ; without an enchantment, infinitely more wide and effectual than physical power ever created. The Catholic faith is not the only spell which has enslaved men's minds ; and if it be said that the religious delusion was less within the reach of improvement, less accessible to reform than the

other, the result has not confirmed this impression. For, while the ecclesiastical power has dwindled to a remnant which endeavours with feeble and trembling hands to rebuild the ruins of its former greatness, the military still exists, and conquerors, small and great, are as sure as ever of the homage of men at the moment they trample them down. The world is not yet weary of supplying their banquets of blood.

Again, we receive from history the impression, that the Roman church was the cause of the immorality of the world. It did nothing to roll back the tide of depravity; and what church establishment ever did what history thus requires of the church of Rome? Did the English church lift up its voice against the adulteries and murders of Henry VIII., or venture to intimate that his hands should be purer while engaged in the sacred enterprise of reform? When the church was more firmly established, did it ever whisper that the two first of the house of Brunswick did wrong to decorate their lemans with public honors, and make them inmates in the royal mansion? Or if the reigning sovereign should violate those domestic obligations which meaner men hold sacred, does any one believe that a single sound of upbraiding would come from the church which denounces Catholic immorality? We intend no reproach to the church of England. We mean only to say that this is what no church has done, and no church ever will do. All that ever is done in the world to prevent or reform corruption, is accomplished by individuals in separate exertions. No one can reasonably doubt that there were Catholics who were ready to do all that men in their circumstances could have done; but the tongue of the mind was not then loosed, and man had neither speech nor language to make himself heard. But in later times, when the world had grown more enlightened, it was a Protestant bishop, if we remember right, who ministered to the immoralities of Henry, and a Catholic who spoke loudly against his treatment of his unfortunate queen. But no man of sense can doubt, that moral excellence was to be found in every party; in Unitarians like Lord Falkland, and Catholics like Sir Thomas More. It is said that the seclusion of monasteries and convents, was anything but holy, and we fully believe it; but this does not seem owing to the Catholic faith alone, for every erroneous faith has its evasion and expiation for crime. We have no doubt that now, under the influences of better views of truth, the experiment of separating

men and women into religious communities, apart from the restraints and enjoyments of social life, would be attended with almost equal danger. Their religion itself would seem, like water in wells disused, to generate a fatal atmosphere, in which light and life would be extinguished. But it is plain to us, that this unnatural system was forced upon the Catholics by the barbarism of the times. Those who felt conscious of superior minds, and could neither resist nor endure oppression, the 'tender and delicate woman,' who found no security from the savage chivalrous institutions except in her youth and beauty—all who were too weak to bear a part in the strife, and too proud to bend the knee, retreated to such places from necessity, like the Christians in Palestine, and took advantage of the prevailing superstition, to bar their doors from intrusion. Had they been permitted to exist, their character would have altered with the times, unless contempt and persecution had denied them the privilege of improving with the rest of the world.

We may imagine an Italian charged with the tendency of his religion to encourage sensuality and every other sin. We may suppose the charge to be made in Italy by some Protestant traveller who boasted that his own purer faith frowned on all such transgressions; that in Protestant England, for example, the least stain of similar reproach, would sink power into weakness, and glory to dishonor. The Catholic, while he allowed that the enlightened nation was purer than the unenlightened, might reasonably doubt whether religion was the cause of this superiority, and whether Protestants themselves, in the midst of Italian darkness, would edify the Catholics much by their example. He might say that Italy had seen a naval warrior, whose fame sounded on the waves and shores of almost every sea; who was admired as the perfection of greatness; who was a member of the Church of England, because that nation will only be defended by consecrated soldiers; and yet that this man, with whose glory every boundary of civilisation rang, stained the deck of his gallant vessel, with a deed which would have brought any other to the yard-arm. His manner of life it was a shame to declare; and yet no murmur of disapprobation ever reached him across the deep. No Catholic prelate was ever more undisturbed in his vices, than this man, of whom it was said that 'he felt all the emotions of a devout and pious Christian.' Surely, Protestants

need not charge Catholics with offering impunity to men in power.

Once more with respect to improvement. History gives us the impression that the Catholic religion was the cause of all the darkness that rested so long upon the nations. True it is, that the Catholic faith did little to remove it. But the darkness itself was owing to the military barbarians who poured in at all the flood-gates of the Roman empire, when it began to fall. Everything in their habits was hostile to improvement. We could have wished that the reforming spirit had been exerted, which resides in every form of Christianity; but we must remember that these barbarians were its disciples. We owe to it whatever relics of ancient literature have floated down to our times; we owe gratitude to the Catholics, that they did not quite destroy them; and let those who accuse them of deadly hatred to the interests of the mind, say from what church the restorers of ancient learning sprang; in what church the Reformers acquired intellectual strength to fight the battles of reform. Unless we believe that the military spirit would have hastened these great results, we cannot accuse the Catholics of enmity to improvement. And yet, who would learn from history, that the Jesuits were fast friends of education; or that these men, whose hypocrisy is a proverb, had given the best proofs of self-devotion, by carrying what they thought the gospel, where the keel of the adventurer had never seamed the waters, nor his sail thrown its shadow on the shore?

We have not forgotten the fate of Galileo, nor the prudence of the worthies who, in publishing Newton's *Principia*, filed a protest against the doctrine that the earth went round the sun. These things, it is true, came from Catholic believers. But when we say truly, that the Catholics were the oppressors, we must show the despotism now existing which allows freedom to the mind; we must show the religious establishment, which ever encouraged any improvement which seemed like an improvement upon itself. Mr Brougham and the London University can bear witness to the Church of England. In fact, we know no despotism, whether of individuals or of numbers, which has ever counted it less than suicide to allow free action to the mind. When the revolutions of the world brought the 'wheel full circle,' and the Protestants rose as the Catholics fell, we cannot discover that the reigning church showed mercy to the Puritans. When the Puritans rose in their turn, we

find their liberality recorded in an act of parliament, which provides that 'whoever says Christ is not God equal with the Father,' shall suffer death. All parties wreaked their vengeance on the humbled Catholics as long as public opinion would let them, and did not relent for a moment, till the voice of the oppressed, 'weak and trembling at first, waxed louder and louder, and at last spoke in one continued roll of angry thunder to the church and throne.

We do not say that the Catholic faith did anything to improve the social condition of men; but we believe that it could not make it worse, for the world was suffering under a military tyranny, which made the weak the property of the strong, protected no interests but those of the powerful, and laid its ban on every improvement in social happiness and order. But the spirit of religion, which resides in Catholics as well as others, did all that was done to restrain oppression. Its influence was in favor of peace, and of course of all those pursuits, which, from their benefit to humanity, are called arts of peace. To this it may be answered, that the holy wars were inventions of the church. But allowing this to be true, though it wants confirmation, it was a public benefit to send away that military fury to distant regions. It was turning aside the lightning, which otherwise would have burst on the civilized world. With their impressions of duty, they were doing right; and well would it be if the wars which have since almost broken the heart of Europe, were founded on pretences half as good. If the vast Catholic enterprise of breaking down the walls of nations to throw the whole into one mighty diocess, had succeeded, it would have been no more than changing a thousand usurpers for one; and we know not why those who could cheer on Napoleon in his great endeavour, should condemn the design of the Popes, which was not more unjust in its object, was less guilty in its means, and, so far as we can judge, would have given to the people, that class so seldom honored with the notice of historians, a quiet they had never known before.

That the arts of peace did flourish under the protection of the Catholic religion, its noble monuments of art yet survive to tell; its paintings, which modern art looks up to with wonder and dismay; its cathedrals, the most solemn and magnificent of all temples made with hands. While it was the boast of the feudal bandits to kill and destroy, it was the business of the Catholic religion to build and save; and therefore we presume

to say, that the lethargy of the convent was not worse than the madness of the field. Its spiritual absolutions were not more hostile to Christianity, than those which now legalize violence and murder; and its immorality, bad as it was, no greater than the license which public sentiment in many countries still forgives to power, though, as Walpole, in almost his only grave and godly saying, observes of the vices of his king, its plea may secure an acquittal at the Herald's office sooner than at the last tribunal.

We have made these remarks respecting the treatment of the Catholics, because they have been condemned without judgment or measure. We have done it, not with a view of defending them, but of having their merits fairly understood—as they cannot be, while we sink their claims and character below those of other religious parties. In all reformations much is done from passion. When principle will go no further in condemnation, passion takes the business into its own hands. Thus almost all writers from the time of the Reformation, like seamen unable to take observations till the winds are laid, have kept up an outcry of censure upon the Catholics, charging them with all the abuses that have ever found shelter under the name of religion. By charging them with transgressions, as if no others had ever offended; by upbraiding them with practices and opinions which they expressly disavow; by insisting, in the face of the best evidence which the case admits, that they stand just where they did three hundred years ago; by treating them with that illiberality and exclusion, which was the greatest of the Catholic sins, and by recording this hard sentence in literature, where all the world can read it to the end of time, they have placed the Catholics in the position of the injured party. But there is in the world a great and increasing number who detest not merely Catholic illiberality, but all exclusion; who know, that liberality means something more than abusing the illiberal, and have no sympathy with those who oppose the oppression of others, only because it stands in the way of their own. The most disgusting form of intolerance, is that which boasts the overthrow of the Catholic faith, and yet fain would wear its broken crown; talks of the Reformation, and sets its face against reform; professes to unseal the scriptures, and suffers none to read and judge for themselves. In all this, there is something which repels their sympathy to the opposite extreme, and makes them feel as if

all who were misrepresented by such a spirit, were martyrs to the cause of truth. Every despotism, Protestant or Catholic, religious or of the world, is their abomination. There is none, under the shadow of which the mind can reach its growth and proportion; there is none, which does not unman those whom it weighs down. This overbearing spirit, whether it dwells in parties, churches, or thrones, should be denounced with sternness and impartiality, and above all, without making any reservation for ourselves.

The great reproach of the Catholic church, is the tyranny with which it enslaved the human mind; its claiming the right to teach religious truth, while it was usurping temporal power. Till the time of Constantine, the Christians were contending with persecution. Their only armour to resist it was the innocence of their lives. Often, their mild fortitude disarmed revenge, and made deep impressions in favor of their religion. Oppressed as they were, their numbers were growing. This Constantine saw, and in a fortunate time for his own ambition, though an evil hour for Christianity, he placed himself at the head of the christian party. From that hour the walks of ambition were thrown open to the Christians, and the worst enemy of their sect could not have contrived a more effectual way to destroy the character of their religion. They were corrupted by prosperity; they soon began to give to Cæsar what belonged to God; and to their vain attempt to serve two masters—to gain the earthly sovereign and not displease the King of Heaven, we may trace the vast demands of intellectual submission which the church made, the release from personal responsibility which it offered, and the steadfast purpose with which it discouraged independence of every kind.

But to explain how the Catholics rose to such a tremendous height of power, we must remember that they were a party; a party, not confined to a single empire, but running through the boundaries of nations, and swallowing up in one great sympathy, all other enmities and passions. While the feudal sovereigns contended each for himself, the Catholics brought the whole force of a party to bear on every enemy and every question. Individual princes might be restrained by prudence, fear, or perchance by feeling, from oppressing their subjects too far; but the church took care to make them willing slaves. Individuals might sometimes feel the power of conscience; but there is no such thing as the conscience of a party. No

one feels guilty, where he does not feel personally liable for misdeeds. What individuals would blush to do, parties will not hesitate to do and to avow. Like the senseless elements, they keep on in their fury when the obstacle is beat down, for nothing can stand against the surge of party lifted by the storm. There is no despotism so unrelenting as that of numbers. Kings can be dethroned; tyrants are vulnerable; but no moral feeling can restrain, no power defy, no energy put down the tyranny of millions. The Catholics were an organized party; and though the separate members were not worse than other men of their day, when they acted as a party they were ready to put out all the lights of the human understanding; for such power can never exist except sustained by some great delusion. Such power is itself an abuse, and leads to many other abuses. They need not be described, for the history of the Catholics will serve as a warning so long as the world endures.

Such was the spiritual oppression of the Catholic church. Such it is still, where light has not broken in. But we confess that we regard as its successors, not those who bear its name, so much as those who inherit its spirit and power. That church held its authority by the force of public opinion, perverted public opinion; and it sunk, in nation after nation, as fast as that foundation gave way. No religious establishment which is not thus supported, can endanger the interests of freedom for any length of time. We cannot tell whether any new religious party will ever indulge the same ambition; at all events, it must be a feeble successor to the giant sovereign of old time. We know not where such an experiment could be tried in the present state of the world, except perhaps in this country. We can imagine a 'christian party' running through the States of our Union, engrossing all substantial power, sinking all minor differences in one great object, bearing with all its weight on every public question, and suffering none to rise to office or influence whose commission is not countersigned by the party. Such a combination may possibly be formed, and Protestant Jesuits and Jansenists unite in the great endeavour. We should then give the name of Protestant to those who contended for freedom, and think the name of Catholic better applied to such an usurping faction than to the Catholic remnant, who, when their magnificent cathedral in which the world worshipped is almost in ruins, are still keeping up forlorn remains of state and grandeur in some of its darkest towers.

The work before us contains evidence, that there were such persons as Catholic Reformers ; men who were strongly attached to the church, and yet deeply sensible of its faults, and most of all of its unrighteous dominion. Mr Roscoe has selected various passages from a foreign work, containing an account of Scipio de Ricci, Bishop of Prato and Pistoia in Tuscany. This Catholic prelate seems to have excited much interest in Europe, though almost unknown in this country. He was educated under the care of the Jesuits, one of his relations being General of that order, at the time of its suppression by Ganganelli. His promise was such, that the road to preferment was open before him ; but he had independence enough to perceive and declare, that the whole system was corrupt, and that no one could share its honors, without a sacrifice of principle, except he desired power for the sake of reform. He said of the Roman court, what we suspect is true of various others, that the possibility of continuing an honest man, was incompatible with the idea of making one's fortune and rising to elevated stations. Instead, therefore, of paying court to the ruling powers, he corresponded secretly with the imprisoned General, Lorenzo de Ricci, regarding him as a victim of oppression, though he disliked his order. The last declaration of this Jesuit is printed in this volume. It is written in a mild and dignified manner. He solemnly denies the charges brought against the Society, but offers forgiveness to his oppressors. He died in his unjust imprisonment in the Castle of St Angelo. Here we would ask, if it is not true that the last declaration of a Jesuit would be treated as false and worthless, by many who would place implicit confidence in a murderer's dying words? We honor Scipio de Ricci for his fidelity to his unfortunate relative, and are happy to perceive that it continued unbroken to the last.

In 1780 he accepted the appointment of Bishop of Prato and Pistoia, a place in which it seemed probable that he might commence the reform which he had at heart. But a peaceful revolution was out of the question. Difficulties had long existed between Tuscany and Rome. The Medici, and the Spanish government that succeeded them in Tuscany, did not interfere in church affairs. The emperor Francis followed their example in the beginning of his reign ; but after a time, he openly resisted the Roman power, suppressing convents and shutting the prisons of the Inquisition. When Leopold

came to the Grand-ducal crown, he pursued the same course, and determined to draw the line broad and deep between the temporal and spiritual power. De Ricci was thus placed in a difficult and delicate position.

Villensi, a Friar of Santo Vito, had written to the Grand-duke, pointing out many religious abuses and proposing means of reform. But unfortunately, in this early movement, it was proposed to employ the wealth of the suppressed orders for the benefit of the state; a plan which brought reproach on the English Reformation, and made it appear like a selfish attempt to transfer wealth and power to other and no better hands. There are letters from nuns, giving an account of the manner of life in their convents, which, if one half of them is true, must awaken shame and indignation. It is utterly impossible for us to give any idea of the disclosures they contain. They serve to show, that when corruption was so bold, the labor of a reformer could not be light.

Ricci was consecrated at Rome, after the usual examination, which was conducted in a manner not wholly unknown in other countries—the venerable examiners supplying the candidate beforehand with a list of the questions they intended to ask him. As soon as he returned to his diocese, he commenced his reforms. His great difficulty was with the Dominicans. Such was their unspeakable corruption, that he hoped to be aided in suppressing it by the order itself. In this he was disappointed; but he used every endeavour to bring their scandalous history before the church at Rome. Testimony followed testimony, letter upon letter; but the monks knew how to make friends at Rome. Ricci then directed strong remonstrances to the Pope himself; but all was of no avail, till Leopold came forward to sustain him. Then the convents were given up to the bishop's care, and the Pope visited the General of the Dominicans with a furious reprimand for concealing from him the true state of things. What this state of things was, may be gathered from one of the editor's moral reflections. He says,—

‘A philosopher would have tolerated the superstitious worship of the “*sacré cœur*,” added by the Jesuits to preceding superstitions, till human reason complaining of it, should confound it with the mummeries already consecrated to ridicule. A philosopher, if he had known the cloisters to conceal individuals of both sexes, who had vowed to violate the laws of Nature, and not to fulfil the

duties of society, would have considered it of very little importance, whether these persons lived according to the strange rules of their order or not, or whether they preserved the chastity they believed to be agreeable to God.' Vol. II. p. 263.

The objects of Leopold were principally political; and it was a singular spectacle to see a member of the Austrian imperial family, endeavouring to prepare the subjects of his little state to receive a constitution. This book contains a memoir, which, though not written by Leopold, expresses his views on these subjects; and, if we had room, we should be glad to insert it at large for the benefit of our republican community. It expresses throughout, the truth that republican institutions are the means through which the national character acts on national prosperity, and that their success must be in exact proportion to the virtue of the people. If selfishness and corruption are tolerated in private life, they will appear still more openly in high places, and when a republican government becomes corrupt, the disease exists, not merely in the rulers, but in the people.

To ascertain the state of public opinion, or rather to know how far the church would sustain him, Leopold submitted fifty-seven questions to the bishops of Tuscany. These questions strike directly at the power of Rome. They question the validity of any order whatever from the Pope, without a confirmation from the government. They propose an inquiry into the genuineness of relics and other prevailing superstitions. They intimate also the impropriety of using a dead language for prayer. It was not to be expected that these should be approved; but the simple fact that they found bold and able advocates, and were discussed with perfect freedom, shows that the Catholics were not inaccessible to improvement. We should be glad to know the place in the Austrian dominions, where the question of civil government might be subjected to similar discussion. We cannot give the debates on this matter, nor can we follow the bishop in his attempted reforms. It is enough to say that the convents were put under new discipline; the marriage licenses from Rome, a fruitful source of iniquity, were superseded by licenses from the bishop; education was encouraged in every possible way, and toleration was better understood and practised than in any other country.

But his plans could not be completed without the concurrence of the other bishops. They, for various reasons, were

against him, the Roman court employed its secret engines to destroy his influence, and when Leopold left Tuscany, to succeed his brother on the Austrian throne, Ricci was left unsupported. He was even obliged to retreat from Pistoia, though not without receiving many proofs of admiration and regard. Finding that the new Grand-duke did not protect him, he resigned his office, and was exposed to various indignities, till all other feelings were suspended in terror at the approach of the French Republican arms.

Ricci seems to have wished well to the French, hoping, doubtless, that they would prosecute his plans. Little was then known of that mighty revolution, whose reforms began or ended in ruin. He and his party, therefore, kept on good terms with the French. There are various letters in this work expressing much exultation at their success. But as we know nothing of the writers, we cannot judge how far they are indications of a general feeling, or whether principle or party feeling was the cause of their rejoicing at the humiliation of Rome. The editor is indignant at the difficulties which the Pope threw in the way of the French, and takes occasion to admire the 'enlightened courage' with which Bonaparte opposed his duplicity. We are at a loss to conceive, how any enlightened man can feel the least sympathy with this selfish and unfeeling plunderer. We should as soon think of being incensed at the evasions practised by a poor householder to escape the exactions of a robber, or of praising the highwayman's 'unwillingness to injure one, who had been guilty of so much towards him.' In such a conflict, our sympathy is all for the weaker party. The Pope and Bonaparte were equal friends to freedom; and how does it happen that so many friends of liberty persist in identifying their sacred cause with the fortunes of this adventurer, when the height to which he rose has left a lasting reproach on the tendency of freedom, by showing that it may lead to a worse tyranny than it overthrows?

In the troubles which followed the French invasion of Italy, Ricci was imprisoned, and prevailed upon to sign a recantation in a moment of weakness. At this we are not surprised; for it is evident that his character was naturally gentle, and moreover that he fully believed in the faith of Rome while he made war upon its abuses. We have even a story of his having been healed from a lameness, by applying an image to the part diseased; and this seems to show that a man may be a thorough

Catholic, and yet have an eye to discover, and a heart to condemn, the practical corruptions of his religion.

If we may judge from various indications, there is great alarm at the increase of the Roman Catholics in our country. It certainly is rapid beyond that of many other sects; and after giving them credit for the zeal of their missionaries, is not easily accounted for. The facts are to be found in Mr Ingersoll's well known Discourse, delivered in 1824. From him we learn that the mission in 1790, laid the foundation of a church, which now extends from Damariscotta in Maine, to St Augustine in Florida, under the care of one metropolitan, and ten bishops. They abound in means of education. There are two seminaries in Kentucky, one in Missouri, another in New Orleans, where also they have a Lancastrian school. In Baltimore there is a Catholic seminary and college, and two charity schools; a college in the district of Columbia, and two charity schools; a seminary at Emmitsburg, and a free school and orphan's asylum in Philadelphia. Even the order of Jesuits has been revived in this country. It was formally organized by a papal bull fifteen years ago, and the college, under the direction of these emissaries, was incorporated as a university by the Congress of the United States. We do not mention the numerous convents, which are generally places of education; and we only add that the increase of Catholics in the city of New York, was from three hundred to twenty thousand in twenty years. Since Mr Ingersoll's statement was made, they have made greater exertions than ever, and those who see nothing but evil in this marvellous growth, have really cause for alarm, which will not probably be lessened by accounts of their increase in England in the same space of time.

After in this country making large allowances for Catholic immigrations, we know not how to explain this circumstance, except by their standing before the public in the light of an injured party, not oppressed by power, but by public opinion. This has created a natural sympathy in their favor, and they, like all who feel themselves wronged, have taken advantage of this sympathy, with a zeal and enterprise which more prosperous sects can neither feel nor understand. This has made republican America a friendly soil to this strange vine, which readily adapts itself to any soil in which it is to grow. Whoever has heard of the licentiousness of their priesthood and the indifference of their worshippers, if he goes into one of their chapels, sees a large portion of the audience to appearance rapt in the

most intense devotion. If he watches their priests, he finds them busy in works of charity and instruction; and if he believes that they have been misrepresented, he becomes their advocate till he is almost of their number. He asks if they retain the principles for which they have been persecuted, and finds that they utterly deny them; that they keep faith with heretics and do not abridge their allegiance to the civil power. If he upbraids them with the absurdity of transubstantiation, they tell him that most Protestant churches deny the authority of reason in matters of faith, and ask him if the words, 'This is my body,' are not, if reason be set aside, explicit and unanswerable. If he charges them with usurping the prerogative of God in giving absolution, they show him a similar pretension in a passage of the English prayer-book, which the American church has rejected. If he tells them that they claim infallibility, they ask him if his own church does not claim the same right on the same foundation, when it drives Unitarians from its table. They show him, if he speaks of doctrine, that they agree with his own church in receiving the Athanasian trinity and Augustin's doctrines of grace. They show him, that there is no difference, except in name, between prohibiting the scriptures, and prohibiting their meaning, and that his own church, Protestant as it is, treats its heretics with all the rigor which the age and country will allow; and they challenge him to name the country under Catholic influence, in which Protestants have not enjoyed more liberty since the Reformation, than the Catholics in the British Empire. In short, he finds them retrieving the character which they lost in former times, and his natural sympathy in their favor, is sustained by every appearance of zeal and sincerity on their part. He sees that there are multitudes in our cities, who must worship God in this way or none, and he will not deprive them of the influence of religion through his dread of its corruptions. Suggestions of this kind have cased them in defensive armour, and they have improved their advantage, with that spirit which promises success to any party.

Education will be the main instrument of their success. They will give impressions favorable to their ancient religion, blended with liberal instruction; and as simplicity has no charm to the young, their imposing ritual, sanctified by many venerable associations, will seem more commanding than any purer forms. But to be impressed with the Catholic service, is a different

thing from adopting its doctrines and errors, and after a time, without giving up their faith, they may transfer their interest and affections to the portion of truth which is found in this faith as well as every other, though now they 'see not the bright light that is in the clouds.'

That the Catholics can ever grow into a powerful party, without giving up all except their nominal distinctions, is unlikely as possible. They now grow by their weakness; they are purified by their exclusion from power. We have the same abhorrence of Popery with others, but we confess that what Hoadly calls Protestant Popery, is all that we see reason to dread. It is far from impossible, that a party may arise with a spirit and power like those of the Catholics in ages past, suited to the changes which time has made. Not that we suppose that any such plan is formed, more than in other cases of successful usurpation, in which the designs grow with the means of their fulfilment. But such a party might be formed, by a great coalition of sects, which agree in little beside their common hatred to some other party; by organizing large social institutions, which shall keep their envoys continually moving up and down in the land; by making every church a strong-hold, from whose embrasures the spiritual thunder shall pour, on the least sign of disaffection; by gradually preparing men to submit to the discipline, and wear the livery of a system. Though we say again we do not believe any such design to be in contemplation, it seems to us that such a party might arise, claiming all the infallibility of Rome, showing equal hatred to heretics, and making itself felt in every private dwelling and legislative hall of the country, with a power that would cause every heart to tremble; and though the progress of truth would be too mighty for it at last, it might take ages to break it down.

But there may be a question, what bearing will the success of the Roman Catholics have on the influence of truth. We have no hesitation in saying, that, as the light of knowledge shines brighter, the influence of truth will spread, let their numbers increase as they will. We never expected to see the various sects renouncing their opinions at once. In such a case, we should fear, that, as individuals too often do, they might throw off all religious feeling. We no more expect the Catholic to give up his church than to pull down his cathedrals; nor do we expect that the great body of the Calvinists will give

up the name of their doctrines, till long after they have ceased to believe them. If their great master could return from the grave, dire would be his wrath at seeing them give up, one after another, the most expressive features of their system ; and the Popes of past ages, could they look in upon their descendants, would regard the Church in Protestant countries, as hardly less heretical than those without its bounds. This assimilating process is constantly going on ; and there is reason to hope that at last nothing but names will remain to divide the christian world. Then all shall be, not of one sect or party, but of one heart and one soul. All shall hold lightly the points that separate them, and hold fast that which is good ; for that which is good is truth—the same in every party, the same in every breast.

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- ART. II.—1. *American Popular Lessons, chiefly selected from the Writings of Mrs Barbauld, Miss Edgeworth, and other approved Authors. Designed particularly for the Younger Classes of Children in Schools.* New York. R. Lockwood. 1828. 18mo. pp. 254.
2. *Sequel to American Popular Lessons, intended for the Use of Schools.* By the Author of American Popular Lessons. New York. Collins & Hanney. 1827. 18mo. pp. 376.
3. *Poetry for Schools ; designed for Reading and Recitation. The whole Selected from the best Poets in the English Language.* By the Author of American Popular Lessons. New York. White, Gallaher, & White. 1828. 12mo. pp. 396.
4. *Primary Dictionary : or, Rational Vocabulary : consisting of nearly four thousand Words, adapted to the Comprehension of Children, and designed for the Younger Classes in Schools.* By the Author of American Popular Lessons. New York. White, Gallaher, & White. 1828. 18mo. pp. 257.

WE have placed the names of so many schoolbooks at the head of our article, because they were all prepared by the same person, and, in our opinion, have all great and similar merits.

The American Popular Lessons, the first on the list, has been for some years before the public, and has obtained great and well deserved popularity. It is intended as a book to be read aloud by young children in schools, and appears to be free from the defects most common in such publications, especially those which preceded it.

In many volumes intended for the same purpose, the style, the thoughts, and the subjects, in many places, are not well adapted to the comprehension of children; and sufficient attention is not paid to selecting such passages as will interest them and fix their attention. We do not assert that these faults are universal, or even that they pervade throughout every part of any one work of this kind, but merely that they are common. We fear that children, in reading aloud what they do not understand, or what does not interest them, are likely to acquire a very monotonous and mechanical mode of reading, measuring off the clauses of sentences with regular cadences, without much regard to their meaning, and to fall into an incorrect manner of emphasis. If these bad habits ceased with early youth, the evil would be comparatively unimportant. But does it not often happen that they continue in maturer age? And may not the multitude of bad readers among well educated people, be ascribed in some measure to their reading aloud when very young, words to which they attached little or no meaning? Is there not also reason to believe, that the practice of reading what is not understood, may produce an almost incurable habit of letting the eye run over words without attending to the sense conveyed by them?

The American Popular Lessons consists of little stories, chiefly selected from Miss Edgeworth and Evenings at Home, hymns from Mrs Barbauld, scripture lessons, information on some common subjects, as salt, bread, the senses, alkali, &c., accounts of several animals, and of the inhabitants of different countries, illustrated with cuts. Most of the selections, as well as the original matter, are well adapted to the taste and comprehension of the class of learners for whom the work is designed. Wherever any words are used which it is supposed will not be understood, explanations are given. It seems to have been the aim of the compiler that children should not be suffered to rest content, as they too often do, with vague and indistinct notions of the meaning of words and phrases which they meet with. From the manner in which the explanations

are here given, they will acquire the habit of attending to what they read, and of endeavouring to obtain clear and distinct ideas on the subjects to which they are introduced, so that a child, after going through this volume, would be better fitted to read any other common book understandingly. As a specimen of the mode in which the explanations are made, we select the following, almost at random. They seem to us remarkable for their simplicity and clearness.

‘*Instrument*—a tool. A knife is an instrument.

‘When God made living creatures, he gave them particular parts, for certain uses. He gave them *legs*, to move with; *eyes*, to see with;—these are called *organs*.

‘*Organ*—is an instrument fitted by God, for the use of his creatures. The ear is the organ of hearing. Plants have organs. The root is fixed in the ground, that it may draw food for the plant from the ground. If a child is kept a few days without food, he dies. If a plant be pulled from the ground by the root, it withers and dies also. The root is the organ which conveys food to the whole plant; as our mouths convey food to our bodies.

‘Take a stone; look at every part of it; all its parts are alike; it has no organs, no eyes, nor root; it is not an organized being.

‘*Organization*—the manner in which organs are placed, and fitted to one another.

‘A fly has six legs; a fish has no legs. These two creatures have a different *organization*.

‘*Respire*—to breathe.

‘*Respiration*—breathing.

‘The lungs are the organs of respiration. The lungs draw in, and throw out the air constantly; if any thing prevents us from breathing, we must die. When a man is drowned, water fills his lungs instead of air, and he dies. To take in the air is, to *inhale* it; to throw out the air is, to *exhale* it.’ p. 73.

This passage contains an error in stating that water fills the lungs when a man is drowned. No water gets into the lungs in drowning, as is well known to physiologists. We notice this mistake, not as detracting from the general merits of the work, but merely in the hope that it will be corrected in any future edition.

It is but justice to the compiler to give her own views with regard to her book.

‘It is, as other works of its character announce themselves to be, a book of agreeable narrative, rational piety, and correct moral sentiment. The subject of moral sentiment has little

application to children. Good examples are the only morality which children can understand and imitate. Infant innocence, and infant intellects, can early learn that it is a duty and a pleasure, for children and friends to "love one another;" but the mind cannot be strained to a moral conception of virtues beyond its experience, till it has acquired a knowledge of those relations that create obligations, and those passions that are the sources of virtue and vice. The most striking morality of this little book, will be found in the pleasure and the praise enjoyed by good children.

'The religion it contains is that of the beneficent Father, and the merciful Saviour—of him who is the God of children, who "is about our bed, and about our path, and who is not far from every one of us"—of Jesus, who took little children in his arms and blessed them.

'It is also a book of clear definition. What extreme simplicity, explicitness, and slowness of procedure, is essential to clear explanation, is only obvious to such persons as can measure the operations of mind very accurately, and who keep constantly in view the great disparity there is between the dawn and the noon of reason. The slowness and stupidity of children, is only the complaint of superficial thinkers; those who are skilled in human nature must constantly admire the natural progress of intellect, when they consider that it starts from absolute ignorance, and in such short time attains to so many facts, ideas, and words.

'Always bearing in mind this primitive ignorance, the publisher of this book has constantly referred her explanations to it, but always in connexion with that accumulation and developement which is operating in the infant mind. She has heard persons ridicule the simple beginning of Harry and Lucy; "Harry was brother to Lucy, and Lucy was sister to Harry."—"Every child must know that," is the sensible commentary made upon it, by critics without thought. There must be a time in every child's life when he did not know it, and if he must understand this reciprocal relation before he could learn to read, he likes best to read what he knows, and he will enjoy what is new because it is connected with what is familiar to his mind, and which serves as a pledge of the truth and importance of his more recent acquirements.' —

'It is designed for the younger classes of learners in schools—the writer hopes it may be adopted. She is certain it will introduce new ideas to children, and give them pleasure. If they do not derive from it, the triumph which elates little hearts, when the memory has mastered all the syllables of "Phar-ma-co-pœ-ia," and "Het-er-o-ge-ne-ous," and the best speller has won the medal—they will have the gratification to discover, that hard words

mean common things; that "anatomy" is the history of their own bodies; and "metaphysics" of their own minds; that "fermentation" means the rising of the bread; and "alkali" is the pearl-ash that softens the water, and sweetens the milk.

'In every lesson they will recognise some agreeable truth, will ascertain some new fact, or be led to some new association, and extended train of thought.

'The style of this book is liable to some objection. Almost every part of it has been written anew, has been altered from one local application to another, has been levelled to one period of improvement. The language adopted is so extremely simple, that a reader of mature age might infer that the whole was the production of a child. Important truths seem in this dress to lose their dignity and elegance; but this familiar style, these ungraceful repetitions, are necessary in the first attempts to convey instruction. The greatest difficulty of the duty is to practise the accommodation. The author's own experience has taught her the necessity, and she would not hesitate to ensure the pleasure of being useful, by a manner of writing which must take from her the praise of talents, rather than to obtain that praise, unaccompanied by such a result, even were it in her power.

'This necessary phraseology has frequently been borrowed from children themselves; the stories have been read to children to ascertain if they interested them. Sir Joshua Reynolds showed his pictures to children, that their natural emotions might satisfy him of the fidelity of his own representations. Miss Edgeworth read parts of her strictures to children, in order to learn, if her inferences agreed with their experience. Such examples, followed at the remotest distance, are an apology.' pp. xii.—xiv.

We are surprised that the compiler should have thought an apology necessary for the style. The honest simplicity of the style in this volume, is always attractive to young children, and forms one of the greatest merits of the work.

The Sequel to Popular Lessons, is intended as a reading book for children whose minds are a little more matured than those for whom the previous volume was prepared. It consists chiefly of historical accounts of the Jews, the Greeks, and the Romans, sketches of the manners and customs of different countries and ages, and a few biographies of distinguished persons, with occasional illustrations and explanations. The following are the remarks of the author on the plan which she has adopted in this work.

‘What is commonly called History—the detail of wars and political negotiations, is not readily comprehended by children; but the religious observances, domestic manners, public amusements, and eminent individuals of all countries, afford lessons which are intelligible to them. I have endeavoured to select from Jewish, Grecian, and Roman history, such traits of character as shall serve to illustrate the history of the respective nations to which they relate, when the matured minds of those for whom this book is designed, shall enjoy better writers than the compend makers; and I hope I have made the triumph of mind and of true virtue over mere physical force, the apparent, as it is the true glory of human nature. For individual examples I have not celebrated any military heroes. Disinterested benevolent characters, as Socrates, Alfred, and Penn—young persons memorable for industry, accomplishments, and amiable dispositions, appear to me to be proper objects of admiration, as well as of imitation. Such are the models which I have set before my young readers.

‘I have endeavoured always to exhibit national character in some edifying aspect; or to present sensible and agreeable images, avoiding prolix moralizing and all disputed questions about the origin of states and of arts. To detect the fallacies of history, to balance the probability of inconsistent authorities, is out of my power, and not necessary to my purpose. Who founded Rome, or who invented letters, are facts involved in the obscurity of fable, and are of no real importance to be known—but the civilisation of a great empire and its influences upon succeeding times, and the results of that art which perpetuates and exalts all other arts, may be retraced with good effects to any mind that is training to just views of human power and human dignity.’ p. ix.

The plan of these lessons is excellent, and it is generally executed with judgment. Much of the volume can scarcely fail to interest young readers. Among those parts which struck us as best adapted for them, are the following articles;—Sparta, Olympic Games, Oracles, Socrates, Chivalry, Alfred, Penn, and Prince Henry—the son of James I., and some passages relating to the Romans. Some portions of the book may perhaps be thought needlessly dry and repulsive, approaching too nearly to chronological tables. Parts of the Old Testament history seem liable to this objection. This fault appears to have arisen from an anxious attempt to condense a great quantity of historical information into a small compass. But the mere skeleton of history, deprived of all flesh, life, and color, however interesting and useful it may be to the philosophic inquirer, is unattractive and unedifying to youthful minds. We

do not mean to imply that this fault is very common in the volume. On the contrary, we think that the author has generally been very happy in her selection of subjects and her manner of treating them; and that the work contains a great amount of useful information, which is, on the whole, well calculated to inspire in young readers a fondness for historical studies. The pieces of poetry, too, which are interspersed through the volume, are selected with taste, and really illustrate the subjects and impress them on the reader's mind. We notice, also, with great satisfaction, both in this and the other works of the author, not only a general and pervading correctness of moral and religious sentiments, but a scrupulous care in introducing them in such a manner as will produce a good moral impression, and in preventing any erroneous opinions on these subjects from being hastily imbibed. Thus some of those actions of distinguished men, which in common history are too often passed over without observation, or even accompanied with praise, are here examined, and shown to be deserving of reprobation and inconsistent with true morality; and the reader is cautioned against being dazzled by the splendor of great names. All this, too, is done without any cant or affectation, upon the occasions and in the mode most likely to fix the attention of the pupil.

The *Poetry for Schools*, which follows next in order, is a work somewhat different in its plan from any which we recollect. It first explains the nature of poetry, and the different kinds of poems, of which specimens are given; then figures of speech and their different sorts, also illustrated by specimens. After this follows a brief history of English poetry. This is succeeded by biographical sketches of distinguished English poets, with selections from their works; and notices of some of the Greek poets, with extracts from the best translations. The poetry is accompanied by explanations and historical illustrations. In the Introduction, the compiler states her views and objects in the selection.

‘All that is new to a pupil stands in need of illustration, for without it his mind is rather overburthened than enriched by his acquirements. Oral instruction may furnish an enlightened commentary upon what is contained in school-books; still it would diminish the labour of instruction if school-books themselves should not only afford the principal matter of instruction, but lead the

young to inquiry, and supply the helps which the understanding requires in order to make the finest writers intelligible, and it appears to me that ordinary school-books are wholly deficient in this respect.'——

'The greater part of young persons do not love literature, because they do not understand it—do not *begin at the beginning*. In our common schools we make our children read disputes upon the comparative excellence of Reason and Revelation,* and require them to recite Pope's Messiah, the Dialogue between Brutus and Cassius, and a multitude more of difficult passages from the poets. I never knew a boy who could explain the first lines of the Messiah, or who could tell the matter of dispute between the complotters of Cæsar's death—and only because boys are not instructed in elementary facts in relation to those pieces, or any others of this character. How repugnant this mode of cultivating literary taste is to some highly endowed minds, is happily expressed by Lord Byron.

“—— I abhor'd
Too much, to conquer for the poet's sake,
The drill'd dull lesson, forced down word by word
In my repugnant youth, with pleasure to record
“Aught that recalls the daily drug which turn'd
My sickening memory; and, though Time hath taught
My mind to meditate what then it learn'd,
Yet such the fixed inveteracy wrought
By the impatience of my early thought,
That, with the freshness wearing out before
My mind could relish what it might have sought,
If free to choose, I cannot now restore
Its health; but what it then detested, still abhor.”

'In a note upon these lines this high authority expresses all that I would say upon this subject.

“‘I wish,’ says Lord Byron, “to express that we become tired of the task before we can comprehend the beauty; that we learn by rote before we can get by heart; that the freshness is worn away, and the future pleasure and advantage deadened and destroyed, by the didactic anticipation, at an age when we can neither feel nor understand the power of compositions which it requires an acquaintance with life, as well as Latin and Greek, to relish or to reason upon. For the same reason we never can be aware of the fulness of some of the finest passages of Shakspeare, (‘To be or not to be,’ for instance,) from the habit of having them hammered into us at eight years old, as an exercise, not of mind but of memory: so that when we are old enough to enjoy them, the taste is gone, and the appetite palled. In some parts of the Continent,

* ‘See English Reader, Dialogue between Locke and Bayle.’

young persons are taught from more common authors, and do not read the best classics till their maturity."

'In conformity to these views, and my own experience in relation to education, I have endeavoured to prepare a school-book; and in order to compose it, I resorted to the purest fountains of English verse, and took what I found suitable to my humble purpose. I left the more elevated and sublime portions of the poets who supplied me, and appropriated to my selection such passages only as I believed would, with a little exposition, be useful and agreeable to young readers. As a bird does not lead her new-fledged offspring to the skies in her first flight with them, so I would dictate short excursions to the unformed faculties of the human mind, that young readers, feeling their own power and felicity as they proceed, may at length be able and willing, without assistance, to ascend "the brightest heaven of invention."

'In the modes of education in present fashion, civil and political history is presented to young minds at an early period of study, but literary history—the peaceful influence of mind upon mind—is wholly neglected; and those who are initiated in the most remarkable passages of Shakspeare, Milton, and other great authors, are taught nothing at school of these memorable men and their contemporaries. It is a debt that posterity owes to genius, to attach the memory of the man to his works, and to keep him and his contemporaries in the view of succeeding ages. I had only sufficient space simply to introduce authors and their relations to contemporary society, but I intended to suggest this relation, to awaken inquiry, to give my readers some acquaintance with the history of English poets and poetry, and also to show them the relations of English poetry to the rest of their intellectual pursuits. I hope my purpose will be effected, and that Poetry for Schools will be acceptable to teachers and pupils.' pp. v.—x.

The course which the compiler pursues in this volume is judicious. It increases very much the pleasure of reading a poem to know the character of the person who wrote it, when he lived, and on what occasion it was written, and to understand all the allusions which it contains to men, customs, and events. Our author has usually been successful in giving such sort of information as young persons would be likely to wish for. The biographical sketches of the poets, though more brief than we could have desired, are yet sufficient to increase the reader's interest in their poetry. The historical illustrations discover extensive reading, and sometimes give a vivid effect to lives, which, without them, would seem dull and obscure. The explanations are generally of those passages which require explanation, not, as is too often the case with commen-

tators, of such as are perfectly intelligible without any remarks. These explanations ought, perhaps, to have been more numerous, but we are not inclined to complain, where so much has been well done, that everything is not accomplished.

The principle of selection adopted by the compiler, seems to us correct, and she has usually applied it with judgment. Most, if not all the pieces of poetry which are introduced, are such as can readily be made intelligible and interesting to young persons. She extracts more copiously from Sir Walter Scott than from any other writer ; and in this we believe that she is right, for the works of no other poet contain so many passages which are sure to command the attention of readers of all ages.

It seems to us a fault, as we have already intimated, in many of the selections for reading and recitation in schools, that the compilers have regarded their own taste, rather than the capacity and acquirements of those for whom their volumes are designed. Nor is this fault confined to books intended for the younger classes only. It is, perhaps, even more striking in selections made for those more advanced. We say this with some diffidence, as we are aware that our opinion is in opposition to the practice of persons whose judgment on most occasions is deserving of confidence. Thus, we often find these volumes abounding in extracts full of high wrought eloquence, powerful reasoning, glowing imagery, and deep sentiment, on subjects entirely remote from the experience, studies, pursuits, and conversation of the young. Boys of the age at which they often begin to use these extracts, can scarcely be made to enter thoroughly into their spirit. The boy has, no doubt, some obscure notion of the meaning of the sentences, and of the general design of the performance which he is reading or reciting ; but the happy allusions, the rich figurative diction, the felicities of style, the imagination, and the energy of passion, are in a great degree lost on him. How can he be expected to comprehend poetry which has a perpetual reference to the mythology of Greece, the history of Greece, Rome, and England, the biography of individuals distinguished in different parts of the world ? How can he be expected to take a lively interest in philosophical criticism, ethics, and metaphysics, or even eloquence, when it is exercised on subjects with which he is entirely unacquainted ? The objections to many pieces might undoubtedly be removed by suitable comments and illustrations. But in most collections for the use of schools

the manner in which the extracts are made, increases the difficulty of understanding them. They are torn rudely from the middle of an oration, poem, or other work, without a single word of introduction or explanation. If a speech, the boy who is to recite it, is not informed in his book, on what occasion it was delivered, nor what result it produced. Of the orator who spoke it he finds nothing but the name. His country, perhaps, he knows, but has nothing which tells him of the points of its history and statistics, or the circumstances in the lives of the speaker and his cotemporaries, with which the speech supposes him to be acquainted, and which are absolutely necessary to its thorough comprehension.

The first two pages of this volume, on the Nature of Poetry, as it is headed, seem to us not to be prepared with the author's usual felicity. This portion of the work is deficient both in simplicity and directness, and might, like the rhetorical introductions in fashion among the ancients, have been placed at the beginning of almost any other work, with equal propriety. We are afraid that it will not afford pleasure to young persons, but rather give them a distaste for the book. It is a bad omen to stumble at the threshold.

There are a few errors in this volume, generally of no great importance. We notice one or two, not as implying any great negligence on the part of the compiler, but in order that they may be corrected in any future edition. On page 218, it is stated that Pope received from Lintot, the bookseller, for his translation of the *Iliad*, '£ 5320, more than \$ 18,000 of our American money.' There must be some mistake in the figures here; for £ 5320 sterling is at the par of exchange \$ 23,644.44.

The explanation of the following lines, addressed by Henry IV. to his son, seems to us not quite satisfactory.

'What in me was *purchased*,
Falls upon thee in a more fairer sort;
So thou the garland wear'st successively.'

'*What in me was purchas'd, &c.*—The royal dignity which I possess was obtained by artifice—it is not my *right*, and I have held it precariously, and in fear. *Thou the garland wear'st successively.*—The crown devolves to thee from thy father—thy *hereditary right* is established, and thou art secure in it.' p. 83.

This explanation does not advert to the technical meaning of the word *purchased*, to which Shakspeare no doubt alluded.

The following extract from Blackstone explains this meaning. 'Purchase, *perquisitio*, taken in its largest and most extensive sense, is thus defined by Littleton: The possession of lands and tenements which a man hath by his own act or agreement, and not by descent from any of his ancestors or kindred. In this sense it is contradistinguished from acquisition by right of blood; and includes every other method of coming to an estate, but merely that by inheritance, wherein the title is vested in a person, not by his own act or agreement, but by the single operation of law.' A reference to this legal meaning of the word *purchased*, renders the passage in Shakspeare clear and pointed.

It is a defect in this volume that it contains no table of contents.

The Primary Dictionary consists of explanations of words in common use, in language adapted to children.

'This vocabulary, in its selection and arrangement, has been taken from an English publication well suited to its purpose, called the MOTHER'S DICTIONARY. The definitions are either original in their form, or carefully revised; and though adapted in simplicity of expression to the language of the young, they are intended to convey to them just and new ideas in words that are in good use, and of proper authority.

'Spelling-books and Dictionaries now in use, may, to many teachers, seem sufficient for all purposes of orthography, and all necessary aid to literary composition which can be thus derived—but there are parents and preceptors who are accustomed to be constantly appealed to for plain and familiar expositions of words which are new, and not of obvious meaning to their pupils, who will be glad of a book which is quite comprehensible, and properly introductory to more ample and systematic vocabularies—to those which serve for ultimate standards, and which are asserted to contain all our primitive terms, and their modifications.

'To advance, without oppressing the infant mind, has been the design of all the publications I have offered to those engaged in education; and to make those publications illustrative of others in very common use, but somewhat difficult for beginners to comprehend, has seemed to me to be supplying so many steps that were deficient in the artificial helps furnished to the natural ascent of mind.

'It is an almost universal custom in schools to give children daily a certain number of words, with definitions annexed, to be committed to memory. I have not found any efficacy in this

practice ; and I must agree with Miss Edgeworth, that words without application, and of significations wholly remote from the possible knowledge of children, when thus forced upon the memory, rather make a mystery, or dead letter of language, than furnish an instrument which serves to express what is known, and to acquire what is unknown. I know not of what utility it can be for a child to repeat, "Metaphysics, the doctrine of the general affections of existing substances," and other such abstractions—but I believe that a selection from Dictionaries, of words corresponding to early requirements of the understanding, and intelligibly explained, may be useful to children.' pp. iv., v.

We have no doubt that a dictionary of this kind would be a convenient assistant to mothers and teachers, if tolerably well made. In the volume before us, as far as we have examined it—for we will not pretend to have read a dictionary through—the definitions or explanations seem well adapted to the capacity of young children, though from the explanations given in the Popular Lessons we should think that the present editor would have in some cases given better definitions, if she had not followed the English work. Some, perhaps, will think the vocabulary might have been more copious, and no doubt some words are omitted which it would have been better to insert ; but in general the selection of words appears to us judicious. As a specimen of the work we insert a part of the first page.

'A-ban-don. Abandon, to leave or go away from. An *abandoned* man or woman, means a very wicked man or woman.

'A-bate. Abate, to make or become less : the storm *abates* when it begins to be less severe.

'Ab-bre-vi-ate. Abbreviate, to shorten : Tom. is an *abbreviation* of Thomas ; *one o'clock*, is an abbreviation of the phrase, *it is one hour of the clock*.

'A-bet. Abet, to help or encourage a person to do any thing.

'Ab-hor. Abhor, to hate, to dislike very much indeed : as, "*God abhors liars.*"'

We have noticed these little works, because we think that they are likely to render good service to the cause of education. They all bear evidence that their author is familiar with education both theoretically and practically ; that she has just ideas of its objects, and of the modes in which these objects are to be attained. In all her books it has been her aim to suit the instruction to the intellectual advancement of the pupil ; to adapt the nourishment supplied, to the progressive state of

the mind. Large parts of the Sequel to Popular Lessons and the Poetry for Schools, are original. Both of these works, as well as the Popular Lessons, are new in plan and arrangement, requiring far greater labor and thought in preparing them, than most reading books, which are composed entirely of extracts.

ART. III.—*A Sermon preached in the Cathedral Church of St Paul, on Thursday, May 8th, 1828, at the Festival of the Sons of the Clergy.* By the REV. PHILIP N. SHUTTLEWORTH, D.D., Warden of New College, Oxford. London. Rivington, 1828.

WHEN measures were first proposed in Great Britain for the extensive diffusion of education, and the establishing of a university in London, it is known that a class of men, strenuously attached to the hierarchy, took an alarm, chiefly on the ground that the proposed scientific institutions were to be conducted without any express connexion with the established religion of the empire. Of this number was the dignified author of the discourse prefixed to this article.

In discussing the question, he is distinguished from some of his coadjutors, by a commendable liberality, which limits his objections very far within the range to which his party thought they might safely be carried.

It is not our intention to follow the learned prelate through the course of his remarks, many of which, though ingeniously advanced, and some of them unquestionably in theory true, are not calculated for the meridian of our society. Least of all should we be willing to lend our support to the opponents of a system, calculated, from the moment of its introduction on the great theatre where now it is exhibited, to promote the best interests of mankind. We feel too much partiality for it, as one of the progeny of our own country; and we think we might claim for our ancestors and our countrymen, some share of the ample honors which decorate the names of those by whom it has been chiefly promoted. For what is that grand scheme of education, which has immortalized Mr Brougham and his compeers, but our well established New England notions in this particular, acted out with great display, but not at

more cost to the wealthiest contributors, than, on a comparison of means, is voluntarily paid by every farmer in our country?

But this improvement in the intellectual, and we trust, moral character of a generation, is brought about by the force of public opinion. In a government, less free than our own, that invisible but controlling agent, with suitable direction, has had power to introduce an element that may materially affect the existence of the nation, and most certainly the condition of the millions subject to its sway. We have thought, therefore, that it might be well to direct our attention to the power which it exercises here, and especially to its influence on the moral character of our community.

Every community *has* a moral character, as determinate and certain as that of an individual. There is a pervading sentiment, difficult perhaps to analyze, but easy to understand, which is perceptible in all its affairs. It is seen in constitutions and laws, in manners and customs, in habits of intercourse, in the fashions even of dress, equipage, and amusement.

This general character extends into all the departments of public and private life. It gives not merely a color, but vitality to society. It creates an atmosphere which all must inhale, and which, combining with other elements, invigorates the system, or destroys it.

The character of a community is necessarily derived from that of its constituent parts, and yet, by a reciprocal operation, it essentially contributes to the formation of the manners and principles of those from whom it is obtained. The proposition is not, indeed, without its exceptions. In a society notoriously dissolute, there may possibly be found as many righteous men as would have saved the city of Gomorrah, and in the best regulated commonwealth, vice will have its votaries, and profligacy its open or secret places of indulgence. But the power of example is pervading and effective, and vastly great when it is the example of numbers. A solitary individual may be seen to be admired or detested. Still, even with the aid of wealth, or rank, or education, his influence is necessarily limited. But when his circle of operation is extended, and numbers are embraced in it, and they in their turn extend their influence over others, who repeat it again to others beyond them, there grows up a force either for good or for ill, which, wherever it may be, but especially under our free institutions, it is always difficult and soon becomes impossible to resist.

Resistance, indeed, is out of the question. There is no such thing. There is no counteracting power with the means or desire of resistance. The state of things may change, but it changes as the wind does, by the operation of causes which philosophy has not yet been able to ascertain.

The character of the community, of the times, of the age, is, in our opinion, one of the most efficient causes of individual character. It diminishes temptation, if it does not banish it; or it spreads allurements, which make shipwreck of virtue. It is the strong current, on which all are borne with a force not easily to be counteracted.

The connexion between the general character of a people and their prosperity, is no longer a debatable question. Christians of all sects acknowledge the universality of the truth, that righteousness exalteth a nation, and that sin is the reproach of any people; and such an admission adds motives of patriotism to those of piety, to exalt the moral condition of the state to which we belong, and the age in which we live. Nor is it by any means doubtful, that the strongest influences upon general character, proceed from the government. To the weight of personal example, is added the artificial consequence of place, authority, and distinction. The temptations which beset a throne, and surround an hereditary nobility, are with us at least, supposed to be too strong for human virtue; and we, therefore, who live under more popular institutions, build an argument upon these temptations, in our own opinion irresistible, in favor of a republican government. But there is a government here too, which has as much need to guard itself from corruption, as the more lordly and wealthier potentates of other countries. There is a sovereignty here, as effectual in its operation on good manners and good morals as the most arbitrary monarchy of Europe. This sovereignty, whose will and whose power is here uncontrolable, is not merely by the theory of our constitution, but by practice and with power, in the people themselves. They are the permanent and immovable government of the nation, and if they become demoralized, the consequence is universal and irremediable ruin.

In other governments, even the most despotic, there is some limitation to the exercise of power. A dissolute king, or a profligate nobility, may, to be sure, do a great deal of mischief; but its extent is controlled by a resistance greater or less in the nation, which sometimes throws off its allegiance and establish-

es a better dynasty. But neither rebellion nor revolution can purify the government of a republic. The people are that government, and when their integrity is broken, it is not merely the overthrow of a constitution which ensues, but the dissolution of the nation itself.

A republican government is only another name for the government of public opinion. This it is that regulates everything. There is no political power of any comparative force. The law is only the authoritative declaration of its will ; and those imperfect obligations, of which the law takes no notice, but which indicate the character, and essentially affect the happiness of society, are under its entire control. Public opinion, thus powerful and extensive, does not submit to artificial authority. It is as free as it is universal. There are no privileged classes to impose peculiar sentiments, no hereditary rank to impress its own consequence on the community, and, by its own uniformity of interest and consequently of sentiment, to preserve the opinion of the community from rapid or frequent alteration. There is no aristocracy of wealth, and the favorites of fortune are too often changed to admit of any common sentiments that may not be as fluctuating as its gifts. Neither education nor talents have any title to command. The influence they acquire, is in individual cases of great amount and great service ; but the *corps* has neither hereditary succession, nor often mutual confidence, and if it is not as frequently that genius and learning make war with virtue as that they combat on her side, it is too frequently that they pay their devotions to false deities, or kindle strange fires on the altar of the true God. Every man feels his personal independence of thought, and of word, and of action, and does his part to make it known ; and the general result, produced by the common contributions of all, can only be favorable to the high interests of mankind, when there is a quickening sense, by each, of his own responsibility.

We have been told, and told wisely, that the political liberty of which we boast, is under the care of the people. They are its guardians. The institutions, by which they have surrounded it, can afford no protection against themselves ; for the power, which raised these institutions, can shake them like an earthquake. The only safeguard for the blessings of public liberty, is, under God, in the hearts of those who enjoy it. This is much more true of public morals and public manners.

What they ought to be, rests on eternal principles ; what they are or shall be, on public opinion. Now they are pure, because their value is distinctly understood, and there is taste enough to perceive their beauties and to preserve them. By and by, there may be licentious innovations to corrupt and debase them.

There are with us none of those mounds and dikes and breakwaters, which elsewhere have been raised to check the surges of public opinion, to stem its force, or change its direction. If the storm comes and beats against our house, it will fall. We have trusted our security, not to a resistance that may control the elements, but to the preservation of that calm atmosphere, which shall prevent their angry agitation.

But is our duty less or more? If we have trusted our protection to our own exertions, are they not to be made? Are we not to see, that defences, which we have not erected, may never be wanted, and, as we cannot withstand the current of corruption by any force at our own command, if it should unfortunately direct its course to our borders, are we not the more earnestly to endeavour that the springs and head waters of the stream shall never accumulate, and that the little rivulets that here and there appear, shall never be permitted to come together?

A correct state of public opinion, then, we hold to be, under our forms of government, the most important, and, in truth, the only means of security for all that is valuable in our political society. This state, too, is in our judgment to be acquired only by the cultivation of mind. It is the result of the good sense of the community, of the whole community. Good men and great men may operate upon it and influence its will. But their power is not at all by authority, and very little by persuasion. It is chiefly the power of conviction. The public mind must be enlightened to understand, and cultivated to prefer, what is upright and honest and honorable, so that all voluntary efforts may be united in advancing the highest moral and political happiness.

We rejoice that it is so ; and we gain confidence in our views, because we are satisfied that the moral condition of man, and especially of man under the favorable conditions of our civil and religious communities, has advanced, and is yet advancing. We are not of opinion that the age is retrograde. The admiration of good old times is to be encouraged, rather for emu-

lation than envy. . It will be our own fault if the present be not better than the past; a fault which we trust will not be justly chargeable to the present generation. Time brings with it means of improvement. The experience of one age facilitates the progress of the next. Materials for good character are more abundant and more easily wrought, and motives only can be wanting, if these materials are not used. Nor do we see any reasons why motives should fail. On the contrary there are many and powerful ones why they should operate with accumulated force. Lamentations over decaying manners and corrupted morals and departed virtue, are in our judgment very much out of place. As the mind is enlarged, new and nobler objects are drawn into view; the moral nature develops itself; it becomes stronger and firmer, more susceptible of good principles, and more submissive to useful restraints.

Religion, too, as it becomes better known, will be more extensively obeyed. Its motives will be more effectual; its doctrines, stripped of their guise of mystery, will be better appreciated; its sanctions, when they are found not to be contradictory, will be more authoritative, and obedience more cheerful and opposition less ardent. If men could be satisfied that honesty, for example, was not only a high moral duty, but the most expedient course of human policy, the indulgence of bad passions for the purpose of illegal gain, would cease, and the pure principles of religion be seen to have the promise of the life that now is, as well as of that which is to come.

Under the operation of high and noble principles the progress of man must be forward and upward. Destined to an eternal existence, he will endeavour, even on this side the grave, to shuffle off this mortal coil of sin and ignorance and wretchedness and crime. His spirit strives, by its own native vigor, for purer pleasures and fairer fields of enjoyment. There have been great and satisfactory advances in the moral condition of mankind—what its ultimate point may be, is seen only by the eye of faith, which is full of cheering promises.

We know not how this opinion can be controverted, although we are aware that its truth is frequently denied. If means of improvement are multiplied, and other things remain the same, improvement will follow. If education and intelligence are diffused, and the intellectual character of society advances, the moral character must advance also, unless there is an opposition, in the nature of things, between morals and mind.

If discoveries in science and progress in the healing art, have prolonged the average period of human life, how can it be that the efforts bestowed on the cultivation of human virtue, should not be equally successful? Can it be possible that the physical constitution should improve, and yet the moral powers remain stationary, or perhaps degenerate?

Religion is better understood. We are making advances in theology, and doctrines which can be explained will the more easily accomplish the end at which they aim. We are aware, that it is sometimes said there can be no improvement of religion; that it came at first pure and perfect from the hands of its Author, and that human agency only adulterates it. This is the faith of the Catholic. He rests satisfied that the church is infallible. Creeds and formularies imply the same thing. They presuppose the ultimate point of human knowledge to be already attained, and that which is perfect is indeed not susceptible of improvement.

But the existence of truth and the perception of it, are very different things. The future existence of the soul was as true before the christian dispensation, as since life and immortality were brought to light in the gospel. The unity of the divine nature was as perfect when the superstition of mankind worshipped in the Pantheon of a thousand gods, as since it has been revealed in the bible. The world rolled, as it now does, annually round the sun, long before the Copernican system was made known, and eclipses occurred in the ordinary course of the planets, although the ignorance of mankind mistook these regular appearances for special indications of divine wrath. The rays of revelation came, without doubt, pure and perfect from the Source of Truth, but they entered the mind of man through the dark and misty medium of human prejudice and passion, which refracted them from direct lines, and broke them into irregular parts. This distorting atmosphere is to be cleared away, and the clouds of sin and ignorance dissipated, that the light may shine brighter and brighter until the perfect day.

We do not assent to the proposition that 'amidst the improvements of art and the not less astonishing revolutions of science, religion alone must remain stationary.'* Religion

*Dr Dana's Sermon at the Installation of the Pastor of Pine Street Church in Boston.

improves when its doctrines are made more intelligible, when its principles are better understood, when its power is more extensive, its influence more general, its sanctions more revered; when its hopes and its encouragements and its promises are more deeply felt, and its joys and consolations, its power sometimes to prevent distress and always to relieve it, its capacity to console the sorrows of the afflicted and increase the happiness of the prosperous, in fact its wonderful and exclusive control over the heart is more extensively and permanently realized. To effect this, the tares, which the art and craft of corrupt men, or the ignorance of foolish men has sowed with the wheat, must be plucked up. The truths of religion must be made plain. That mystery, which makes it teach one thing and common sense another, must be done away. The doctrines, which the gospel reveals, must be shown not to contradict the revelation of reason, the first ray that divine goodness imparted to man when the inspiration of the Almighty gave him understanding. It must be made certain that the mind is not obliged to forego the principles of its nature, in learning the regulations of its duty. Religion, we repeat, is improved when its power is extended. It is improved when the extravagances and mysteries and artifices of human invention, are destroyed. It is improved when it is made plainer and simpler and more on a level with human capacity. This is the improvement of our religion, or if any one pleases to call what we have described the improvement of mankind, we are not disposed to cavil for the word; for mankind cannot improve in their religious character by force of a religion in itself stationary. When the weakness of a simple age, or the credulity of a superstitious one, or the policy, or the craft, or, if you will, the intelligence and virtue of hierarchies and synods and councils, have bound down the consciences of men to articles of faith, all subsequent attempts at improvement are vain and useless. The doctrine is established, and right or wrong it must remain so forever. The errors, if there be any, are made as permanent as the human race.

A vast amount was gained to the cause of Christianity when it became the religion of the Roman empire. It was another glorious triumph, when the usurpation of papal power was overthrown. When the Puritans of New-England laid the foundations of a mighty empire, the event was not more important in its political character than in its effects on

religion. Freedom of inquiry and the right of private judgment were established on a basis as enduring as civil society. But the persecuting temper, which our forefathers were not liberal enough to control, and the mystical dogmas, which they were too fast bound by the prejudices of education to examine and renounce, mingled an earthly alloy with their piety. The greater intelligence of their successors has improved on their example. Intellect has expanded; improvement in the arts and revolutions in science have been the consequence, nor has progress been confined to mere human learning. Man has better learned the revelations of the Divine Will. The language, in which they were communicated, has been more studied and better understood. Mysteries, which interest had invented or ignorance had collected, have been cleared up, and truth has in some measure been restored to its original simplicity. The faith once delivered to the saints, has been rescued from the delusions of those who had more credulity than wisdom. The knowledge of the true God has been more generally diffused, and the unity of the divine nature, the first doctrine of Christianity, commended as well to the sense as to the feelings of mankind. Progress in human science could not be made alone. Religious knowledge and the moral character of the age move onward by the same causes and with equal pace. The vast improvement of public sentiment with regard to the lawful causes and manner of conducting war; that change which has been effected in public opinion respecting domestic slavery; the advance of civil and ecclesiastical liberty and religious toleration; the introduction of liberal systems of government, and the softened features of those which are still arbitrary; the multiplied institutions for charity; the elevated character of the female sex; the extended means of education among all classes of the community, and similar improvements, show an advance in the moral character of the age quite equal to its intellectual progress.

If, then, much has been accomplished for human science, and all that we have mentioned, and more that is too obvious to be particularized, has been done for good morals, why may we not suppose that much also has been done for the improvement of religion? Can the greatest and dearest of our possessions remain in darkness, while an intellectual and moral day shines in full splendor about us? We do not permit discouraging doubts to check the gratitude that inspires us. They find no place in our

minds when we look at events that are passing before us. The faith, which some who say it is of recent origin for that reason pronounce a heresy, we believe to be the original purity of the first lessons of the Messiah, and to have been redeemed from the delusions of man's device, and the corruptions of his ignorance or wickedness, in the progress of that improvement for which the present age is most favorable; and we look forward with a cheering and happy confidence to the time when it shall be universally acknowledged. We find no argument that it is not true, in the fact that it was for a long time covered up and concealed. So have been those great truths of physical science, which the genius of educated men has recently brought to light; so have been those great moral principles, which for ages slumbered unregarded. Religion was given to be studied. It was intended to furnish materials for the employment of that mighty power of mind, which assimilates man to his Maker, and the enlargement and improvement and refinement of which, is to be a work, not merely for the little time he moves on the earth, but for the ages of eternity.

But, although the age is an improved one, we do not mean that it is perfect. The character of communities, and of ours in particular, has advanced; but there is a great distance yet to the goal. The current of sin is flowing on, we may hope indeed with less depth and velocity, but still with a fearful swiftness. It has changed its channels; but while a great alluvion has been gained on one shore, it has probably made some encroachment on the other. The crimes of the present age are the offspring of refinement and luxury, and not the earlier progeny of a barbarian rudeness.

If this were all, the cause of morality would be a gainer. Vice, when deprived of its grossness, loses something of its depravity. It is more secret and less contagious; more fearful of detection, and therefore confines itself to a narrower circle, with diminished votaries and decaying influence. It is much to hunt it from open day, to drive it into dens and by-paths. We think ourselves comparatively safe from the infection of pestilent disease, when the patient is kept at quarantine, or the street is blocked up, and warning given us that the ground is dangerous; and when public sentiment does the same thing with moral pestilence, when what it cannot annihilate, it banishes, we may feel some safety for ourselves and some encouragement for the community. When the guardians of

public manners are able to confine it to narrow quarters, and bar the approach to it from the careless, the curious, or the rash, we may be assured that there is no danger of any general corruption.

The public sentiment, to which we have already referred for so many effects, is in this respect, too, to be kept enlightened and pure. There may even be danger, that in the very earnestness to accomplish a desirable object, measures may be honestly taken, which will end in its defeat. Something of this has been already witnessed in regard to public charity. Under the inflamed excitement of momentary causes, opinions were at one time entertained, that would have led to an indiscriminate liberality, more injurious to honest industry than useful to the objects of its bounty. Whatever judgment may be held on any particular state of things in this regard, we suppose it is not questionable, that the charities of the benevolent may be carried so far as to offer a better bounty to the idle and indolent, than to the honest and laborious members of society.

The same case has not yet occurred, nor have the same doubts yet been suggested, as to the correctness of the public sentiment in regard to the extent, manner, and objects of general education. But may it not be a proper subject of inquiry? Is there such a thing as over-education? Is a person destined to some handicraft employment, made a better citizen or a happier man by acquiring a fine taste, which he may have no means to indulge, or a love of letters, which he can have no opportunity to gratify? Admit that in every class of society he who can think, whatever be his employment, may be more useful than he who can only labor;—are there any disadvantages to balance in any degree the benefit derived from too much cultivation? Is it possible, that while in everything else a middle position is ordinarily the safest, in regard to education there is no extreme which public opinion is not justified in supporting?

We doubt not that if the correct doctrine in this respect were stated as an abstract proposition, it would be received without controversy or cavil; but the difficulty lies in the application of it. There are here, we thank God, no castes. We have no classes even, which are confined to the trade, business, or condition of their parents. We start, all of us, on equal terms as to rights and objects. The highest prizes of society are open to universal competition, and though in the nature of things

some must fail, the unsuccessful candidate is known only in the result. No man admits beforehand that he or his children should be put out of the race. There is no impassable bar to fortune, fame, rank, or honors. Wealth has descended in golden showers on orphans who in boyhood could scarcely obtain bread. Unknown or forsaken outcasts, without friends, or family, or home, have made their way to the high places of authority, and, in courtesy or in taunt, dealt out their favors to patricians who once scorned their humble origin. Lower down in the ranks of life,—for society has its ranks as the ocean has its waves, changing and unstable but constantly presenting themselves above the common level,—lower down, then, the professions are more than filled with unemployed and eager aspirants. The commercial community is contending with its own inconvenient crowds, and a vast array of numbers, too proud to work and ashamed to beg, are thrown into a dangerous idleness, not by any fault of their own, but because the business in which they are engaged, is incompetent to maintain all who look to it for support. The misfortune is less easy to be borne, because it is not confined to imprudent adventurers. Time and chance happen to all. The best sometimes fail, whilst the worst, by some strange accident, succeed. From these causes there is found a class of men, numerous and disappointed, sometimes morose and at others vindictive; and we would ask whether this can be without danger to our institutions, our laws, our republican habits, and whether it in any degree proceeds from a public sentiment, which is constantly pushing on, and forever crying *En avant!* to every member of society?

We would not be misunderstood, nor have our remarks extended beyond their obvious limitation. Ignorance in any part of the community we most seriously deprecate. Intelligence to discharge the public and private duties of a good citizen, is indispensable to the existence of our free institutions. Sufficient ability to perform well the business of life, must be acquired, and whatever beyond this will not interfere with the object itself, is certainly to be encouraged; but practical and observing men may put the question, whether there be any line of limitation, and if so, where it is; what course of education strengthens the faculties, and what renders them too susceptible and effeminate for their ordinary occupations; whether all men and women are to be instructed in the same way; and whether, if philoso-

phy and literature should be universally cultivated, music, dancing, and the foreign languages, should receive equal attention, so that a smattering, at least, should be attained by those who have neither time nor money to gain anything more?

But to whatever extent the labors of education may be carried, it can admit of no diversity of opinion that here, more eminently than in any other country, they should be directed to the advancement of the moral as well as intellectual faculties. Is the public sentiment well informed on this topic? To collect and confine together two or three hundred pupils of either sex, for four or five hours at a time, with directions to study some subject within the range of a common education, which direction all cannot and many will not obey; or urging them on in a process of intellectual skill which does little to aid their moral perceptions—what is this but to throw on society a swarm of unsatisfied claimants, to whom can be given neither employment nor support? What is it but to collect a band of paricides to destroy the source of their lives, when it can no longer supply nourishment to feed them in idleness? A misguided liberality in this, as in other cases, may produce a serious calamity.

There must be somewhere a power to bring these things to the level which nature intended. Some people, under other forms of government, choose to do this by force of authority and the power of the law. In other cases it is effected by an unyielding state of society, which keeps one class in bondage to preserve for another its hereditary possessions of wealth or rank. We disdain these arbitrary and iniquitous means. We trust our institutions to the good sense and virtue of the people; and we do well. While they are under such protection they are unassailable. But let us see that they are thus protected. Let us preserve the security of a correct public opinion. We have classes in our society distinguished by many of those circumstances which mark different ranks in older countries, and these classes are as inevitable and permanent as theirs. The persons who compose them change much oftener, but the classes remain. Their condition and duties, their relative importance and their corresponding rights, will be coeval with society. It may be a question who shall be poor and who rich, but none at all whether there shall be rich men and poor men among us. It may cause great controversy, before it is settled who shall command and who

shall obey. He who to day is at the helm, may tomorrow be turned before the mast. But that there must be officers and crew is as certain as that we are sailing on the great ocean of time. Each man must have an appropriate place, which he may not desert in the vain hope of discharging other and higher duties, better than his own.

We have left ourselves no room to advert to other not less important respects, in which public opinion operates in the formation of the moral character of the community; yet we cannot forbear to say a word on the general tendency to extravagant display and expenditure. Of all matters of a social nature this is most exclusively under the control of public opinion. Laws cannot reach it. Individual effort cannot modify it. Private duties, personal obligations of justice, regard to convenience, inclination, or taste, are overborne by it. All are compelled, or feel themselves compelled, by some resistless power, to do what each frankly confesses to be against his judgment, and not congenial with his wishes. But still this power, which is nothing else than an incorrect public sentiment, arising we cannot say how and continuing we know not why—determines the habits of life, and maintains its despotism undiminished; and while it is censured by the discerning, regretted by the prudent, and lamented by the serious, it is in no small degree obeyed and conformed to by all. This effort to exaggerate, to put on a personal appearance not warranted by fortune, is a practical egotism which is not less ridiculous in any given case because it is fashionable, and not the less a matter of profound grief than it is the offspring of consummate folly. Of the misery which it generates and entails in some families, and the vices and ruin to which it panders in certain classes of the community, it would be difficult to speak in terms of too much severity. Our hope is that when the public attention shall be fixed on it, good sense will administer the appropriate remedy, and like some other diseases in the moral system, it may be cured by the salutary operation of a sound and enlightened public opinion.

ART. IV.—*Union Questions ; being a Compilation from 'Questions on the Selected Scripture Lessons,' by Albert Judson, Minister of the Gospel ; and from 'a New Series of Questions,' by a Superintendent of a Sabbath School in New Jersey.* Prepared by HARVEY FISK, in conjunction with the Authors of these respective Works, and revised by the Committee of Publication of the American Sunday School Union. Philadelphia. American Sunday School Union. 1829. 2 Vols. 32mo. pp. 154, 128.

THE institution of Sunday schools constitutes one of the most remarkable features of the present age. It has already done much to supply the deficiencies of domestic education, and, if wisely conducted, is destined, we trust, to become at no distant day one of the most efficient instruments in forming the characters of the young. We would not assign to it an undue importance. Far be it from us to represent it as a substitute for parental discipline—for the wise counsels of a father, or the gentle teachings of a mother. For these no substitute should be sought, for none can be found. But all parents are not capable of instructing their children in the principles of religion. Some are utterly disqualified for the delightful task ; and many, it is believed, who are both capable and faithful, are ready to acknowledge, with heartfelt gratitude, the aid they have received from the benevolent and well directed labors of the Sunday school teacher.

Sunday schools, like many other of the excellent institutions of the present age, are of recent origin. They were first established in Gloucester, England, in the year 1782, and they owe their existence to the benevolent exertions of a distinguished philanthropist, Richard Raikes Esq. At first they held the place of charity schools, to which only the children of the poorer classes resorted, and where they were taught the rudiments of secular knowledge, no less than the truths and principles of religion. This resulted from the deplorable ignorance which prevailed among the lower orders at that period, and which we believe still prevails to a very considerable extent in England, and in many other parts of the British dominions.

Owing to the admirable provisions of our laws, we have not had occasion to guard against an evil of this kind. Accordingly, Sunday schools have been instituted among us, not for

furnishing our children with secular knowledge, which they can gain at our public schools, but with an exclusive reference to their moral and christian improvement. They are viewed with us as the instruments of moral, rather than intellectual culture; as designed to advance the pupil in virtue rather than science; to give him juster and more affecting views of his relation to God, to the Saviour, and to his brethren, rather than to teach him, what he can be better taught elsewhere, the principles of human science.

This is as it should be. The exercises introduced into Sunday schools, should be in some measure appropriate to the day. And we are not of the number of those who would take from that day the peculiar reverence with which the descendants of the Pilgrims have been accustomed to regard it. We very much fear that too lax views are beginning to prevail among us on this subject, and we think that all who have at heart the interests of practical religion, should be exceedingly cautious how they unsettle the minds of the uneducated classes, and especially of inexperienced youth, in regard to the observance of the Lord's-day.

The exercises of the Sunday school, should, we contend, be of a religious character. Not that we would exclude all books but the bible, and all instructions which do not immediately relate to revealed truth. For religion, as we understand it, is a term of comprehensive import. As a subject of speculation, it embraces whatever tends to give us enlarged views of the character of God, and just and affecting views of our relation to him, and of all the duties of private and social life. We do not therefore object to the introduction of exercises of a somewhat secular character, provided always that they have a moral bearing, and are applied to a moral purpose.

But the study of the bible we regard as one of the most appropriate and useful exercises of the Sunday school; and this we believe has, in some form or other, become almost the exclusive object of attention in a large majority of the Sunday schools in the United States. In some instances the study of it is made merely an exercise of the memory; that is to say, the scholar is required to recite *memoriter*, verse after verse, and chapter after chapter, without note, or comment, or explanation of any kind. In other instances, a knowledge of the scriptures, more or less thorough, is gained by the study of some manual in which the principal facts and doctrines are

set in order, either in a continued narration or in a catechetical form, or in a set of questions with scripture references.

The method which strikes us as incomparably the best that has come to our knowledge, at least for instructing young children in the New Testament, is that which, under the title of *Union Questions*, has been recommended by the Committee of Publication of the American Sunday School Union, and which we presume has been generally adopted by the Orthodox churches throughout the United States. The outlines of the method may be given in a few words. Selections from the four evangelists, arranged in chronological order and divided into lessons of convenient length, are indicated at the head of each lesson by the chapter and verses in which they may be found; and references are made to parallel passages in the other evangelists. On each of these lessons numerous questions are formed, arranged in two separate series; the first, designed for the younger classes, the answers to which may be given wholly or in part in the language of scripture; the second series, designed for more advanced scholars, and well suited to awaken their attention, to suggest the true interpretation of the lesson, and to impress it on the heart.

The first volume relates chiefly to the history of our Saviour's life, the second to his instructions; both together embracing the principal facts and moral precepts contained in the four evangelists.

But whatever merit belongs to the system, we must enter our solemn protest against the sectarian character of the work. It is deeply to be deplored that our Orthodox brethren should deem it necessary to perplex the minds of young children with the higher mysteries of their faith, whatever importance they may attach to them themselves, and are not content to feed them with simple food suited to their tender age. Why are they not willing to leave the doctrine of the trinity, of the double nature of Christ, and other kindred doctrines, which, whether true or false, are confessedly inexplicable, or at least hard to be understood, till the mind of the learner has become more mature and better capable of distinguishing between truth and falsehood? Why will they not, in this particular, follow the example of Jesus, who adapted his instructions to the circumstances of his hearers; and who, as the Orthodox themselves must admit, scarcely adverted, in all his teachings, to those points which they are accustomed to represent as essential parts of the christian system?

But we bring a more serious charge against the work under review. We complain, not so much that the mysteries of Orthodoxy are inculcated, as that the pupil is taught to reason illogically and inconclusively. We complain, not so much as rational Christians, as rational men; and we think we have a right to complain. Will it be believed that in the nineteenth century, and in a region renowned for the general diffusion of knowledge, the officers of a highly respectable association, composed of some of the leading men of several denominations of Christians, should recommend, without qualification, a work, on almost every page of which the child is made to infer that Jesus Christ is God, from the simple fact that he wrought miracles! Yet this is done in the *Union Questions*—a work probably more extensively used in the Sunday schools in the United States than any other. Probably several hundred thousand children are instructed from this manual—receive some of their most lasting impressions in regard to the meaning of the New Testament from a work in which they are taught that Jesus Christ must be the Supreme God, because he was able, by his word, to multiply the loaves and fishes, to still the raging of a tempest, to heal the sick, or to raise the dead to life!

We neither mistake nor misstate the case. Take the following for an example. The twentysecond lesson in the first volume contains an account of the miracle of feeding five-thousand men with five loaves and two fishes; in reference to which the following questions are proposed.

‘Who alone could cause the loaves and fishes to increase? Who created them at first?—What evidence have you in this lesson that Christ is God?’ Vol. I. p. 88.

Similar questions are proposed in reference to almost every miracle of our Lord. Take another specimen. The following questions occur in the seventeenth lesson, in reference to the miracle of stilling the winds and waves.

‘Do the winds and waves obey any but God? Did not this miracle prove Jesus to be God?’ Id. p. 71.

The evangelists inform us that at the commencement of the storm Jesus was asleep on a pillow. In reference to which circumstance, the question is proposed—

‘Does that show that he was *man* as well as *God*?’ Id. p. 70.

Many questions like the following occur in the work before us.

‘How were the three persons of the Godhead manifested to man, at the baptism of Jesus?’ Vol. I. p. 43.

‘Could any mere creature give such power?’ viz. as Jesus gave to the twelve apostles. ‘Who, then, must Christ have been?’ Id. p. 76.

‘What do you owe him,’ Christ, ‘since you have been made by him?—John says *the Word* was God: Can you mention any other passages of Scripture which prove that he is God?’ Id. pp. 46, 49.

‘John says he created all things: Where else in scripture is he mentioned as Creator?’ Id. p. 49.

What confusion must there be in the mind of an intelligent child, who, after being taught in this way, that Jesus is God, meets with the following questions, which are found in the same work.

‘Whom has no man seen?’ (John i. 18.)

‘Who has declared him?’

‘Who is the only begotten Son?’ Id. p. 50.

‘Why *had* God forsaken him?’ (Matt. xxvii. 46.)

‘Had *he* deserved to be forsaken of God?’ Id. p. 133.

But it is in reference to the conclusions drawn from the miracles of Christ, that we complain of dishonest dealing. The subject is one, we contend, of no common importance. It is no small thing that half a million of the rising youth of our country, are, we will not say indoctrinated in error, though this we believe, but taught to reason most absurdly from admitted facts. For we put the question to the Orthodox themselves, and we do it with great solemnity—we ask whether they are prepared to defend the kind of reasoning on which we have animadverted? Do they really believe that the inference is a legitimate one, that Jesus is God because he wrought miracles? If so, what will they say of the miracles of Moses, Elijah, and others which are recorded in the sacred writings? If it is a legitimate inference from the miracles of the loaves and fishes that Jesus is God, may we not infer from the miraculous supply of meal and oil, in the case of the widow of Sarepta, that Elijah was God? Elijah also raised the widow’s son to life, called down fire from heaven, and himself ascended thither in a chariot of fire. Add to this, that his name is by interpretation *God the Lord*, as that of Immanuel, given to Jesus, is *God with us*. Are our Orthodox brethren then prepared to follow

out the principle adopted in this manual to its legitimate consequences, and to say that every one who performs a miracle is God? If not, are they willing that their children should be taught to reason thus inconclusively? Is it lawful, is it right, thus to trifle with the sacred writings? We are confident that every fair mind must perceive at a glance the disingenuousness of such a course, and that many, who, through ignorance or inconsideration, have given it their countenance, will reprobate it at once, as soon as the facts come to their knowledge; and we greatly overrate the intelligence and honesty of the Orthodox community, if the evil be tolerated much longer, and if a revised edition of the work, of whose general character we have formed so favorable an opinion, be not called for speedily, and in a voice that will be heard.

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- ART. V.—1. *An Historical Account of my own Life, with some Reflections on the Times I have lived in* (1671—1731). By EDMUND CALAMY, D.D. Now first printed. Edited and illustrated with Notes, Historical and Biographical, by JOHN TOWILL RUTT. London. H. Colburn & R. Bentley, 1829. 2 Vols. 8vo. pp. 508, 561.
2. *The Correspondence and Diary of Philip Doddridge, D.D., illustrative of various Particulars in his Life hitherto unknown: with Notices of many of his Contemporaries; and a Sketch of the Ecclesiastical History of the Times in which he lived.* Edited from the Original MSS. by his Great-grandson, JOHN DODDRIDGE HUMPHREYS Esq. London. H. Colburn & R. Bentley. 1829. Vols. I. & II. pp. 488, 520.
3. *Letters to Dissenting Ministers and to Students for the Ministry, from the Rev. Job Orton, transcribed from his Original Short Hand, with Notes Explanatory and Biographical, to which are prefixed Memoirs of his Life,* by S. PALMER. London. 1806. 2 Vols. 12mo.
4. *Memoirs of the Life, Writings, and Character of Dr Philip Doddridge,* by ANDREW KIPPIS, D.D. Boston. 1793. 8vo.

It is somewhat remarkable, that works like the two first of those we have set at the head of this article, the Memoirs of Calamy, and the Correspondence of Doddridge, throwing

light upon characters and times already known, should, after so long an interval from the death of their authors as in the one case of seventy-eight, and the other of ninety-nine years, be now for the first time presented to the public. And though, as may hereafter appear, the private letters of Doddridge are not of a nature to make their publication necessary or desirable, either to the religious or literary world, the simple fact of the existence of such documents, with other examples of the kind which might be adduced, may lead us to the inference that there are yet in England, and perhaps among ourselves also, unexplored and unpublished treasures, in the decaying manuscripts of eminent men of generations that are past, which are yet in reserve for the instruction or curiosity of generations that are to come. We must only trust, that a sound judgment and a due reverence for the memory of departed excellence, may always prevent such abuses of these hereditary possessions, as we find too much reason to lament and condemn in the descendant of Dr Doddridge.

We connect with the volumes to which we have alluded, the Letters of Mr Orton, not as proposing any distinct notice of them or their writer, though entitled to high respect, but because they incidentally illustrate our subject. Dr Doddridge, it will be seen, was a cotemporary with Dr Calamy, precisely at the period to which his Correspondence refers; and in the *Memoirs of Dr Kippis*, who was the pupil, assistant, and biographer of Dr Doddridge, we find frequent allusions to those personal, domestic, and professional incidents, which are so curiously, and, we must add, so improperly developed in the recent compilation of his great-grandson. As almost everything in the public characters of these eminent men, may be supposed familiar to most of our readers, we shall confine ourselves chiefly to what is peculiar to these their more private documents; and, declining all pretensions to any elaborate speculations of our own—for which a book reviewed has sometimes served but as an apology to the reviewer—we shall endeavour to select a few of those features in the characters of these individuals themselves, which may seem most likely to deserve and reward attention.

The name of Calamy has been long honored in the history of Non-conformity. Dr Edmund Calamy, the writer of the *Historical Account*, was the third of his family who attained

to distinguished reputation as a divine, and as an asserter of religious liberty. His memoirs embrace almost the whole period of his life from 1671 to 1732, a term of more than sixty years; so that he was cotemporary with those eminent men, who, either within or without the church, adorned the age of the second Charles, of William III., and of Queen Anne. He early adopted the ministry for his profession, pursued his theological studies at the University of Utrecht, and commenced his ministry in London, in 1694, where he remained in honor and usefulness through the rest of his life. As an author, Dr Calamy is known by many practical and controversial writings; but his fame in this respect must rest chiefly upon his valuable work, entitled the 'Non-conformist's Memorial, being an Account of the Lives, Sufferings, and Printed Works of the Two Thousand Ministers ejected from the Church of England, chiefly by the Act of Uniformity, August 24, 1662,' an act which was not less the disgrace than the misfortune of the earlier part of the reign of Charles II.

Among these faithful and generous sufferers, of some of whom it may be truly said, that the world was not worthy, the grandfather of our author was highly distinguished. The grandson seemed to have inherited or imitated his best qualities; and from all the testimonies that remain of him, and from the light in which he presents himself, though with singular simplicity and modesty, we should infer that he was altogether entitled to the character given of him by a friend in a sermon preached at his funeral, 'as a person of sound judgment, extensive learning, sincere piety, of a candid and benevolent temper, and very moderate with regard to differences in religion.' This moderation, indeed, and good sense, with an apparent freedom from all personal vanity and self-exhibition, are among the most attractive features we discover of him in these memoirs. Whatever might have been his theological speculations, and even in these there is good evidence of his liberality, he was totally removed from any form of bigotry and intolerance. He surveyed with a calm and attentive mind the differences of opinion among Christians, and, upon diligent study, with meekness and impartiality adopted his own.

We must pass over many passages of his earlier days, and shall select a few sentences from an interesting part of his journal, in which he relates the steps by which he was led to sacrifice bright prospects of a temporal nature, and unite himself with the Dissenters.

‘I had it now particularly under consideration whether I should determine for conformity or nonconformity. I thought Oxford no unfit place to pursue this matter in. I was not likely to be there prejudiced in favour of the Dissenters, who were commonly run down and ill spoken of. I was entertained from day to day with what tended to give any man the best opinion of the church by law established. I was a witness of her learning, wealth, grandeur, and splendour. I was treated by the gentlemen of the University with all imaginable civility. I heard their sermons, and frequently attended their public lectures and academical exercises. I was free in conversation as opportunities offered; and was often argued with about consorting with such a despicable, such an unsociable sort of people as the Nonconformists were represented. But I took all occasions to express my hearty respect and value for real worth, wherever I could meet with it.

‘I carefully studied my Bible, and particularly the New Testament, and found the plain worship of the Dissenters, as far as I could judge, more agreeable to that, than the pompous way of the Church of England. I read Church history, and could not help observing, with many others that have gone before me, that as the fondness for church power and pomp increased, the spirit of serious piety declined and decayed among those that bore the name of Christians. I read several of the Fathers, and, among the rest, Ignatius’s six Epistles, of Bishop Usher’s Latin and Isaac Vossius’s Florentine, Greek editions, of which Mr. Dodwel gives it as his judgment, that “the Presbyterians questioned them only out of interest.” But I doubt there would be more reason to think the Episcopalians favour them out of interest. I read also Bishop Pearson in defence of these Epistles, as well as Monsieur Daillé and Larroque in opposition to them; and I so well liked the way of arguing’ &c. &c. Vol. I. pp. 224, 225.

Having taken a careful view of the arguments to be urged on both sides, he thus concludes.

‘Supposing then, (though not granting,) that we Dissenters are in an error, I think we have good reason to believe, that the God we have to do with, is so merciful, that he will not judge or condemn us, or exclude us from his favour, for any errors of judgment or practice which are consistent with true love to him; but will graciously accept us, upon a general repentance of all our sins and errors. Without taking in this principle, we must send all our forefathers that lived before the Reformation, down to hell, without any relief, even though they acted in the integrity of their hearts, which would be hard.’ Vol. I. p. 290.

Among the eminent Dissenters of those times, perhaps none was more distinguished than Dr William Bates, called for his winning eloquence, the 'silver-tongued.' His works are to this day commended above those of most of his cotemporaries for their excellence of style as well as of judgment. With him, Mr Calamy, though at the time but a young preacher, was conversant, and requested his counsel and aid at his entrance upon his ministry, more particularly in the services of his ordination. It may be necessary to remark, that this service, as publicly conducted, was at that time a novelty among Dissenters; of the expediency, perhaps rather of the political safety of which, there were many doubts. From the interview here related, we perceive, that as great men are not always wise, so neither are men who are called mighty, and able to sway the opinions of others by their word, without their prudential scruples. Mr Calamy had already been disappointed in his application to the no less celebrated John Howe. He then writes;—

'I waited also upon Dr. Bates, and told him that several of us had a design shortly to be ordained. He appeared very well pleased; and said many kind things, with abundance of freedom. But when I moved that he would bear a part in the work of the day, and join in laying on hands, he desired to be excused; and told me that he had such a respect for my grandfather, (whom he always admired as an excellent person,) that he would as soon do such an office for me, as for any person whatsoever, yet that, having forborn any concern in ordinations hitherto, he was not for engaging in them now. He added, that this need not be the least hinderance or discouragement to us; for there were ministers enough that would readily join in so good a work.

'This, I confess, a little startled me, and was the occasion, perhaps, of my using more warmth than was decent in one of my age, towards one of the Doctor's gravity. I told him, frankly, that I did not understand his proceedings; and must desire he would give me satisfaction as to the grounds he went upon. I took upon me to give him to understand, that his encouraging such as I was, while we were prosecuting our studies in order to the ministry, and giving us a good word and recommending us to the people when we had finished our studies and began to preach, did indeed look kind. But, after all, if when we offered with solemnity to enter upon the ministerial office, we must be left to shift for ourselves, and such as he, refused to lay hands upon us, it looked as if either regularity in such matters was little set by, or accounted of, or as if he was under some doubt as to the lawfulness or sufficiency of ordination by Presbyters. I added, that for my part, I was so shock-

ed with this treatment, that unless he gave me some light in this matter, I should be tempted to lay aside all thoughts of being ordained, (notwithstanding, that most things relating to the matter were settled,) and he must excuse me, if I gave Dr. Bates's so positively refusing to be concerned in any ordination, as my reason for so doing.

'At this the good Doctor was nettled, and rising from his seat, he went to the door, called his servant, and gave orders that care might be taken not to give him disturbance upon any account whatever, until he opened the door again, which he now shut fast, that we might have freedom of discourse, without interruption. Then sitting down again in his chair, he entered into a long discourse in order to my satisfaction. He assured me, he was himself fully satisfied as to the sufficiency of ordination by Presbyters, and its agreeableness both to Scripture and primitive antiquity. He was therein entirely of the mind of Bishop Usher. He had often argued with persons that were of different sentiments; and was at any time ready to do it, when he saw reason to think it might answer a good end, &c. I, on the other hand, urged the strongest arguments I could recollect, (and having just then studied the point, I was pretty ready upon the subject,) that were used by the Episcopal party to prove the necessity of the concern and agency of a superior Bishop, in order to a valid, or at least a regular ordination, and enforced them as much as I was able; to which he gave me a very frank and ready answer.

'From the whole strain and connexion of his discourse I could easily perceive that he had not any scruple as to Presbyterian ordination. He affirmed, moreover, that he took our separation from the Established Church, to be not only justifiable, but necessary, as circumstances stood; and declared that our having ministers ordained among us was necessary too. He thought that we that were free, and willing, to enter into the ministry among the Dissenters, in their discouraging circumstances, deserved all the respect that could be showed us. Yet, after all this, I insisted upon it, that his absolute refusal to be concerned in any ordinations was very discouraging, and the more so because upon the principles he laid down, it appeared to be a thing not to be accounted for. Upon this he was pleased to enter into freedoms with me, at the same time obliging me to secrecy, which I have observed religiously; never discovering to any one what was communicated. I shall only say, that the Doctor's hinderance was peculiar to himself. I cannot pretend, upon the whole, that he gave me all the satisfaction I could have desired, yet I thought he must answer for himself and his own proceedings, and so must I for mine. This I could not see that I could be able to do, should I wave being ordained, merely because a particular person,

whose help upon that occasion was very desirable, refused to assist.

'At length, after a good deal of trouble and difficulty, June 22, this year, [1694,] seven of us were ordained, in the face of a public assembly, at Dr Annesley's meeting-house.' Vol. I. pp. 345-8.

Among the more remarkable passages of Dr Calamy's history, which he selects for record, is one, which, though sufficiently melancholy in itself, may supply a useful lesson to doating and over-anxious parents, who are ready to imagine that all their happiness is bound up in the lives of their children. It may be taken as a specimen, though incidentally supplied, of the prudence and good judgment, of the fidelity also and affection, with which Dr Calamy was accustomed to perform his most difficult pastoral duties. It appears that before his marriage, Dr Calamy had boarded in the family of a Mr Mart, 'the most unhappy,' says he, 'of any that I ever was acquainted with. This man had a very melancholy wife and a most miserable wicked creature for his eldest son, who, by that time he arrived at manhood, had run through an unusual course of villany and impiety.'

In the progress of the history, it is found, that this abandoned young man, whose profligacy had driven his mother to distraction and suicide, at length was guilty of crimes for which he was condemned to death. The friendly sympathies and counsel of Dr Calamy were sought by the unhappy father on the occasion, and he thus writes ;—

'On the day upon which this peculiarly unhappy youth was executed, I spent several hours with the father and the rest of the children in his chamber. A very melancholy day it was, though an instructive one. I went to them about eleven in the morning, and coming into the chamber, found the father lying upon his bed, and the children sitting round him. After some discourse both to the father and the children, I put up a prayer with them, suitable to the awful occasion, begging that so startling a dispensation of Divine Providence as that was, might be remarkably sanctified, and that all of us might have wisdom and grace from Heaven to make a right improvement of it. Nor did I forget that poor creature that was then to make his exit; begging that He, that had all hearts within his reach, would in such a manner work upon him that was near his end, as that he who had taken so much pains to sin himself out of the reach of the Divine mercy, might be touched with such contrition that he might give glory to God. Both father and children seemed not

a little affected. I still continued with them, talking one while to the poor father, and another while to the children, doing what in me lay to promote some good impression from so melancholy a Providence as this, both on the one and on the other.

'At length, between one and two o'clock, the father on a sudden broke out into a violent fit of crying, and all the children, as it were with one common consent, fell to crying and roaring in a manner that was affecting. I sat still on my chair by the bedside, without attempting to stop or check it, and in some time it a little abated. But upon my beginning to speak, it broke out afresh. Therefore, I made a further pause, till they began to be composed. Then I asked the father what the occasion might be, of the agony I observed he was in? I made it my request he would give me satisfaction, whether the consideration of the case of his unhappy son, who he might reasonably suppose was about that very time launching into eternity, was the sole ground and occasion of it, or whether any particular passage coming then into his mind, might contribute to it? Upon which, fetching a deep sigh, he told me the following memorable story :—

"Sir," said he, "when this wretched creature, that I now count myself a miserable man that I ever was a father to, was a very young child, and our only child, my wife and I were so fond, as even to dote upon him. It pleased God then to visit him with a fever, and we were not satisfied with using such means as were within our reach in order to his relief, looking upwards for a blessing upon them, but we thought that our lives were bound up in his, and were apt to imagine we should be perfectly undone, if we should lose him; upon which I was earnest with God to spare him. One evening, particularly, as I was praying in my family, I was more than ordinarily importunate with God to continue him to us, and ran into some expressions that discovered an indecent earnestness."

'He added, that a good Christian woman, a country friend, then in the family, came to visit them in their affliction, and took particular notice of it, and freely reasoned with him; and as he was, one time, rising from his knees, charged him home with an immoderate vehemence of spirit, and told him that he seemed to carry the matter so far, that she dreaded the consequence. Whereupon he told her that it was not possible for him to help it. She gave it him as her judgment, that it was better and safer, and much more becoming, to leave the matter to an infinitely wise God, who knows the end from the beginning, than for such weak creatures as we, so much to seek as to futurities, to pretend to be positive and peremptory, as to any events that fall out that we have concern in. His answer was, that he could not bear the thoughts of losing his child, of which he apprehended there

was great danger. She desired him to consider how little he knew what that child might prove if he should live to be a man: and how unreasonable therefore it was in him to pretend to say, that he could not bear the thoughts of losing him. The poor father, in the agony of his spirit, made answer, Let him prove what he will, so he is but spared, I shall be satisfied.

“This,” said he, “I now see to have been my folly. For through the just hand of God, I have lived to see this wretched son of mine, a heart-breaking cross to them that loved him with the greatest tenderness, a disgrace to my whole family, and likely to bring down my grey hairs with sorrow to my grave. I read my sin very distinctly in my punishment: but must own that God is righteous in all his ways, and holy in all his works.”

‘As I could not but be much affected with such a passage as this, myself, so have I often told it, very particularly, at such times as I have been called, in the way of my function, to visit parents that were in sore affliction and distress of spirit, for the loss of their children, while they were yet young. I have several times observed that the telling it has had a good effect, and helped to compose, silence, and quiet, notwithstanding the aptness of most parents to hope well as to their own children, what wretched crosses soever they many times find the children of others prove to them.

‘I do not, however, think it needful to dilate upon the little effect, for any good purpose, that such an awful dispensation of Providence as this was, taken in all its circumstances, had on the other children who survived, or even upon the father himself. The judgments of God are sometimes unsearchable, and “his ways past finding out,” and I think it sufficient to add, that this proved, afterwards, in the several parts and members of it, as unhappy and miserable a family as any I ever knew, which was generally observed by all their friends and acquaintance, and which, I think, should be a warning to all who know or hear of it, “to take heed lest their hearts be hardened by the deceitfulness of sin.”’ Vol. I. pp. 498–503.

There is much instruction to be drawn from this narrative. It may rebuke that earnestness of solicitude with which parents are too ready to desire the lives of their children, as well as that excess of grief, with which they are equally prone to mourn their early deaths. And though assuredly it is the part of wisdom, the dictate of a devout trust, to hope that judicious counsels, examples, and prayers, will be blessed, so that the natural fruits of good education shall not fail, yet instances of depravity far inferior to that here related, may be remembered

for the instruction of those whose children God hath early hidden in the grave; and, by exposing the power of temptation, the inefficacy of the fairest outward advantages, the uncertainties, also, to which character, no less than condition, is exposed, may enable them to appropriate the consolation, that their children, whom in infancy or childhood God hath taken to himself, are taken also from the evil to come.

Should we pursue the instruction to be deduced from this narrative, we might find in the strange depravity of the remaining branches of this family, after the miserable fate of the son and mother, only an additional proof among the many which observation and history supply, of the possible failure of the severest sufferings, and of even the most awful visitations of Divine Providence, to effect any radical change of character. The afflictions, which are designed to awaken and reform, may be so abused as to become the instruments only of a more determined profligacy. The dominion of habit over the whole character, its power to make ineffectual all the motives and corrections, which Omnipotence itself can supply, cannot be too frequently or seriously considered. It is this power, which, opposing itself to the whole course of divine providence and truth, closes up the heart against all good impressions; and, as has been well illustrated by a christian philosopher and divine, * makes the term of a man's probation shorter, in fact, than the term of his natural life; setting an indelible seal on his character, perhaps years before death has sealed up his account.

In the year 1709, when he was about forty years of age, and had been a minister in London about fifteen years, Dr Calamy took an extensive tour through England and Scotland; visiting more particularly the universities of the north, attending in Edinburgh the sessions of the General Assembly, and gathering all the information in his power with regard to the state and prospects of religion and literature in the kingdom. The distinguished honors with which he was received, especially in Scotland, prove the estimation in which, even at that early period of his life, his name was held, and the weight of character he had acquired. The result of his observations also upon the distinguished men and events which came under his notice form a valuable part of his Diary. They prove,

* See Dr Priestley's discourse on the Danger of Bad Habits, of which admirable treatise it was said by a late eminent clergyman of our own day, 'that he had read it seventy times, and could never read it without alarm.'

as indeed is uniformly seen, his accurate discernment, his sound judgment, and catholic spirit. We admire also the exemplary modesty, the manliness and good sense, with which he notes down with other passing events, the flattering honors, with which he was himself distinguished.

But omitting, as our limits require, any further notice of these, we will select the following account of his visit to Exeter, in which those of our readers who are familiar with what has been denominated the Western Controversy, or a controversy among the Dissenters in the west of England on the subject of the trinity, will find some pleasant mention of the excellent James Peirce, who, having been settled, as will appear, amidst the cordial affection and boundless expectations of his people, afterwards became the victim of relentless persecution.

‘In the month of May this year, [1714], I took a journey into the West of England, for health and diversion.’——‘I was no sooner arrived [at Exeter], than I was attended by a number of the leading Dissenters of that city, who were impatient to hear what news I brought them from Mr. James Peirce, of Newbury, whom they had chosen to fill up a vacancy in that city. He had signified to them by letter, that they should know his mind in some things by me, upon my making them the visit I intended, and had accordingly met me on my road and communicated his thoughts, and left the issue to what appeared upon my conversing with the people at Exeter. Though I was tired with my journey, and was to preach the next morning, yet such was their eagerness, that they could not be satisfied without a great deal of discourse about the affair that night. They stayed with me till it was very late, and were really insatiable; and I thought they would have left me no time to take my natural rest.

‘Never before did I see such an earnestness in any people for a minister’s coming among them. They talked as if they were quite undone, if he did not accept their call, and no one else could signify any thing to them, if they had not him. They ran to such a height, that I took the freedom to tell some of them that I was afraid they were under a sore temptation, and that their carriage would provoke God, some way or other, to cross their too raised expectations, either by suffering something to befall Mr. Peirce that should keep him from coming among them, or by blasting his pains among them, if their desires were gratified, by his settling with them. This was remembered by several of them afterwards with some concern, when there were such heats among them about doctrinal matters. By me, I am sure, it never can be forgotten. I told Mr Peirce himself of it, with no small trouble,

when I saw him afterwards : and could not help thinking that the peculiar eagerness and impetuosity of their spirits, upon this occasion, boded very ill.

‘They had their desire at length, and compassed their design in his settlement, and for a good while reckoned themselves exceedingly happy. But, after some time, they questioned his soundness as to the doctrine of the Trinity, excluded him their place of worship, shut the doors upon him, and left him to shift for himself, and there were such flames amongst them as almost consumed them. Nay, they spread over that and the neighbouring county, and reached as far as London, and it was the great mercy of God, that our whole interest had not been thereby destroyed and ruined. It was a very instructive dispensation, and helped to make me more sensible than before, how dangerous a thing it is to have too raised expectations from the creatures; and how little reason we have to think that the wrath of man should work the righteousness of God.

‘May 6. I preached to “a numerous assembly of the Dissenting ministers of Devon and Cornwall,” upon “the prudence of the serpent and innocence of the dove,” and afterwards printed the sermon at their common request. I spent the afternoon in a meeting of the ministers, in a body, in order to advice and consultation about matters of common concernment, in which all things were managed with great harmony, friendship and love; I should have been glad if the same had always continued.’ Vol. II. pp. 262-5.

It may be obvious here to remark, that the history of other churches and of more private associations, especially of personal and domestic friendships, affords similar examples of sudden and overflowing fondness turning first to indifference and afterwards to rancorous hatred; and this, by that general law of our constitution, by which all extremes, either in our religious or social affections, hasten to their opposites. Through the whole of the controversy, in which that learned and exemplary divine, Mr Peirce, became an intrepid confessor and sufferer, and which in its progress divided the churches of London as well as of Exeter, Dr Calamy maintained his characteristic moderation and charity. He firmly withstood the reproaches of a deficiency in zeal and Orthodoxy, with which by his more exclusive brethren he was assailed, and maintained a friendly intercourse with both the contending parties. ‘Though I read,’ says he, ‘what was published on both sides, and that sometimes with no small concern and trouble, yet I fell not entirely in, either with the Subscribers or Non-subscribers.’ The question

was on the expediency of enforcing subscription to the doctrine of the trinity. He was earnestly importuned to engage in this controversy, but foreseeing the consequences, 'I took up a resolution, says he, 'to have no hand in it.—As to the grand matter, which they contended about, I was entirely of the mind of the celebrated Mr Chillingworth, who closes his preface to "The Religion of Protestants a safe way to Salvation," with these memorable words;—"Let all men believe the scripture, and that only, and endeavour to believe it in the true sense, and require no more of others; and they shall find this not only a better, but *the only means to suppress heresy*, and restore unity. For, he that believes the scripture sincerely, and endeavours to believe it in the true sense, cannot possibly be an heretic."

We must here, though reluctantly, take leave of Dr Calamy. His memoirs extend to the year 1730; and his death took place in the course of the year succeeding. From even the little which has been here selected, it may be seen how just were his claims to the reputation he enjoyed while living, and to the respect with which his memory has since been cherished. Those of our readers who are conversant with the life and writings of Dr Benjamin Colman, the first minister of Brattle Street Church in Boston, and one of the most eminent men of his times, may discover in the subject of these memoirs, a resemblance to some of those qualities which adorned the character of that accomplished scholar and gentleman.

Of Dr Doddridge, whose early Correspondence is now before us, much more is generally known. Few have not heard, and multitudes have read of his name and works. By his Sermons and Theological Lectures, his Family Expositor and practical treatises; by his devotional hymns, which form a favorite part of the best selections of sacred poetry used in our worship; by the Memoirs of Orton, Kippis, and others, his character has become established in the Protestant world, and his praise in our churches. Indeed he has long been a favorite with Christians of very various opinions; and we may not hope to add to, as we surely have no wish to diminish, the esteem with which, for genius and piety, for eloquence, charity, and evangelical zeal, his name has been cherished.

The private correspondence of so distinguished a man must certainly be regarded with interest. The world will naturally be curious to know of the personal feelings and

character of one, whom in his public or professional relations they had honored so much. Nor, on the whole, are we willing to believe, that the volumes before us will permanently affect this interest. They are what they purport to be, the familiar letters of the Doctor, chiefly upon subjects of the most personal description, and written at a period of life, when the ardor and the weakness of the character are most in danger of being betrayed. They undeniably contain some things, and indeed not a few, that will surprise those who have associated only the images of sanctity and spiritual-mindedness with their idea of this amiable man. And even those, who, from the impartial life of him by his pupil, Dr Kippis, and from the letters, to which we have referred, of Mr Orton, may have been led to anticipate that admixture of infirmities to be found in the wisest and the best of our race,—will yet regret the prominence here given to emotions, of which the existence may be always safely enough inferred, without the expression.

In truth, no inconsiderable part of the collection before us, is made up from the earliest love-letters of Doddridge, in some of which the endearments of the tenderest affection, the hopes and fears, the suspicion or distrust, resentment and forgiveness, joys and agonies of his love, are uttered with a singular fullness and simplicity. And notwithstanding the large indulgence to be allowed for the period at which they were written—when he was between nineteen and twentyseven—notwithstanding the private and the confidential nature of the correspondence, intended surely for no eye but that of the lady addressed, we are left to some wonder at the writer, and to much more at the publisher, who, after the lapse of a century, has chosen to bring into light what only a common respect for the name of his ancestor, and a common share of the prudence that dwells with discretion, should have constrained him to suppress, or rather to destroy.

We would not, however, be understood as implying, that these letters exhibit much that is absolutely discreditable to the pure fame of their author. Many of them, as we may presently show, will reflect an added lustre to his character. But the sin of exposing without cause the infirmities of good men, we hold to be scarcely inferior to that of indulging the infirmities themselves. And by whatever motives this compiler may have been moved, whether by hunger or thirst, love of mischief or

of fame; whether, as he would seem to intimate, the wish of exhibiting the social virtues of his ancestor—for with apparent unconsciousness of the treachery he was committing, he boldly presents himself as the great-grandson of Doddridge—whether these, or other pressing motives may have united to prompt to this work, we know not. But in the indignation we feel at this abuse of transmitted possessions, we are almost ready to exclaim, with the celebrated German critic on discovering that a certain rocket-maker, who, by some luckless accident, having stumbled into possession of some precious manuscripts, had, with more than Vandal barbarity, consumed them in his trade, ‘O that I might but lay my hands upon that rocket-maker!’ And were this great-grandson of the Doctor’s, Mr Doddridge Humphreys, now before us, we should freely expound to him, that of the lesser transgressions few were less pardonable, than that of forcing into light the tender concerns, and especially the love-letters, of good and great men. And this we might show, in part, because such men of all others are most liable to betray the fondness or the silliness common to such concerns—the very elevation and purity of their principles making their love, when it once gets possession, the master passion of their souls. The selfish and unprincipled, the slave of his interest, who makes love for money, and the devotee of guilty pleasure, may indeed maintain a seeming wisdom and caution in the expression of a passion, the purity, tenderness, and power of which, in its best influence, they are absolutely incapable of feeling. And they may easily divert themselves withal, with the weakness or the extravagance of better men, and with the fondness that comes with purer hearts than their own; and all the while their own exemption from the same weaknesses and the same follies, shall but prove the pooriness of their spirits, and the doubtful nature of the affection, they can either feel or offer.

In further palliation of the freedom we occasionally find in the language of some of these letters, it must be remembered, not only, as we have said, that they were in their nature confidential, but that the usages of a century ago permitted a license on such topics, which the refinement, we cannot think it the fastidiousness, but should rather honor it as the improvement, of the present age, would scarcely tolerate. A more elevated standard of taste, language, and manners, has banish-

ed from conversation and from books, what might formerly pass without censure. In illustration of this fact, without adverting to the popular plays and works of fiction of the time, which in this connexion might be justly considered irrelevant, we will only refer for an example, to the sacred hymns and poems of Dr Watts, in which, as has been truly observed, we find epithets and allusions taken from 'mortal beauties,' and applied to the objects of a heavenly love, with a license at once strange and disgusting.

Amidst, however, all the excuses which we are willing to find or invent for what must be deemed objectionable in these letters, we are constrained to admit that they contain expressions which we may not defend; and we are left to regret the weakness or the imprudence, which could permit them a place even in the most familiar correspondence. That which may be uttered incautiously by the lips, may not so readily find indulgence, when deliberately recorded by the pen. We will not here repeat the offence, which we have just been reprobating; but, as some curiosity respecting these letters may be felt by our readers, we deem it only reasonable so far to gratify it, as to lay before them a few passages, in which they may read the complaints and remonstrances of an unrequited love, and which we herewith give them full liberty to improve for their own imitation and benefit, if perchance it should ever be their misfortune to experience a similar calamity. We prefer selecting the letters we find of this class, as being far more tolerable in the repetition, than those in which the youthful Doddridge gives utterance to the tenderness of his passion.

It may at once be seen, without a word of explanation, that the lover had to deal with a capricious fair one, who had grown dissatisfied with the prospect of uniting her fortunes for life with those of a poor Dissenting minister, and who finally put an end to an engagement of more than two years continuance. The name of this lady was Miss Catharine Freeman; but with the familiarity of endearment, we believe common to such epistles, she is addressed by the appellation of Miss Kitty. It may be noted also in all charity, that the lover himself was at this period only twentytwo years of age, the minister of an obscure flock at the little village of Kibworth. Our readers will not fail to perceive, that, amidst all the tenderness of his passion, he was by no means insensible to the caprice of the

lady, and that, as we are happy to discover, he writes, under such provocation, as much in anger as in love.

‘TO MISS KITTY.*

‘March 21, 1726.

‘DEAR MADAM,

‘I was exceedingly surprised at what you said to me yesterday at Kibworth; and indeed my amazement was so great, that I hardly knew how to answer you upon the spot. It was indeed no convenient place for a debate, therefore I choose rather to rectify your mistake by a letter. I assure you, madam, nothing can be more unjust than the charge you advanced against me. I acknowledge you have now fully convinced me, that I must no longer flatter myself with the hope of enjoying you as my wife, as you insist upon a surprising demand which it will be impossible for me ever to comply with, and which I cannot entertain the least thought of submitting to! But though you forbid me to entertain any thought of conversing with you any longer as a mistress, you may depend upon it, madam, that I shall always regard you as one of the most valuable and excellent of my friends, and should think myself highly blameable, if my behaviour should give you any just ground to question the sincerity of my gratitude and respect. As for my not coming in when I called at the door, I am sure it was no intended neglect or affront. In fact it was so late that I was afraid it would be dark before I could get to Wagstone. And indeed I found the way so bad, that in all probability I should have been in the utmost danger if I had stayed but a quarter of an hour longer. I need not mention your coming to the door, because I confess I have still so much fondness for you, that I cannot see you without some discomposure; and judging of you by myself, I was ready to imagine it might have been an uneasiness to you, which I thought so much the more probable, because you have often told me, that if we parted, you desired to see me as little as possible. You perceive, madam, it was really my respect and tenderness, which determined me to this conduct, which you are pleased to call barbarous. I am heartily glad, that I can so confidently affirm, that most of your suspicion and resentment which has given both of us so much uneasiness in this affair, has been fully as groundless as this.

‘I cannot but lament those unfortunate mistakes which seem on both sides to have destroyed the expectation of that happiness which we might otherwise have found in each other. But you may depend upon it, madam, that in whatever place or circum-

* ‘After parting with her.’ Vol. II. pp. 89, 90.

stances Providence may fix me, you will always command a very high share in my affection and esteem, and a very sincere remembrance in my daily prayers.

‘I am, Madam,
‘Your most obedient and obliged Servant,
‘PHILIP DODDRIDGE.’

Again, he thus writes to Miss Kitty, after a few sentences of polite introduction.

‘I apprehend, madam, that the main question in debate between us, is whether I have given you any reason to believe that I did not love you, or that I preferred any other person at the time when you entertained those suspicions of me, and proceeded to such dreadful extremities, upon the supposition that they had a rational foundation. If I did, I very readily acknowledge that your late conduct towards me has not only been strictly just, but far more indulgent than I could reasonably have expected. But if the reverse has been the fact, then you yourself must allow, that I had reason to apprehend that a temper inclinable to such groundless suspicions would be the occasion of much future uneasiness, and will rather applaud the strength of my resolution, than accuse the weakness of my love, in accepting the dismissal which you had so often been offering to me. To prove that I did heartily love you, I need only appeal to those professions which I made of it to yourself and to all that I conversed with. For the sincerity of these professions, in a case of such great importance, I need not scruple to appeal to that God, who is the searcher of hearts, and before whom I could not appear with any confidence or hope, if I had been so base as to dissemble with you. I know you are already replying in your own mind, that you are persuaded I loved you once; but that it was the decay of that love which gave occasion to your suspicion. But, in answer to this, I would entreat you to recollect that I repeated these assurances almost a hundred times after this suspicion appeared, even to the very day when you resolved upon our parting; and all the answer these professions could procure was this, “You wished you could believe them to be true.” Indeed, madam, this was language to which I had not been accustomed! It was too plain a proof that you could put but little confidence in my sincerity; and I cannot but wonder that I could so long entertain any hope of being happy with a woman who had entertained such an unworthy opinion of me, as to believe I could prevaricate in an affair of such a nature.

‘As a further proof of the sincerity of my love, I may argue from my having urged you so frequently to continue to admit my addresses, when you seemed absolutely resolved to dismiss me.

Were I, as you misrepresent it, desirous of an occasion of breaking with you, why did I not take those occasions when you very expressly offered me that alternative, and indeed, almost every time I came to wait upon you? You tell me it was a sense of honour that engaged me to repeat the offer. But I entreat you, madam, to consider what appearance of dishonour can there be in quitting a lady who gives her lover a free dismissal, and that for the most substantial reason in the world, that after an intimate acquaintance of above two years, she apprehends that their tempers are very disagreeable to each other. Besides, madam, you yourself told me again and again, that you thought after such a declaration from you, I might very honourably make my retreat; and I always professed myself of the same opinion, and yet continued to follow you for several months together. Now such an indefatigable pursuit of a woman whom one did not love, when one could propose no extraordinary worldly advantage by obtaining her, must really argue such a mixture of the knave and the fool as I have not often observed in the same person!'

'You further argue from my behaviour to you since I came to Harborough; in which you say you have plainly discerned the unquestionable marks of a declining passion. Here likewise I will frankly confess, that I have been guilty of some little negligence, which business, conversation, and many trifling accidents, which I cannot now particularly describe, may very fairly account for, and for which I have frequently asked your pardon. However, I do solemnly profess, that I have loved you since I came to Harborough as heartily, though not as extravagantly, as I ever did in my life. I have been therefore resolved to prosecute my affair with you as far as I prudently could; and though I was not for returning to Burton, till I thought there was some considerable probability that it was upon a pretty good bottom; yet I assure you I have often longed for that time, in the midst of all the good sense, the religion, and the friendship, with which I have been entertained here; but here was the killing stroke: you indulged a great many unaccountable fancies, which had really no solid foundation, and so tormented yourself in my absence; and then when I came to see you, and brought with me a heart full of tenderness and love, you received me on almost every occasion with indifference or indignation. This is what I often told you I was not prepared to bear, and sufficiently intimated my apprehension that it would prove fatal to my love; and I must be so honest as to confess, that it has in fact given it a shock which I fear I shall never be able perfectly to recover; and has done much more to impair my affection to you, and my expectation of happiness with you, within a few weeks, than I could have believed possible. You, madam, have been wearying me every time you saw me

with repeated declarations, that you were fully convinced our tempers could never suit; that you could never make yourself easy in the thoughts of spending your life with me; that you could not credit any of the professions which I made of my love; and that you had reconciled yourself to the thoughts of parting. You know, madam, it was a long time before you could bring me to be of this mind; but when I came to consider of the affair at a distance from the blaze of those charms which have often dazzled my reason, and melted down my resolution, I was convinced of the justice of what you had said. When I reflected upon your former resentments, and compared them with my own temper, I very plainly saw that in the course of my life, I should almost daily repeat many of those things which had given you so much disquietude. I therefore resolved not to affect any air of excessive fondness, but to leave the affair to your determination, and to acquiesce in that, whatsoever it might be.

‘When I was in this temper, you, madam, to my unspeakable surprise, put the affair upon a new footing; you told me you could not be easy if I kept up my familiarity at Harborough, and persisted in my resolution of a journey to Bedford, and other appointments of that nature. I then thought, and I am still of the same opinion, that this was going entirely out of your way, and prescribing to me in particulars which ought to be left to my own discretion to determine; and I fancied, if I could think it prudent to put my love to such kind of tests, I must either leave you in continual suspicion of it, which would have made me miserable as a husband, or have engaged myself to a fond kind of severity, to which I could never long have submitted. I recollected what trifles your jealousy had sometimes engaged you to resent; what unaccountable constructions you had sometimes put upon the most innocent of my words and actions; and therefore, upon the whole, I thought it prudent and rational rather to take a dismissal upon these terms than to yield to demands of such a kind; and herein I had the concurrence of some few among the wisest and best of my friends, to whom I made a faithful representation of the case. I determined upon this course, not because I did not love you well enough to make you a very good husband, but because I did not think I owed any woman in the world so much deference, as you seemed to expect; indeed you have expressly declared such singular notions of a husband as I am sure I could never have complied with. I am all this while well assured of the excellency of your character in general, and was never more charmed with your behaviour in my life than I was in some of my last visits; but when I was fully persuaded in my own mind that we should be unhappy together, and you declared you could

not comply with my terms, which I still think to be entirely reasonable, my love and friendship to you served only to confirm me in my resolution of desisting, that I might not injure so excellent a creature.' Vol. II. pp. 92-100.

And, at length, in a postscript, that convenient appendage to letters of moment, said to be of special significance in the epistles of ladies, our author thus expresses himself.

'Upon the whole, madam, I do still very sincerely love you; and I see a very beautiful character under this cloud which your imprudence has thrown about it. If the matter, therefore, should come to extremities, I could never resolve to see you unhappy if it were in my power to prevent it. God forbid I should ever entertain so unworthy a thought. I should hate myself for it. But if, as you have often told me, the change of company and a few weeks of absence may restore us both to our former tranquillity, I really think it is the best event which, in our present circumstances, we can reasonably expect; and though I have already felt, and do still feel the pain that attends a separation from so dear and excellent a person, yet I think I must bear it to prevent a greater evil; as I would do the loss of a limb, if I thought it necessary for the preservation of my life. I am sure it is a sincere regard to your happiness, as well as my own, which has dictated this sentence, as uncourtly as it may possibly seem. My heart aches while I write thus—but I verily believe that, if you consider it, you will see it is only reasonable—God is a witness of the integrity with which I act in this tender affair.

'I most earnestly beg, madam, that you would not charge me, in the manner you have lately done, with having treated you in a base and unworthy manner; for such assertions will lay me under a necessity of telling the story as I apprehend it. And as I am sure, that that will be wholly prejudicial to your reputation in the world, and may be a hindrance to your future comfort, it would grieve me to the heart to be compelled to do so. I tell the world in general we are parted by consent, upon the discovery of some things unsuitable in our tempers; but that I have still a very high esteem for you, and think you one of the most deserving women whom I ever knew. Why will you force me to say any thing more?

'Remember, madam, the reputation of a minister is of the highest importance: and that the man who basely deserts a woman that loves him is one of the worst of villains. Let the story be but fairly told, and then I would leave even my enemies to judge, whether I have not behaved myself to you according to the strictest rules of integrity and honour.' Vol. II. pp. 103, 104.

Finally, in a letter of a few days previous, to his excellent friend, Mr Clark, of St Albans, whom he made the confidant of all his sorrows, and whose counsel was always wise, he thus writes ;—

‘DEAR SIR,—I was yesterday at Burton, and then made an end of my affair with Miss Kitty, who has now absolutely discarded me.’ Vol. II. p. 86.

We are not willing, even did our contracting limits permit, to multiply extracts from this *familiar* correspondence. It is extended through many pages, in which the writer, in communications to *several other friends as well as the lady in question*, utters the sorrows of his heart. They were indeed many and grievous. Had it been an enemy, he would have borne them better. But from a friend, on whom such hopes had rested, and who seems to have been set for the peculiar trial of his temper, they could have been no other than bitter. In a letter, which after the separation he addressed to the lady in question, he *sums up under nine distinct heads* (a manner altogether accordant with the habits of his profession), the various grievances of which she had given him occasion to complain. From this, as well as other sources, our readers may readily infer, not only the extent of his troubles, but his susceptibility to suffering. In truth, it is very evident, that the Doctor, in his early youth, before experience and matrimony had taught him judgment, was a great sufferer under that painful dispensation—we mean that of early and unrequited love—which beyond all the exactions of a Levitical or a ceremonial law, gendereth to bondage ; in the perplexities of which, as we have said, the purest spirits are most easily entangled ; nay, by which that frequently happeneth to the good, which under a better dispensation is threatened only to the wicked, that they are like the troubled sea, and find no peace.

But we hasten to remark, for the relief of our readers and our own, that all these perplexities were at length terminated in a happy matrimonial union, about four years afterwards, with a more suitable object. During this interval, indeed, it must be confessed, the Doctor was not without other plans and hopes, which failed of accomplishment. But by his judicious friend and biographer, who, as a wise man should, passes over in silence everything of that nature, we are told, that in December 1730, he married Mrs Mercy Maris, a native of Wor-

cester ; that he found in her a prudent, religious, and affectionate companion ; that she was the faithful mother of his numerous train of young children, and survived him as his mourning widow a great number of years.

Let it not, however, be forgotten, that amidst all that with a less susceptible spirit might pass for weakness, or that might justly bring into question the solidity of his judgment, Mr Doddridge never lost sight of his high and generous aims, of the claims of his profession, or of his habitual piety. At this very period he was a conscientious and faithful pastor, and, as fully appears from the Memoirs both of Kippis and Orton, was preparing himself, by diligent study and the improvement of all his powers, for the usefulness and honor to which he was destined. These petty entanglements and disappointments of his heart—somewhat numerous, we confess, and perplexing for a wise man to suffer—were but passing clouds, that could not long obscure the beauty or the brightness of his ascending sun. In the letter to his prudent counsellor, Dr Clark, already quoted, we find him calmly surveying the troublesome path he had trodden, and uttering sentiments altogether so worthy of himself, and so indicative of the recovered tone of his spirits, that before we pass to weightier topics, we cannot forbear laying it, in part, before our readers. We must take freedom, at the same time, to recommend it to the consideration, as of young men in general, so especially of young ministers, who may be in danger from similar trials. And if we have presented this excellent man in somewhat of the state which, like one described by an intrepid apostle, was ‘in weakness, and fear, and much trembling,’ it seems but the demand of justice, and we hope it may be profitable, to exhibit him also in his vigorous resolution, and the friendly warnings of his experience.

‘And now, sir, I have seriously to look back upon an amour of about twenty-eight months ; and I find, that at the expense of a great many anxious days and restless nights, fond transports, passionate expostulations, weak submissions, and a long train of other extravagances, which I should be ready to call impertinent, if they were not too injurious to admit of so soft a name, I have only purchased a more lively conviction that all is vanity !

‘On the whole, I bless God that it is not such an intolerable vexation as I was once ready to imagine it would have been. But the warning I had of this dreadful blow gave me an opportu-

nity of summoning up all my philosophy to my assistance. I am just now come from the sacrament, where I have been renewing the dedication of myself to God, and leaving all my concerns with him. I have so often been referring this dear business to his wisdom and goodness, that I dare not dispute his determination. Kitty has left me, and a thousand fond schemes are vanished with her, and it was just that I should lose this creature, of whom I knew in my conscience I had sometimes made an idol. But let me engage your prayers for me, that whatever I lose, I may never lose the approbation of my own conscience, the sense of the divine favour, the lively apprehensions of an eternal world, and the esteem and affection of such excellent friends as yourself, in whom I expect a very considerable part of my present and future happiness. My sincerest respects wait upon your good lady, &c.

‘I am, Reverend Sir,

‘Your most obliged and most affectionate Servant,

‘PHILIP DODDRIDGE.’

Passing now, as we acknowledge ourselves impatient to do, from the inexperience and fervor of his youth, we shall consider Dr Doddridge in the true character in which he ought to be exhibited—as a good minister, an able instructor, and head of one of the best theological seminaries of his time. And among the excellent traits, which these letters exhibit, is his contentment, modesty, and resolution, in preferring, for the first scene of his labors, the retired village of Kibworth, and a ministry among a small and illiterate flock, notwithstanding the many lucrative and honorable situations which were urged upon his choice. From large congregations in Worcester, Coventry, and London, he received repeated solicitations to become their pastor. Some of these he positively declined on account of the *bigotry of the people*, and because he would not be embarrassed by their subscriptions to articles, or the exclusiveness of their spirit. But from a modest distrust of his own qualifications, from the high standard he had formed to himself of ministerial excellence, from a determination also to give himself in his earlier years to diligent study, and a generous affection to the people with whom he was first connected, he resisted all the temptations of fame and influence, so flattering to one of his ardent temper, and resolutely remained for more than seven years at Kibworth, and in its neighbourhood, where, as he tells us in one of these letters, his morning audience seldom exceeded forty persons, and his

annual salary was just £29, which was almost his only dependence.

There is surely a generosity and elevation in such a course, worthy of all praise. It marks a purity and disinterestedness of motive, which might be taken for a sure pledge of permanent usefulness. And when we consider the distinction he afterwards obtained, we cannot but present it as another fine example to candidates for the ministry, who may be seeking too anxiously, at the commencement of their course, for conspicuous places in their vocation, or who may find themselves discouraged by the prospect, or even the certain allotment, of the humbler.

We have adverted to the catholicism of Dr Doddridge, and his freedom from uncharitableness. These were early and decided traits of his character, and were exhibited through his life. He absolutely refused all participation in exclusive measures. He especially considered separation of churches on account of differences in subordinate points of faith or discipline, as unwarrantable; and not seldom did he incur the censure of Exclusionists for the liberal system he invariably pursued. 'Once, I remember,' relates Dr Kippis, 'some narrow-minded people of his congregation gave him no small trouble on account of a gentleman, in communion with the church, who was a professed Arian, and who otherwise departed from the common standard of Orthodoxy. This gentleman they wished either to be excluded from the ordinance of the Lord's Supper, or to have his attendance upon it prevented. But the Doctor declared, that he would sacrifice his place, and even his life, rather than fix any such mark of discouragement upon one, who, whatever his doctrinal sentiments were, appeared to be a true Christian.'—A correspondent having charged him with unsoundness in one of his publications, his only answer was, '*Quod scripsi, scripsi*,' 'What I have written, I have written.' He expresses in one of his letters, his admiration of the catholic sentiments of his own theological tutor, Dr Jennings, who 'does not,' says he, 'entirely accord with the system of any particular body of men; but is sometimes a Calvinist, sometimes a Baxterian, and sometimes a Socinian, as *truth* and *evidence* determine him.'

On the other hand, he speaks with dissatisfaction of the arguments of a certain popular preacher, as 'very inconclusive, though they were generally as good as high Calvinism will

bear.' He would not listen for a moment to an invitation to settle in any church, however acceptable he had reason to believe would be his services, where he must submit to subscription to articles; 'a thing, which,' as he writes to his friend Clark, 'I have resolved never to do.'

In truth, all his sentiments and conduct upon these points were of the most decided character. We fear he will more readily obtain the indulgence of his exclusive brethren for some of the puerilities of his early loves, than for some of the expressions of dislike or ridicule, which, in the freedom, perhaps the confidence of friendship, he utters against all forms of bigotry, narrow-minded deacons, and separating religionists. Many examples of this might, did we desire it, be adduced. He speaks of 'high Orthodoxy,' as apt to be coupled with something wrong in the social character. And—let us here bespeak for him the charity of all concerned—he even ventures to say, of this same '*high Orthodoxy and good sense, that they are seldom found together.*'

Of Dr Doddridge, as a theological tutor, or, as in any of our seminaries he would be called, a professor,—of his qualifications for this arduous work, and his distinguished success, we have ample accounts by his pupils, Orton and Kippis, more particularly in the excellent Memoirs of the latter, who, with equal respect for the character of his instructor, is more discriminating in his encomiums, and candidly admits some of the defects, which were undeniably mingled with his excellences. Of this impartiality, so essential to all faithful biography, and so honorable to the character of that accomplished writer and divine, we find examples in his judicious remarks upon Doddridge's account of the conversion of Colonel Gardiner, and his estimate of the character of that gentleman; upon his love of popularity, his habit of speaking somewhat ostentatiously of his own employments, and particularly that accommodation of religious phraseology to the opinions or associations of others, which, even in his lifetime, did not escape without some charge of insincerity. With the same candor does Dr Kippis speak of his tutor's strain of preaching; and the remarks he offers upon this subject, and the anecdote with which he connects them, we will here transcribe, particularly as with a defect, they exhibit also a great beauty in the Doctor's character.

'With regard to the composition of sermons, his work as a tutor, and the pastoral inspection of a very numerous congregation, rendered it next to impossible that his discourses for the pulpit

should be so exact and accurate as they were in the 'former part of his ministry.' p. 185.

And, having quoted a high encomium on his preaching by Mr Orton,—

'This encomium,' says Dr Kippis, 'is, I think, to be admitted with some slight degree of abatement.—When he had leisure to draw out his plan, and the hints of what he proposed to say, to a considerable extent, his discourses were often excellent in a high degree. But, at other times, when he could but just lay down his scheme, with only a very few thoughts under it, his sermons, especially if he was not in a full flow of spirits, were less valuable. Once, during my residence with him, a number of pupils complained, through the medium of Mr Orton, that, though their revered tutor's academical lectures were admirable, they had not in him a sufficiently correct model of pulpit composition. The consequence of the information was, that his sermons became far superior to what they had sometimes formerly been; for he was the most candid of all men to the voice of gentle admonition.' pp. 185, 6.

The influence and history of the Theological Seminary at Northampton, over which Dr Doddridge presided, are sufficient proofs of the excellent system of instruction he pursued. The fruits were precisely those which might be anticipated. All liberal studies and just freedom of enquiry will conduct, if not to rational doctrines, at least to a catholic spirit. And notwithstanding the tutor's well known attachment to what are usually denominated evangelical principles, or to a qualified form of Orthodoxy, very many of his pupils imbibed under his care the most liberal sentiments; and, as they advanced in their profession, became, both by their preaching and their publications, distinguished advocates of Unitarian Christianity. Of these, one of the most eminent was Dr Kippis himself, the accomplished author of the *Biographia Britannica*, and entitled to honor, not more for his classical literature, than for his high place among the Dissenting ministers of his time. Another, and among the first who entered his school, was Dr Hugh Farmer, author of the *Essay on the Dæmoniacs of the New Testament*, of the *Dissertation on Miracles*, of the *Inquiry into the Nature of our Lord's Temptation*, and of other learned and able treatises. Nor can we omit the name of Newcome Cappe, whose *Practical Discourses* are much read among us, and to whose youthful genius, industry, virtue, and promise, Dr Doddridge himself bears affectionate testimony,

in a letter written to his mother on the departure of this 'his esteemed friend and pupil,' * from his school.

We should undoubtedly include in this list also, Mr Orton, one of the most serious and judicious of practical writers, and who, if retaining more of the doctrinal views of his instructor, was not less decided in his aversion to high Calvinism, and to every form of uncharitableness.

Indeed the number of liberal men educated by Dr Doddridge, would appear remarkable, were it not, as we have intimated, the undeniable, we might add, the natural result, of the freedom to which he left them. This, however, though clearly demanded by all upright views of the subject, was regarded with distrust by his more exclusive brethren. It brought into suspicion the soundness of his own Orthodoxy; and, long after his death, it was not only an occasion of grief, but of reproach, that from his seminary and from that which succeeded it at Daventry, should have proceeded so many, whose talents, learning, and eloquence, whose love of truth and piety, were all engaged in a cause, which some men called heresy. And certainly, amidst the little weaknesses, or timidity, which Dr Doddridge in interests of less importance might betray, and which were among the undeniable foibles of his character—it is to the lasting honor of his name, that, upon questions like these, he would not suffer himself to be moved. He had too much regard for the sacredness of truth, and too much respect for the rights of conscience, to prescribe to his pupils any limits to their inquiries, or to yield for a moment his own views of duty to the suspicions or reproaches of men, whose favorable opinion, in matters of a more personal nature, he was possibly too solicitous to secure. Nor, distasteful as to some may be even the suggestion, can we resist the conviction, that had he and Dr Calamy, whose moderation amidst Orthodoxy we have noticed as the shining grace of his character,—had they and other worthies it is easy to name, but of whom for brevity's sake, we will only mention Dr Isaac Watts as the representative and head, lived in these our times, their integrity of soul, their catholic temper, and their fidelity to the light which God was continually opening to them, would have distinguished them as the advocates of Liberal Christianity, as they are already distinguished by Christians of every name, among the best of men and the most useful of ministers.

* For this letter see *Memoirs of the Life of Newcome Cappe*, by his Wife.

This last, it may be noted, is the eulogium deliberately pronounced by Dr Kippis, in summing up the character of the author of the letters before us. For he says, 'that Dr Doddridge was not only a great man, but one of the most excellent Christians and christian ministers, that ever existed.' In acknowledging at the same time, the defects to which we have adverted, he imagines that he had, in certain points, a resemblance to Cicero; particularly in his love of fame, and in not possessing the sternness of fortitude. But, he adds, 'he resembled him likewise in more estimable qualities; in the copiousness, diffusion, and pathos, of his eloquence; and in the sensibilities and tenderness of his mind, especially as displayed in the loss of his daughter.'*

With our highest respect for the judgment of Dr Kippis, we are not sure that his affection for his 'benefactor, tutor, and friend,' and his readiness of classic allusion, rather than the exactness of the truth, has furnished out a comparison so honorable to Doddridge. But be this as it may, we wish that the great-grandson had imitated the pupil in his delicacy and good sense in setting forth, or rather forbearing to set forth, the more private qualities of his ancestor. We repeat our thorough reprobation of the folly or the meanness; the lack of prudence, or, what was perhaps the commanding motive, the love of money, which has forced these manuscripts into light. But since the evil is committed, and we cannot avoid it, we will, like christian philosophers, endeavour to deduce from it the good which it may yield us, and shall conclude this notice, already too extended, with one or two of those practical reflections, which, though somewhat more appropriate within the walks of pulpit instruction, cannot, we trust, be deemed out of place, or intrusive, in the pages of our journal.

And to give to these their full efficacy, we shall wave all doubts as to the authenticity of *some* of these letters, though we confess we have many; and will only remark in passing, that the titles affixed to them are purely the work of the compiler, who has betrayed a strange eagerness to exhibit in strong relief the least desirable portions of them, and whose flippancy and thoughtlessness, to use no harsher terms, seem to us, when we consider with whose good name he was trifling, as amounting to 'an iniquity to be punished by the judges.' Admitting, however, for the present, the genuineness of these let-

* Kippis's Memoirs of Dr Doddridge, p. 299.

ters, and comparing them with the unquestionable notices we have of Doddridge, we may see with what weaknesses and foibles the characters of good, and even eminent men, may be mingled. We perceive, that there is a certain unavoidable delusion in biography, as well as in history, which, in selecting only the brighter parts of character, separating the precious from the base, what is wise and noble from what is foolish, imprudent, or mean, shall make that pass for true greatness, or unblemished worth, which in reality, and even to the view of friends, while the hero was yet alive, may have been tarnished, or even degraded by many faults.

On the other hand, in the just honors, that for nearly a century have been bestowed upon the name of Doddridge, we perceive how the memory of such infirmities may be lost in the essential worth, dignity, and usefulness of the character; so that if its failings are noticed at all, it shall be as spots in the glorious sun. There is a blessed charity, which, since it is not of themselves, God in his mercy has given to time, to death, and the grave, to cover a multitude of sins, and to secure to substantial goodness its own immortality.

‘Who now ever speaks,’ in the hearing of the present writer said a venerable minister, now almost in his century of years, and probably the only man living, who has seen Dr Doddridge, * ‘who now ever thinks of the Doctor’s vanity, or complains of his talking so fondly of his own works, his many engagements, and large correspondence? Who hears of him now, but as the great and eloquent divine?’ Thus it is, that the grave dresses up for us our virtues, and sends them out in fresh beauty and glory for the praise and imitation of men, whilst it hides our faults, nay, even our vices, under the friendly cover of its

* The Rev. Thomas Tayler, formerly the minister of Carter Lane, London, who, as we understand, retains in his extreme old age, the judgment and benevolence, which marked his whole life. He is the only surviving pupil of Dr Doddridge; and though too young to have belonged to his Theological School, having, as he told this writer, only recited his lessons to him when a school-boy, he may be numbered with those that have been mentioned as imbibing the catholicism of his instructor. This most amiable and exemplary man has, we learn from the preface to the letters, lately paid a touching tribute of his filial regard to the memory of his early instructor, by renewing, at his own expense, and in a handsome manner, the tomb of Dr Doddridge in the Protestant burial ground at Lisbon. It was in that city, it will be remembered, the Doctor died, having sought in vain from its milder climate the recovery of his health. There, also, his remains were interred, and his tomb, with the lapse of more than half a century, had fallen into decay.

own darkness. 'Therefore,' said the wise man, 'happier esteemed I the dead who are already dead, than the living who are yet alive.'

Yet again, and here the instruction applies especially for our fear and warning, we learn how the innocent foibles, the petty infirmities or imprudences of early life, may come up to the surprise of others, and to our own dishonor, long after the memory of them has passed away. A publication like this before us, may awaken from its sleep of a century, the record, which even our own hands had made, and our own carefulness rather than thoughtlessness, had preserved, of hopes or fears, love or hatred, follies or sins, which every earthly being that had known them, had forgotten, and the God, to whom alone they were present, had graciously forgiven. Some untoward accident, or that which men call such; some idle stroller or painful searcher into garrets, some needy or spendthrift grandson, willing to make of our name that which he cannot make from his own—shall drag them into light; and long after we have been slumbering in our graves, and there is none that knew us, to defend us, shall make us the reproach or ridicule of a third or a fourth generation—of young men and of young women, who had come into the world too long after we had gone from it, to hear of the good, which was mingled with our evil, or the virtues that prevailed, while we lived, to procure charity for our faults; nay, which, perhaps, left to us unimpaired, except in our own unforgiving consciences, the name and honors of good men.

To pursue these very serious reflections to their just conclusion, we must remark yet further, that to guard against this posthumous dishonor, the only true and efficacious method is, to guard against the occasions of it; to do nothing that shall be 'grief of heart' to ourselves, or to them who may come after us. The seed, sown thoughtlessly in the beginning of life, may spring up an unbidden and unwelcome harvest, and nothing be left of us but our defenceless memories to reap it. But since, as in the instance before us, good may sometimes take the shape and appearance of evil, and foibles and inadvertences show themselves in this imperfect state in the best and wisest of our race, we have, lastly, one word of counsel, which the history we have been exhibiting must sufficiently show to be wise. Are we writing, then, for any who

desire that their memory shall flourish sweetly over their graves—and what son or daughter of Adam does not desire it?—and have they the felicities or the sorrows of their lot accumulated on their hands in files of confidential correspondence; or, to come yet nearer to the point, that we may not fail to be understood, do they hold in their most secret repositories the faithful records of their laudable, but disappointed projects of the heart, then our counsel is, Burn them;—in the words of Horace, applied, with a single change, by a most grave divine,* to the manuscripts of a learned ancestor, who was also one of the lights of New England—

Dissolve frigus : scripta super foco
Large reponens.

Brief as this counsel is, let it not be doubted that it includes the whole wisdom of the case.

Nor will the sacrifice be great. It may cost indeed a few short pangs, and may revive for an hour the remembrance of hopes that have past, or of wounds that have closed. But then it may rescue our memories from a more scorching flame; and in the smoke of that sacrifice shall be consumed forever the record of those days, in comparison of which with their wiser years, some of the best and most honored of mankind may have found cause to say, 'When I was a child, I spake as a child, I thought as a child, I understood as a child; but when I became a man, I put away childish things.'

ART. VI.—*Principles of Congregationalism. The Second Century Lecture of the First Church.* By CHARLES WENTWORTH UPHAM, Junior Pastor. Salem. Foote & Brown. 1829. 8vo. pp. 72.

WE are indebted to the author of this discourse for some very valuable contributions to our stock of theological publications. His sermon, on the Principles of the Reformation,

* Dr Charles Chauncey, of Boston, in recording the fate of the manuscripts of his great-grandfather, President Chauncey, of Harvard College, for learning and weight of character among the most eminent men of his day.

published three years ago, and designed to lay the broad foundations of religious inquiry, as this is to lay the particular foundations of church order—was not a mere effusion, as occasional sermons are apt to be, but an able discussion of the subject, enriched by the aids of much and various reading. His Letters on the Logos, published afterwards, furnish, we think, an admirable specimen of theological discussion. The armour of learning, which in most hands is apt to be cumbrous, is wielded with much ease and grace; and whatever opinion theological friend or foe may entertain of the theory supported, he must allow, if our judgment does not greatly mislead us, that investigations, in such a spirit and manner, though they seem not at this moment to be very congenial with the temper of the times, are to be earnestly welcomed. We are not now to review these Letters, but we will say in passing, that, although it does not appear to us very easy to settle exactly the respective claims of secular and of Jewish learning to be the expositors of the proem of John's Gospel, the theory of Lowman deserves more attention, perhaps, than it has received; and that the Letters, while they unfold and illustrate this theory, with a clearness and to an extent much beyond the conceptions of the original author, also throw very interesting light upon many passages of scripture, and will reward the attention, not only of the theological student, but of the general reader.

The Second Century Lecture, the publication now before us, fully supports the honorable standing which Mr Upham has taken. In the first part of the Lecture, he passes in brief review his predecessors in the First Church at Salem—'the Mother of us all.' He retouches with a skilful hand, the monuments of the olden time, which were fading from our memory. We were much interested with this part of the discourse. It seemed to us an offering of filial reverence, worthy of the occasion, of the men, and of the place which the author occupies. We must content ourselves with presenting to our readers but one of these sketches; that of Francis Higginson, the first 'teacher.'

'In tracing the course of FRANCIS HIGGINSON, from the place of his education in Emanuel College to his early grave in Salem, we are presented throughout with the most interesting scenes. We pass through the wide field of Nonconformity and of the Reformation in England—a field crowded with the most affecting, romantic, and momentous incidents; and we come into close contact

with all the adventures, perils, and distresses, of the first settlers of New-England. He was one of the most amiable and accomplished ministers of his age. We cannot contemplate his character without feeling the deepest reverence for his virtues, the highest admiration of his talents, and the tenderest interest in his sufferings and death. With a genius and eloquence, which, had he stooped to conformity, would have secured to him all the glory and power that an earthly ambition could covet, he submitted, for conscience sake, to the severest sacrifice and the most embarrassing distresses, while in his own country. For conscience sake, he braved what were then indeed the dreadful perils of the ocean, and fled to this wild and wintry shore; and here he perished an early martyr to the holy cause of christian liberty.

‘Virtue and religion demand that the character and actions, the services and sufferings of this good man should be presented in all their interest, and with all their attraction, to the generations of New-England. The man, who laid the foundations of our religious institutions in the principles of the most perfect freedom, and of apostolic simplicity, ought never to be forgotten. We should take delight in rescuing his example from obscurity, and his name from oblivion.

‘The christian graces shed such a beauty upon his daily life, that the hearts of all who witnessed it were charmed into love and admiration. It is related, that, when he left Leicester, the place of his residence in England, to embark for the forests of America, although at the time he was suffering beneath the frowns of the government, the people of every rank and party rushed forth from their dwellings to bid him farewell. They crowded the streets through which he passed. Every eye was filled with tears, and every voice was imploring blessings upon him! Our imaginations should often present him to our hearts, as he called his family and fellow passengers around him, leaned over the stern of the vessel, in which he was borne in exile from his native home, while the cliffs of his country, still dear to his soul, although it was driving him out to perish in the wilderness, were disappearing from sight, and uttered that memorable benediction, than which there is nothing more affecting, more magnanimous, or more sublime in the records of history: “We will not say, as the Separatists were wont to say at their leaving of England—farewell Babylon! farewell Rome!—but we will say, FAREWELL DEAR ENGLAND! farewell the church of God in England, and all the christian friends there!” Our bosoms must always experience a softened and melancholy emotion, when we reflect upon his rapid decline and premature death. His delicate constitution could not bear the rigors of the new climate, and the privations incident to

the early settlement. The sufferings of one short year, the severities of a single winter, carried him off. As the termination of his life approached, he seemed to have been admitted to clearer views of the results of the great enterprise which he had been called to conduct. His soul soared into those higher regions, from which the scenes of futurity can be discerned. In his dying hours he repeatedly uttered the prediction, which has already been so wonderfully fulfilled. "He was persuaded," he said, "that although the Lord was calling him away, he would raise up others, to carry on the work that was begun, and that there would yet be many churches of the Lord Jesus Christ in this wilderness." While he sleeps by the side of their fathers, may our children of every generation venerate his character and cherish his memory. 'Such was Francis Higginson! We have cause to bless Providence that a character so bright and beautiful in all the attributes which can adorn the man, the patriot, and the Christian, was selected to take the lead in that great work commenced at the formation of this Church, and which will never be finished while error and bigotry remain—"the further reformation of religion in the world."' pp. 9—11.

Among the pastors of the First Church in Salem, was the celebrated Hugh Peters. No man of his day seems to have been more obnoxious to the royalists of England than Peters. In a series of letters, now printed in the form of a postscript to the Lecture, Mr Upham has attempted to ward off this reproach from the character of his illustrious predecessor. We could easily believe, if the argument were less successfully made out, that grievous injustice has been done to this powerful and eloquent defender of free principles in church and state; that his very elevation but made him the more certain victim. We could easily believe this, because we have too much evidence, that, if there were a set of men preeminently unscrupulous both as to rights and characters, they were the restored royalists under the second Charles, with their master at their head.

This old and prevailing injustice renders it incumbent on the friends of religious liberty in this country, to embrace every proper opportunity for the defence of its confessors and fathers in England, and of those principles which brought them, two centuries ago, to these then wild and desolate shores. We think, therefore, that the author of this Lecture has done an appropriate and good work, in reviving the memory of some of the suffering advocates of this great cause, and in discussing their religious principles.

These are the principles of Congregationalism. Instead of following the author of the Lecture before us, we shall offer a few remarks of our own upon the same general subject.

The great principle of Congregationalism is perfect religious freedom. It is freedom to an extent scarcely recognised by the most of the modern churches, that bear this denomination. It is freedom in every church from all interference, coercion, and power of other churches, and from all councils, except such as are strictly advisory.

'The second principle,' says Mr Upham, 'which our fathers established on the 6th of August, 1629, was *the Independence of the Congregational Churches of all external jurisdiction*. This principle is important beyond description or estimation. It was not only declared by the founders of this church, but, justice requires that it should be said, its whole history is crowded with evidence, that it has been steadily and resolutely maintained to this day. It was declared at its foundation. The early writers inform us that, when Governor Bradford, with others, arrived during the solemnity of ordaining the first ministers, and it was proposed that he should extend to the new church and its pastors, in the name of the christian brethren at Plymouth, the Right Hand of Fellowship, he was not permitted to discharge that interesting and friendly service, until it had first been proclaimed, that no inference should ever be drawn from it, in support of the idea, that there was the least dependence whatever in this Church upon others, the least jurisdiction over it in any external body, or the least necessary connexion between it and other churches, wherever they might be. It is impossible to conceive of a clearer, or stronger declaration of entire independence, than that which was thus uttered by its founders, at the moment of establishing the Congregational Church.' pp. 40, 41.

A late traveller among us, has denominated Congregationalism, such as we now define and contend for, the 'Democracy of religion.' We may extend the comparison and say, that Presbyterianism is the Oligarchical form of government; and that of the English Church, with the king for its head, the Monarchical form; and that of the Catholic Church, with its pontiff, the ecclesiastical sovereign of nations, the Imperial form.

Now the great reason that leads us to prefer the first of these modes, is, that it is most consonant with the end to be gained.

We might urge, indeed, that it was the primitive mode. The early congregations of Christians, it is certain, were entirely independent of each other. And even the apostles, divinely au-

thorised as they were to teach them the christian truths, did not 'lord it over God's heritage,' 'did not desire to have any [human] dominion over the faith of their converts, but only to be helpers of their joy.' But we would not press this early example, as of absolute authority. We believe, that, under the general suggestions of religious liberty which the gospel breathes, much in regard to modes and forms, is left to expediency. On this subject let the learned Hooker speak for us; we can go no higher for authority, we suppose, with our Episcopal friends. 'What was used in the apostles' times,' says he, 'the scripture fully declareth not; so that making their times the rule and canon of church polity, ye make a rule, which being not possible to be known, is as impossible to be kept.'*—"The rule of faith," saith Tertullian, "is but one, and that alone immoveable, and impossible to be framed or cast anew." The law of outward order and polity not so. There is no reason in the world, wherefore we should esteem it as necessary always to do, as always to believe, the same things; seeing every man knoweth that the matter of faith is constant; the matter contrawise of action, daily changeable; especially the matter of action belonging unto church polity. Neither can I find that men of soundest judgment have any otherwise taught, than that articles of belief and things which all men must of necessity do to the end they may be saved, are either expressly set down in scripture or else plainly thereby to be gathered. But touching things which belong to discipline and outward polity, the church hath authority to make canons, laws, and decrees, even as we read that in the apostles' times, it did. Which kind of laws (forasmuch as they are not in themselves necessary to salvation) may after they are made, be also changed as the difference of times or places shall require.†

Let it be so, then. With a right and scriptural definition of the word *church*, we have no difficulty about the power, certainly, which is here claimed for making canons, though the authority in Hooker's sense we must deny, and still more the pertinence of the example on which he founds the claim. It can scarcely be admitted that we may do what the apostles might do. But still there is no doubt, that every congregation of christian worshippers has power to frame its own rules, and ordain its means of mutual improvement and edification, though

* Preface to Ecclesiastical Polity, p. 155. Ed. Ox. 1820.

† Eccles. Polity, Book III. pp. 401-2.

if it ordains anything oppressive or wrong, it can claim no authority from Christ for such enactment.

Let it be, then, that expediency is the rule; for Hooker maintains it as if it would help him in the argument against Non-conformity. And against the principles of the early Dissenters it did; for they maintained that their own precise form of church order was enjoined in the scriptures. In this respect, certainly, we agree less with them than with the liberal Churchman. Yet, nevertheless, taking expediency for the rule, we contend for the simplest form of ecclesiastical polity—for our own Congregationalism, because, in our judgment, it is more suitable to the end to be gained.

What is that end? The promotion of virtue and piety. And these are to be promoted by an appeal to man's moral nature, to his conscience. There are various kinds of polity, if we may speak so, for the various departments of human action. There are systems of education for the mind. There are systems of government for the outward conduct. But the sole department of ecclesiastical polity is the conscience. No doubt these various spheres of influence are intimately connected, and are, in a degree, blended with each other. The cultivation of the mind tends to enlighten the conscience, and this again, enlightened and impressed, leads to correct conduct. But it is upon conscience itself, that religion and religious institutions first and chiefly press their claims.

Now, *legislation for the conscience*—say that the thing is feasible; say that the conscience *can* be ruled by human authority; say that the phrase is *not* a contradiction in terms—yet such legislation, we are sure, should be confined within the narrowest limits compatible with the guidance and welfare of mankind. We can perceive that great social compacts have their uses; but they seem to us to have no place here. We see that an extended and well organized system of government, for instance, is necessary for political purposes—necessary to repel invasion, to carry on works of internal improvement, to collect a revenue for this and other purposes, to legislate upon the thousand questions of property and personal rights, which are continually arising in a great community. But the church has nothing of all this to do; or ought not to have. The simple business of this department of our institutions, is, to make men good and devout; and to make them so by moral means, by instructions, persuasions, warnings—by appeals, in other

words, to the conscience. We cannot see the necessity of any greatly extended combination for this purpose. A public assembly, public worship, public instruction, the simple ordinances of religion—these are all that seem to us needful. And these may be arranged after one form or another, and according to one faith or another—we shall not object, or, at least, we shall not strenuously object in matters of this sort, provided that no particular form of faith be imposed upon the conscience.

But here arises the great danger of extensive combinations of churches—of synods and hierarchies, of ecclesiastical ‘dominions and principalities’—that they *will* abridge the liberty of the mind; that they will make it unsafe to inquire for the truth or to follow the dictates of conscience. Our objection, be it repeated, is not to forms as such, not to liturgies and bishops. We are inclined, some of us at least, to believe that a liturgy, used to a certain extent, and subject to revision, would be desirable. We think that a venerable, excellent, and eloquent man, visiting all the churches in succession, might do much to unite and strengthen the hearts of Christians. Our objection, then, is not to these simply considered, but it is to power and prescription. We are afraid that great convocations, call them General Assemblies, Episcopal Conventions, Methodist Conferences, Oecumenical Councils, or by whatever name you please—that great convocations, we say, legislating for the mind, will forget the holy thing they are dealing with; that, amidst the imposing formalities of debates and enactments, and in the presence and power of numbers, they will forget the sacredness of conscience; that they will legislate oppressively for the mind; that, in fine, they will not leave, to the body of Christians, the liberty wherewith God has made them free. The history of every great combination of churches, whether Catholic, English, Presbyterian, or Methodist, if it shows anything, shows that this is no misplaced fear.

Is it said that no great grievance of this kind is experienced in this country, and that, at any rate, a man can leave the denomination whose laws and usages he does not like. Yes, he can leave it; but will it not be with great odium, and with an odium proportioned to the extent, the exclusiveness, the mutual connexion and dependence of the body he leaves? Things of this sort, it is to be remembered, are very much neutralized in this country. But let the dissenter leave a church which embraces the whole population of the land—that happy ideal state

of things which almost every denomination is sighing after—and he would find that it was like losing *caste* in India. There would be no more liberty of conscience in such a country than there is in Spain. Indeed, all the evils of church power are to a considerable extent neutralized by our institutions. The full tendencies of the anti-congregational systems are not developed here. The stern Presbyterian, the lofty Churchman, whether Reformed or Catholic, is exceedingly tamed down from what he has been in Scotland, in England, or in Italy. We are speaking, of course, quite in the abstract. We are far enough from saying, that the members of any religious denomination among us, desire to bring in here the abuses of former times or of other countries. But we do say, that we would not trust them, nor any human beings, with the unrestrained power to commit such abuses. The question is about the actual tendency of extensive ecclesiastical legislation, of much power in few hands. Our own conviction is, that human nature cannot be safely trusted with it.

The point we urge, is, that the independence of our Congregational churches, as a system of discipline, is more suitable than any other, to the sphere in which religion is to operate—the sphere of conscience; and that any departure from this simplicity is dangerous to the liberty of conscience. And on this point we will only further ask, why the cause of religion cannot be left as free from prescriptive regulation and legislative interference, as the cause of education and learning? We should not choose, in these matters, to be subjected to the scholastic systems of three centuries ago. We should not choose to leave it to the ‘collective wisdom,’ as it is called, of Congress, to decide in what way we should educate our children, or our families. Let no one start from the comparison as if it were irreverent. We are not speaking of religion and the gospel, but of humanly devised methods for teaching them and giving them efficacy. And what method, what ecclesiastical polity, what creed or liturgy of three centuries ago, does not bear marks of that period? For our own part we cannot pay the wisdom of former centuries in religion, any greater respect than their wisdom in politics or education. And as to present times, we know not the men—and here we speak without exception or qualification—we know not the men, though the four quarters of the earth gave up their wisest, whom we would suffer to meet together, and to say what we should believe, or how we should worship.

Against this obvious and reasonable view of the subject of church order, there ought to be, to set it aside, some strong and decisive objections. When the framers of the First Church in Salem, met together to form that covenant—we refer to the Lecture before us, for a very interesting account of the transaction*—when they took their stand on the ‘platform’ of entire equality and perfect independence, when they agreed among themselves to assemble regularly and to sustain the ordinances of christian worship and instruction, we think it must be allowed that they pursued the perfectly obvious and natural course. It was just what any of us would do, unbiassed by any preconceived notions of church discipline, or any love of power. Now the question is, whether, in process of time, difficulties would arise, requiring a more extended compact, a more complicated legislation, and a greater variety of functions and officers.

The advocates of a more comprehensive and complicated polity say there would. Let us attend to their arguments derived from this quarter. We shall give but a brief answer; and in fact, they seem to us to require no more.

It is said, in the first place, that extensive combinations of churches, with fixed usages and creeds, which cannot be altered but by high ecclesiastical judicatories, tend ‘to preserve the faith.’ They do indeed; but how? They preserve the faith, by preventing inquiry. We cannot listen to the argument.

In the next place, it is said that our system ‘tends to anarchy and disorder.’ Is there any anarchy in our schools, for want of a Board of Education? Is there any anarchy in our families, which an extensive domestic legislation can help? Is there any more disorder in our Congregational or Baptist churches, than in other churches? And is not, in fact, almost all the disorder and difficulty there is, occasioned by improper interferences of one church with another?

But if there are no extraordinary disorders, our system, it is further maintained, ‘breaks up the unity of the church, and opens the door to endless schisms.’ But we ask again, Is there not as much unity in our churches, as in any others—as much harmony, peace, and mutual affection among their members? And as to schism, we are not troubled with it. All this cry about schism comes from other quarters. Differences

of opinion, differences of faith, will, no doubt, arise in the Congregational, as they do in other churches ; but the advantage of our system, is, that these differences arise gently, as they should do, and instead of being silenced by thunders of anathema from high tribunals judging for us, they are settled by ourselves—settled where they should be, at the tribunal of our own minds. Differences among us create difficulty, no doubt ; but the difficulty is only increased by legislation. The current of free inquiry is dammed up for a time, only, as it has done in the Catholic and English churches, to break away with greater violence, rending the bosom of peaceful and holy ground, and staining it with ‘ the blood of saints ’ and martyrs.

How forcibly does this view of the subject call to mind the struggles and sacrifices of our own ancestors in the holy cause of religious freedom. It is meet that we should do homage to their memories, not only by public celebration and eloquent eulogy on the spot hallowed by their first labors and sufferings, but that, sometimes when the circuit of our favored and happy years brings round the cheerless season of their coming, we should put on record our testimony to that holy and fervent zeal which burnt freely and clearly, amidst the sorrows of exile, the disheartening visitation of poverty and peril, and the bleakest desolation of nature.

We know that these Puritan Pilgrims had their faults. Our reverence for them, in fact, is less than our involuntary language of admiration for some of their virtues, might seem to imply. But in the noble sacrifices they made for a perfect religious independency, we certainly do feel a strong sympathy ; and we see reasons for it, which neither their own age nor ours has yet sufficiently acknowledged. The sacred right of inquiry and of dissent, the holy claim of conscience, the pure freedom of the invisible, unchained, and boundless thoughts, has never yet had the reverence that is due to it. To depart from the faith and worship of the multitude, has ever been, and it is now, visited as a crime. Our ancestors believed it to be a duty ; and to this duty they made sacrifices—in weariness and painfulness, in hunger, and cold, and nakedness, and peril, they made sacrifices to it, which should restrain those who sit in quiet and warm homes, and amidst the very heritage of their labors and prayers, from harshly accusing them, or coldly passing them by.

They fled from the inevitable oppressions of an established

religion. We say, inevitable ; for enactments and statutes never yet did respect conscience as they ought, and they never can. The only safe language to be heard from the state, in regard to religion, is, Let it alone. Even now, while England is wondering at her own catholicism towards Papists and Dissenters, and while the whole world is lifting up one voice of eulogy and congratulation at her liberality—even now, Papists and Dissenters are laboring under disabilities in England, which cry shame upon the noble institutions of that country. Could our ancestors have foreseen this, could they have foreseen that two centuries after they forsook their country, that country would be rejoicing and glorying in the repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts, as if it were the very charter of liberty—that two centuries after they were gone, the slightest lifting up of the iron chain that bound them, would be hailed as the most magnanimous forbearance, they would have found cause enough to say, though with inexpressible regret, ‘ Farewell England ! ’—to exclaim, with the mixture of tender and bitter sorrow, that swelled the bosom of one of her noble but outcast children, when he gazed upon the receding shores of his native land, ‘ We will not say, as the Separatists were wont to say at their leaving of England, Farewell Babylon ! farewell Rome ! but we will say, FAREWELL DEAR ENGLAND ! farewell the church of God in England, and all the christian friends there ! ’

We are sometimes accused of fostering in this country, a hatred of England. It is not true. We always speak of England, perhaps with a degree of filial partiality, as in its institutions and character the noblest country in the world ; and we will not be prevented by the attacks of her petty scribblers and angry Reviews, from saying so still. But by so much as we reverence her more than others, do we the more regret, that her institutions are not worthy, in a higher measure than they are, of a generous and free people. The more we love her, the more do we condemn her, as in fact her own subjects do at home. The more we feel and acknowledge the filial relation to her, the more do we wonder that she should have cast out from her such noble sons of her soil, as preferred exile to oppression.

It must ever be a hard fate that carries a man from his native land purposely to live and to die an exile. He may be willing to go, but it must be when many ties are broken at home. When the land that should nourish him, refuses him

sustenance, when strange misadventure or dark calamity hath fallen upon his fortunes and upon his house, when 'seared in heart and love, and blighted,'—he may be willing, he may sadly and sternly resolve to go. But his very going tells a bitter tale. Exile is a word that speaks of disappointed hopes, of defeated plans, and wrecked affections. And the men who made themselves exiles here, for conscience' sake, did feel, when the last forlorn hope of its liberty had gone down, that it was failure and shipwreck to them. The circumstances of worldly defeat, the desolation of broken fortunes, which lead to ordinary expatriation, had not fallen upon them. Theirs was a nobler inducement, a purer sacrifice. To that holy exile they were driven by the single calamity of an enslaved mind and conscience. And we agree with them. We have yet so much of the Puritan within us, that we can award what is due to their motive. We would cross the sea for this, if for anything. If anything could drive us to put oceans between us and our country, to seek a new home, far away upon some untrodden shore, or amidst the most sequestered wilds of nature, it would be a chain upon the free mind—it would be the agony of an oppressed conscience. If the whole civil and ecclesiastical power of *this* country could be united to crush the faith we hold, and the persons of its professors; if the noble seminaries and just honors of the land could be shut against us, and the rights of citizenship should be sold to us only at the price of conscience; if forms were forced upon us, invading alike the solemnity of worship, the sanctity of marriage, and the holy rites of sepulture; if the sentence had gone forth, Sacrifice your conscience or your country, our election is made—we would 'flee to another wilderness.'

They who in the seventeenth century fled to these inhospitable shores, who built up here a new order of communities and churches, set the seal to their great undertaking in the simple form of Congregational Independency. This was the form in which they embodied the practical results of their experience, their wisdom, their love of religious liberty. This form, be it remembered, does not exclude or demand any one particular mode of worship, any one precise ritual. It only demands the absolute freedom of each congregation from all foreign interference. Congregationalism is not opposed to Methodism, to Presbyterianism, to the Church of England, as a form of worship; but it is opposed to them, in that every

church, faithfully adhering to this order, rejects all dominion, and every shadow of dominion from its brethren in the great community of Christians. This, we believe, to say nothing of political equality, is the relation in which christian men should stand to each other ; the same, the simple relation which learned men, wise men, good men, bear to each other. This, we believe, is the form of ecclesiastical polity, most consonant with the nature and ends, the freedom and power of religion. This, if we may say so, is the republican form of church government. Let what will be feared by political theorists for a religion unsupported by the state ; we can only answer that it is ' a part and parcel ' with our institutions, and must rise or fall with them. So strongly is it the tendency of things and thoughts among us, to set up this form of church order, that all other forms are, in a greater or less measure, neutralized by it. We have no sympathy with the fears, which some express, of a spiritual hierarchy in the land. Many of the churches that bear a different name, are in practice, if not in principle, with us. Every church, every congregation, that will not consent to receive laws or usages, inconvenient, unedifying, or oppressive to it—every such body that has the power, and uses the power, to overawe its Bishops and Conventions, its Presbyteries and Synods, or its Councils and Consociations, so as to cause its rights to be respected—is, whatever it may call itself, a Congregational church. We welcome this influence of our institutions, because we believe that it is favorable to the true, divine, unshackled religion of Jesus Christ. We would welcome above all, that independency from man, which is the stronger and higher, only because it bows the soul in deeper and more prostrate reverence before God ; which frees from human fears only by binding with divine obligations ; which derives its liberty from its humble and supreme devotedness to the Infinite Wisdom and Power ; which gathers its freedom from prayer, and holy virtue, and a pure conscience. Concerning this and all that aids this, we would say, ' stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage.'

- ART. VII.—1. *Address on Infant Schools; delivered at the Request of the Managers of the Infant School Society.* By WILLIAM RUSSELL. Boston, 1829. 8vo. pp. 18.
2. *Practical Observations on Popular Education.* From the 20th Edition. Boston. Office of the Massachusetts Journal. 8vo. pp. 36.
3. *American Lyceum, or Society for the Improvement of Schools, and Diffusion of Useful Knowledge.* Boston. Perkins & Marvin, 1829. 12mo. pp. 24.

POPULAR education has of late years attracted more attention than any subject which has been brought under discussion. In this fact we see a happy omen of the permanence of our free institutions. The New England free schools have always cherished a spirit of intelligence among the great mass of our yeoman population, the effects of which, as far as they have reached, have been the admiration of keen-sighted observers. So far, however, has this system been found from the perfection of human skill, that we now consider it only a fractional portion of the great array of means, in such vigorous operation at the present time, to promote the intellectual improvement of our nation. The zeal that has been displayed within the last dozen years, has, we are convinced, no parallel in the history of the human mind. High schools upon new and improved systems have been established; in England lectureships upon the most important sciences have been founded; mechanics institutes, upon liberal and popular principles, have been opened there, and rapidly imitated here; and Lyceums, or associations for mutual improvement, have been extensively and successfully devised. Infant schools have also been attempted, with what success we are not informed, except in so far as information is contained in Mr Russell's judicious and interesting Address. The pamphlet mentioned second at the head of this article, is a treasure of thought upon the most important of human subjects, and apart from the other beneficent and splendid labors of its author, ought to insure him an immortality among the great philanthropists who have benefited man. That placed third, indicates a disposition on the part of the public, to join in a mighty effort for bringing science and philosophy within every man's reach.

It is not, however, our object to discuss the merits of any

particular treatise, nor indeed of the general subject. We wish simply to offer a few reflections on *the obstacles that lie in the way of progressive knowledge*, in our own country. It is of importance to our improvement, not only that we should know the means of actually advancing, but also the impediments which obstruct our progress. Else we may give up at once in disgust, finding the result of our efforts in no way corresponding to our anticipations. A difficulty often needs only to be pointed out, in order to be avoided ; and the simple art of avoiding a single difficulty, often produces more lasting and beneficial effects than the laborious application of many actual means. We trust then, that our remarks will prove useful, if not in the amount of information they may convey, at least in the thoughts they may suggest to our readers' minds.

Our first remark is, that there is great danger of resting satisfied with superficial knowledge. It is the popular impression, that the attainment of knowledge is an extremely easy matter, requiring hardly an effort of the mind, except the mere act of receiving what is offered to its grasp. So much has been said of bringing the great truths of science within the reach of the humblest aspirant, and of making them the common property and blessing of every, even the lowest class, that we begin to imagine the old-fashioned hard study of our gigantic scholars, fit only for a cloistered devotee. We forget that the mind contains within itself the principles of its own developement, and requires long and steady efforts of self-discipline to unfold in their beauty and proportion its mighty powers. That knowledge is little worth, in acquiring which the intellect is a mere passive recipient. To make it truly valuable the mind must act upon it with the concentrated energy of its various powers. It may be pleasant enough to dream an hour after dinner among the fantastic imaginings of a wandering fancy, or to doze over the last new novel or poem. It may be an agreeable pastime, and not altogether useless, to listen to a series of popular lectures. But, unless all this results in an increased excitement of the intellect to put forth its powers of action, and find out truth for itself, most of the benefit ends, with the pleasure, at the moment of enjoyment. Truth, knowledge, is too precious a boon to be had merely for the asking, and he who expects to win it on such easy terms, will find himself wofully disappointed. It was patient, unremitted thought, that gave Newton his immeasurable preeminence above the loftiest spirits of his

time. It was untiring, resistless self-study that enabled Locke to thread his way through the otherwise inextricable mazes of metaphysical speculation. From the original principles of our nature, the conclusion is irresistibly certain, that no real knowledge, no true intellectual eminence, can be attained without hard labor. And happy is it for us that such is our constitution. It gives security to virtue, and is the most unerring guide to the highest happiness earth has to bestow. Who would exchange the satisfaction derived from the consciousness of having won truth, by long, laborious, and faithful study, the pure and serene delight of gazing upon a beautiful prospect from an eminence he has reached by his own vigorous efforts, for the greatest conceivable mass of untoiled for knowledge, heaped upon the inert intellect, and smothering and deadening its noble faculties beneath the oppressive weight?

We have then, as we think, reason for apprehension in regard to the intellectual elevation of our age, from the very thing which constitutes its superiority over other ages; namely, the general diffusion and the popular nature of instruction at the present day. The works published in England by the Society for the Promotion of Useful Knowledge, we consider one of the most valuable series of tracts ever given to the world. The objection frequently urged against them, that they are not sufficiently comprehensible to the minds of the multitude, has no solid foundation. Truths which are come at by processes of reasoning, cannot, by any human art, be presented in a shape so popular as to be comprehended at once by any except an intellect of the first order; and vain indeed is the expectation of rendering knowledge more easily attainable to the great mass, than it is to professedly scientific men. Those, therefore, who complain of the Library of Useful Knowledge for not being sufficiently popular, seem to us to mistake the nature of knowledge and the true design of those works. The subjects which they treat, are presented in a form as convenient and popular as possible; that is, the truths, and the reasonings on which those truths are dependent, are set forth in a clear and logical order; and their great merit consists in reducing the facts and reasonings of science within so small a compass, and affording them at so low a price, that a common mind, by a vigorous application of its faculties, may comprehend them, and a poor man, by a little extra industry, may procure them. Without the steady co-operation of the individual's

mind, they will be, and they ought to be, of little avail ; without this, however great may be the show of knowledge, it will be but transient and dream-like.

Closely connected with the foregoing considerations, is that of the many methods, to which our age has given birth, of rendering the attainment of knowledge easier than it has been in times past. It has been very justly remarked by an elegant foreign writer, that ours is a *mechanical* age. This truth the wonder working contrivances that solicit our attention at every turn, prove most palpably, and often amusingly. We remember having seen an ingenious machine for the manufacturing of grammatical knowledge, in which the 'objective,' or 'object acted upon,' to use the phrase of Lindley Murray, was most unmercifully belabored by the 'nominative case,' in the shape of a hammer, which was considered the 'agent.'

In the study of languages this mechanical propensity has been most remarkably and injuriously developed. It was left for our age to discover a method of acquiring the classical tongues, without that thorough study of the philosophical principles of grammar, which formerly was considered indispensable. The system commonly called the Hamiltonian, we believe, has our hearty disapprobation. The use of an interlinear translation, must not only render a thorough knowledge nearly impossible, but must also take away all the delight of the study. The theory on which this system is built, is the result of extremely superficial views of the subject. It is what is called technically the *natural* system of teaching languages, though we believe it is in fact anything but a natural system. In the first place, if we suppose it the best method of acquiring the modern, it by no means follows that the same holds true of the ancient languages. Because a child, in acquiring the words of his mother tongue, is obliged to learn its principles by a natural induction from facts taught him by imitation, we are not to infer that this is the best way of acquiring a second or a third language. A child has a certain number of ideas, or the images of a certain number of things, which he wishes to find audible signs to express. These signs he finds out by his observation of others, and masters them by imitation. The same would be the method followed by a child placed in a foreign family for the purpose of learning a foreign language. But we in general enter upon the study of other tongues at a period of life when the mind has attained some degree of

maturity, and the process is exactly the reverse of that by which we are taught our mother tongue. The problem to be solved, is, not to ascertain the sign expressive of a given idea—we have already one set of signs—but to ascertain the idea expressed by a given sign. The words are placed before us, and we are to decipher their meaning by the acknowledged philosophic principles of general grammar, rendered more definite by the particular principles of the particular language which we are employed upon. This certainly is the process in what is called *acquiring a language*; for we would by no means be understood to say that we gain no new ideas in the range of foreign studies. But these are in a higher region of literature, and are not brought within our grasp, until we have threaded our way some distance along the less tempting path of philology.

It is true, a student somewhat versed in the study of languages, will be able to unfold the mysteries of a foreign tongue with infinitely greater facility, and much less preparation, than a mere tyro in the business. A student, also, who has a decided taste for such pursuits, may venture upon the ocean of a new language, relying more upon his instinctive tact, and less upon preparatory knowledge of declensions, conjugations, and syntax. But to such our remarks are not intended to apply. We speak of the study in the earlier periods of education, and of the manner in which it must be pursued by the vast majority of pupils. Besides, it is not the object, at least it is only a secondary object, with by far the greatest number of students, particularly in our country, to *speak* a foreign language. This is a matter depending infinitely more upon mechanical practice than upon philosophy, and can rarely be mastered except during a residence of years in the country where the language is spoken. It is not the conversation, but the literature and science of foreigners, that we wish, at least as long as we are on this side of the Atlantic, to comprehend. To one versed in the modes of thinking, feeling, and reasoning of another nation, it will be no hard matter, upon visiting that nation, to acquire rapidly the power of fluent conversation. A little practice superadded to theory and philosophy, will make him a thorough master of the foreign language in its widest range. But the pupil, who has been taught to despise the necessity of previously laboring at the task of grammar, and to imagine himself a foreign scholar because his memory is stored with a

sufficient quantity of words and phrases to blunder with tolerable facility through a half hour's talk, will find that his fancied knowledge extends but little beyond the mere borders of the drapery, while the substance and soul of foreign genius, are not only beyond his present reach, but almost at a despairing height above it.

In nine cases out of ten, the power of conversing, is not attained with a sufficient degree of correctness to render it an acquisition of the smallest value. We believe any competent linguist, who has had an opportunity of listening to the wretched smattering of French, Italian, &c., which is commonly heard in boarding schools, will bear us out in our assertion, however extravagant it may appear. While, therefore, we would recommend foreign studies as one of the surest means of improving the judgment, elevating the fancy, and correcting the taste, we most earnestly enter our protest against mistaking the shadow for the substance, and deprecate the effeminate notion, that labor, long and severe labor, is wholly unnecessary for the attainment of the literary treasures embraced in the languages of other nations.

If the preceding observations are true of the modern, they must, *a fortiori*, be true of ancient languages. Indeed, we find it difficult to conceive by what strange delusion many very respectable teachers have fallen in love with the Hamiltonian system of interlineation. As to the merit of the discovery, we do not, even supposing it to be entirely original, we do not envy its author his laurels. But the fact is, it is only a very slight improvement upon the system which has been prevalent from time immemorial, at least as far back as our memory extends, in every college of the United States; and if it was not known in England previously to the time of Mr Hamilton, we have only to remark that, in this respect, our tyros have outstripped the elaborate skill of British artisans. We appeal to the experience of every alumnus of Harvard, if he has not at least *seen* in his own class a dozen specimens of this system, in the shape of '*interliners*;' and if he has allowed himself, through the enticements of indolence, to use them, instead of honestly getting his lesson by the labor of his own mind and the sweat of his own brow, whether he has not afterwards lamented his yielding to the temptation.

We say that our remarks apply more strongly to the ancient than to the modern languages, because their construction is of

a much more complicated character. The power of language, considered as an artificial structure, or a contrivance for the transmission of thought, is much more fully and perfectly developed in the former. Considered as simple instruments of reasoning, the latter have a decided advantage. The principles of grammar and rhetoric, are therefore more fully unfolded in the languages of antiquity than in those of modern days;—and the idea of acquiring anything like a competent knowledge of them, without a severe study of their curious and recondite philosophy, seems to us so palpably absurd, that when we hear it seriously advanced, as it sometimes is, by intelligent and scholarlike men, we listen to them with wonder and almost with incredulity. No matter how many facilities are afforded, in the shape of improved grammars and dictionaries, containing more clear and philosophical expositions of the principles of language, and more elaborately correct etymological investigations. These are important improvements, in which the last few years have been wonderfully fertile, and which have put an entirely new face upon classical studies. But let us hear no more of the empiricism of dispensing with severe systematic labor in mastering the languages of classical antiquity. The truth of the whole matter is, that the Hamiltonian system is a natural method only so far as it is natural to us, in consequence of what the Calvinists would call our depravity by nature, but which we call the simple *vis inertiae*, to rid ourselves of labor whenever we conveniently can.

We have spoken particularly of the study of languages; but it would be easy to find absurdities, if not equally glaring, at least equally unphilosophical, in other branches of education. For the present, we shall extend our remarks no further upon this topic, but proceed to the next in our discussion.

Another obstacle to the progress of knowledge, is the waste of time in disputing upon the utility, whether absolute or comparative, of certain kinds of information. Our readers undoubtedly retain a fresh recollection of the excitement produced in this region a few years since, on the subject of classical learning. That excitement, or at least the scepticism produced by it, has not yet ceased to exist. The rage for improvement has swept away, not only the absurd restrictions of scholastic systems, but also much that was valuable, and that ought to have been retained. We remark, first, that any kind of knowledge, however far removed from what is called, in the cant of the day,

practically useful, is worthy to employ the labor of a rational being. The object of attaining knowledge is twofold. It promotes the physical happiness, and increases the conveniences and luxuries of the present life, as witnessed in the superiority of the civilized over the savage state; and it tends to elevate our moral and intellectual nature, as instanced in the superiority of the poor man of letters over the wealthy *ignoramus*. These generally, but not always, coincide. In training the mind in a way to act its part well here, and to prepare itself for a higher state of existence, regard must be paid to both these ends. Some kinds of knowledge tend immediately to the promotion of physical comfort, and remotely to intellectual elevation. That these are exceedingly important, we are far from denying. Every new application of scientific truth to the practical arts of life, we hail as a blessing to the whole family of man, and as entitling its author to a place among the benefactors of his age. But the danger is, lest we rest satisfied with the *means* and forget the *end*—lest we limit our aspirations to bodily comfort, leaving out of the question a matter of incomparably higher moment, the happiness of the mind. Wealth is desirable, not in itself—for in itself, a piece of gold is of less value than the same weight of iron; but because it is the means of procuring happiness—not the happiness of the body merely, except so far as that is subservient to the happiness of the soul, but the happiness arising from moral and intellectual dignity. Yet how many spend the precious hours of youth and manhood to attain a mass of worldly treasure, to be brooded over in an ignorant and cheerless old age.

If, then, the ultimate aim of all knowledge is, or should be, moral and intellectual happiness, we must allow some importance to that knowledge which bears directly upon this kind of happiness; nay, we will go so far as to assert, that it ought to hold the highest place in the education of a rational being. The developement of the intellect, the cultivation of the taste, the refining and exalting of the fancy, the exciting an inextinguishable thirst to drink deeper and deeper at the fountains of truth—these are the objects of a truly elevated education. Whatever, in the world about us and the world within us, is presented to the cognisance of our minds, is worthy to be seriously embraced; for thus are we enabled to approach nearer to the source of all truth, the throne of the Eternal. The vague use of the word *practical* has led to many absurd conclusions.

We hear it applied to one kind of knowledge, and that too, not in reference to an end, but to a means; as if the knowledge, which we have just alluded to, were not equally, nay, more practical, in the high and true sense of that term, as contributing to the elevation of the mind.

There is current in society a great deal of cant on this topic, an evident indication of a propensity to make the intellectual subservient to the physical, instead of paramount to it. This we deprecate deeply, sincerely. From this have sprung those illiberal sentences of condemnation, which have been so sweepingly passed upon classical studies. It is true, that the same reasons do not now exist for making these the whole, nor even the principal aim of education, as formerly were in force. But so long as purity of taste, directness and force of eloquence, correct and inimitably clear perceptions of the beauty of external nature, the most graceful and perfect embodying of her heart-stirring inspirations, shall be held in honor among men, so long will the classics of Greece and Rome stand high on the list of studies, worthy to employ the energies of the human mind. It is not our purpose to enter upon an elaborate argument in defence of Greek and Latin. We believe it is hardly wanted at the present day, and if it were, that it might be easily supplied. An increased zeal in the cause of good learning, which we conceive to be inclusive of the ancient classics, is all that we require to raise up among us scholars worthy of our nation.

We come now to the consideration of a topic of deep and lasting importance. We allude to religious disputes, and to the jealousies which have occasionally broken out between different sects, and have exerted a strong influence upon the progress of learning. Our remarks are not intended to apply to controversy in general—for that we heartily approve—but to controversy, in which the peculiar religious sentiments of individuals or institutions have been turned to odium, and their usefulness prostrated in a career of exertion entirely distinct from theology. The cry of heresy has been raised against those who have taken the liberty which the New Testament, by implication at least, enjoins upon all to assume, of investigating questions of speculative theology for themselves, and professing to believe the conclusions which the free exercise of their reason has forced them to believe in fact. Let us examine a moment the right which any man has to charge another with heresy.

In the first place, all religious sects, in our country at least, if they would preserve the least shadow of consistency, must *professedly* be willing that every other sect should have an equal liberty with themselves, of forming its religious faith according to the only standard which all acknowledge; viz. the holy scriptures. A man who would deny this, we should hardly attempt to persuade. But where is the advantage of enjoying this liberty in appearance, if it be denied to us in fact? And if we exercise a right which universal consent has accorded to us, and come to a different conclusion upon subjects, whether important or not, from the fixed belief of our neighbours, it is a corollary as strictly deducible from that right, as any inference short of mathematical clearness, that we should have the right of openly professing that conclusion, without exposing ourselves to the odious charges, which have been rung against certain Christians from one end of the country to the other. He who would acknowledge the first proposition, and yet deny the second, would be guilty of an absurdity in logic, which we have no name to express.

Again, what right has any man to charge another professing Christian with heresy? History reads us an instructive lesson, which it would be well for Protestant infallibles to remember. It is not, we believe, going too far to assert, that, in all cases, the heretics have been the minority, and in nine cases out of ten, have had the truth on their side. They have been branded with infamy, and suffered in every way, because those from whom they differed, happened to be more numerous and powerful than themselves. This is the amount of the teachings of history. But to lay out of the question the results of actual experience found in history, and to come to the subject considered by itself, we say, that, from the very nature of man and the unchangeable circumstances of the case, no one has a right to charge another with heresy, who has examined faithfully for himself; nor can he do it without usurping a power belonging only to the Most High. You may believe that any particular doctrine or scheme of doctrines is grounded upon a mistaken belief; but you have no authority for fixing a line, and saying, Thus far shalt thou come and no further. You may believe that this point in your creed is true, and that opposite belief is false; but you have no right to act upon the presumption that your judgment is infallible, and your neighbour's full of error, and to follow out this presumption till you deny him the name of a Christian, and denounce him as an unbeliever.

We have heard it said by advocates of the Exclusive System, that truth has a convincing power, which is borne in upon the mind with an impulse that cannot be resisted. Something like this is undoubtedly the fact. But truth of this kind should be of such a nature, and your convictions of it should be so clear, that you can not only persuade yourself, but others also. Else, however satisfied of it you may be yourself, you have no pretence to force others into it, or to denounce them for being headstrong against you. But is not ignorance proverbially dogmatical? Do we not all know, that true knowledge is modest and unpretending, and that, take the history of the world together, the positive, the dogmatical, the infallible, in a vast majority of instances, are either knaves or dupes; either crafty hypocrites, or bewildered madmen?

Before you can pretend to denounce a fellow being as heretical, three conditions are absolutely necessary, either of which failing, your pretensions fall to the ground. First, you must have an infinite power of distinguishing between the true and the false; for if your power be finite, then is your neighbour upon a level with yourself, and if you stigmatize him with heresy, you must not complain if he returns the compliment. Such power belongs to none but God. Secondly, you must be able to enter completely into another's character and feelings before you have a right to call him a heretic. You must be able to decide, within a hair's breadth, what he believes, and what he does not; which is a degree of knowledge no man has of himself, much less of another, and which is plainly impossible, particularly as the first condition we have mentioned is impossible. And, thirdly, you must be able to trace your neighbour's belief back to its origin, and forward to its effects. You must discern clearly the motives that influenced the formation of his belief, in order to decide whether that belief be sincere or the contrary; and you must be sure of the influence which that belief has exercised and will exercise upon his actions; for a belief dangerously erroneous, ought, in the nature of things, to produce corresponding effects. But this is no less impossible than the preceding conditions. Thus, then, the right to pronounce another man a heretic, because he differs from you, depends upon a series of impossibilities, each of which is doubly strong by its connexion with the rest. You must be either competent or not. If you say you are competent, you must be either insane or superhuman.

But it may be said the scriptures contain a standard by which all must be measured, and that a real Christian can hardly be mistaken. We acknowledge that all the necessary truths of religion are taught so clearly, that it is next to impossible to mistake them. But the doctrines which serve as a hook on which to hang a charge of heresy, are no such matters. They are generally inferred from hints darkly scattered here and there, which may admit of other interpretations, equally, if not more consistent with the general tenor of the scriptures, or which may be interpolations in the genuine text. We acknowledge that whatever is unfolded by revelation, man must receive with reverent submission. But human reason, which is so much scorned by some religionists, must be brought into action to decide *what* has been revealed. All that we know of the christian religion is contained in human language, addressed to us as human and rational beings, and subject to the same rules of interpretation, that are applied to the interpretation of other documents. Besides this, a large body of collateral and subsequent evidence is to be sifted, by the aid of this same human reason. And if an insulated passage appears at first sight to teach a doctrine inconsistent, nay, directly opposed to reason, the presumption is very strong that we have misinterpreted the passage, and common philosophical honesty would compel us to review an opinion founded upon such questionable ground. An appeal to the scriptures, therefore, upon matters of speculative faith, however satisfactory it may be to the individual making the appeal, will hardly convince his opponent of the justice of branding him with heresy. So much for the claim of pretenders to the throne of conscience.

But what application have these remarks to the subject with which we began the present paper? A fact or two may enlighten us a little upon this point. The general fact, that persons tainted with a supposed defection from Puritanical Orthodoxy, are looked upon with suspicious eyes in by far the largest part of our country, is too notorious, perhaps, to need even this passing mention. Men engaged in different professions have felt the paralyzing sirocco-breath of religious rancor. Teachers have been denounced, and have had their characters attacked with a bitterness which can hardly be paralleled in the annals of theological quarrels. The alarm has very generally been raised by those who ought to know better, if they do not; and then echoed in every tone of horror, by a thousand underlings, who

follow the key-note of their spiritual guides. The pretence is, that the peculiar religious sentiments of an individual have an intimate connexion with his fitness to become a teacher, which is about as reasonable as to maintain that a man in a broad-brimmed hat is unfit to calculate an eclipse.

Setting aside for a moment the questionable truth of such doctrines as the trinity, total depravity, &c., and even admitting them to be of great spiritual importance, we ask, as we have in another connexion asked before, is it wise, is it judicious to insist upon their being taught in all our schools? They are doctrines, particularly that of the trinity, which those who profess to believe them, rarely profess that they understand. But every one at all acquainted with the science of education, knows well, that a teacher ventures upon extremely dangerous ground, when he attempts to enforce what he himself does not comprehend. Children are extremely inquisitive in regard to the reasons of things, and go much deeper in their reflections than superficial observers are apt to suppose. The only way, then, to force the reception of these dogmas, is, to destroy the wish, or at least to prevent the act, of inquiring, admitting even that they may be afterwards received upon different principles. The look of painful perplexity, with which an intelligent child listens to instructions, not only utterly beyond his comprehension, but directly opposed to the teachings of the simplest reasoning, ought to speak volumes to the mind and heart of the bigoted dogmatist. The young mind, before it has been tainted by the contact of vice, experiences a natural and intense delight in the acquisition of knowledge. Its perceptions are clear, and every new addition to its intellectual stores, spreads over all its previous attainments a beautiful lustre, in proportion to the keenness and strength with which it has been grasped. But once check this vivacity of intellectual habit, by crowding upon it a system of dogmas that no mind can adopt, until it has prostrated its noblest powers, and you oppress it with an *incubus* which years, perhaps, will be unable to shake off. If these dogmas must ever be pressed, let the intellect first arrive to a degree of maturity which will enable it to comprehend the necessity, if there be any such necessity, of receiving an apparent absurdity without an effort of investigation, as if it were the *ipse dixit* of the Eternal. You may place the whole array of scholastic subtleties before your pupil, you may harangue him day after day upon the unpar-

donable sin of rejecting them, and he will be about as much benefited as the merest tyro in mathematics, by gazing upon a series of formulas in the infinitesimal calculus.

Those of the present generation, who have come to years of maturity, must have witnessed scenes in our schools, which no rational mind can look back upon without a feeling bordering upon detestation for their perpetrators. We are not certain that these scenes have passed entirely from the stage at the present day; but at any rate they are of much less frequent occurrence, and the increasing good sense of our population, it is to be devoutly hoped, will tend strongly to prevent their repetition. We allude to the *revivals*, as they are called, got up by hair-brained religionists, in academies and schools. We have ourselves witnessed extravagances on these stormy occasions, that almost rivalled the outrages by which Beman and Finney and other Western incendiaries lately violated every feeling of propriety and delicacy. All the horrors of a Calvinistic hell have been arrayed before the little tremblers, and the unutterable wo of eternal fire pointed out as the consequence and reward of that obstinate depravity which would close the mind against the monstrous terrors drawn from the exhaustless imaginations of these deluded but crafty agitators. The ordinary pursuits of sound and wholesome learning, have been thrown aside. The buoyant and throbbing joyousness of youth and childhood, have been changed to an indescribable sadness and gloom. The healthful sports of the play-ground have been renounced for that 'weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth,' which remind us more strongly of Pandemonium than of God's beautiful world; and those, who, from more judicious treatment at home, or a stronger tincture of good sense, have been enabled to see the height and breadth of the absurdity, have been pitied or scorned as deluded reprobates, destined to everlasting perdition. But this high straining of the mind must in time give way, or destroy its tone. The natural rebound often carries it to the other extreme; and observers have been astonished to see so much heat and fervor, not only cooling away to indifference, but turning into a positive dislike for all religious things. One would suppose that an honest mind would be taught wisdom by a few instances of such backsliding. But there is in genuine fanaticism a blind wrong-headedness, which would affect to consider any attempt to moderate its extravagances as a tampering with the Holy Spirit.

We do not pretend to say how far religious instruction should be combined with scientific and literary education ; but we would remark, in general terms, that the truths and doctrines of Christianity, which are universally received, and which have a universal application, should be scrupulously inculcated. The paternal character of God, his infinite wisdom, goodness, power, and mercy ; the precepts and teachings of Jesus, explaining our duties to ourselves, to others, and to God, should undoubtedly be blended with every portion of early instruction. But we are equally firm in the belief of the utter absurdity that those are guilty of, who place first among the essentials, the disputed, and in some instances, the injurious doctrines of a particular sect. The harm that has been done by it, to many noble intellects, in shrouding the light of reason with a more than Egyptian darkness, or in weakening, after the first bursts of passion have subsided, their attachment to the lofty and ennobling qualities of true religion, can hardly be calculated. We venture to say that hundreds of our readers will bear testimony to the baleful influence of this early sectarian education. Such dark and dismal impressions, when once deeply received, as they often are, into the susceptible mind of the child, the strongest efforts of the maturest intellect can rarely efface. The images of darkness and terror linger around the outer court of the mansion into which they have once been admitted, long after the exorcism of Truth has banished them from its inner apartments.

We trust implicitly to the progress of time, and the simultaneous progress of intelligence, to remove these obstacles, which have been, and are still, weighty ones, to the advancement of knowledge ; particularly that of religious prejudice. The greatest conquest the human mind has to achieve, is the conquest over this great enemy to its truest interest. But it is an enterprise of great difficulty and delicacy, requiring much time and patient moral effort for its accomplishment. It is easy enough to make men assent to the general truth, that we are all responsible to God alone for our religious belief ; that we all possess an equal right to shake off what we deem to be errors, and profess what we deem to be truth. But in granting thus much, they mean only that we may renounce errors as far as they have renounced them—and we be to those who step an inch beyond that line. No matter how thorough may have been his research, how sincere his belief, how patient and

prayerful his watchfulness, how pure and conscientious his practice—the man who steps beyond the strictest limits of stern Orthodoxy, though he may be allowed the merit of being a moral man, is held up to reprobation as an unbeliever, no better than the veriest pagan. To use the mildest language, this is a terrible enormity in the christian character, and one, we devoutly trust, which the present age is destined to away with.

In the exact proportion in which the mass of the people become intelligent, will these melancholy perversions of our moral powers be corrected ; and in the same proportion that these obstacles to knowledge are removed, will the removal of future obstacles be facilitated. Knowledge alone can display to men the full extent of that liberty with which Christ hath made us free. Knowledge, alone, can teach men to distinguish between the ravings of self-conceited bigotry, and the true impulses of christian zeal ; between the indiscriminate denunciations of vulgar fanaticism, and the earnest, yet calm and gentle admonitions of evangelical piety.

We have barely hinted at many topics, because our present limits forbid us to enlarge upon them as we could wish. Our deep and anxious interest in the progress of knowledge, with which we believe the dearest hopes of humanity are indissolubly linked, has led us to point out what we conceive to be some of the most important obstacles in its way. The voice of history and of reason is with us, when we give to knowledge this preeminent importance. The political revolutions of the world, which stand out so glaringly from the pages of history, mournfully remind us of the fate, which has awaited nations as great, as powerful, as majestic, as our own beloved republic, and which may await her too, unless men learn to follow where true knowledge leads the way. The real interests of our race have been warred with by the stern and destroying passions of conquerors, and the multitude have shouted mad pæans while dragged after their chariot wheels. And as to the history of the church,—what is the lesson taught by her flames of martyrdom, her Inquisition, and her almost infernal refinements in cruelty ? Is it that the spirit of christian love breathes a divine influence in regions overshadowed by the clouds of ignorance ? Is it that our holy faith beams with a more celestial radiance, when the mind, in the purest depths of which that faith serenely dwells, is shrouded in a bewildering mist which the sun of knowledge has not yet pierced ? Is the lesson such that we

may confidently expect a millenium for Christianity without an effort to improve the heart by kindling the light of mind? We answer unhesitatingly, No. The voice of reason is with us. The mind is gifted with powers capable of infinite expansion. The more these powers are called into action and improved by knowledge of whatever sort, the readier must be its comprehension of the sublime truths of religion, the highest and noblest objects of the soul. Let him, then, who would do good service to his country and to his religion, use his utmost to promote the cause of true knowledge, either by contributing to its actual advancement, or by removing the obstacles to its progress.

ART. VIII.—*On the Future State of Man.* For the Christian Examiner.

[Continued from p. 404 of the last volume.]

THE Affections or Feelings, as I have before observed,* form one of the three essential attributes of the soul; the first of which, the Intellect, I have already considered with a view to the future state of man. In treating of the Affections and the Moral Powers, I shall pursue the same method of reasoning; namely, to discover what will be the future state of the soul, by investigating its nature, as it is manifested in its present condition.

Man is made not only to form ideas of the world and of himself, but also to be interested in what he perceives, thinks, and imagines. The objects, which, through the eye of the mind, the intellect, are brought into contact with ourselves, do not remain indifferent to us. We take part in them, or rather make them part of ourselves. They affect the state of our being, as they give rise to pleasure or pain, desire or aversion, hope or fear, trust or distrust. All these various states of the soul we comprehend under the general name of affections. Through the self-conscious power of our intellect, we know that our affections or feelings are not the productions of our own free will or imagination. To say that the pain we complain of is imaginary, or of our own choosing, is as much as to

* Vol. II. New Series, p. 401.

say that it is not real.* Our affections, though intimately connected with all other states of the mind, are not merely other names for ideas or resolutions, operations of the intellect and the will,—they are peculiar states of the mind distinct from all others. We can imagine a being endowed with the power of thinking and resolving, but incapable of pleasure or pain, love or dislike. If there were such a being it would be as impossible for a *feeling* mind to give any definite idea of his pleasant or painful emotions, as it is to convey ideas of sound and color to the deaf and the blind. The affections, then, are not merely synonymous terms for other operations of the mind, but they exist distinct from all others, as a matter of fact within us. Men therefore, generally and justly, ascribe their affections to a constituent principle in the soul, as their common source and centre. It is the nature of this principle, which we call the Heart, that we must search into, in order to form some adequate pre-conception of the future state of human affections.

This part of our investigation is attended with peculiar difficulty, since many of the most important operations of the heart, the true motives to actions, and beginnings of passions, are apt to pass unnoticed even by the eye of the mind. This every one should consider, when he attempts to unroll the mysterious scroll of the heart, with a view to decipher the hieroglyphics of the soul. Impressed with the difficulty of this undertaking, I shall confine myself to the duties of a faithful historian of the soul. I shall mention such facts only, as lie within the consciousness of every individual, excluding all preconceived theories, that the soul herself may be her own interpreter and prophet.

The feelings or affections, in different men, and in the same individual, are infinitely various, and continually changing. They are, moreover, so frequently blended with other operations of the mind, with thoughts and actions, that in order to know what is likely to be immortal in them, it is necessary to view them, if possible, separate from all other phenomena of the soul; and by a philosophical analysis trace them to their sources and elements. It would exceed the limits of this article, as well as the powers of the writer, to analyze all the va-

* Hooker says, 'Affections, as Joy, Grief, Fear, and Anger, with such like, being, as it were, the sundry fashions and forms of appetite, can neither rise at the conceit of a thing indifferent, nor yet choose but rise at the sight of some things.'

rious affections. It is necessary, and sufficient, to show by some examples, what appear to be the elementary feelings of man ; leaving it to the reader to test the correctness of the results we come to, by subjecting any other emotion or affection to the same analysis.

In the first place, a person who fears an impending evil, and one who regrets the loss of a friend ; one who suffers from sickness or poverty, and one who is ashamed of his ignorance or sins ; one who resents an injury he has received, and one who compassionates the sufferings of another ; each one of these persons is subject to a particular affection. But there is one feeling mixed up with, or at the bottom of all these various affections of fear, regret, discomfort, shame, remorse, resentment, anger, indignation, hatred, envy, and compassion. This is the simple feeling of Pain. Of this, there are many various degrees and modifications, which we denote by the words uneasiness, grief, unhappiness, or misery. But this feeling of pain itself is a simple and primitive emotion, which cannot be resolved into any other.

On the other hand, a person who is elated with hope, or confident of success ; proud of possessing what he himself esteems, and vain of what is prized by others ; one who respects, loves, and admires all that is praiseworthy, and the libertine, who triumphs in his freedom from all moral restraints ; each of these persons is actuated by a different affection. But one elementary feeling is embraced in all these affections of hope, confidence, pride, vanity, esteem, love, admiration, joy, on account of the perfections or imperfections of others. This common element is the simple feeling of Pleasure. Of this, there are also different degrees and modifications, such as gaiety, joy, happiness, and bliss.

In the third place, one who relieves another's wants from charity, and one who does the same for the purpose of humbling him whom he assists ; a person who reprehends another to insult, and one who does the same in order to improve him ; he who is led by kindness, gratitude, humility, and courtesy, and he who is impelled by revenge, or avarice, or ambition, by moral or immoral, religious or irreligious zeal, indolence or curiosity ; all these persons are under the influence of different affections. But they are all characterised by the same primary feeling. This feeling we call Desire, be it the desire of doing good, or evil ; of spreading truth or falsehood ; the desire

of wealth, power, or fame; the willingness to recognise one's own imperfections, which is humility, or the desire of humbling others, which is haughtiness.

There are, then, in man, three feelings, Pain, Pleasure, and Desire, which cannot be traced to any more simple operations of the soul, nor are they resolvable into one another. The relation of these three elementary feelings to each other, may be learned from a few examples. The want of food, the want of information, and the want of merit, give rise to three kinds of pain—animal, intellectual, and moral pain; that is, to a feeling of dissatisfaction with our animal, our intellectual, and moral state. This feeling of dissatisfaction gives rise to desire. The pain of starving gives rise to hunger and thirst; the suffering from ignorance to curiosity, or desire of knowledge; and the painful consciousness of moral imperfection to virtue, or exertion after excellence. All these animal, intellectual, and moral desires are evidently called forth by a feeling of dissatisfaction or pain. Desire is nothing more than a felt tendency to change the unsatisfactory state we are in, for a more satisfactory condition. The true object of all desire, therefore, is satisfaction; that is, cessation of pain, and experience of pleasure. The real object of hunger is not the food that is used, nor the process of eating. Food and eating are not desired, except when they serve to remove the pain of fasting, or to gratify the palate. In the same manner the ultimate object of curiosity is not information, but intellectual enjoyment, for which information is the necessary means; and the end of virtue is moral happiness, which can be attained only by the means of doing good, or performing our duties.* The immediate object of all desire is

* The limits of this article do not permit me to argue this contested point in ethics. But I wish those who are of a different opinion would ask themselves whether virtue is not founded on the free desire of goodness or perfection, and whether the main object of all desire is not satisfaction—satisfaction of the desire itself; and thirdly, whether a man can be said to be perfectly satisfied, unless he *feels* satisfied, that is, happy.—Those who are not used to metaphysical speculation on this subject, will no doubt be persuaded that he is the best man who finds his *happiness* in goodness; and that no one can be virtuous without *desiring* to be good.—Impressed with the importance of a strict distinction between that which is *moral*, and that which is merely *profitable*, and not knowing in what this difference really consists, many have defined virtue and morality as something which has nothing to do with desire and happiness, as a necessary product of the clear and strong conception of duty. But an act produced by the mere conception of it, without a motive, that is, a desire, and consequently, without a choice between different motives—such an act deserves no more to be called an action, strictly speaking, than that of yawning or sighing under the impulse of imitation.

the cessation of pain ; but this of itself is the beginning of pleasure or satisfaction. Hence we can say, the origin of all desire is pain, and its object is pleasure. Desire is the motive, and pleasure the end of all actions of man. Out of the heart, the centre and source of all desire, pain, and pleasure, are indeed the issues of life,—of animal, intellectual, and moral life. It is the pleasure, the happiness we find in any pursuit, which prompts us to choose it, or at least recommends it to our choice ; which to the one makes gold more valuable than honor, and to the other renders truth dearer than life.

If the common expressions of pleasure and pain give us a true idea of the feelings of the infant, it seems that pain is the firstborn emotion in man. This gives rise to desire—be it the desire of air or food, motion or rest,—which directs all his movements, first unconsciously, then voluntarily, to its true end, the satisfaction of its wants, cessation of pain, and attainment of pleasure.

Experience shows, in regard to all the various sources of pleasure, what I have already observed with respect to man's intellectual life, that those attainments which give full satisfaction for a time, soon again become a source of discontent. Thus the enlargement of man's knowledge makes him conscious of its limits ; the advancement to a station in society which was once the highest mark of his ambition, creates the want of greater influence ; and moral greatness attained, becomes small in the eye of the possessor, and wakes in his soul a 'divine ambition' after an unknown and unconceived of state of power and glory.—Thus, with the expression of dissatisfaction man enters upon life, and with the conviction of its insufficiency he leaves it.

What is the meaning of this constant succession of pain, desire, and pleasure in human life, which ends with a feeling that seems less like a termination than another beginning of life ? The poet divined its true import, when he said,

'Man's grief is grandeur in disguise,
And discontent is immortality.'

Nor can it be mistaken by the true student of human nature, who finds out the real meaning of this deep and mysterious author, not from the made up theories of her various commentators, but from her own authentic works, and as it were in the language of the original ; that is, from the spontaneous workings of the soul, ascertained by faithful self-observation. He can-

not fail to find in that regular succession of emotions in his soul, a revelation of his present and future being. For if he inquires into the causes of pleasure, pain, and desire, he finds that pleasure is called forth in man by everything that is, or seems to him conducive to his *perfection*; that is, favorable to the continuation of his being and increase of his powers—while every impression of an opposite nature causes pain. All that secures to an individual his own existence, be it the acquisition of a livelihood, or a satisfactory proof of the immortality of his soul, excites pleasure, while poverty and doubt are causes of pain. The same emotions are called forth by the real or imaginary increase or diminution of his power, be it by increase of knowledge and moral excellence, or by acts of violence and oppression.

What is the cause and object of the third elementary feeling of man, his desire? I have shown that desire is called forth by pain, or the feeling of dissatisfaction which arises from imperfection; and that its object is satisfaction or happiness, which is founded on perfection. Desire, then, is, in fact, nothing but the tendency of human nature to pass from imperfection to perfection. Thus poverty, which endangers man's earthly existence, gives rise to industry to secure it; thus the pains of ignorance and doubt concerning the state of man after death, call forth intellectual exertion to establish the happy conviction of his immortality. In the same way, the transition from a supposed imperfection to an imaginary perfection, is induced by desire. The sufferings of honest poverty thus become temptations to exchange it for ill gotten wealth; and the restraints which the laws and manners of society impose upon the passions, give rise to a criminal desire to surmount or to brave them.

The regular succession of pain, desire, and pleasure, takes place in animals, as well as in man; and for the same purpose; viz. the attainment of that degree of perfection for which they were fitted by their nature. But the nature and destiny of the animal is finite; accordingly the succession of its feelings is a continual round of the same pains, desires, and pleasures. The want of food causes pain and hunger; this being satisfied gives way to a feeling of weariness and desire of rest, until rest becomes painful, and calls for exercise, which excites the appetite, and reproduces the same course of feelings. But man is differently constituted in this res-

pect. In him there is a desire to continue and increase each pleasure he is enjoying, to infinity. This is true, not only of the pleasures of the mind, the intellectual, moral, and religious enjoyments, but also of the gratification of the senses. The animal frame, indeed, is not sufficient to minister to the unnatural craving of the gross drunkard, or the refined epicurean; but the cravings of the sensualist, the miser, the ambitious, out-reach his power to satisfy them, as well as the desires of the true philosopher and philanthropist. Whatever man has, be it gold, or honor, or knowledge, or virtue, it reminds him of what he has not, and thus satisfaction itself breeds discontent, as the true and only way to more perfect happiness.

This important fact that the summit to which our desires tend, however high, as soon as it is reached, becomes a starting point for a new ascent, only shows that the tendency to perfection, as it exists in man, is not like that of the animal or of the plant, which becomes at last what it was at first, to undergo the same changes. The germ of life which nature has implanted in man, unfolds gradually like that of the plant; but the fruits of human exertion should bear the seeds of another existence and a higher order of being. Human perfection consists in infinite growth. All the powers of the soul, the intellect, the will, and the affections, are capable of infinite expansion; and there is a divine impulse at the very root of human existence, that prompts to the continual exercise of all its powers to the utmost of their extent, and requires a sphere of existence and action conformed to his faculties and attainments. The boy for whom the nursery was an ample field of action, information, and enjoyment, soon finds the play-ground and the school-room too confined for his views, and his desires go forth to compass land and sea, until he looks down upon this whole world as a nursery, and upon life as a primary school for eternity.—The continual succession of pain, desire, and pleasure in man, whatever pursuit he engages in, is the surest evidence of his infinite destiny; while it is at the same time the propelling force that speeds him onward in his course. It is a necessary consequence of his progressive and ever growing nature, that the pleasure which accompanies every advancement of man beyond mere existence, should gradually give way to a feeling of discontent or pain, and excite a desire after a more complete satisfaction. Thus, with every step he takes forward in the journey of life, the horizon of his affections enlarges.

The sun of joy that rises within him, again sets in darkness which calls for another more perfect day.

The inference with respect to the *future* state of the affections, which I feel justified in drawing from these observations, is simply this. Believing, as I do, that man in the life to come will still be essentially the same being, I conclude that the nature of his feelings will remain the same forever. Many causes of pleasure and of pain, and objects of desire, will cease, or be changed. But man, that is, every individual, will still be susceptible of pleasure, pain, and desire. The most perfect employment of all his powers at any one time, will still be attended with entire satisfaction ; but then as human nature will still retain its capacity for, and tendency towards continual progress, a more complete exercise of them will alone satisfy the mind. The want of this higher satisfaction will still be indicated by pain, and excite a desire after happiness. The great and kind design for which the susceptibility of pain was made a constituent part of human nature, is adapted to every stage of an infinite existence and progress. For why was man made liable to all kinds of want ; to hunger and thirst, sickness and death, ignorance and sin ? For no other purpose, certainly, than that food and health, life, truth, and virtue, might become objects of desire, sources of happiness. Even the present life is sufficient to teach us, that the true object of all pain is to fit us for pleasure, or the enjoyment of perfection ; and that the life to come will complete and fully reveal this great and kind appointment of Providence, that we sow in tears only to reap in joy.

In the foregoing remarks upon the nature and future state of what I consider the elements of feeling in man, I have barely touched upon the power of the will over the affections. In the observations I intend to make hereafter on the Moral Powers of man, I shall treat also of his ability to sustain and exalt, or pervert and debase the natural state and tendency of his affections, and thus complete the view I have now given, by pointing out the probable effects of the *character* of man upon the future state of his feelings.

I have thus far considered the immortality of what may be called the feeling nature of man, the susceptibility of pleasure, pain, and desire, with which he is born. The result of this inquiry concerning the elements, naturally leads to the consideration of what may be termed the *attainments* in feeling ; that is, the interests and affections which men actually form in this life.

Every day's experience furnishes numberless examples of that wonderful power in man, the elements of which I have endeavoured to explain—the power to interest himself in all that is going on without and within; that is, to be excited to pleasure or pain by objects perceived or imagined. It is one of the great prerogatives of the nature of man, that he can be interested in everything he knows or imagines, while the animal cares only for those objects which lie within the narrow scope of its instinct. This power of man to interest himself, of which I have before spoken as the vital spring of intellectual growth, is the inexhaustible capital that is laid out and employed in every shape of human industry. That this power itself is immortal, is in fact synonymous with the assertion that the mind is immortal. That there are great objects of interest laid up for the mind in the future state, cannot well be doubted, when we consider that even in this life every generation of men looks back upon those who preceded them, as having lived and died as mere children in knowledge and skill; as if mankind, to the present day, had only served their apprenticeship in learning and handling the great interests of the present life. It seems then unnecessary to take notice of, or to ask, the question, whether the capacity of man to be interested, will continue to exist, and find objects to exercise itself upon after death. But the question remains to be considered whether the offspring of that parent power in man, the interests and attachments which he actually forms in this life, are likely to outlast it. For this purpose we must examine in what manner and by what objects we are generally interested.

The objects by which we are surrounded, and which have an influence upon our lives and feelings, are so various, and the state of the mind itself is subject to so many changes, that we live in a continual alternation of agreeable and disagreeable impressions. The same objects not unfrequently give us at one time pleasure, and at another pain. Some, however, take such a powerful hold upon our feelings, that, whenever they recur to us in experience or in thought, they revive and confirm the first impression. Thus, different countries afford to the traveller manifold pleasures. But these are supplanted by others, while there is one spot on earth, the thought of which has a home in his heart, even while he is far from it. There are many persons, too, whose kindness to us has at different times gladdened our hearts; but there are some who found

their happiness in the pains they endured for us, whose blessed memory fills us with truer delight than all our present enjoyments. There are persons, on the other hand, whose presence gives us pain, because it brings with it the remembrance that they have wronged us, that they have overcome our good with evil; but of all our enemies there is no one whose wrongs give us such deep and lasting pain as our own. Thus, in the large company of thoughts and impressions in which we are constantly moving, we find some familiar friends, and some decided enemies, whilst most of them pass in the crowd unnoticed, or are soon supplanted by others.

These facts naturally lead to the supposition, that the inborn capacity of the soul to be interested in objects and events, was not destined to remain in its infant state, a mere susceptibility of pleasant or painful impressions. The pleasure with which the savage sees the first fine painting, is not less real than that of the connoisseur. The feelings of both originate in the same property of their common nature. But the sensibility of the enlightened lover of the fine arts, has not remained in the state in which that of the savage still is. In the same manner the constant enjoyment of good, or frequent exposure to bad society, not only leaves the soul sensible of the pleasures or pains arising from our intercourse with others, but they create a more or less decided taste or distaste, love or aversion. The frequent repetition, or the depth of the pleasant or painful impressions, has a lasting influence on the soul itself, modifying its native capacities and tendencies. Thus mere sensibilities become habits or dispositions of the soul, and are then called affections, in the strictest sense of the word. The sight of misery will excite an active sympathy in every person that is not destitute of moral sensibility. But the affectionate need not the presence of suffering to excite them to actions, the performance of which has become the habitual delight of their souls.

As by the frequent repetition, or the inherent force of agreeable impressions, habits of delight, or affections, are engendered in the soul, so the impressions of an opposite character give rise to dispositions to be displeased with the cause of such feelings—to disinclination, aversion, or hatred. Is it likely, then, I would ask, that the inclinations and disinclinations which men form in the present state, will continue in the future? I suppose the continuance of our affections after death will depend

on the same circumstances, on which their existence depends in this life ; viz. in the first place, on the real depth of feeling, and secondly, on the objects of our love and dislike. As I consider death but as one of the various events in the life of the mind, I do not think it will have a different, though perhaps a greater, effect upon our feelings than other changes in our circumstances before death.

Now there are some affections which hardly deserve the name, since they are rather the fruits of circumstances than of the mind—our promiscuous tastes and fancies, the transient fashions of the soul. It is not probable that these passing likes and dislikes will be proof against the change from life to death, since they are subject to the fluctuating circumstances of this life, being easily supplanted by other impressions. But there are other attachments formed in this life, for good or for evil, which are so deeply rooted in the soul, that no change of circumstances, nothing but a moral regeneration, can eradicate them. Thus, when the night of affliction comes upon the prosperous man, his day-friends all forsake him ; but true friendship commands the sun of happiness to stand still upon the afflicted, until the powers of misfortune are discomfited. Thus, on the other hand, the true miser, when his hour is come, shows, by the eagerness with which he clings to the last plank in the shipwreck of his fortune, that the love of millions still lives concentrated in the death-grasp of avarice.

These real affections and lasting interests of the soul, can be changed in this life, only by a decided alteration in the character through the moral power of man. Whether such a moral change be possible in the future state, is a question which I shall endeavour to answer in connexion with other remarks on the moral powers. In this place I shall confine myself to the question, whether those inclinations and disinclinations which are proof against every change of circumstances in this life, must be considered as a part of that property which the soul is to carry hence into another state of existence. This question I believe is decided by the previous observations. Our real affections are the natural and steady growth of the heart. If, therefore, we believe in the immortality of the feeling nature of man, or the elements of our affections, it would be inconsistent not to believe also, that our true attainments in feeling, the inclinations and disinclinations, which we form in this life, will enter with us into the future. If we should be

born again merely with that susceptibility of pleasure, pain, and desire, which we brought into this world, without the habits of feeling we have formed, we should no more recognise ourselves as the same beings, than the full grown man if he were born again as an infant.

If it is true, as has been said, 'know what a man loves or hates, and you know the man,'—it is certainly true, that, if he knows himself at all, it is by his affections. It is the sight or thought of whatever he likes or dislikes which reminds him most powerfully of himself in this life. Suppose a person to be transported to a far distant country where the face of nature as well as the inhabitants, their language and manners, is entirely unlike anything that is familiar to him. He would feel a stranger, indeed, even to himself, if it were not for the recollection of what he loved in his native land. But should he unexpectedly find, if it were but a simple plant, or hear the familiar note of a bird, or still more, should he behold the face of one he has loved in his own country, the strange land would at once become a home to him. Thus the consciousness of our inclinations awakened by seeing those again who were dear to us, and who outran us in the course, will in all probability form the connecting link between the present state and the future, by reminding and convincing each one of the identity of his own being. 'The first to live, the last to die,' affection will be also the first to awake again, after the last sleep, to eternal day.

The permanence of our affections, good or bad, rests on what has before been designated as the foundation of men's happiness—the constant interest of each individual in his real or imaginary perfection, which consists in his own perpetual existence and progress. The affections, or habits of soul, as they make a part of himself, and on this ground are sources of satisfaction, remain so, even after the outward means of gratifying them have ceased. Thus, gratitude does not die in the affectionate soul, though he to whom it is due, and the means of showing it, have ceased to exist. Thus, party spirit, though its real sources be dried up, will sustain itself from artificial reservoirs. But though there is an inherent satisfaction not only in good but also in evil affections, as parts of ourselves, we know that this pleasure is increased or diminished by the possession or want of adventitious means to sustain it, which become on this account objects of desire. Envy, for example, though it

may still live and rankle in the soul after its object is dead, yields a full satisfaction only when it actually triumphs, while it becomes a source of pain if generosity put it to shame. It is the same with every other affection; and on this account it is an interesting question to every one, which of the various *objects* of human affection are likely to endure after death; and particularly which of the sources of happiness he has opened for himself here on earth, may be hoped will spring up into everlasting life.

I have shown that the simple emotions of pleasure, pain, and desire, are the constituent elements of all our various affections. I have shown also, that desire is nothing but the felt tendency of the soul to pass from pain to pleasure. Now the most simple of those affections which are founded upon the feelings of pleasure and pain, we call *inclinations* and *disinclinations*. Inclination is the disposition of the soul to be pleased at the thought of something that has proved the cause of pleasure, be it a person, or a book, or any other object. Disinclination is the disposition to be displeased with something that has been known as the cause of pain. Inclination and disinclination are at the bottom of all those affections which are ultimately founded on pleasure and pain; such as hope and fear, pride and shame. Like and dislike, love and hatred, are only different degrees of inclination and disinclination. I believe when we speak strictly, we say we *like* a thing if we are disposed to be pleased at the thought of it, compared with what is either painful to us to think of, or indifferent; and we *love* a thing when at the thought of it we feel better pleased than with any other object of the same kind which we like.* The same difference exists in regard to dislike and hatred.—The above question, then, concerning the permanence of the objects of our various affections, may be reduced to this; What objects of inclination or disinclination are calculated to prove constant in themselves; and particularly which of them are likely to be permanent sources of satisfaction?

That our inclinations, though all founded on a previous experience of pleasure, and gratifying in themselves, may become

* The frequency of a promiscuous use of these expressions, naturally arises from the circumstance that we think and speak of the same thing sometimes in comparison with unpleasant or indifferent objects, and sometimes in comparison with those which we like. But every one feels, that in saying he loves another, he expresses a more entire satisfaction, than when he speaks of merely liking him, and that in speaking of the Supreme Being we can use only the one of these expressions and not the other.

sources of pain, is evident. Those whose hope and trust are founded on wealth and the favor of men, while they are digging for happiness, are never secure against striking upon bitter springs of disappointment. On the other hand, we know that our disinclinations, though founded on the experience of pain, and in themselves productive of pain, may conduce to pleasure. Virtuous toil and godly sorrow open again to man the gates of paradise, which forbidden pleasures have shut against him. And if the previous general remarks are founded on correct observation of the real tendencies of human nature, they show that no pleasure can continue and be increased forever without pain; and that the real object of pain, is no other than, by giving rise to desire, to promote pleasure. Our present inquiry, therefore, after the sources of immortal happiness would be vain, if we went in search of objects of human affections calculated to exclude all pain forever. I only wish to answer the question, what are the objects of affection, which, through the instrumentality of pain and desire, can lead us to ever-increasing happiness, as the greatest felicity of which human nature is capable.

The question thus stated has already been answered, in a general manner, in treating of the sources of pleasure. Ever growing perfection is the only sufficient foundation of ever increasing happiness, and consequently the first permanent object of human affection, of inclination and love. The existence of a constant love of perfection in man, supposes that of a constant disinclination or aversion to imperfection. This aversion never allows him to be satisfied with any attainment in excellence, whenever it is in his power to rise beyond it. It is a necessary and constant incentive to the highest happiness of which he is capable.

The love of perfection, as it exists in every individual, has for its primary object the perfection of *himself*, the satisfaction of all his wants. Whatever is essential, or conducive to his own perfection, is an object of this affection. Human perfection consists, as I have observed, in perpetual existence and in a continual progress growing out of the most various and harmonious exercise of all our powers. The accomplishment of his destiny depends partly on man himself, and partly on the circumstances under which he is placed. Accordingly I shall speak, first of the being, and then of the condition of man, as the two great objects of human interest and affection.

The immediate object of man's love is his own being. Man

loves himself. The thought of his own happiness is the constant cause of it ; and if his idea of himself and his happiness is but perfectly just, his self-love is the foundation of all pure affection, and the most perfect of all motives. If he knows and loves himself in truth, he prizes those sources of pleasure which he has in common with the animal, so far and no farther than as they are consistent with, and subservient to, the infinite powers and tendencies of his nature. He knows that the body, though it is of more worth than raiment, is itself only the raiment of the soul. His self-love is a source of ever-increasing happiness, when he loves himself as an immortal being invested with infinite capacities. He loves himself as an *intellectual* being, in the free exercise and constant improvement of his powers of perception, imagination, and reason, exploring himself, the world, and the Deity, and thus opening to himself an infinite range of thought, affection, and action. He loves himself as an *affectionate* being, interesting himself in all he knows, thinks, and imagines ; impelled by motives which find their natural explanation only in the infinity of his being ; capable of unbounded and unfathomable love. He loves himself as a *moral* being, working out his highest, his moral, happiness, by ascertaining and performing his duty. This is true self-love, an affection which man alone of all created beings is capable of conceiving, and which opens in himself a source of eternal happiness. His attainments in wisdom, excellence, and love, treasured up as they are in his memory, and in the conscious increase of his strength, are the first and lasting shoots in the spring of his existence, by which the immortal plant raises itself above this earth to mature its choicest fruits under the genial influences of its native heaven.

In the second place, the *condition* of man, the circumstances under the influence of which he lives, as they are necessary to the accomplishment of the great end of his existence, become objects of his interest and affection. His perfection, and consequently his happiness, depends on nature, man, and God. As the immediate object of man's affection is his own immortal self, he loves everything besides in proportion as it contributes to his perfection. That which allows and calls forth the freest use of all his powers is the prime object of his affection.

As I have before observed that it is through his intellect that man lays out the sphere of action for all his other faculties of body and mind, it follows that in all things he loves best that

which calls for the fullest exercise of his intellectual powers ; that is, perfection itself. Therefore what he loves best in nature and man, is not that which ministers to his animal wants. He loves the useless graces of the flowers which neither toil nor spin. He loves her who thought it no waste to pour the precious ointment, which might have been sold for more than three hundred pence, upon the feet of her Saviour. Man, when true to himself, loves in nature, in his fellow beings, and in God, what he loves in himself, perfection. Therefore his heart grows, as his intellect expands in contemplating the various orders of beings. In the inanimate world he views in silent admiration the various and harmonious motions of the celestial bodies around their common centre. He considers with increased interest the plant, as it frees itself in some degree from the common law of gravitation which binds the mineral to the mass. He loves to watch its growth, its flowers and its fruits, the first essays of the self-supporting and self-renewing power in nature. With still greater interest he contemplates the animal, a plant, as it were, which, through the emancipating act of nature, has gained that freedom after which the whole vegetable world seems striving. It is, however, not merely the perfection of the vegetative system which engrosses our interest in the animal ; it is the infancy of the intellect, of feeling, particularly in animals of the highest orders ; it is the dawn of human nature in the animal world. Still the interest with which the true student and lover of nature observes an animal, and the wonderful displays of instinct, has for its object, not so much any individual, as the whole class to which it belongs. For the instinct which directs the animal to provide for itself and its offspring, however perfect for its purpose, binds each individual to that particular and finite mode of existence which nature has assigned to every species, and which no individual is able to rise above. Even within this contracted sphere of existence, the individual animal cannot be said to be the real author of its mode of life and action, as this does not in any way depend on its own choice, but is controlled by instinct, the unalterable law of the species.

But in the sphere of existence which God has marked out for man, there is no degree of excellence which he *must* attain, and none which he cannot pass. There is no law of instinct, binding upon the whole race, that would prevent the individual from rising above, or sinking below, the rest of his fel-

low men. For every individual human being is created a free agent, capable of infinite improvement. On this account man is the object of a deeper affection than any other created being, or species of beings we know. Not merely the whole race, but each individual is the object of an ever-increasing interest. Every improvement of man in bodily comfort, or in social blessings, in knowledge and taste, goodness and piety, is an object of interest that is ever new; because the individual in whose advancement toward perfection we rejoice, was, and still is, free to choose the opposite course.

The moral self-dependence of man, which makes it impossible for any other to calculate with certainty upon his future conduct, gives rise to those feelings of lofty trust and tender reliance, which make friendship among men a virtue. The love of man to man commences with the daybreak of human existence. It is the angel of joy that welcomes him into being; it gives him a home; it leads him to the temple of knowledge; it continues with him in his temptations; it leans on his bosom; it stands by his cross; it opens the heavens, and sees him at the right hand of God. Do we yet ask, whether those who were interested in each other in this life, will meet again? Let each one ask himself first, whether his interest in another is strong enough to live through the burning summers, and chilling winters, and all the lukewarmness of the intermediate seasons of this life. Let him ask himself next, *what* he loves in his fellow man. Is it the costly frame, for which the world honors the object of your affection, or the inestimable image itself, the likeness of the living God? 'He that soweth to the flesh shall of the flesh reap corruption; but he that soweth to the spirit, shall of the spirit reap life everlasting.' Then, if you love another for his free and noble thought; for his deep and tender affection, rejoicing in self-sacrifice, embracing all mankind, and aspiring to the God of love; still more, if you love him for what is most truly his own, for his virtue, justice, truth and holiness—O then you need not ask whether the object of your affection be immortal. You indeed do not see them now upon whom your eyes once rested with delight; but what you loved, and still love in them you never saw. But this too you will see when their spirits meet your mental vision, as once their bodies stood before your mortal eyes. Those, also, who quitted this world before we could know them, but who have left behind, in their works and in their lives, monuments of their minds,

the just men made perfect in heaven, and Him who without a change ascended from glory to glory—we shall know them face to face, if we now begin to deserve their love. And when we ourselves shall have entered that invisible kingdom to which now our highest thoughts and loftiest hopes ascend, can we suppose that our love, in the height of its glory, will forget or disown its birth-place—when we read that the rich man in his torments did not forget his five brethren in his father's house?

The growth, the permanence of our love to our fellow men, depends on their, and our own, growing excellence. For love is the vital interest of the soul in perfection. The most intimate unions of love among men, if they are not founded on continued striving after perfection, are less like the golden fruits, than as the golden leaves of autumn, whose dying charm contains no promise of a coming spring. But is not that the true love which goes to save that which is lost, which extends not merely to *our* enemies, but even to those of God and goodness? This is indeed true and perfect love; but it is love in search of its object—it is the forereaching faith of love that, even in the depth of corruption, seeks and cherishes the germ of salvation and the hope of heaven.

The love of man to God, also, is susceptible of perpetual progress in extent and in truth, in proportion to his ever-increasing knowledge of Him, the inexhaustible source of every kind and degree of perfection, whose being is perfection itself. If we love God now when we cannot see him, how much more shall we love him when we shall see him face to face. Still, as he is, we can never know him. The sun that now appears to us the centre of this world may hereafter appear to us but as a planet, carrying with it a system of worlds around an unknown centre; and though we should arrive at length to a knowledge of all created things, the creation of God is continual production, world without end. Thus, our love of God will grow with our knowledge of him; and the deepest source of our knowledge, as well as our love, we shall ever find within ourselves. For we know Him in whose image we are created, only as the recognition of that image in our minds leads us on from glory to glory.

[To be concluded in the next number.]

THE CHRISTIAN EXAMINER.

NO. XXXVIII.

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ART. I. *Unitarian Christianity free from Objectionable Extremes.* By SAMUEL GILMAN. Printed for the American Unitarian Association. Boston. Gray & Bowen. 1829. 12mo. pp. 24.

WHEN will it be fully understood that freedom is not riot; that emancipation from unrighteous servitude is not the renunciation of lawful and virtuous authority; that a right to use is not a right to abuse our faculties; that the assertion of independence is not the denial of duty; that fearless inquiry after truth is not synonymous with sneering skepticism or reckless infidelity? How long shall history have to mourn and weep that the holy cause of liberty has suffered in the world not more from her direct and declared enemies, not more from tyrants and slaves, than from the undisciplined, unprincipled, lawless rout who have swarmed round her standard, and blended her name and cause with their own licentiousness?

Religious, as well as civil and political liberty, has suffered, and suffered long, from these misapprehensions and intrusions. It is one of the sorest trials which the friends and promoters of a liberal theology are called to undergo, that they are sometimes thought to favor levity in matters of faith, and looseness in matters of practice, while they themselves are conscious of entertaining and inculcating entire seriousness and strictness in both. It is true that they who know us, and know our theology, know that we are serious. But there are so many who are properly acquainted neither with us nor our theology, and ig-

norance so necessarily implies a want of justice and discrimination, that we must expect to be misunderstood by those who are without, till knowledge becomes more thorough and more widely extended. We must expect to hear the partisans of an exclusive theology beating the alarm of our licentiousness and infidelity, while they can muster up a single fear or bad passion against us by the sound; and we must expect, which is still harder to endure, to be hailed as fellows by the dissolute and light minded, till they are all made aware that our liberty and their liberty differ from each other as light differs from darkness, order from disorder, and duty from disobedience.

Under these circumstances our course seems to be plain. We are by no means to forsake or disavow our liberal principles, because they are denounced and reviled by their foes, or because they are contaminated by the rude touch of self-called and self-invited friends, who are worse than foes. We must continue to cling to them, without a single feeling of suspicion or fear, as to the eternal truth of God and the real hope of man. We must oppose all narrowness and exclusiveness, all spiritual pride and assumption, all endeavours and contrivances to fetter inquiry, to restrict privileges, to monopolize rights, to intimidate reason;—we must oppose all these with a promptness which doubts not, with a courage which quails not, with a fidelity which is not tired and is not ashamed. And with even more directness and energy must we oppose the heartless indifference, the demoralizing libertinism, and the bold impiety, which, each and all, have decorated themselves with the wronged and holy name of freedom. We must let it be most expressly known, that we seek no fellowship, that we can have none, with the licentious and the scoffing; that much as we love liberty, we love it not better and prize it not higher than we do order and religion and oldfashioned virtue; and that it is our fixed persuasion that where the spirit of the Lord is, the spirit of purity and holiness, there, and there alone, is liberty.

Considering how very superficially all subjects, especially religious subjects, which require any reach or comprehension of thought, are wont to be viewed by the great mass of those to whom they are presented, it is no matter of surprise that liberal Christianity has been misapprehended in every possible manner. From the freedom and fearlessness of its character alone, it is calculated to raise up such clouds and hosts of alarms, misgivings and prejudices, that its features and designs

are almost necessarily distorted to the view of common beholders. The medium through which it is seen is not yet clear and settled. Few will approach sufficiently near to it, to form a right judgment of its features, and the greater number make a merit of keeping at so great a distance from it, that they must needs be deluded. Because it comes out and denies the truth of certain doctrines which for centuries have been generally received as fundamental and essential doctrines of Christianity, it is charged with the denial of Christianity itself; and this charge is made by two very different parties, the one regarding unbelief with horror, and the other beholding it with approbation, but both uniting in this point, perhaps, that they wish the charge to prove well founded, because the former party would thus gain a victory, and the latter an accession of strength and respectability. One fact is confirmed to us by this state of things, which is, that the doctrines to which we just now alluded, and which we regard as the corruptions of our religion, such as the imputation of Adam's sin, the trinity, and the popular scheme of the atonement, have been so intertwined and incorporated with the christian system, that they have been esteemed, in almost universal opinion, as one and the same thing with that system. This is just what we have always asserted. We have always asserted that the world in general had little idea of Christianity as separate from those doctrines, and that this was one of the main reasons why they who could not believe the doctrines, rejected Christianity. They thought that in disbelieving the former, they did in fact reject the latter. It is in perfect accordance, therefore, with this prevalent, though extremely erroneous notion, that we, who have discarded those doctrines, which we conceive to be gross misconceptions of Christianity, have been accused of an utter want of faith, and suspected of a corresponding laxity of principle. And it is in reference to this notion principally, as the root of a rank growth of error, prejudice, and abuse, that we now propose to set forth, in a few pages, the real seriousness of the Liberal and Unitarian system of belief, and to show that it denies not a single doctrine of revelation, and dispenses not with a single sanction to virtue, and that its great purpose is, to make men not less but more holy, devout, spiritual and religious than they are.

It is serious, in the first place, very serious, in rejecting those irrational doctrines which have so long been popular, and have so long assumed to themselves the titles of peculiar, essential,

orthodox, and evangelical. They are rejected, because they are believed to be the exact contrary to all this; because they are believed to have no foundation in the gospel, and no good influence of themselves. We are constantly accused of setting up our carnal reason in opposition to revelation. But it is not so. We take our Heaven-inspired reason, the gift and light of the Lord, and holding it up before the record of his word, we behold no such doctrines there, as those which have been called *evangelical*. On the contrary, we are brought to the conclusion that they are in appearance and character opposed to the reigning simplicity and soberness and reasonableness of the christian scriptures; that they overload and disfigure the real christian doctrine; that they were added to it by a false philosophy and a carnal superstition; that they maintain their place and connexion through the power of custom, association, ignorance and fear; that they have no intrinsic value, and that their separate influence is rather bad than good, upon the virtue, happiness and improvement of man. We therefore renounce them as not christian, as not rational, as not beneficial. The Christianity which remains after these are gone, is called by those who retain what we reject, cold, bare and lifeless;—we say that it is risen from the dead, freed from its death bandages and grave clothes, restored to its pristine vitality and health. In disencumbering our religion from what we believe to be its corruptions, we are actuated only by a serious and earnest love for the religion itself, and a serious and earnest regard for the welfare of our brethren, which we believe this religion is intended and calculated most effectually to promote. We have no designs, secret or overt, against Christianity. Our only design is to induce others to receive it, as we receive and embrace it ourselves,—in its simple beauty and truth.

If our asseverations to this effect are not to be heeded, what is the language of facts? Are not Unitarians, and have they not always been, among the boldest and most successful defenders of the truth of the christian religion? Is not Lardner's work on the *Credibility of the Gospel History*, a laborious and faithful collection of evidences and reasonings to which the Orthodox themselves are obliged to resort, whenever they would defend the very foundations of their faith and ours? And did not Lardner reject the doctrines which we reject? And if he had been an infidel, is it in the least degree probable that he would have spent the best of his life, that he would have labored day

and night, to furnish the most complete historical argument for the truth of Christianity which has ever been given to the world? Is it probable, we say, that he and other Unitarians would have devoted their time, zeal and strength to the support of a cause in which they had no faith, or to which they were indifferent?

Again; many have suffered odium, persecution, imprisonment, for rejecting what we reject, while they still clung to the profession of the faith of Christ. Is it to be conceived that infidels would have done so? Is it to be imagined that any men, in their senses, would choose to suffer for a certain form of that religion which they altogether and in every form renounced and despised in their hearts? Would they choose to suffer as prevaricators and hypocrites, when they could suffer no more for declaring their whole disbelief, like true men? No;—men without faith and without principle, often remain in professed communion with a popular and lucrative establishment, the creed of which they silently condemn, but they do not voluntarily bring themselves into trouble by laboring for an unpopular belief, which they equally condemn. The course which we have taken sufficiently proves our seriousness. If we had been infidels, we should either have quietly refrained from touching the least portion of what is generally regarded and revered as Christianity, or we should have cast away the whole. But we have done neither. We have incurred the opprobrium of infidelity, and have been all the while laboring for the great christian cause. When we determine to give up Christianity, we shall announce it ourselves. Till then, we claim to be believed when we declare, that it is our reverence for its purity, and our desire for its increased influence alone, which induce us to separate it from those opinions which in our view greatly injure it. We are no more to be confounded with unbelievers, than the husbandman, who with great toil and care frees from weeds and stones the garden in which is his delight and nourishment, is to be confounded with the wild beasts who rush in and lay waste the beds, and trample down weeds and flowers and fruits in one common ruin. We may be wrong in our views of Christianity; that is certainly within the range of possibilities; but we know that we entertain them as friends and not enemies to Christianity, and that a sincere regard for its honor and truth and efficacy, is the motive which impels us to declare and diffuse them.

If we are thus serious in our opposition to the corruptions of Christianity, we are no less so in our estimate of the writings which tell us of the origin and author of the religion itself. We call them sacred; sacred on account of the men who wrote them, sacred on account of the subjects of which they treat, and the events which they record; sacred on account of their integrity, their truth, their spirit, and their tendency. To us, the Bible is the book of books, and we trust that it will always so be. We receive and revere it as the only authentic history of the interpositions of God in favor of his human offspring; as the only volume which gives us a true account of the life, and the words, and the actions and sufferings and death of Jesus Christ our Saviour, the beloved Son, prophet, and messenger of the Most High; in short, as the only true record of divine revelation and inspiration. But here the cry is raised against us, that we do not believe that the book itself is inspired, and that the pens which wrote it were guided, not only by honesty and knowledge, but by the constant dictation of the Holy Spirit; and that consequently we do really reject it and tread it under foot, and are unbelievers and scoffers.

In answer to this, we say, that if there ever was a weak and unwarrantable inference, it is the inference of our denial of the authority of the Scriptures from our disbelief of their direct inspiration. Not to mention that the charge of infidelity which is brought against us on this point, is one which we share in company with many bishops, doctors, and learned men in good Orthodox repute—for this is a subject on which we care not much for human countenance—we most distinctly assert that so far from being actuated by a reckless spirit of irreverence and hostility toward the sacred writings, it is our respect for them, as well as our regard for consistency and probability, which induces us to believe and to declare, that, though they were written by inspired men, they are not, in the common sense, inspired, that they were not produced under the miraculous supervision of the Deity. We do not conceive ourselves warranted in attributing so remarkable a dictation to the productions of the apostles and evangelists, when they themselves intimate nothing of the kind. If they felt, if they knew, that what their pens traced was proceeding, not from their own minds, but from the Supreme Mind within them, taking the place of their own, would not so remarkable a fact have been noticed by them, and prominently registered? Would not

Matthew have said to his readers, What I write, is written, not by me, but by the Divine Spirit which inspires me? Does he say so? Does Mark, does Luke, does John say so? Do they not, on the contrary, write as those who are recording in the usual way, events and sayings which were witnessed in the usual way? When Paul, or Peter, or James, writes a letter to the churches, do they write as if their own injunctions and opinions were superseded and absorbed by an irresistible external influence; or do they write as if they were dispensing, in their own way, truths which they had received from intercourse with their Master, from their own observation, and from the teachings of the holy spirit of God? That they were taught by the Holy Spirit, in all things necessary and otherwise unattainable, we do not, and we never did deny. But that they were thus taught by the Holy Spirit, and that all that they *wrote* was suggested and superintended by the Holy Spirit, are two very different propositions; and while we acknowledge the truth of the former, we see no evidence for, and a great deal against, the truth of the latter. It is on account of this evidence, which is founded on the appearance and character of the Scriptures themselves, and the force of which we cannot withstand, that we speak as we do of their inspiration;—and therefore we speak seriously and reverently, not lightly and unadvisedly.

We say that it is impossible for any person of sense and candor to read the epistles of the New Testament, and not perceive that several things in them are merely the private opinions or commands of the writers, and therefore not of general or perpetual obligation, and of no other authority than that of their own reasonableness. If we are asked how we distinguish between the private opinions of the writers and the essential principles of their religion, between what is of partial and temporary, and what is of universal and constant obligation, we answer, that we do it as we would do everything else of a similar nature,—by the sober exercise of our reason, by the consideration of times, seasons and circumstances, by comparing opinions with facts, and local and occasional precepts with the dictates of propriety and eternal truth. And we say, moreover, that they who hold to the inspiration of the Scriptures in apparently the most unqualified and literal sense, do, in this respect, precisely the same thing that we do. There is much, especially in the epistles, which they do not look upon as in-

spired and binding, and which they distinguish from that which is of permanent utility and obligation, by the use of the same means which we employ. And though this may seem to be a bold assertion, it can very quickly be proved. In the eleventh chapter of Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians, there are some minute directions with regard to the attire of women in the religious meetings of the converts. They are directed to pray with their heads covered; while the men are enjoined to pray uncovered. It is also declared that even nature teaches that if a man have long hair, it is a shame unto him. Now we say that such directions and observations are evidently founded on the apostle's private notions of fitness and propriety, and that no Christians, not even the most Orthodox, believe them to be obligatory or inspired. The Orthodox Puritans, in the times of the Charleses, might have quoted, and we believe did quote, the latter of these texts against the Orthodox High-church Cavaliers; but the Cavaliers did not leave off wearing long hair on that account, and few persons, of any church or denomination, would risk their reputation for good sense, by quoting the text now as one of obligation. It is not, and other similar passages are not regarded, practically, as inspired. No divine authority is claimed for them, or attributed to them. And in what principles do our Orthodox brethren separate these from other parts of the Scriptures, and treat them, in practice, as of no obligation? On precisely the same principles with our own. They bring their reason, as we do, to the investigation. They consider, as we do, the circumstances of the case. They make a distinction, as we do, between what is local and what is universal; between what is for a time and a season only, and what is for Christians in all ages. And it will not do to say, that they hold such passages as those referred to above, to be inspired as well as the rest of scripture, but inspired only for a particular church, and a particular age; for there is no sign whatever of any such limitation; there is not a single hint that those directions were not intended, equally with the rest, for other churches as well as for that at Corinth. The fact is, that minute disciplinary regulations of this kind, are viewed by all Christians, really if not professedly, as having no other weight than the personal authority of the apostle who prescribes them.

We now repeat, what we intimated above, that we fully believe that the scriptures were written by inspired men; that is, by men, who, in various measures and at different times, had

been assisted and enlightened by the aids and teachings of the spirit of God. But there is a distinction between the inspiration of what is written, and the inspiration of those who write, or those concerning whom others write. If the mass of mankind were in the habit of making distinctions, this subject would not be involved in its present obscurity, nor would Liberal Christians be assailed, as they now are, by the charge of infidelity.* The distinction which I have mentioned, may be illustrated by a single instance. In the tenth chapter of the book of Acts, an account is given of a heavenly vision by which the apostle Peter was instructed not to call any creature of God common or unclean, and was thus prepared to dismiss his Jewish prejudices, and receive the Gentile family of Cornelius into the christian church. Now we believe that Peter was, according to this narration, supernaturally informed on a subject, and a very important subject, on which his views had been before narrow and false, and therefore that he was in this case inspired. But we do not believe that the writer of the book of Acts either required or received divine inspiration in penning the account of Peter's inspiration, but that he gained his information in the most usual ways, probably from the lips of Peter himself. And if Peter had drawn up the account, he would evidently have required no assistance in doing so, but the promptings of his own memory. This appears to us so plain, so true, and so satisfactory, that we marvel that any other views should ever have been entertained of the subject. If by the inspiration of the Scriptures, it is meant, however, that they were written by persons who had partaken of the gifts of inspiration, and that they furnish a true account of divine revelations, we are willing to call them, in this sense, inspired; but our conscience forbids us to call them so, till the sense in which we apply the term is well understood.

* While this article was going through the press, the writer happened to be reading a recently published work of Coleridge's, 'On the Constitution of Church and State,' &c., and met with a passage on page 32, which, at the same time that it well expresses the principle contended for in the text, is another Orthodox authority added to a list, already long, in favor of that principle. We call Coleridge an Orthodox authority, because he appears to be claimed by the Orthodox, though on what grounds we are not fully aware. The passage is as follows. 'But to confound the inspiring spirit with the informing word, and both with the dictation of sentences and formal propositions; and to confine the office and purpose of inspiration to the miraculous immission, or infusion, of novelties, *rebus nusquam prius visis, vel auditis*,—these, alas! are the current errors of Protestants without learning, and of bigots in spite of it.'

As we have already asserted that the strictest adherents to the popular doctrine of the inspiration of the Scriptures, do not, in fact and practice, believe some parts of those writings to be inspired, and that they select those parts from the rest by exactly the same process of reasoning which we employ in separating what is obligatory from what is not, we now proceed to assert, with equal confidence, that the *authority* of the Scriptures, as a rule of life, is not at all impaired in our eyes by the views which we entertain of their inspiration, but is, on the contrary, as complete and final with us as with them. We believe the Scriptures to be true—true histories, true records. We believe that the writers of them were honest, intelligent men, incapable of being grossly deceived themselves, or of wishing to deceive others, and that the events which they relate, with some trivial and natural discrepancies in their details, are facts. In short, we believe, from abundant evidence, both external and internal, in the truth of the Scriptures. Believing this, we believe everything, and acknowledge everything. If we believe that Jesus of Nazareth was sent from God, as the christian Scriptures say that he was, to announce God's will to men; that he proved the reality of his mission by the performance of miracles which no one could have performed unless God were with him; that he lived a life of spotless purity and virtue, and that after a violent and cruel death he rose from the grave—if we believe this, and none of our accusers have as yet had the hardihood to charge us with denying it, then the Scriptures have an authority over us which is strictly divine, and consequently of the highest possible character. As soon as we confess that the precepts which appear in the Gospels as those of Jesus, were really uttered by him, and that he was in truth a teacher sent from God, then those precepts become to us the words of God, and of course an absolute rule of conduct. As soon as we acknowledge that the character of Jesus is accurately delineated by the evangelists, as honest historians, that moment does his example become our professed guide to virtue, happiness and heaven. And we now would simply ask, whether, if a man receives the precepts of Jesus as truly divine commandments, and the life of Jesus as the model of his own, he could, by any effort of faith or imagination, attribute a higher and more effectual authority to the writings which propose these commandments and that model? We ask, whether, obeying Christ as an instructor and lawgiver sent to him by

their common Father and God, he is not in the way of being a good Christian? We ask, whether he deserves to be called an infidel?

We have dwelt thus long on this topic, because we are desirous that those who are the least versed in questions of theology, may understand that a denial of the immediate inspiration of the Scriptures, does not, in the slightest degree, affect their authority, which can only be affected by a denial of their truth; that they may also understand and be assured, that Liberal Christians and Unitarians recognise the divine authority of the Scriptures as completely as do our most Orthodox brethren; and that, understanding these things, they may treat with a due regard, the clamorous appeals which have lately been made to prejudice, ignorance, and fear.—We have dwelt on this topic for yet this further purpose; that those, who, partaking of the vulgar misapprehensions of our principles, entertain the idea that we are approaching toward themselves in a disregard for the Scriptures, may be certified, that they are under an entire delusion; that we look upon those Scriptures, which they undertake to esteem so lightly, as truly sacred; that we love and revere them with a sincere and faithful love and reverence; that we take our stand upon their authenticity and truth; that we have planted our feet decidedly and firmly upon those muniments of their credibility and of our christian faith, which Locke and Lardner, with their associates, aided by the perpetual might of internal evidence, have rendered, if not unassailable, yet impregnable.

We are serious, then, in our regard for the Scriptures, and serious and not disrespectful or reckless in rejecting the popular doctrine of their inspiration; a doctrine which we reject because we see no warrant for it in reason, none in the Scriptures themselves, and because it incumbers our faith with difficulties, from which, in common justice, it ought to be separated and freed.

We will pass on to another subject on which there has been, and still exists, a vast deal of error and ill feeling. We refer to our opinions concerning the person and nature of Christ. Because we do not believe that Jesus of Nazareth, whom we acknowledge as our Saviour and Master, is one and the same being with Almighty God, we are charged with digging up the very foundations of the christian faith. This charge is so common, and we are so accustomed to it, that we do not ourselves

often stop to consider what a wonderful one it is. But it is a very wonderful one. We shall not enter, however, into the controversy which it involves, because, though we certainly never mean to shrink from it, this is not the time for so long a discussion as would be necessary. We will only say, in defence of our seriousness and sobriety on this subject, that we do not believe Christ to be the Supreme Being, because we cannot see that the Scriptures require such a belief, and because it is our conviction that Jesus Christ himself, and God himself absolutely forbid it. We entirely disavow any design to rob the Saviour of his glory. Most gratefully and joyfully do we render to him all the glory which belongs to the Son of God and the Redeemer of men ; and we cannot justly be said to rob him of that, which, according to our sincere belief, he not only does not claim, but expressly disclaims. Indeed we regard the common notions of the glory of Christ as remarkably superficial and inaccurate. We believe, that although by the exercise of power which he solemnly and explicitly ascribes to his Father, he could silence the storm, and raise the dead, yet his chief glory is not to be found even in that mighty power, but in his perfect obedience to his Father's will, in his finishing with zeal and exactness the work which was given him to do. We regret to say, that this view of the Saviour's glory is not so common, even in our own denomination, as we could wish it to be. Those of our own Unitarian brethren, who hold the doctrines of the preexistence and superangelic nature of Christ, have been too apt to reproach those who do not hold them, with this same robbery of their Saviour's glory. Those of us who feel wronged by the imputation, may answer, that it is not thus that we understand his glory, or what is due to him as our Master. If we read the Gospels aright, he seems to require us to love and imitate his character, not to admire his nature ; to keep his sayings and obey his commands, rather than to be particularly zealous for his preexistence. And when we weigh these things together, and see how far more important is the first than the last, it is then that we deeply feel that we are not robbers. We believe in one only God, the self-existent Creator, and worship him alone ; we revere, we love his Son Jesus Christ, and would observe his precepts, and enjoin others to observe them, as the word of God, and the way to God. If this faith is not serious, we are not yet acquainted with the signification of that term.

It would be easy to show, with regard to some other supposed doctrines of Christianity, that our views of them are serious, entertained in conformity with the Scriptures, and with a true concern for the moral and spiritual improvement of our fellow men. But we must hasten to a consideration of some topics of a more general character, in order to show the seriousness of our sentiments and principles on the whole subject of religion.

The single word, *life*, includes within its meaning much doctrine, and may serve as a test of moral opinions. What then do we think of life, of human, mortal life? We certainly do not look upon it as a sporting time which may be wasted in the pursuit of amusements and trifles, or a grieving time which may be consumed in sadness and tears, but as a season of mental and moral advancement, of usefulness, of discipline, of preparation for a future state. We believe that of this our life God is the giver and upholder; that it is passed under his all-searching and perpetual sight; that he beholds what is good in us with complacency, and what is weak with pity, and what is evil with anger, and that he will reward the first, and assist the second, and punish the last.

Like others, we are to die. With the faith which we entertain, this knowledge cannot make us gloomy, but we cannot be, in the view of so certain and momentous an event, reckless or heedless, or teach others to be so. We regard death as a change, a solemn one; and a change for which the manner of our life, its duty and its piety, ought to make us at all times ready.

After death comes the judgment. Are we not to be judged? We believe that we are, and that we must render an account, and take the consequences of every action and every thought of our lives. Believing this, is it probable, is it possible that we can be so palpably, so sadly inconsistent, as to be licentious in faith or practice, or induce others so to be? Is it possible that we can intentionally undervalue God's word, dishonor his Son, and trifle with his commandments, when we believe that we are soon to be summoned to our account before his judgment seat? Are we to be suspected of playing the fool and the madman at this astonishing rate? No;—if our creed contained but this one article; if all that we believed, was, that we were to be judged by an Almighty and Holy God, according to the

deeds done in the body, that single article ought to be sufficient to secure us against the charge of a want of seriousness.

We have said enough for our purpose. We have spoken in defence and apology alone. We have attacked the sincerity and piety of no sect or denomination of Christians. On the subject of the inspiration of the Scriptures, we have spoken somewhat at length, because it has been much agitated of late, and explicitly, because that is the way in which we always intend to speak in this work. We trust, however, that we have not, by a light, intemperate or uncharitable word, done dishonor to the real seriousness of the faith, which, on that point principally, we have undertaken to defend.

- ART. II.—1. *The Apocalypse of St John, or, Prophecy of the Church of Rome, the Inquisition, the Great Revolution, the Universal War, and the Final Triumph of Christianity; being a new Interpretation.* By the Rev. G. CROLY.
2. *Babylon and Infidelity foredoomed of God; a Discourse on the Prophecies and the Apocalypse.* By the Rev. E. IRVING. 2 vols.
3. *A Key to the Revelation of St John; being an Analysis of those Parts of that Prophetical Book, which relate to the General State of the Christian Church in Aftertimes; and to the peculiar Signs of those Times.* By the Rev. PHILIP ALLWOOD, B. D., Fellow of Magdalen College, Cambridge. 2 vols. 8vo.
4. *Annotations on the Apocalypse.* By the Very Rev. J. C. WOODHOUSE, D. D., Dean of Lichfield. 8vo.

WE profess to hold in very light esteem the whole progeny of apocalyptic interpretations, great and small, which have been brought out by the heat of the Catholic question in England. However zealous and ingenious some of them may be, they are all strangely wanting in learning and good sense. The titlepages that stand at the head of this article, have not been placed there with the intention of making the works themselves the subjects of any special comment; but merely for the sake of introducing, in a popular form, our own views of the book

to which they relate. In disclosing these views, we shall avoid as far as possible all doubtful questions and all minute criticisms. We shall endeavour to make not only our own meaning, but the meaning of the writing which we wish to elucidate, plain to common readers. We shall try to strip off both the veil and the reproach, which have been cast so long upon this portion of the New Testament. To do this requires no very profound research, and admits, at the present day, of no pretension to originality. The exposition that we shall offer, has in all its leading points been borrowed from Herder's *Maranatha*, from the annotations of Heinrichs, and especially from the masterly commentary of Eichhorn. We shall assume the genuineness of the Revelation, that is, that it is indeed the production of the apostle John, though we are not unacquainted with the arguments on both sides, which have made this question one of the nicest in sacred criticism.

The book of Revelation is on many accounts the most remarkable among the books of the New Testament. It is neither a narrative like the Gospels, nor an exhortation like the Epistles. It is a vision. Its object is not to unfold any doctrine, or to record any transactions that had taken place on the earth; but it opens its scene, like some gorgeous poem, among the wonders of the invisible world. Its language is not that of ordinary composition, but of symbol and allegory. It adopts the almost hieroglyphical style of some of the latest of the Hebrew prophets, Ezekiel, Daniel and Zechariah. Strange shapes and portentous signs are from the beginning to the end rising and vanishing before us. We scarcely read it as a book. It resembles a spectacle addressing itself to the eyes; or still more a drama, whose different parts are regularly introduced, and follow one another in splendid succession, interspersed with mysterious voices, with the speech of persons who converse together, and with odes of adoration. Indeed the form of it seems essentially dramatic, from the title to the epilogue; and by looking at it in this light, we make the first step towards the proper understanding of it.

It is a subject at least of liberal curiosity to inquire into the contents of so singular a production. As a part of the Scriptures, of the sacred records of our religion, we take an interest in knowing for what purpose it was written, and what all those bright trains of its descriptions import—in gaining some just apprehension of its great outlines of meaning, if we cannot as-

certain satisfactorily all the details. This interest is heightened by the extreme obscurity and difficulty of a book, which has exercised the minds of ingenious men from the early days of the gospel till now. It is heightened still further by the circumstance, that there is continually coming out some new romance under the name of an exposition of the Apocalypse, which is soon gathered to the long, slumbering line of its predecessors in ignorance and dreaming fancies. It may seem presumptuous to profess to speak with decisiveness on a subject which has been so variously regarded, in which the sagacious mind of Sir Isaac Newton showed itself but little in advance of the popular interpretations, and which the learned Luther gave up in despair, saying, in the preface to his translation of the book, 'Let every one think of it what his own spirit suggests; my spirit can make nothing out of it.' But the keen eye or the good fortune of modern research has discovered what had lain so long concealed. What seems to be the true key to the secret has been accessible to the learned world for more than the third part of a century, and has been so generally agreed on by all who are competent to judge, that no writer is now deserving of the least respect, who pretends to point out in the revelation, any prophecy of any events in civil history, either near our own times, or even since the time of its being written. The fanciful theories that have woven into it the whole history of Europe, and seen depicted upon it almost every military or ecclesiastical leader from Attila king of the Huns to the late Emperor of the French, have been all swept away. No enlightened critic now thinks of adopting anything like the old ways of exposition. It requires, therefore, but a moderate share of learning, and implies no undue presumption in the attempt, to unfold the general signification of it. We enter on this task the more readily, as no work, we believe, presenting the true picture, has ever been published in England—a country, we must be permitted to say, where sacred letters are lower than in any part of Christendom that professes to cultivate them, perhaps not excepting even our own young republic.

We are anxious to convey in a few words and in general a correct impression of what was written by John, when 'he was in the isle that is called Patmos, for the word of God and for the testimony of Jesus Christ.' The venerable apostle of the Lord was in banishment at that barren and uninhabited islet of the Ægean sea. The Christians were persecuted under the

emperor Domitian, and it was not to be supposed that their leader, the survivor of all his brethren, should escape. He had gathered communities of believers in all the large cities of the lesser Asia, and he was now taken from the head of them to dwell in this desolate spot. It was natural that in that solitude he should think intensely of the holy cause that had made him an exile there in his old age,—the cause in which his two bosom companions, Peter and James, had already given up their lives, one by crucifixion, and the other by the sword. The churches were suffering tribulation, and the heathen were raging against the name of the Lord's anointed, like the sound of the many waters that were rolling around him. In this situation he could not but have remembered the words of his Master, 'if I will that he tarry till I come, what is that to thee?' But where were the signs of such a coming? John had lived out nearly all his days, but the hope seemed yet far from its fulfilment. He could only speak of the 'kingdom and *patience* of Jesus Christ.' But he was not left to despond. The assurance was strong within him that this kingdom was to be established in great power, and that speedily. It was to prevail over its two great enemies, the Jews who had rejected its prince, and the Gentiles who were putting to death its subjects. It was to fill the earth. It was to be exalted to heaven. It was to put an end to the evils of the world, and lead on that day of consummated glory, into which the old prophets had been rapt,—when the tabernacle of God should be with men, and the former things should have passed away, and there should be no more night, no more sea, no more death, no more curse, neither sorrow nor crying nor pain. The vision of the Apocalypse was unrolled to his mind, and this was the vision—the approaching advent of Christ and the triumph of his religion. This is the whole subject of it. It has no other. It is not prophetic of any particular transactions. So far from looking forward into the minute details of events that were centuries afterwards to take place, it declares, in the very beginning, that it is 'to show things which must shortly come to pass,' and it repeats at the close, 'he who testifieth these things saith, Surely I come quickly.' Whether the seer, in the images which he presents to us, anticipated a personal appearing of the Messiah and a literal accomplishment of the promises which he records, or whether he points to a spiritual fulfilment in the spread and blessings of the gospel, it is perhaps at this distant day impos-

sible to determine. Whether we suppose one or the other, however, the main current of the interpretation will flow just the same.

It cannot be expected that a short essay should discuss and explain all the particulars that are contained in so long a work. We can attempt only to set in order the several parts of which it is composed, and to touch the prominent points of its wonderful descriptions.

The title of the work is first solemnly announced, with the name of him who bears witness. John then proceeds to address the seven churches of Asia, of which he was the overseer, warning each of them against its peculiar sins and dangers, commending each wherein it was found worthy, and calling on them all to prepare for the end, and to 'hear what the spirit saith unto the churches.' This introduction occupies the three first chapters.—The scene is now opened. John is in the Spirit. He is summoned to look into the courts of heaven, that he may learn what is decreed there to be done on the earth. A throne is before him, and one is seated thereon,—the Ineffable One. Much of the description that follows is after the manner of the vision that Ezekiel saw at the river Chebar. Before the divine presence are intelligent creatures in various shapes, and their perpetual ascription is, 'Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, and honor and power; for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created.'—The seer has scarcely recovered himself from the admiration, into which he was cast by so bright a spectacle, when he perceives in the Almighty hand a book,—the book of the fates of the gospel. But it is sealed within and without with seven seals, and no one is found worthy to loose them. While he is filled with grief at this, he discerns Christ in the form of a lamb, standing next the throne, who has prevailed to open the book; and as he receives it, the heavens again resound with praises, 'Worthy is the Lamb that was slain to receive power and riches, and wisdom and strength, and honor and glory and blessing.'

The opening of the seals now commences; and as each is broken, some prodigy is shown, denoting that times of distress await the inhabitants of the world. As the four first are successively loosed, figures representing Conquest, a bloody Death, Famine and Pestilence, ride forth on a white, red, black and pale horse, the last of which is followed by troops of phantoms.

At the fifth seal, the shades of the martyrs are heard crying under the altar, and demanding how long their blood is to remain as if it had been shed for nought. They are answered that they must be patient for yet a little season till their number is completed. At the same time they are clothed in white robes as an assurance of speedy victory. At the sixth seal there is a violent earthquake, which is described with all the tremendous accompaniments of Eastern imagery,—the blackened sun, the falling stars, the affrighted nations. The seer is now waiting for the last seal of this great book of events to be broken—the *seventh* one, for that was a favorite and sacred number with the Jewish people, and is often used in their scriptures to denote *many*. He is eager with curiosity to know the good or the evil that is written within the unfolding volume. But suddenly there is a pause. A solemn preparation must usher in so important a disclosure. The four angels who preside over the four winds, and who were ready to let them loose over the earth, are restrained. There had been enough of terror, and some gracious sign must now be interposed for the reassurance of the faithful, to show that these calamities were for their enemies and not for them, and so to answer the consoling purpose for which the vision was revealed. An angel ascends from the east, the beneficent quarter of the rising sun, and orders that there shall be perfect repose and safety, till the lovers of truth, the servants of God, have all been stamped with his signet of salvation. He carries the seal in his hand, and fixes its mark on their foreheads. First from every tribe of Israel the chosen are designated; and then from all nations and kindreds and people and tongues. A great multitude, which no man can number, is standing before the throne in the robes of the accepted, and carrying palm-branches of praise. And now the temple of heaven is filled again with ascriptions of glory mixed with promises of everlasting peace. All the immortal spirits cry out together, ‘Blessing and glory, and wisdom and thanksgiving, and honor and power and might, be unto our God forever and ever;’ and a gentle voice is heard after that shout, saying, ‘The Lamb, which is in the midst of the throne, shall feed them, and shall lead them unto living fountains of waters; and God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes.’

The seventh seal now gives way. The book is unclosed. A dread silence of half an hour prepares the mind for the sor-

rows, which are about to be denounced on the unreclaimed portions of mankind. But what has produced that stillness and awe? Seven angels come forth with trumpets in their hands to sound the decrees of the Almighty displeasure. All are in suspense. An interceding spirit approaches the heavenly altar, and while he offers up from his golden censer the approved odor of incense with the prayers of saints, he casts down on the earth the live coals, which he had used in his ministry, as a sign of burning wrath on the enemies of the faith; and then follow noises, and thunderings and lightnings and an earthquake. Here is an end of delays. The seven angels prepare themselves to sound.

The principal action of this divine drama is now to begin. We shall find it to be distributed into three parts; first, the victory over Judaism, under the figure of the destruction of Jerusalem; then, the victory over heathenism, under the figure of the overthrow of Rome; and finally, the descent of the spiritual Jerusalem, the tabernacle and kingdom of God, upon a renovated world. The seven angels with trumpets, who had come forward at the yielding of the seventh seal, are preparing themselves to sound.—At the blast of the first trumpet, a storm of hail and fire spreads devastation over the earth. At that of the second, a burning mountain is cast into the sea, destroying a large part of its inhabitants and covering it with wrecks. At that of the third, a bitter star falls from heaven on the fountains and streams, so that many die of their poisoned waters. At that of the fourth, the lights of heaven shrink up and lose a third part of their lustre. Nothing further is denoted by these signs, which are borrowed chiefly from the plagues of Egypt, than a general season of calamity. A pause is here interposed, such as happened after the four first seals, when Conquest and Carnage, Famine and Pestilence, rode forth in company. An angel, meanwhile, is heard denouncing further woes as he flies like an eagle through the midst of heaven. The fifth trumpet is now blown. A star-like angel descends and opens a subterranean abyss, out of which rises a swarm of loathsome shapes, locusts with the stings of scorpions, to whom is given power to torment 'those who have not the seal of God in their foreheads,' during five months;—a period of time probably suggested by the fact, that it is only for the five months from May to September that the locust and scorpion infest Judea. We are to remember that Jerusalem had become a ruin under the Roman

power, during the reign before that in which the Apocalypse was composed; and in these fierce insects, which were permitted only to wound and not to destroy, we probably see a description of those ferocious partisans called Zealots, by whom the holy city was so grievously afflicted before the advance of the enemy to its walls. The sixth angel sounds,—and the squadrons of an immense army are seen on their march. They are mounted on steeds of preternatural form, that breathe out a destructive flame, and are commanded by four spirits, who have been loosed for this very purpose from their prison in the deserts of the Euphrates;—for since from that spot the land had been so often invaded and ravaged, the Jews of Palestine imagined that evil angels and ministers of wrath were kept confined there till their agency was needed. These spirits had been ‘prepared for an hour and a day and a month and a year,’ that is, for any period that God should appoint, and they are now leading on their forces to slay;—but ‘the rest of the men who were not killed by these plagues yet repented not.’ That host represented the Roman legions, and it is well known that nothing could exceed the obstinacy of the Hebrews in their last disastrous war.

There is an interval before the sounding of the seventh trumpet, corresponding to that before the opening of the seventh seal;—for nothing can be more methodical than the whole arrangement of this marvellous vision. A mighty angel now appears, clothed with a cloud, a rainbow upon his head, and with a face as it were the sun. His right foot is planted upon the sea and his left on the dry land, and as he cries aloud, seven thunders utter their voices. But he was manifestly from his appearance a benignant messenger, and John is forbidden to record the mutterings of those sounds, which to a Hebrew ear augured the divine displeasure; for that displeasure, being only against the unconverted, ought to be forgotten in the approaching victory of the truth. The angel does not speak out the oracle he is entrusted with, but he holds it high in his hand in the form of a small book, and swears by ‘him that liveth forever and ever’ that there shall be no longer delay. The common translation is that ‘there shall be time no longer.’ But these are words, that would not only have no application to the subject, but would have really no meaning at all; for there must be time, wherever there is thought and succession. Everything must now be accomplished—that is his declaration.—As the old na-

tions were accustomed to speak of instruction as food, the seer is told to eat the small book, and on tasting it, he finds it both sweet and bitter;—that is, he understands the contents of it to be of a mixed kind, disastrous and happy.

That there may be no doubt as to what city is the subject of the threatened ruin, the seer is bidden to measure the temple in it, and told that ‘the holy city is to be trodden under foot of the Gentiles forty and two months.’ We learn from various Jewish sources, that this space of time, or three years and a half, was used among them to denote an indefinite season of calamity—perhaps from the circumstance that in the days of the Maccabees the temple was just so long polluted by the Syrian soldiery. A description follows of two faithful persons in Jerusalem, who withstand the prevailing disorders for a thousand two hundred and threescore days, or the three years and a half. They are at length killed by the leader of that foul swarm which rose out of the abyss, and their bodies left exposed to insult, but are afterwards translated to heaven. This corresponds so well with what history tells us of the efforts of the two chief priests, who were at last overpowered by the factious Zealots, and had their lifeless remains—a frightful thing to a Jewish imagination—cast out to insult, that we may reasonably suppose their virtue and fate to be here commemorated. It is possible, however, that the whole is introduced merely to correspond to the style of the later prophets, and to give greater effect to the approaching catastrophe.

The seventh trumpet now speaks. Instead, however, of the sudden rushing down of any great calamity, voices of praise are heard through the whole heaven, saying, ‘The kingdoms of this world are become the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ; and he shall reign forever and ever.’ The gates of the most secret places of the Jewish temple fly back at the sound, and the very ark of the covenant, which was to be looked upon but by a few even of the chosen people, is thrown open to the gaze of the whole world. But lightnings and voices and thunderings and an earthquake and great hail indicate that this consummation is only to be effected through sorrows, and judgments on the ungodly.

This first scene of the main action of the piece is to be concluded by a singular allegory. The intention of it is to represent the christian church as proceeding from that of the Jews, at first weak and persecuted, but always remaining under a di-

vine protection. This fact is portrayed in the most striking manner. The Jewish church appears in the form of a woman, 'clothed with the sun, the moon under her feet, and upon her head a crown of twelve stars.' The description is borrowed from Joseph's dream in the book of Genesis, and the twelve stars are the twelve tribes of Israel. A dragon is lying in wait for her new-born child. He is of enormous stature, with seven crowned heads and ten horns. Seven and ten were favorite numbers with the Hebrews, and the crowns and horns denoted only majesty and strength. The little child is caught up to the heavenly throne, and the mother escapes into the wilderness, where she is sustained a thousand two hundred and threescore days; that is, the three years and a half of tribulation, which have been already explained to be an enigmatical expression for an indefinite space of time. And now, as the immortals have always been supposed, in the poetry of all languages, to take part in the fortunes of this lower world, there is war in heaven. Michael, the fabled chief of the angelic host, is arrayed against Satan, the dragon, at the head of his infernal followers. As he casts down that 'accuser of the brethren,' another hymn of praise resounds through heaven. The vanquished fiend again pursues the woman, but she is preserved from his attacks for 'time, times and half a time.' This peculiar mode of numbering is taken from the book of Daniel, and means three years and a half; so that we have here the same number as before, only more ambiguously expressed. The enemy now turns from this object of his pursuit, and goes 'to make war with the remnant of those who keep the commandments of God and have the testimony of Jesus Christ,' as they are scattered among all nations.

Here ends an important part of this wonderful vision. Judaism is overcome;—or rather has ended in giving birth to the divine faith of the gospel. A new scene is to be disclosed, representing the prevalence of 'the word of the kingdom' over its Gentile adversaries, in the fall of Rome, the lordly seat of pagan empire and superstition.

The imagination of the seer now places him upon the seashore, whose sands and waves have always been accounted as emblems of the multitude of the nations. A sea-monster rises out of the water. Upon his seven crowned heads is written the name of Blasphemy, and all the world wonders after the beast. This is paganism or idolatry. Power is given him for forty and

two months ;—again the term of three years and a half, which has occurred so often before. He is aided by another monster coming up out of the earth. This latter one has the attributes of mildness and subtilty, and represents the arts of the heathen priesthood. He commands that the image of the first beast shall be worshipped and his mark received in the hand or the forehead. This seems to allude to the worship of the emperor's image on the standards, and the marks with which the soldiers stamped themselves as bound to his service. The number of the name of the sea-monster is now given, according to the rule of a secret science, which was much studied among the later Jews. However clear it might have been to the first readers of the Apocalypse, it has long ceased to be so. The oldest explanation of the name that has come down to us is perhaps the most satisfactory,—ROMAN.

In strong contrast to the unlovely sights just described, the Lamb now appears on Mount Zion, surrounded with an immense train of followers. A new song is sung in heaven. Three angels fly past, announcing the gospel, and declaring at the same time that the hour of divine judgment is come, and that Babylon—under which name is meant Rome, the mistress of heathen superstition—is already 'fallen, is fallen.' The beautiful benediction on 'the dead who die in the Lord' is next pronounced. Then under the common figures of the reaping of a harvest and the treading of a wine-press, is shown forth the vengeance that is ready to come on the enemies of the truth.

As the overthrow of the Jewish adversary had been proclaimed by the blast of seven trumpets, so the destruction of the pagan oppressor is to be signified by seven angels, each bearing a vial filled with wo to be poured out on the devoted city. The judgments, which they contain, are again in imitation of the seven plagues of Egypt; and as the last vial is emptied, there comes a great voice out of the temple of heaven, saying, 'It is done.' The destruction of Rome is next prefigured by another similitude. A woman with the mystical name of 'Babylon the Great' written on her forehead, is seen sitting on a formidable beast. She is blazing in gems and scarlet, intoxicated with the blood of saints and martyrs, and holds a golden cup of abominations in her hand. Her shameful end is then described. That there may be no doubt as to the subject designated, it is expressly said that the woman is that great city on seven hills, which reigneth over the kings of the earth.

An excessive obscurity has settled over the details of this part of the book. It is an obscurity which is to be dispelled, if at all, by reference to the history of the first seven emperors of Rome and to the popular expectations of that time, and not by imagining any prediction of events then unborn. There is no need of mentioning either the difficulties or their attempted solution. We have room only to trace the strong outlines of the piece.

In the next chapter we emerge from this perplexity into language that is perfectly plain and clear. The proud and wicked city is burnt up, and 'made the hold of every foul spirit, and the cage of every hateful bird.' The kings of the earth, the merchants and seamen, look on from afar and take up a lament over her sudden ruin, in almost the very words that are used by Ezekiel in describing the downfall of Tyre. Then a mighty angel, throwing a rock into the sea, declares that, like that stone, she was sunk forever, to be 'found no more at all.'

The lamentation that has just been heard from the earth, is succeeded by hymns of praise from all the spirits in heaven, whither the scene is now transferred. Under the scriptural figure of a marriage feast is represented the union of the church to its head, and the Messiah is seen riding as a conqueror, followed by the celestial armies, under his title, 'The Word of God.' The sea-monster and the false prophet oppose him in vain. They are cast down, and sentenced to a lake of fire. Their whole host is destroyed, and devoured by the birds of prey, which had been already summoned, by an angel standing in the sun, to hover over the field. Satan, the arch-enemy, is seized and confined for a thousand years, by which is probably meant a long but undefined season, that the church may have rest, and that it may be seen whether he will then give over his evil machinations. During that interval, the saints and martyrs are represented as restored to life and reigning with Christ on the earth. At its expiration, Satan is loosed, but unreclaimed by his punishment. He musters the wild nations of the unknown north, who were called among the Hebrews Gog and Magog, to fight against the believers and their cause. They are consumed by fire out of heaven, and their leader, the great deceiver, is sentenced as incorrigible to perpetual punishment.

A question arises here, which has from the beginning divided the church, and occasioned great controversy. Does the writer of the Apocalypse give the sanction of his venerable name to

the Jewish dream of a millenium, or a literal reign of the Messiah on earth for a thousand years, in the company of his faithful people, who are to be raised for that very purpose from the dead? Or may we suppose that he is only sketching with a bold fancy the triumph and peace of the flourishing days of the gospel? On this question, two plain considerations suggest themselves, which, if they are not enough to decide it, at least deserve attention. The first is, that when we read the book of Revelation, we must remember that we are reading a poem—a poem of a very peculiar kind, and not a doctrinal work. The second is, that where all else is allegorical and symbolical, and no real thing is described from beginning to end, except what all is intended to illustrate—the triumphant progress and close of the gospel—we do not seem authorised to make an exception here. To interpret literally is to interpret against the whole scope and spirit of the production.

Every enemy is now subdued, and the consummation of all things hastens on. This is the subject of the closing part of the vision. A white throne is set forth, and the heavens and earth vanish from the look of him who sits upon it. The dead, small and great, are given up from the sea and from all the receptacles of death, and stand before God. The books of human deserts are opened. The world is judged. The wicked receive their sentence. A description of the state of the blessed must conclude the whole. But how shall that be described? It is set forth under figures the most attractive and striking to a Jewish mind. There is a new world in the place of the heavens and earth that had fled away. A diviner Jerusalem descends like a magnificent pageant from the skies, and a voice accompanies it as it comes down;—‘Behold, the tabernacle of God is with men, and he shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow nor crying nor pain.’ The materials of this wondrous city are gems and precious stones. The river of Paradise flows through it, with the tree of life flourishing forever on its banks. There is no temple in it, for the Lord himself is there. There is no light of sun or moon, for the Source of all effulgence and glory sheds upon it his continual blessing. There reign the faithful forever and ever.

The seer closes his book with an irregular epilogue, of which the leading object is to exhort believers to faithfulness, that they may have right to the tree of life, and may enter in through the gates into the heavenly city.

We have thus endeavoured to unfold the meaning of this mystical book. In laboring to be short, we may have been obscure. Let us repeat, then, some of the points that seem to have been established. The Apocalypse is not the prophetic book, that it is commonly supposed to be. It contains no prediction of particular historical events. It is not the original and peculiar book, that it at first seems to be; for its imagery is borrowed from the Hebrew writers, especially the latest of them, and its strain of thought resembles closely that of the writer's nation and time. It is not an incoherent book, as has often been supposed, but on the contrary is arranged with the nicest skill and method. It is not a useless book; for though sealed as it were with seven seals, enigmatical and dark, it contains some of the noblest passages of holy writ. It utters christian truths, though in the language of symbols. It has a deep foundation of reality under its splendid fictions. The effect of the whole should be to lift up the heart as with a hymn to that Eternal Providence, which reveals itself through so many channels, instructs us by so many signs, and mixes and ends all its visitations of judgment with hopes of mercy. Its very imagery suggests a multitude of the most interesting associations. The city and tabernacle of God, coming down out of heaven, fill us with the hope of that day when all the sorrows of men shall have gone by. And who can read of those seven angels preparing themselves to sound, without reflecting that there are other angels with other trumpets which they are preparing to blow over the busy scenes of human interests and fortunes, and over the clods of the low valley where all those interests and fortunes will lie buried? Here is no fiction. It is the course of nature. It is the decree of God. Change—death—judgment,—such are the thrilling tones which those trumpets will speak with. Ought we not to be as ready to hear as the divine ministers are to sound them?

ART. III.—*Address to the Community, on the Necessity of Legalizing the Study of Anatomy.* By the Order of the MASSACHUSETTS MEDICAL SOCIETY. Boston. Perkins & Marvin. 1829. 8vo. pp. 28.

It might perhaps astonish many persons to be told, that the members of the medical profession are indirectly obliged by the laws of the land, to be in the possession of a species of knowledge, which very knowledge the laws of the land forbid them to acquire. This seems absurd, no doubt, but it is neither more nor less than the simple truth of the case. The laws give to certain bodies the power of licensing practitioners in medicine and surgery. They require that those who are licensed shall be examined as to their proficiency in the various branches of their art. They give to those who are thus found qualified and who receive licenses, certain advantages and privileges in their practice, beyond those who are not thus qualified; or rather they deny to those who are not thus qualified, the common right, possessed by all other members of the community, of recovering by a process of law, the debts becoming due to them in the exercise of their regular occupation. Such is the importance attached by society to the proper education of medical men. Such is the disability imposed upon those who are not regularly educated;—a disability which is made to apply, we suspect, to no other class or occupation of men under any circumstances whatever.

Now whilst on the one hand the law thus requires of physicians a competent education, on the other hand it virtually forbids them the means of obtaining it. We may say, indeed, and that with hardly a verbal exaggeration of the matter, that it has virtually made the study of the profession unlawful. It has imposed a penalty upon the pursuit of medical knowledge, in the only way in which medical knowledge can be obtained. In fewer words, he who devotes himself to the study of anatomy, is made liable to fine and imprisonment; and no man can attain to any considerable amount of medical knowledge, who does not begin and accompany his studies with anatomy.

This obstacle, then, encounters the medical student on the very threshold of his professional career. Either he must consent to enter into the exercise of most important and responsible duties, very imperfectly qualified, by evading that requirement of the law which demands of him a competent education,

or he must make up his mind to become properly qualified by a daily and long continued offence against another law, which brands and punishes as a criminal, any one who is engaged in the practice of dissection.

This is a plain and precise statement of the case. No doubt those who made and those who defend the laws as they exist, look at this subject in a point of view a little different from that in which we have placed it. People in general have no adequate idea of the importance of a knowledge of anatomy to every medical practitioner, physician as well as surgeon. They have no notion either, of what a knowledge of anatomy consists in, nor of the process which it is necessary to go through in order to acquire it. They may think, therefore, that our statement is exaggerated, is overdone, is got up for effect. Got up for effect no doubt it is ; that is precisely what we profess it to be. We hope it may have an effect. But if it have, never will effect have been produced by a more bare and unvarnished statement of the truth.

In proof of what has been said, we might simply refer to the statements contained in the very judicious and well written pamphlet before us. We think that few unprejudiced persons can give to it a fair consideration, without becoming convinced that the ground which it takes is the right ground, and that society is bound, by a regard to its own interests, to give to the medical profession those facilities which this address suggests. We know, indeed, that such has been very universally the impression which it has produced, wherever it has been read. It might therefore perhaps be sufficient to refer to it, or to transfer to our own pages, some of its most striking parts. But as there is an advantage, in the dissemination of truth, in varying and modifying the medium through which it is conveyed, we may perhaps most effectually enforce and follow up the impression already made, by presenting the same general principles in our own way.

We said above, that men in general have no adequate idea of the importance of a knowledge of anatomy to every medical practitioner, physician as well as surgeon. No doubt every intelligent person would at once admit that some knowledge of anatomy is necessary ; and especially that to the surgeon, a very considerable knowledge of anatomy is necessary. But few do or can know how necessary it is as the basis upon which all medical knowledge is built. All medical study and instruction pre-

suppose a competent knowledge of anatomy, as much as the study of arithmetic presupposes a knowledge of numbers, and as much as that of grammar presupposes a knowledge of words. A man unacquainted with anatomy and physiology, can have no more conception of the nature of disease, than one who is unacquainted with the distances and relations of the heavenly bodies, can have of the nature and causes of an eclipse or a transit. Many persons have an impression that a knowledge of disease may be learned from writings on diseases, and from the observation of cases alone. Many tolerable routine practitioners of medicine are made in this way. Long experience and the habit of carefully observing the phenomena of disease, will convey, to the mind of a man of good sound sense, much real knowledge of the functions of the human body, both in health and disease, even if he have no other knowledge of anatomy and physiology than he has obtained from books. But the majority of men are not possessed of good sound sense; and the object of medical education, is, to make good physicians and surgeons of men taken as they rise. This can only be done by instructing them on that subject upon which alone a true knowledge of the profession can be built, and by beginning with conveying to them some acquaintance with that structure, whose most intimate operations their lives are to be spent in superintending.

It is a most important consideration to the community, that by a competent professional education, the length of time in which a physician may acquire sufficient experience to perform his duties in the best possible manner, is prodigiously shortened. No one doubts the absolute necessity of experience to the accomplishment of the practitioner; but it is certainly for the interest of those who are the subjects of the medical art, that those who are coming into the profession should be so instructed as to make the acquisition of knowledge from experience as rapid as possible. Now we say that a man who begins to practise with medicines upon the human body, without an acquaintance with anatomy and physiology, learns slowly from experiment (we use the word in the philosophical sense) upon the living human body, that knowledge, or rather a part of that knowledge, which the properly instructed physician begins with the full possession of. His first attempts in the art of healing can do nothing more than give him some knowledge of those laws of action in the human body, and those relations

and connexions of its different functions, with which the science he has neglected would have made him acquainted at once. He has, and can have, no proper conception of what disease is, or by what symptoms it is indicated. He can know little or nothing of the powers of resistance and of restoration in the system with which he is dealing. He can know nothing of the strength of materials in the machine with whose operations he interferes, and nothing of the adaptation of the tools, with which he is to work, to the parts upon which he is about to employ them. He is in certain respects like a man who is moving around and busying himself in the operations of a large piece of machinery of the principles of which he knows nothing. Knowing nothing, he fears nothing. By his luckless and injudicious interference he may have his coat torn from his back, his arm twisted from its socket, or perhaps be crushed into atoms at a blow. The only difference is, that, in our illustration, the machine is the stronger of the two, and the intermeddler himself pays the penalty of his ignorance. In the empirical practice of physic, unhappily, the reverse is true. The machine is the weaker, and the patient alone suffers. In the former case the machine crushes the quack, in the latter the quack destroys the machine. And how many machines may be destroyed before the quack learns to operate!

So far we refer merely to that knowledge which is necessary to all classes of practitioners, the possession of which is a preliminary step to the actual study of diseases and remedies, and is necessary before they can comprehend in what disease consists, or in what the cure of disease consists. But there is a further and more intimate knowledge necessary to those who devote themselves particularly to the practice of surgery, and are concerned in operations upon the human frame. This knowledge, as distinguished from that of which we have already spoken, may be called *mechanical*; since it not only includes an acquaintance with the structure, connexions and situation of all the parts of the body as connected with the performance of their functions, and the phenomena which are exhibited in disease, but also an acquaintance with their situation and mechanical relation to one another, as to distance, direction, &c., so that in the living body, the exact locality of the most minute parts can be determined so accurately, as to guide the hand to them or from them, in the performance of operations.

It was especially in reference to this kind of knowledge, that

we said above, that people commonly have no notion of what a knowledge of anatomy consists in. They have a very general impression, that it is necessary a surgeon should know the structure of the human frame in such a way as to be able to know what he is cutting in the performance of an operation. But they have no conception of the immense number of parts with which it is necessary to be intimately acquainted, and of the labor and time which must be expended in the acquisition of this knowledge, and also in its preservation. They have an idea that a surgeon must know his way about the human body, as a man knows his way about a city. One would be said to have a very particular and accurate knowledge of a city, who should be acquainted with every square, street, lane, and alley in it. He would be thought to have a knowledge wonderfully minute, who should be acquainted with every building of every size and denomination. But neither of these degrees of knowledge sufficiently illustrates the extent to which the knowledge of minute anatomy must be carried by a thorough surgeon. We should say, to speak in the language of our illustration, that he must make himself acquainted, not only with every square, street, lane and building, but with every part of every building, every room, every door, every window, every closet, indeed we might say every beam and every brick. We may add, that not only must he know all this so as to be able to find his way to any spot by the light of day, but so that he can direct his steps to it at once, in darkness and under circumstances that require more than ordinary self-possession.

There is only one way by which this knowledge can be obtained ; viz. by actual, repeated, and long continued dissection of the human body. Going once over with the whole subject in this way, in ever so thorough a manner, is not enough. A surgeon, to be completely adequate to the duties to which he is called, must not only have studied anatomy practically in this way, but he must always continue to study it. His mind must be constantly refreshed. Nothing is more fleeting than knowledge of this kind. Nothing but constant practice can keep it fresh. We presume that few even of the most accomplished anatomists or adroitest surgeons, dare to trust themselves for any length of time, without a recurrence to dissection, for the purpose of renewing and refreshing that knowledge which may at a moment's warning be put in requisition.

And it is not merely this knowledge of the minute anatomy

of the whole body, for the acquisition and preservation of which dissection is necessary. The anatomy of certain parts often requires a still more particular attention, with the view to operations of uncommon delicacy, or difficulty, or rareness. It will be perceived that a surgeon may know thoroughly the anatomy of a part, and yet, in order to operate upon that part, may find it necessary to examine it, not with a view to its anatomy alone, but with a view to the manner in which its anatomy is connected with the mode in which it is to be cut in the performance of the operation. In navigating a very difficult harbour, under circumstances of obscurity, the pilot does not trust to his recollection simply, of the course he is to steer. He sounds as he proceeds, and thus feels his way along, going over again with the very process by which he originally acquired his knowledge. In an analogous manner, the surgeon, always in the commencement of his career, and frequently in all parts of it, finds it necessary to feel his way, by examining the anatomy of parts concerned in an operation on the dead body, previously to the performance of it on the living, or even by going through with all the steps in the dead, which he is afterwards to go through with in the living subject.

Improved methods of performing particular operations are constantly devised. New operations are brought into use, either by the occurrence of new diseases, or by that progressive improvement of the science by which operations, once thought impossible, have now become matter of daily occurrence. Not much more than half a century ago, it was thought, and it was, a great triumph of art over disease, that by tying the great artery in the thigh, a disease in the ham was cured, by which the subject of it had formerly always lost either his life or his limb. The discovery of this operation has justly immortalized the surgeon who led the way to it, not because of its actual importance or difficulty in its relation to the science of surgery in its present state, but because it established the principle upon which a great part of the modern improvements in the science have been founded; just as the discovery of America has made the name of Columbus imperishable, although the same voyage may now be made by any tyro in seamanship. Starting from this operation as a beginning, there seems to have been no bounds to the successful boldness, with which modern surgeons have approached from the extremities to the centre, from the limbs to the very trunk, in the pursuit of disease and in the application of

means for its cure. Not content with lopping off the smaller branches of the circulation, they have almost invaded the very source and spring of it. From the thigh they have gone into the groin, and from the groin up into the abdomen. From the arm they have gone to the neck, from the neck down to the very walls of the chest, and within a few inches of the heart itself.

Now upon whom are these new operations to be first performed by those who originally propose them, and how are others to qualify themselves for their performance after they have been introduced? By trying them for the first time on the subjects of disease? The thought is appalling. They must be first done, and repeatedly done, upon the dead body. There is enough to disturb the nerves of the practitioner of surgery in the common circumstances of an operation—in the gush of blood, the groans and struggles of the sufferer, without his feeling at the same time the apprehension of unknown and uncertain dangers, which must necessarily accompany the performance of an experiment upon a living human body. Even a veteran operator would not be willing to undertake a rare, though well known operation, which he may have before performed, but at a long interval, without refreshing his memory by an actual recurrence to the dead subject. The most experienced and expert operators would never attempt any the slightest improvement in the mode of performing an operation, without first testing it in this way. We have heard a surgeon of the first eminence in our country, perfectly versed in anatomy, and an expert operator, declare, that he should hardly expect to be believed were he to detail the course of preparation which he felt it necessary to go through, for the performance of a difficult and somewhat rare operation, but one which he had several times performed with success, though at considerable intervals of time. We were ourselves surprised that he should have thought so careful a preparation necessary as he described; and yet he declared that he could never have felt as if he had done his duty, had he done less. So precious a thing is human life—so delicate a thing, and yet so heavy a burden to a man of feeling and principle, is medical responsibility.

And if there be this necessity for the constant cultivation of anatomy in those who are in the frequent practice of surgery, what must it be with those who are only occasionally under the necessity of operating, but who must yet be prepared for certain emergencies, or make up their minds to see life lost for

want of aid. There are cases where life hangs on a thread, where yet, if the hand of the surgeon be ready, it may easily be preserved. Yet if he be ignorant of anatomy, he dare not interfere; for it is better that the patient should die by the visitation of Providence, than by his hand. Thus are lives continually lost.

All this may seem a little out of the way. But it is to our purpose, because it establishes this truth;—that, in order that society may be furnished with physicians and surgeons who will serve them well, anatomy must be studied, and must be studied by the dissection of the human body, not now and then and at public lectures, but at all times, in private as well as in public. There are a great many illustrations of the same general truth, which might be drawn from particular facts in the history of cases of disease, and some striking ones of this kind are contained in the Address of the Medical Society before us.

But it may be said, and it *is* said by those who admit all that has been stated,—We are convinced of the necessity, we allow that dissection must be carried on; but how can you alter the laws so as to aid you? This is certainly a delicate question; and we would answer it by suggesting the following considerations. Every one, perhaps, will grant that some study of the human body by actual dissection is necessary. There is a general impression that physicians should be permitted to disinter the bodies of persons of certain descriptions, for purposes of anatomy; that the violation of the law may wisely be winked at, so long as the bodies of no other persons are taken. The clamor, generally speaking, is raised against the taking of the bodies of persons who are not proper subjects. So long as no bodies but those of proper subjects are taken, society is patient under the infraction of the laws; nobody takes pains to protect the sepulchre from violation. Now, as the community virtually admits, that, for the promotion of science, the exhumation of the bodies of certain persons should be past by without notice, in spite of the most positive laws; since it admits that there are certain bodies which should be applied to this use, why will it not permit the medical profession to do that under the sanction of the law, which it permits it to do in the very face of the law? If there be such a class of bodies, why not define them, and transfer them at once to physicians, without obliging them to break the laws of their country in obtaining them?

This, in substance, is what the medical profession ask of the

public;—to be allowed to do that openly, and under the protection of the law, which they have been in some measure permitted to do in spite of the law, in consequence of the general conviction, on the part of society, that it is necessary,—and yet which they are liable to be persecuted and abused for doing, whenever any accidental occurrence of indiscretion or exposure shall excite popular feeling and clamor.

The objection to dissection, as it exists in the minds of most men, arises from the unfounded apprehension that indignity is offered to a dead body by this process; and the feeling chiefly exists with regard to the bodies of one's friends. There is in all our minds a sentiment almost of reverence for the remains of those with whom we have associated and whom we have loved. We love to think of them, as we have last seen them, in the quiet and calm repose of the shroud and the coffin, decently laid in the tomb where we perhaps expect to be laid at some future day, in as tranquil and undisturbed a slumber beside them. There is something superstitious and romantic, no doubt, in this feeling. Calm reason, and even religion, teaches us that this association is merely delightful to the fancy, and that to the immortal soul it matters not whither the elements which have composed our mortal bodies are scattered. Still, we believe that there is something not merely gratifying to the fancy, but salutary to our moral and religious feelings in these associations and in that sacred awe with which we contemplate the remains of the dead. Far be it from us to do anything to lessen or disturb these feelings, which, however reason may show them to be unfounded, are at once honorable and consolatory to the human heart.

But we believe that there is really nothing in the means which have been suggested, inconsistent with the feelings of which we have spoken, or which need in any degree violate those feelings, when they are fairly and fully understood. In the first place, as all thinking men will probably assent to what we have just stated, that the injury and outrage is only to our associations and acquired feelings, and does not exist in reality, it will follow that where these associations do not exist, no injury can be inflicted. Where there are none to mourn and weep for the dead, there can be none whose feelings will be outraged by the appropriation of their remains to a purpose which will be admitted to be a useful one. Now it is proposed that those only who are unclaimed after death, that is, those

who have no friends or even acquaintances to signify an interest in their remains, should become the subjects of the legal provision. Any objection to this provision, therefore, must proceed from an objection to dissection in general, and must arise from the feeling that dissection is in itself an injury, an indignity, an outrage, upon the human body.

In the second place, then, it is very important that ideas so erroneous and unfounded with regard to dissection itself, should be removed. There is surely nothing disrespectful to the dead body in its dissection. It is true that the practice of making it part of the sentence of criminals, that their bodies should be given over to surgeons, as if it added severity or infamy to their punishment, has given no small countenance to this opinion. We consider it unfortunate that this should ever have been done. It is true, also, that anatomists have generally sought to disinter the bodies of those, whose vices and crimes have made them nuisances, or outcasts from society. But this has not been because they believed the dead bodies of these people more properly the subjects of indignity than those of any others. They have taken such bodies, simply because these persons have no friends to be wounded by their exhumation; and not because they thought that one human body, simply as such, was to be treated with more respect than another. Death reduces all to a sad equality. The corpse has no character and has committed no crimes.

Many persons entertain very strange and whimsical notions with regard to the anxiety of physicians for dissections, and their love of the study of anatomy. The impression seems to be, that they have a morbid and brutal appetite for cutting up dead bodies. We hear them talk of hacking and mangling bodies on the dissecting table, very much as they would if a body were torn from the earth and rent to pieces by dogs or wild beasts. That there are men, engaged in the practice of medicine and surgery, who have neither respect for the dead, nor sympathy with the living, is no doubt true; but such instances, we believe, for the honor of the profession, are rare, and if they are tolerated by the living, they surely may be by the dead. But what is there like mangling or treating with indignity the body of the dead in its anatomical dissection? What is it but to separate it into all its parts with the purpose of studying its beautiful and wonderful structure? Considered in the abstract, is it more dishonorable to one's remains to con-

ceive of them subjected to the hand of the anatomist, who shall carefully inspect them as objects of scientific investigation, to whom they shall serve as the means of instruction in the surprising mechanism of the human frame, than to conceive of them as reduced to a decomposing mass, exhaling noxious vapors, the food of things loathsome and abominable? We say this prejudice with regard to the act of dissection is wholly without foundation. Considered without reference to the feelings of friends and mourners, there is nothing in this disposition of the human body which can be regarded as disrespectful. For what is the human body but a compound of all that is most express and admirable in mechanism and structure which the universe exhibits—a world of parts in itself, so various and so extensive that it is the study of a life to comprehend fully all its excellences and all the purposes it is intended to subserve? The study of it by the anatomist is not a mere cutting and mangling of flesh, but an exercise of the mind of the highest character; an exercise not only of the mind but of the moral principle. For our own part we cannot conceive of the man, who has made himself in any degree acquainted with anatomy, who can approach or engage in the dissection of the human body, with a single feeling of levity in regard to it. It is a thing to be approached only with sentiments of awe and respect and admiration, not only as the remains of a fellow being and as reminding us of our own mortality, but in a more philosophical point of view, as exhibiting in its form and structure the most admirable specimen of the wisdom and benevolence of the Deity.

Many objections arise spontaneously in the minds of most persons at the first view of the proposition which has been suggested by the profession—objections, partly arising out of that horror of the dissection of a human body of which we have just spoken, and partly out of certain feelings of sympathy with the poor, which are highly honorable in themselves, but arise, in part at least, from a mistaken view of the subject. What! they say, would you devote the bodies of the poor to this unhallowed purpose? Will you make poverty a crime to be visited even after death, by a penalty to which the vilest malefactors alone are by law subjected? Will you increase the already sufficient evils and sufferings of poverty, or of a death in a hospital or an alms-house, by the terrors of dissection?

But it is not the bodies of the poor which we wish to see devoted to this purpose. It is the bodies of those who have no friends to claim them, to follow them to the tomb, or to complain that an indignity has been offered to them by this appropriation. It surely is not the poor who are least anxious about the disposition of the remains of their relations. In fact they are far more likely, from the greater strength of their prejudices on this subject, to feel a deep interest in their respectful interment. We leave it to any one's judgment, whose corpse is most frequently followed by a long train of attendants—the rich or the poor man's. Many a wretch, who has expired half starved and half frozen, amidst filth, rags and misery—who has hardly found, during life, a single relation to visit or watch by his bed, will be followed to his grave by a goodly company of mourners, who will expend in the purchase of apparel for the occasion, far more than they would ever have been willing to contribute to his relief when living.

There is nothing in the poverty of any man's condition, be it the most abject and humbling, which, as such, would subject him to this provision. But there is a large number of persons dying in various places, and under various circumstances, who have, so far as it can be discovered, no single human being interested in their remains. No doubt they are generally persons who have no friends, because they deserve no friends. They are those whose profligate and abandoned lives have made them outcasts from society, and have destroyed, in a great measure, the ties by which they have been connected with their fellow men. But it is not on this account that we would have them subjected to dissection. It is not because we consider dissection in the light of a *post mortem* disgrace and punishment—a species of vengeance wreaked upon them by society after their death. It is not on account of their character that we would have them thus disposed of. We repeat it, the vices of the individual leave no stain upon his body. That is the habitation which his presence has defiled and disgraced. But he has been cast out from it, and it remains the same noble structure as when first it came from the hands of its Creator. It is not every man who has thus abused existence, whom we wish to see thus disposed of. It is only those, who, as one of the consequences of their conduct, or from other causes, have no friends to feel for them,

that are deemed the proper subjects for the purpose in question.

And surely, if any bodies are made subjects for dissection, these, all must admit, are those that should be. The real question is not, let it be remembered, whether any bodies should be dissected, but what bodies, and in what manner they shall be obtained. We take it for granted, and all experience bears us out in the assumption, that bodies will be obtained by exhumation, wherever the law makes no regular provision for their supply. In France, and in some other countries on the continent of Europe, the unclaimed bodies of persons dying in hospitals are all liable to dissection. The thing is familiar, is looked upon without horror, and is regarded as no disgrace. But in England, where prejudices are entertained similar to those in this country, bodies can only be obtained by the violation of the grave. Yet neither there nor here have any laws been found sufficient to check the practice. It has always continued. The difficulties have been sometimes greater and sometimes less, but still dissection has always been carried on. And it probably will be, let the nominal penalties be what they may, because there are always enough of those exerting an influence upon the execution of the laws, and who are well aware of the necessity of the case, to prevent a rigorous enforcement of the punishment for their violation.

The real question then is, How shall this supply for the study of anatomy be procured? legally or illegally? If it continue to be procured in defiance of the laws, the chief object for which those laws were passed is entirely defeated; namely, that the friends of deceased persons may feel secure that their repose has not been violated. There is now, in fact, no security to the sepulchres of the dead. No man can feel altogether secure that the graves of his friends may not be opened. And this is no fault of the profession. So far as they are concerned, it is for their interest that none should be disinterested, but those who have been entirely friendless and alone in the world. But neither the manner, nor the subjects of this practice, depend upon them. Individuals of the most abandoned and desperate character engage in it as a means of subsistence, and it matters not to them who are the subjects of their traffic.

Now we regard the feeling of society on this subject as worthy of all encouragement and sympathy. We would have

the sepulchres of the dead protected from all invasion. We would hold the grave to be an inviolable sanctuary; but we soberly believe that in no way can this be done but by some such provisions as have been discussed.

The community is too apt to look upon this as a selfish attempt on the part of the medical profession—as if they were the parties chiefly to be benefited by a free study of anatomy. But if all are subjected to equal difficulties in the prosecution of this study, physicians and surgeons, as a profession, do not suffer in their rank, their influence, or their reputation for skill. These things are all comparative, and if none could study anatomy, none could acquire consideration by the knowledge of it, or lose it by the want of that knowledge. But society would suffer grievously from the want of well educated and skilful physicians and surgeons. Instead of advancing, the science of medicine would go backward; for a personal knowledge of anatomy is necessary, not only to the first origin of improvement, but even to its preservation and comprehension in subsequent generations.

We repeat, society is more deeply interested in this subject than the medical profession. The close and intimate relation which this profession maintains with society, makes the character, moral as well as professional, of its members, an object of deep interest and importance. Is it desirable that the student should, at the very beginning of his career, find himself engaged in pursuits, which are forbidden by the laws of his country, and which may be visited upon him as a crime? Is not the general feeling of obligation to respect and obey the law likely to be somewhat weakened in a young man who is engaged in an occupation pronounced by the law to be criminal? The effect may not be, and probably is not, very great, yet it may, to some minds, be sufficient to turn the balance between good and evil.

We have endeavoured to speak with perfect plainness upon this subject, because it is desirable that every one should understand it fully. We are rejoiced that the members of the medical profession have introduced it to the consideration of the public. To some of our readers, probably, the discussion of it in these pages may not have proved agreeable, and may have appeared somewhat out of place. But it is our duty to call the attention of the community to all subjects, which, like this,

are closely connected with some of its most important interests. This is not simply a professional topic. It is not principally a medical question, or a scientific question. This were a very narrow view of it. It is a subject in which the whole mass of mankind, high and low, rich and poor, have a deep and permanent concern. We hope the profession will maintain the ground which they have taken. That they will obtain what they ask for at once, is not to be expected. Prejudice is yet too strong and deeply rooted. But a great and favorable change is taking place in public opinion, and there is reason to believe, that, by perseverance, the object will at last be accomplished.

ART. IV.—1. *The Imitation of Christ*. In Three Books. By THOMAS À KEMPIS. Rendered into English from the Original Latin, by THOMAS CHALMERS, of Glasgow. A New Edition: Edited by HOWARD MALCOLM, Pastor of the Federal Street Baptist Church, Boston. Boston. Lincoln & Edmands. 1829. 18mo. pp. 228.

2. *The Works of the Rev. H. Scougal, A M., S. T. P. containing the Life of God in the Soul of Man; with Nine other Discourses on Important Subjects. To which is added, a Sermon, preached at the Author's Funeral, by George Gairden, D. D.* Boston. Pierce & Williams. 1829. 18mo. pp. 272.

WE are happy to see works of a practical and devotional character produced, or republished among us. They are still, as there has been frequent occasion to remark, among the wants of the religious world; and they who supply them, will, by composing for themselves, or editing from the labors of others, serious, judicious, and valuable treatises on any of the great topics of piety, christian duty, or morality, render an important service to the community. It is of this class of works, that Bishop Burnett somewhere remarks, that by his taste for them, a man may judge of his pretensions to religion, whether he has any true relish, or not, for its life and spirit.

Of the former of the volumes, whose titles are set at the head of this article, it might be difficult to say anything, that has not

been said before. Nor is it any part of our purpose to enter largely into its character. Few books of this class have been so long, or so extensively circulated; it having been once and again translated into almost every language of Christendom. It has usually been ascribed to Thomas à Kempis, the Catholic recluse, whose name it bears; nor does the editor of this present edition intimate any doubt of its genuineness. But notwithstanding common consent, the learned among Catholics as well as Protestants, have by no means been agreed upon the subject; and some, as appears from Dupin, have offered reasons, which go to show even the impossibility of his having been the author. We do not consider the question at this distant day as material; much less as affecting, in the slightest degree, the value of the work. But it is right, in giving any account of the various editions of a book so remarkable, as well as of its writer, to separate what is doubtful from what is known. We have before us a splendid copy of it in the original Latin, from the once famous press of Didot, in which that excellent editor, doubtless aware of the uncertainty in which this point remains, speaks of it in his preface, only as that celebrated work, 'known by the title of *Imitation of Christ*.'

The introductory essay by Dr Chalmers, who, after many like honors, is, we believe, now promoted to the professorship of divinity in the University of Edinburgh, will undoubtedly be considered by his admirers, as greatly enriching this edition. It is written with the usual ability, and with somewhat of the peculiarities also, of that popular divine. It is designed to relieve the work from an objection grounded on its supposed deficiency in an article of Orthodox faith; an objection naturally to be expected from men, who, first assuming the point that nothing good or spiritual can spring from any other than an Orthodox stock, find themselves at a loss to account for any evidences of a serious spirit, or even any approaches to a due standard of christian virtue, where there is not some decided recognition of their favorite dogmas. Hence, as we learn from Dr Chalmers, it has been complained, that the writer of the '*Imitation of Christ*,' has not given sufficient prominence to the doctrine of '*justification by faith*.' We see also in his answer, what is more and more evident in the productions of other theologians of the same school, the growing adaptation of Calvinism to the changes and complexion of the times. It belongs to the ingenuity and comprehensiveness, if such we

may term it, of modern Orthodoxy, to protect from the reproach of heresy, and to vindicate for itself, what it may suit the interest and purposes of its advocates to claim; and when, as in this volume, they find spiritual views and christian graces well recommended, though wholly without the help, and, as would seem to the impartial eye, in the total neglect of their little distinctions and technical names, they charitably infer, that though the body indeed be absent, the spirit is there, though the utterance be wanting, the faith is strong, that, in fine, there is a pervading principle within the writer, guiding and giving its efficacy to all he writes, like the heaven which silently but effectually penetrates the mass.

We confess that we have been at once gratified and amused by this new form of charitable interpretation, and by the perspicacity, with which it is connected, that discovers in a writer, nay, and asserts for him, too, a larger faith than he was ever conscious of possessing, or would be willing to accept for himself. It is the same charitable spirit, which we sometimes hear inferring in favor of any serious preacher, who, though well known for his attachment to liberal views of religion, is also distinguished by his persuasive and earnest methods of presenting them, 'O! that man is a Calvinist, though he may not know it, or may not choose to avow it to his friends.' And it is much in this mode of inference, that the Professor of Edinburgh thus kindly maintains the soundness of *Thomas à Kempis*.

'The doctrine of our acceptance, by faith in the merits and propitiation of Christ, is worthy of many a treatise, and many are the precious treatises upon it which have been offered to the world. But the doctrine of regeneration, by the Spirit of Christ, equally demands the homage of a separate lucubration—which may proceed on the truth of the former, and, by the incidental recognition of it, when it comes naturally in the way of the author's attention, marks the soundness and the settlement of his mind thereupon, more decisively than by the dogmatic, and ostentatious, and often misplaced asseverations of an ultra orthodoxy. And the clearer revelation to the eye of faith of one article, will never darken or diminish, but will, in fact, throw back the light of an augmented evidence on every other article. Like any object, that is made up of parts, which we have frequently looked to in their connexion, and as making up a whole—the more distinctly one part of it is made manifest, the more forcibly will all the other parts of it be

suggested to the mind. And thus it is, that when pressing home the necessity of one's own holiness, as his indispensable preparation for heaven, we do not dissever his mind from the atonement of Christ, but in reality do we fasten it more closely than ever on the necessity of another's righteousness, as his indispensable plea for heaven.

'Such we apprehend to be the genuine influence of a Treatise that is now submitted anew to the Christian public. It certainly does not abound in formal and direct avowals of the righteousness which is by faith, and on this account we have heard it excepted against. But we know of no reading that is more powerfully calculated to *shut us up* unto the faith—none more fitted to deepen and to strengthen the basis of a sinner's humility, and so reconcile him to the doctrine of salvation in all its parts, by grace alone.' p. 20.

Now, to the view of some, there may be somewhat of candor, but, we confess, there is to our apprehension not a little of assumption and unwarrantable inference in all this. It is giving a name, or imputing opinions to a man, which he himself might refuse, or never think of. Nor do we believe, that Thomas à Kempis, or whoever may have been the writer of this treatise, would, at an interval of more than three hundred years, prefer to have himself or his book 'shut up,' as the Professor expresses it, within the limits of a technical faith, when his far wider and nobler object was, to recommend a practical imitation of Jesus Christ. His work, in this view, is deserving of the exalted praise it has received, and of the wondrous circulation it has obtained. His design was, and he could not have proposed a nobler, to portray and to encourage a life of christian piety and virtue. And though some of his views of christian perfection were undeniably drawn from the spirit of the church of which he was a faithful priest, or from the seclusions of his cloister; and though in accordance with the established creed and symbols of that church, he takes for granted, and not seldom presents, the doctrine of the trinity with its consequences, *

* We have recently met with another work ascribed to Thomas à Kempis, entitled 'Meditations and Prayers on the Life and Loving Kindness of our Lord Jesus Christ,' in which the ascetic devotion, and other peculiarities of his church, are throughout exhibited. Indeed the work itself is chiefly composed of devout addresses or invocations to Jesus Christ as to the true God. It will at once be perceived, how widely these two works differ from each other; and should it be established beyond controversy, that the latter of these is the genuine production of Thomas à Kempis, we should be much disposed to add ourselves to those who have questioned his claims as the author of the 'Imitation.'

the deity and worship of Christ, still, with a generous elevation above what is merely ritual or doubtful, above feasts and fastings, rites and images, and much, too, of what is to be ranked with these among the points of doubtful disputation, does he press those simple principles of piety and true goodness, those great duties of imitating Christ and of obeying God, which far beyond, and wholly independent of the vain doctrines of men, in every true church and in every true heart, are the source and life of godliness. What is peculiar to the writer as a Catholic, may indeed, as in the present edition, be omitted. But the reader need only cast an eye over the titles of the chapters, to mark how eminently and exclusively practical, how free from the mystical and the doubtful, are the topics of which he treats. The personal and the social virtues; humility with respect to our attainments; prudence with regard to opinions and actions; danger of rash judgments; patience with the infirmities of others; the evil of superfluous talking; the beauty of charity; the due consideration of human misery; with suggestions for a right intercourse with the world, as well as for reading the scriptures and other holy books, for meditations of death, and diligence in the reformation of life,—will be found among the subjects of the first part; and they are all exhibited with a simplicity, tenderness, and energy of feeling, which make for them a way to every heart, and at the same time with a sobriety and just qualification, which recommend them to every judgment. And here we are happy to adopt the eloquent tribute rendered in the conclusion of his essay by Dr Chalmers.

‘The utter renunciation of self—the surrender of all vanity—the patient endurance of evils and wrongs—the crucifixion of natural and worldly desires—the absorption of all our interests and passions in the enjoyment of God—and the subordination of all we do, and of all we feel, to his glory,—these form the leading virtues of our pilgrimage, and in the very proportion of their rarity, and their painfulness, are they the more effectual tests of our regeneration. And one of the main uses of this book is, that while it enforces these spiritual graces in all their extent, it lays open the spiritual enjoyment that springs from the cultivation of them—revealing the hidden charm which lies in godliness, and demonstrating the sure though secret alliance which obtains between the peace of heaven in the soul, and patience under all the adversities of the path which leads to it. It exposes alike the sufferings and the delights which attach to a life of sacredness: and its wholesome tendency is to reconcile the aspirant after eternal life,

to the whole burden of that cross on earth, which he must learn to bear with submission and cheerfulness, until he exchanges it in heaven for a crown of glory. Such a work may be of service in these days of soft and silken professorship,—to arouse those who are at ease in Zion; to remind them of the terms of the Christian discipleship, as involving a life of conflict and watchfulness, and much labour.' pp. 22, 23.

We learn, that the present work is intended by the publishers as introductory to a series of practical treatises, which they propose to reprint. The plan we think excellent; and should their selection be judiciously made—that is, from the most useful and approved practical writers, we shall cordially wish it success.

With this class of writers, of the older school, we should unquestionably rank Scougal, whose beautiful treatise on the *Life of God in the Soul of Man*, is comprised, with other devotional and practical works, in the little volume before us. We gladly avail ourselves of the opportunity, furnished by this recent edition, of inviting to it, as it justly merits, the attention of our readers. It may be regarded as among the best practical productions of its time, abounding in valuable thoughts, high and spiritual conceptions, and most engaging representations of the christian life; and these too, recommended by the graces of a youthful imagination, and the fervent, but chastened eloquence of a devout soul. We hope this little book may find its way into our families and closets, well assured, that if its spirit could also be familiar to our hearts, the *Life of God*, that which alone constitutes life to the Christian, would not only be formed, but would flourish within us.

Considering the character, as well as the eventful, though brief, life of Scougal, we are surprised that we do not find his name in that copious depository of biographical literature, the *Cyclopædia* of Dr Rees. It must have been only from the oversight, to which works so extensive are unavoidably exposed, and from which, perhaps, in a first edition, no diligence can wholly secure. That by his fine genius and accomplishments, his early distinctions and premature death, he is entitled to an honorable place among the good and eminent of mankind, will not be questioned. Those, however, who have associated his name, or idea, with that of the more venerable writers of his times, as Charnock and Baxter, Flavel or Leigh-

ton, will probably be surprised to learn, at least this was the feeling with us, that Scougal died almost in his youth; that he was educated in the Scotch Episcopal establishment, being the son of a bishop of Aberdeen. Entering as a student of the University at fifteen, he was appointed to the professorship of philosophy in it before he was twenty. In this responsible situation, so early obtained, he continued with honor and success for four years. At the expiration of this term, the depressed condition of the Episcopal Church, and its urgent want of a faithful ministry, persuaded him to take orders, and he became the minister of a small village in the north of Scotland. But here he was permitted to remain only a few months, being called back to Aberdeen, and promoted, at that very early age, to the professorship of divinity in king's college; the same dignity, which, after that university returned to the government of the Presbyterians, or at least to conformity with the 'Kirk,' has been filled in later days, with so much learning and ability, by Gerard and Campbell, and others of the most eminent divines of the Scotch establishment. To the duties of his professorship, Scougal brought his admirable talents and premature attainments. He devoted to them his whole time and heart, and instructed his pupils scarcely more by the fruits of his genius and learning, than by the sweetness and purity of his life. But it pleased God to allow him only a brief term of usefulness. In his twentyseventh year, as we learn from the brief biographical notice prefixed to his works, 'he fell into a consumption, which wasted him by slow degrees, and at last put an end to his life, on the 13th of June 1678, before he had completed the twentyeighth year of his age.'

In an eloquent discourse, which was preached at his funeral, by Dr George Gairden, and which forms a valuable appendix to this volume, we find many notices of this remarkable young man, drawn with precision and discrimination, as well as feeling. Of several that might be selected, as marking the distinguishing features of his character, we copy only the following; and these we prefer, as particularly falling in with the design and spirit of the whole work, suited, as is rightly said by its editor, 'to draw away the attention of its readers from things of doubtful disputation to the diligent keeping of the heart.'

'And, sure, a soul so much inflamed with the love of God, could not be wanting in a suitable charity towards men: and, in-

deed, to this his very natural temper seemed to incline him. There was nothing of harshness in the disposition of his spirit; but it was full of sweetness and love, which appeared in his very air and countenance; and was apt to attract men's hearts at the first sight; and this happy disposition was hallowed and raised, by the love of God, into a holy charity. His soul was as wide as the world, and his love and good will were universal, and every man the object of them. His prayers and good wishes were extended to all men; and all the harm he could do his enemies, (if there were any such universal haters of mankind as to do him bad offices,) was, to pray for them the more earnestly to God.' pp. 250, 251.

'And O what holy charms and pious arts had he to catch men's souls, and to make them pursue their own happiness! A charity which he thought far superior to any that could be done for the body, (though he was eminent in that kind also,) and of which he would speak with the greatest concern and emotion of spirit. How many arts had he to better them, and make them good and happy? His love made him always as intent upon this, as the love of money will make the covetous man bend all his thoughts and designs to add to his treasure. How would he take advantage, from every thing, to make all things work together for their good? He seemed to be the visible spring that put all good designs in motion, for bettering the state of our church. He was the genius that put life and spirit into the serious studies and pious endeavours of those he conversed with. How careful was he to propagate, everywhere, right apprehensions of religion! and what a visible influence had he among us in this matter! What wise methods had he to make his friends sensible of their infirmities and failings, by speaking to them of his own; and to stir them up to zeal and diligence in piety in good works, and to the use of the most effectual means of purifying their souls, by telling them instances of the piety and lives of others of his acquaintances!' pp. 251, 252.

'As the pleasures and pomp of the world could never bewitch, so the hardships and troubles of it did never oppress and overcome his spirit; but, in all conditions, his mind seemed always equal and constant to itself. When he lived in the country, the hardships and inconveniences he then endured were the common talk of all that knew him: his coarse fare, and hard lodging, and unwonted solitude, the extreme coldness of the season, and the comfortless shelters he had against it, did excite the compassion of others, but never lessened the quiet and contentedness of his spirit; and he suffered them with as much patience as if he had been bred up from his infancy in the Turkish galleys. Any traverses that befell him in the circumstances of his life and de-

signs, did never becloud the natural serenity and cheerfulness of his mind: and he used to say in relation to such discontents, that as he blessed God he was not naturally melancholy, so he thought an acquired melancholy was scandalous in a clergyman.

‘And O what a profound humility of soul did shine forth in his life and actions! The admiration of the perfections of the Almighty, in the contemplation of which he was often taken up, had sunk him into truly mean thoughts of himself. All who had occasion to converse with him, were sensible of the lowliness of his mind; and yet he scarce ever observed those little officious ceremonies or compliments, which we must oft-times make use of to cover or counteract the pride of our spirits, or which it prompts us to traffic with, to purchase the regard and esteem of others. He disdained not to converse with the meanest; and looked upon every man as his fellow and companion. And the exemplary regard he had to young children, was equally the expression of his humility and his love. How ready was he, on all occasions, to converse with them, taking a singular delight in their harmless innocence, and usually, after the example of the great master of love, affectionately embracing and blessing them. And such was the pious meekness of his soul towards others, that if at any time his natural temper raised any little commotion in his spirit, (which was scarce ever taken notice of after his entering into the holy function,) yet he quickly appeased it, and never suffered the sun to go down upon his wrath. He was never seen to boast of any of his performances, nor yet to use the finer and more subtle fetch of vain-glory, in an elaborate undervaluing of them, that others might commend them.’ pp. 257, 258.

To these extracts, exhibiting with much feeling, and, we doubt not, with fidelity, the excellent character of our author, we shall add a few remarks on the subject of the treatise by which he is best known, and which, as might easily be inferred from the early period of his death, is the longest and most important of the works of Scougal which remain. Nine sermons, however, chiefly of the same practical and devotional character, are published in this little volume.

The title of the work, ‘*The Life of God in the Soul of Man*,’ is borrowed, as our readers familiar with the language of the New-Testament, will at once perceive, from St Paul. And it certainly is with great beauty and expressiveness, that religion is represented under the image of ‘*life*.’ The apostle distinctly denominates it, as here, ‘*the life of God*.’ The spirit, which it cherishes and includes, is called ‘*life* and

peace;' and with equal exactness and propriety are they who are alienated from this life, or who are strangers to it, said to be 'dead.' One 'who liveth to pleasure,' who is given to sensual passions and pursuits, is declared to be 'dead while he liveth.' And they, on the other hand, who have recovered themselves from this spiritual torpor, this moral death, are pronounced to be 'alive to God,' who, through the religion of his Son, by the truths and precepts, promises and threatenings of the gospel, by the good influences also of his own spirit, quickens them into a new and spiritual life.

This last term, also, is with much beauty employed to express the christian character. They who are sincere and holy in their tempers and lives are called spiritual; and to desire or to seek this condition and character, is to be 'spiritually minded.' This word may be considered as embracing all that Scougal would denote by the title of his work. And perhaps there is no single term, that we can select, more comprehensive than this. The religion of Christ itself, in all its extent and excellence, may be described by it. For it is a spiritual system; pure and holy in its very nature. It relates to spiritual objects and opposes itself to whatever is opposed to these. It is of heaven; and it is concerned with things heavenly. It addresses itself to the moral and spiritual man; to those faculties and affections, by which the 'things of the Spirit,' or the great objects of religion, are discerned or understood. Hence that well-known distinction, which the apostle intimates, between the natural or animal man, whose judgment on religious subjects is perverted by his senses and passions, and between the spiritual man, who, with pure affections and an unbiassed mind, in the freedom of an unreproving conscience, with sincerity of purpose and faithfulness to his own convictions, seeks to know what the will of the Lord is, and what the 'mind of Christ.'

It is particularly descriptive of this religion, which we thus call spiritual, and whose influences are with so much beauty exhibited throughout this work, as constituting the only true 'life' of man, that its worship also is spiritual--opposed to what is merely external, ritual. Its great Object being spiritual, even pure spirit, so also must be the service rendered him. True religion is not, and under no dispensation can be, a religion of form. What St Paul with characteristic energy and eloquence declares of the disciple of Moses, may with still

greater distinctness, be applied to the believer in Christ. 'He is not a Jew who is one outwardly, neither is that circumcision which is outward in the flesh. But he is a Jew who is one inwardly, and circumcision is of the heart, in the spirit and not in the letter, whose praise is not of men, but of God.' Outward forms and positive ordinances, however scrupulously observed, are in themselves but means. They are the body, through which the spirit may act, and display its power. But religion itself dwells in the soul. Its throne is in the heart; and there, chiefly, does it live and flourish. Whatever respect is to be rendered to the outward form, it is only as it is an aid or an expression of the interior grace; of that holiness of heart, without which the most fervent professions and the richest sacrifices are of no worth.

It is characteristic of a false religion to rest in forms, to encourage reliance on what is outward, and to substitute what is ceremonial for that which is spiritual and within. At the same time, it must be freely acknowledged, that this is not the danger to which we of the present day are specially exposed. This was the error and the temptation rather of times that are past. It was a great part of the folly and corruption of the Church of Rome. All its policy and all its spirit have helped to cherish it. But with the usual tendency to opposites, Christians of these days, and, perhaps we should admit, Christians distinguished in other respects by their just and enlightened views of religion, have suffered themselves to fall into the contrary extreme; and in their disgust at the bondage and abuse of forms, have neglected them altogether. They have found, that the stated means and ordinances of Christianity were perverted, as indeed may be the very purest of the gifts of God, and instead of taking the admonition as wise and good men should do, to make a better use of them, they have begun to think lightly even of the authority that enjoins them. Nay, in some natural disgust at the hypocrisy of which these ordinances have undeniably been the occasion or the ministers, they have suffered themselves to grow distrustful of religion itself, without considering, that sincere religion must have its symbols and its evidences, and that the evidence of its power is in outward observances, as well as in keeping the heart.

Connected with this error, and indeed one of its obvious effects, is a disposition to magnify beyond all proportion the exterior and social virtues; that conventional morality, which no one can doubt may exist, and that, too, in great perfection, with-

out the help of religious principle. We refer, it will at once be understood, to those qualities which concern our mutual intercourse. And here such men imagine, that as long as a man is peaceful and friendly, just and honest, fulfilling the duties of a good citizen and a good neighbour, doing to others what he wishes that others should do to him, he is entirely safe, and has no need to concern himself with that mystical and unintelligible something, which the Scriptures call spirituality, and which is here called, as it is elsewhere, the 'life of God in the soul of man.' But surely such men must remember, that there are duties which we owe to God, as well as to man; and that social morality, however important, nay, however indispensable, is at the utmost but a part, and cannot embrace the whole of religion. They must not forget, that the same word, which commands us to do justly and to love mercy, commands us also to walk humbly with God.

The truth is, that religion addresses itself to all our affections and faculties, to the inward and to the outward man, to all our relations with earth and with heaven. And in every precept, whatever may be its object, whether God, or our fellow-creature, or ourselves, it refers us to its own great principles; to the relations in which we stand to God, our heavenly Father, our Creator, Benefactor and Almighty Friend; to Jesus Christ, as our Saviour, the author and finisher of our faith, and to the future life, which he alone has clearly revealed. No man, therefore, can be a Christian, no man has within him even the elements of this spiritual life, who does not unite with his other principles of religion, a sincere faith in Jesus Christ as the Son of God, and the Saviour of men; who is not conscious of a prevailing desire to be faithful to his religion and to yield obedience to its commands. In fine, no man is a true Christian, who does not inseparably connect the spirit of faith and piety with his views of morality; loving his God with all his heart, as well as his neighbour as himself.

On the other hand, for we would guard, as carefully as we are able, against the various and opposite mistakes upon this great subject, it is never to be forgotten, that no duties we owe to God can ever be inconsistent or incompatible with known duties to our fellow men. And he, most surely, is not a Christian, and has no part in the spiritual life, who, while he prays to God, is unjust or unkind, malicious or uncharitable to men. Nothing, in truth, can be imagined more absurd, nothing more revolting

than this substitution of devotion, or rather this pretence of devotion, for real and substantial goodness. Yet are there those, and the number, it may be feared, is not small, who think to compound with certain forms and acts of piety for the undeniable delinquencies and transgressions of their lives; who on no account would omit their daily prayers, or the worship of the temple, absent themselves from the Lord's supper, or even omit the evening lecture or the occasional conference, but who do not scruple, as long as they can hope for concealment, to be dishonest in their business, severe in their exactions, censorious in their judgments, inconsiderate and unrelenting to the dependent and unhappy. But let no one imagine that he holds the least claim to the name of Christian, or has yet known anything of the life of God in his soul, if there be found within him anything of this. If religion exert within us any true, any life-giving power, it will exhibit itself in the most common relations and offices of life. It will make us better men, and better members of society; more peaceable and industrious, more kind and meek and forgiving, more temperate and pure.

It also enters into a just view of this religion, to regard it, not only as in itself an inward principle, operating on the heart and the life, but as having within itself the sources of its own satisfactions. According to the fine expression of the apostle, it is a 'life hidden with Christ in God.' It does not seek the regards, nor does it depend for its rewards, on men. It may be passed in much obscurity, far from the gaze, and wholly without the honors of the world; for its witness is in heaven, and its praise, not of men, but of God. It has within itself unfailing subjects for thought; enduring and inexhaustible resources of solace and enjoyment. For it implies a faith that overcomes the world, and makes him who has nothing, the possessor of all things. 'How,' says an eloquent father of the early days of the church, 'how can you disturb him, whose heart is established in the belief of an everlasting life, and the peace of a Christian's hope? Bring him word, "Your estate is ruined;"—"Yet my inheritance," says he, "is safe."—"Your wife, your child, or your nearest friend is dead;"—"Yet my Father lives." Bring him the summons, "You yourself must die;"—"Well, then, I go to my Father and to my inheritance;" and though he pass through the valley of the shadow of death, he will fear no evil, for God is with him, and when Christ, who is his life, shall appear, he also shall appear with him in glory.'

But there is still another view of this subject, which we must not altogether omit. The whole spirit and character delineated in the work before us, or intended by other expressions, usually employed in similar treatises—such as heavenly-mindedness, spirituality, vital religion, &c., are produced by principles of general acknowledgment, with which the distinctions of a disputed theology have little or no concern. The life of God in the soul is formed by having the love of God shed abroad in the heart; by filial views of his parental character and law; by faith in his perfect providence, his unerring wisdom, and his fatherly goodness; by a practical conviction of his impartial judgment, followed by an exact retribution according to character; and, lastly, by the hope of immortality. Who will doubt, that in these grand, simple doctrines, are included all that is essential to life and godliness? Who, that is not an utter stranger to their influence, may not find in these glorious truths the relief of his cares, the solace of his sorrows, the correction of his sin, the sanctification and improvement of his soul? Are not these the truths, which, incomparably beyond any of the doubtful questions of the day, make the gospel what it is,—the unspeakable gift, and, through their regenerating and sustaining influence, the power of God unto salvation?

ART. V.—*Goethe's Werke. Iphigenie auf Tauris. Ein Schauspiel.*

[*Goethe's Works. Iphigenia in Tauris. A Drama.*]

THE works of Goethe form an integral and important portion of German literature. During his long literary reign of more than half a century, he has given to the world a series of works, astonishing for their variety, depth and power, each one strengthening the impression made by its predecessor. His name has long been familiar as household words to every individual of Germany's thirty millions, and the ever deepening sound of his fame has found an occasional echo from the most distant quarters of the world. And now, having arrived almost to the utmost verge of human life, he has paused to review the splendid career he has been permitted to pass through, and affix the

final seal of immortality to his productions. Schiller, Wieland, Klopstock, and those other literary giants who have made Weimar the Athens of Modern Europe, have long rested in the silence of the tomb. Of that constellation, one star only, but that the brightest of all, yet remains, shining on with a pure and steady lustre, amidst the flood of softened and reflected light that still lingers over the horizon where those kindred stars have set. The Arch-duke of Weimar, the patron of Goethe's youth and the friend of his manhood, has lately been laid in the sepulchre of his princely line, with the remains of Schiller on one side, and a cenotaph, destined ere long to be the resting-place of the poet of Frankfort, on the other. Standing in this interesting and solemn relation to the generation that has been and the generation that is, this literary Nestor is still heard, with a reverence bordering upon worship, among those whose fathers' hearts were kindled to enthusiasm by his strains, as they came fresh and burning from his lips. The actors in the great literary drama of which Weimar has been the theatre, have all departed save one, and in the common course of things, *his* death must soon be the touching epilogue.

The most striking trait of Goethe's genius, is its unrivalled versatility. In every department of literature he has tried his power, and with wonderful success. He possesses, what belongs only to the most gifted minds, the power of entering into, and identifying himself completely with every mode and phasis of human life. His intellect is as varied in its compass, as the phenomena of the physical, moral and spiritual world, that have so often passed in review before it. The learned and the ignorant are equally charmed with the thousand-fold creations of his muse. The critic most deeply versed in the refinements of an enlightened age, finds in his lightest effusions matter for grave reflection. The untaught child of nature meets in them the feelings of the heart so truly given, the master tones of humanity so stirringly uttered, that his own soul responds at once to the appeal. His works display none of that egotism that runs through the productions of inferior minds, though all are stamped with the undying impression of his peculiar genius. His mind has traversed in every direction the vast domains of knowledge, and made them contribute of their choicest materials to the sightly edifice of his fame. Scarce a strain of poetry has ever been uttered, to which his ear has not listened; scarce a specimen of creative art exists, which

his eye has not accurately scanned ; scarce a system of physical or intellectual science has been devised, that his searching and curious reason has not sifted. And such is the true education for a poet of this age. It is one of the greatest mistakes of shallow speculators, that extensive and progressive knowledge is at war with the inspirations of the muse. An appeal to literary history would show that poetry has, on the whole, steadily advanced with the advance of intellectual refinement. The sophism springs from the *ex parte* evidence of the bad taste, and corrupt and degenerate literature, founded on certain transient extravagances that pass away with the temporary modes of thought in which they originated. But genuine poetry began with the inspiration of external nature, as uttered with matchless grace in the earliest strains of the Grecian muse, and has ever since proceeded inward, aspiring to sway the spiritual nature of men, and speaking in a deeper and more solemn tone, in proportion as the worlds of mind and heart have been unfolded.

The command which Goethe has attained over the resources of his native language, constitutes one of his strongest claims to attention. In some respects the German is the most difficult of all modern dialects, and it is fully mastered by very few among the numerous authors who have adorned it. But Goethe's comprehensive mind has grasped it in its almost boundless variety. His wondrous reach of thought and power seems to have become coextensive with its wide and deep significance. He therefore moulds it to whatever form he pleases ; plain narrative flows along in even, unbroken, harmonious sentences ; description, in his hands, glows with hues as bright, and features as distinct, as those of the prototype ; passion, whether dark and stormful, or sad and subdued ; the proud bearing of the hero, and the boundless devotedness of the lover ; the throbbing aspirations of youth, and the calm thoughtfulness of manhood,—all find, under his pen, exact, appropriate and powerful expression, rich and magical imagery, and beautiful illustrations springing up unbidden and thronging around them. Some of his lyrical pieces are among the noblest specimens of that branch of the poetic art. Many of his songs rival in melody the softness of the far-famed Tuscan music. In the novel, no German writer can be placed by his side. In criticism, his beautiful and profound examination of Hamlet, in *Wilhelm Meister*, ranks him at least on a level with Schiller, Lessing and the Schlegels.

In the drama Goethe's productions are so various and distinct, and each one so superior in some respects to every other of the kind in German literature, that we find it difficult to imagine them all the works of a single mind, however gifted and versatile. His *Faust* is a production teeming with wonders and requiring long and deep study to comprehend. The doubt, darkness and despair, to which modern inquiries have in many cases unhappily led; the dim twilight of the mind between ancient and unsuspecting faith, and the light which intellect, as if rousing from the slumber of ages, attempted to let in upon the region of thought, even to its most sacred and mysterious recesses; the many dismal forms that appeared, spright-like, to the mental eye, before it had adapted itself to the new and dazzling influx; the disappointment of raised expectations and satiated appetites; the struggling between hope that will not die, and skepticism that will not let us hope in peace; the headlong recklessness with which the mind rushes to the attainment of a long meditated and almost despaired of aim, even at the price of its eternal salvation—are all embodied in this fearfully significant character. In *Goetz von Berlichingen*, the poet labors successfully to accomplish another and a different aim. The rough bravery, the daring chivalrous spirit of an early German age, are dramatically represented, yet in accordance with strict historical truth. The poet prepared himself for this flight, by a long and severe study of the manners, institutions, laws and history of the feudal times; and hence his accuracy of costume, character and spirit. In *Egmont*, we have scenes from vulgar life alternating with the deepest tragedy, somewhat in the manner of Shakspeare. We are led into the streets of Brussels, and hear the murmuring of a discontented populace described with that wonderful exactness and power of language which we have said is one of Goethe's most striking characteristics. But the most beautiful portion of this romantic drama, is the picture of feminine devotedness to a beloved object, exhibited in the exquisitely drawn character of Clara. We do not remember, in the whole circle of dramatic poetry, a finer or a truer display of the high qualities of woman, the unconquerable attachment, which no pressure of external adversity, prostration of honorable hopes, loss of the pomp and splendor of fortune belonging to a princely name, arrest, imprisonment and a dishonored death, can destroy or affect, except to heighten, than Goethe has embodied by the master touches that make up this

incomparable delineation. We have never read a specimen of autobiography which excited so lively an interest as the *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, and that, too, by reason of the very qualities which gave such offence to the British critics on its first appearance. Every trait of his character, and the whole career of his life, are therein reflected, like the images of surrounding scenery in the bosom of a placid lake. His early education and the progress of his mind, the genius which bore him away to 'the highest heaven of invention,' and the practical good sense which enabled him to seize the spirit of human life and human endeavour, give to it indeed a claim to the title of *Poetry and Truth*. The essays of Goethe on subjects of natural philosophy we have no personal acquaintance with; but we know that they stand high in the estimation of those whose opinion, on matters of that sort, is authority.

We have made these remarks by no means with the presumption of doing justice to the Musagetes of German literature, but merely as an introduction to our view of the poem whose title we have placed at the head of this article. Our object has been to show, that, however admirable the power exhibited in this beautiful production, it is but a single item in a long list of claims which Goethe may assert to the intellectual supremacy of continental Europe. A mythus of the heroic age of Greece, presents the materials out of which this classical drama is woven. The subject is Iphigenia at Tauris, some of the traditional incidents connected with which, such as the murder of Thoas, Goethe has very judiciously omitted, or varied in the coloring. The united forces of Greece having been detained at Aulis by contrary winds, are informed that the sacrifice of Iphigenia, Agamemnon's daughter, will alone appease the wrath of the goddess who had been chiefly instrumental in causing the delay. After the abhorrence of the father has been overcome by the remonstrances of the allied chieftains, she is sent for under the pretence of a marriage with Achilles. The murderous preparations are already completed, the lovely and innocent victim is laid on the altar, the knife in the hand of Calchas is about to pierce her virgin bosom, when suddenly the goddess relents, rescues the princess from her impending fate, transports her to Tauris, and makes her priestess of the temple. These incidents form the ground-work of the best and most touching play of Euripides. The Iphigenia in Aulis of this poet contains a masterly and moving description of the struggle between

a father's love, the natural shrinking from so dark a transaction, on the one side,—and the love of country, reverence for the gods, and the persuasions of an heroic brother, urging him to the sacrifice, on the other. The leading quality in the character of Euripides, was tenderness ; and nowhere has he so well succeeded in awakening the gentlest feelings of pity as in this beautiful production. In the delineation of character, that of Agamemnon and Clytemnestra, for truth of representation and sustained interest, are not equalled by any in the whole range of his other dramatic works.

Every stranger, who, by whatever accident, visited Tauris, was, in accordance with a bloody custom, sacrificed on the altar of Diana's temple ; and Iphigenia, in virtue of her assumed priesthood, was required to superintend these human oblations. This is one of the leading points in another play of the same poet, the title of which, *Iphigenia in Tauris*, Goethe has borrowed in his classical imitation. During the absence of Agamemnon in the Trojan war, Clytemnestra proves unfaithful to her lord, and with the aid of her paramour Ægysthus, assassinates him on his return. Orestes, the son of this hero, is saved by Electra from his mother's bloody hands, and brought up at the court of the king of Phocis, with his son Pylades. The incidents connected with this complication of crimes, are woven into two tragedies of the poet Æschylus, who represents Orestes as impelled by Apollo to avenge his father's murder. He accordingly returns to Mycenæ, and puts to death the adulterous pair. The crime of parricide was supposed, in the poetic fable of Greece, to be punished by the Furies, who are accordingly sent to haunt Orestes. From these terrible visitants he is informed by the oracle that he must purchase exemption, by the restoration of Diana's statue, which had fallen from heaven and was to be found in the temple of the goddess, at Tauris. The custom of sacrificing strangers, which has before been mentioned, rendered this a most perilous enterprise. But the dreadful agonies to which he was subjected, made any danger, even death itself, a cheap ransom from this state of torture. Accompanied by Pylades, for whom he had formed a friendship that has rendered their names proverbial, he travelled to the Chersonese, in order to accomplish his deliverance. They were both discovered, brought into the presence of Thoas, and condemned to the altar. Incidents occur that excite the curiosity of Iphigenia, who, after having questioned them

upon the affairs of Greece, particularly of Agamemnon's family, recognises her brother, and, with the two friends, conspires to rob the temple of the image and escape to her native land. This project is crowned with success. The Iphigenia of Euripides is constructed of these materials, and differs, in some important particulars, from the German poem. They both open with a long soliloquy pronounced by Iphigenia, but they are exceedingly different in tone and character. In Euripides, the heroine appears on the stage, tracing her genealogy from Pelops, and giving a somewhat tedious account of the affair at Aulis; mentions the barbarous sacrifices she was compelled to perform, calls Thoas 'a barbarous chief of barbarous tribes,' and alludes in no very respectful terms to the goddess herself;—

‘Ὅς προσομοίῃ τοισὶν ἵδνται θεῶν
 Ἀγέμεναι ἰούσῃσι, τούτομ' ἢς καλοῖ μογον
 Τα δ' ἄλλα στήθε, τὴν θεοὶ φέρονται.

Then comes her dream of the falling house, with a single column left, which suddenly assumed the aspect and voice of a man. The house was her father's royal family, and the standing column her brother Orestes, who was destined to restore the prostrate glories of his princely line. Goethe has very judiciously given a different tone to the character of Iphigenia. The most profound and reverential awe for the temple and the goddess; the tenderest reminiscences of the fair land of Greece, of the joys of her childhood and youth, and a feeling of penitence for the unwillingness in which she permits herself to indulge on being detained in the service of her deliverer, give a solemn and melancholy character to her reflections as she enters the sacred grove before Diana's temple, where the action commences. The following version, without pretending to the grace, terseness, and simplicity of the original, will give some idea of the soliloquy which Goethe puts into the mouth of the Grecian maid.

‘Beneath thy shade, thou whispering forest-top
 Of antique, holy and dense-foliaged grove,
 Come I, as to the goddess' silent temple,
 With shuddering feelings thrilling through my frame,
 Like my first entrance to this solemn wood,
 Ere yet with awe my spirit had communed.
 A higher will, to whose strong sway I yield,
 Full many a year hath held me to this spot;

But ever am I, as at first, a stranger.
The sea, alas! from those I love, divides me,
And long, long days I stand upon the shore
In fancy wandering to the Grecian land;
But the ocean-wave, in answer to my sighs,
Brings damp tones only o'er the roaring deep.
Wo unto him, who leads a lonely life,
From parents and from kindred banished far!
Each joy untasted sorrow wastes away.
His thoughts returning, ever throng around
His father's halls, where first the sun
Disclosed to him the heavens, and loved companions
In childhood sports were to each other linked,
Closer and closer, in sweet Friendship's band.
I would not rise against the gods—but ah!
What woman would not woman's lot deplore!
In peace, in war, man wields the sceptre.
In foreign lands his own right arm protects him.
Possession blesseth him and Victory crowns.
A death of glory aye is ready for him.
How sternly guarded is *her* dismal fate!
To serve a master's tyrant-will, is now
Her duty and her bliss—and then how wretched
When fortune drives her to a stranger soil!
Thus am I here by Thoas' royal will,
Fast bound in chains of sacred servitude.
It shames me, Goddess, that I render thee
Service unwilling from my silent heart—
Thee! my deliverer!—freely to thy worship
My heart, my life should joyfully be given.
My hope hath rested ever, and doth rest
On thee, on thee, Diana! who didst take me,
Deserted daughter of the king of kings,
Into thy holy and benignant arms.
Daughter of Jove! since thou hast guided home
The hero-prince, the godlike Agamemnon,
Whom by thy dread command to sacrifice
His daughter, thou didst wring with deepest pangs—
Who on thine altar laid his darling child—
From Troy's beleaguered walls since thou hast led him
With glory to his natal soil again,
His queen, Electra, and his son preserved,
Those priceless treasures—oh! restore me too,
And save me, Goddess, who from death didst save,
From this lone life, which is a second death!

This soliloquy is interrupted by the arrival of a messenger, with a royal salutation to the priestess, and the annunciation of a 'new and wondrous victory.' The dialogue is quickly turned from public transactions to affairs nearer home. Arcas remonstrates with Iphigenia upon the uninterrupted gloom which overhangs her countenance, and the impenetrable secrecy in which she had ever veiled her character, her lineage, and her name. Filled with the thoughts of home, of country, and of kindred, she replies in a melancholy strain, that an orphan and an exile cannot assume a happy look when sorrow preys upon the heart.

Iph. Can foreign soil become our father-land?

Arc. Thy father-land to thee's a foreign soil.

Iph. And therefore never heals my bleeding heart.

In earliest youth, when scarce my soul
Embraced a father, mother, and dear kindred—
The vigorous shoots, in union and in beauty
Were heaven-ward towering from the ancient stem—
Then fell the curse of strangers on my head,
And tore me from those loved ones—rent in twain
With brazen hand the lovely tie; and gone
Was youth's best joy, the throbbing blissfulness
Of earliest years. I lived but as the shade
Of what I had been, and the morning bliss
Of life for me no longer freshly blooms.'

Iphigenia laments the useless and idle life she is compelled to lead, and Arcas in reply enumerates the various services which she had been instrumental in rendering. She had cheered the sombre mind of the king; she had checked, by her gentle persuasions, the horrible sacrifice of strangers, who from year to year were driven to that inhospitable coast; her purity and goodness had found favor in the eyes of Diana, and crowned with victory the Taurian arms; and, under her auspicious influence, every one was conscious that a happier fortune smiled upon him. Then he passes to the principal object of his errand, which is to urge the suit of the king, who had formed the design of raising her to the throne. He entreats her to listen favorably and encouragingly to the royal proposal, the acceptance of which would restore happiness to the bereaved heart of Thoas. The Grecian princess, to whom a barbarian palace offers but small attractions, evades ingeniously the gracious proffer, and upon the appearance of the king himself, Arcas retires, leaving Iphigenia alone.

'*Iph. (sola.)*—Indeed I see not
 By what device Truth's counsel I shall follow ;
 But I will follow Duty's—and the king
 For numerous favors pay a kindly word ;
 I would I might to princely Thoas say,
 And truly, that would cheer his darksome spirit.'

The king urges his suit in person, but encounters an opposition which he had not anticipated. Forthwith he becomes angry and imperious, but the priestess reminds him that she is under the special care of Diana, and that it would neither be safe nor in keeping with his royal word, to force her from the temple to the palace. Thoas then declares that the ancient sacrifice, of which the Goddess had, by her persuasion, been so long deprived, shall be resumed, and two strangers, who have just been discovered on the coast, are destined to be the first victims of the sacrificial knife. 'I send them hither ; well thou knowest thy duty.' The act closes with a wild and highly poetical speech of the heroine, in the lyrical lawlessness of the ancient chorus.

The second act opens with a dialogue between the two strangers, who prove, of course, to be Orestes and his friend Pylades. This is one of the best executed portions of the drama. The dismal gloom which had settled over the mind of Orestes, the deep despair and life-weariness to which the haunting of the dire avengers had reduced him, are powerfully expressed on the part of Orestes, and all the consolations which the truest friendship has to offer, are set forth by Pylades, with great tenderness and truth. Meantime the action proceeds, and Iphigenia, in the execution of her duty, approaches the destined victims. A conversation ensues between her and Pylades, whom she discovers to be a Grecian, and naturally interrogates upon his name and family, and the unhappy fortune which had driven him upon the Taurian shore. He replies that they are sons of Adrastus, himself Cephalus by name, and his companion Laodamas, the oldest of the family, who in a quarrel had shed a brother's blood.

'——— And for the crime of blood
 The avenging Furies wildly press upon him.
 Apollo sends us to this savage shore,
 The God of Delphi, hoping for deliverance.
 He bade us in his virgin sister's temple
 Await the bliss-bestowing hand of help.
 But we are captives made, and hither brought
 An offering for the altar. Now thou knowest.'

On hearing from Pylades the narrative of the melancholy fate which had befallen her father's house, the priestess shows an almost incontrollable emotion, that arouses his suspicions of her being at least the daughter of Agamemnon's friend; but when he proceeds to say that Clytemnestra had tarnished her honorable name, and slain her returning lord, to avenge the supposed sacrifice of her daughter,—Iphigenia, unable any longer to repress her bursting sorrow, suddenly draws a veil, and leaves him.

'By the sad fate of Agamemnon's house
Her spirit's deeply stirred. Whate'er her name,
She hath herself our royal leader known,
And for our weal, snatched from a princely home,
Is hither banished. But be still, my heart,
And let us wisely follow Hope's bright star,
That shines upon us now, with trustful heed.'

In the next act, the mutual recognition of Iphigenia and Orestes, the astonishment of the latter at the discovery, his incredulity, and the wild and poetical flights of a disordered imagination still under the dark dominion of the avengers of murder, are described with a depth and power that belong to none but those who have nicely scanned the recesses of the human heart, and learned, by long effort, to embody in the creations of fancy, the master-feelings that exist therein. Nothing can be more powerfully executed than the impassioned and dreamy soliloquy that Orestes utters upon recovering from the trancelike state into which his maddening excitement had thrown him; and his bounding exultation when the Furies depart 'to the realms of Tartarus, and close the far-thundering brazen door behind them,' reminds us of some of the loftiest strains of Æschylus.

Preparations are now made to fulfil the command of the oracle, by stealthily conveying away the image of the goddess. The captives are released from chains by the priestess, who pretends to get ready the sacrifice. Meantime the king becomes impatient at the delay, and sends his messenger to announce his displeasure and the murmuring of the people, and to command the instant performance of her duty. Anticipating such an event, the conspirators invent a story of which Iphigenia is to avail herself for the purpose of allaying the excited suspicions of Thoas. The struggle in her mind between her delicate and in-

stinctive love of truth, her gratitude for the kindness of the king of Tauris, and the apparent necessity of supporting a fabricated tale, in order to rescue those who are near and dear to her from a dreadful death, is beautifully expressed in the soliloquy which opens the fourth act. She declares to the royal messenger the impossibility of proceeding with the sacrifice, until the sacred image has been purified from the pollution it had sustained by the presence of the infernal spirit, that had seized upon Orestes in the very temple and presence of the goddess. This task it belonged to the priestess only to execute, by taking the image from the temple to the shore and performing the ceremony of ablution. The ship of the strangers is already prepared. Nothing further is requisite than to evade the suspicious watchfulness of Thoas and his train, and transport the object of their dangerous adventure on board the waiting galley. Arcas leaves her to inform the king of the unexpected hindrance, and Pylades immediately appears to carry into execution their plan of escape. Iphigenia is still irresolute, but finally yields to the persuasions of the ardent youth, 'as the flower turns its face towards the sun.' The act closes with the 'ancient song which the Fates terrific sang, when Tantalus fell from his golden throne,' which the daughter of Agamemnon had forgotten, and gladly too, but now suddenly recalls to memory.

In the last act, the king issues an imperious mandate to seize upon the fugitives, and summons the priestess to his presence. Indignant at the attempt to practise upon his credulity, he begins his conversation with her in a rough and haughty tone, which she retorts by assuming the proud bearing becoming the daughter of the greatest Grecian king. His reverence for the names of her heroic and godlike ancestors, and the awe with which her firmness inspires him, quickly lower his lordly style. Seizing, by a masterly effort, upon the favorable moment, Iphigenia descends at the same time to the most bland and gentle entreaties, and so works upon his softening spirit, that he is on the point of consenting to their peaceful departure, when Orestes enters armed, and calls hurriedly for an instant flight, declaring that they are all betrayed. The king, Arcas, Pylades and Orestes being now brought together in arms, a bloody contest is on the point of ensuing, but, by the skilful interference and timely persuasion of the priestess, is happily prevented. In all these scenes Goethe has shown the keenest discrimination

and most unerring taste. The influence which Iphigenia exercises over the rude but generous and heroic character of Thoas, by her mildness, beauty, and loftiness of purpose, is a happy thought, and a great improvement, according to modern taste, upon the prototype in Euripides.

'*Thoas*. Then go!

'*Iphi*.——Not so, my king!—without thy blessing—

In enmity!—I will not leave thee thus.

Exile us not—O let the sacred tie

Of guestship * bind us, and we shall not be

Forever sundered. Loved and valued as

My father was, art thou, my prince, to me.

Deep in my soul the strong impression lives.

Let but the meanest of thy subjects ever

Bring to my ear the well remembered tones

Thy voice so oft hath uttered to my listening—

Let but the poorest show a token from thee—

And I will hail him as I would a God ;

With my own hands a couch for him prepare,

Will place him by me near the sacred hearth,

And ask him only of thy fate and thee.

O may the Gods for all thy gracious deeds

And gentleness, grant thee a rich reward!

Farewell! O turn not from me, but bestow,

Ere we forever part, one kindly word.

The breeze more favoring fills the swelling sail,

And tears more soft from weeping eyelids flow,

If thus we part. Farewell! O pledge thine hand

That former friendship shall not be forgotten.

'*Thoas*. Farewell!'

We have thus given an imperfect sketch of this poem. Our chief object has been to show how thoroughly Goethe understands the spirit of the Grecian drama, and how powerfully he can transfuse it into his own productions. The French, who have always made the loudest pretensions to a classical theatre, have no single piece that will stand a comparison with this. To enjoy it fully, the student must have learned to relish that extraordinary and unrivalled union of perfect genius, taste and

* The law of hospitality was a well known feature of ancient society. Families of distant and often hostile nations were united by this bond, which was deemed sacred and inviolable. It passed frequently from father to son through several generations, and is familiarly alluded to by Homer and all the elder poets.

skill in the use of materials, which no nation but the gifted Greeks have ever shown. The three great masters of Grecian tragedy require much study to be perfectly understood; and this remark is particularly true of Æschylus. Mr Dalzell has attempted to be exceedingly severe upon the 'rant and fustian of Æschylus,' as he is pleased to term his sublimest passages; but let any one study the Prometheus, or Agamemnon, in the true spirit of a classical scholar, and, unless we have utterly mistaken the character of Æschylus and the feelings of a scholar, he will rise from the perusal with the profoundest admiration for the poet, and with unmeasured surprise at the flippant criticism of the Scottish professor. We have often been struck, in the study of his wonderful creations, of which unfortunately but too few remain, with the resemblance in some points of intellectual character between him and Shakespeare. As an illustration of our meaning we may instance the scene in the Persians, in which the chorus summons the shade of Darius from the regions of the dead, and when it rises, gives utterance to the overpowering awe, which the supernatural apparition inspires. The scene itself and the occasion differ essentially from the ghost scene in Hamlet, but the manner of presenting it, and the expression given to the characters, have always brought to our mind the kindred genius of the English dramatist. Did our limits permit, we would venture to prosecute this inquiry farther, but we are compelled to dismiss it for the present, without pledging ourselves, however, that we shall abstain from so interesting a subject on a future occasion.

In the poem which has been the subject of the present paper, Goethe has not attempted to handle his materials as a Grecian writer would have done, in all the details of the plan; but he has preserved the essential spirit of the Grecian character, softened by the deeper sentiment of a more cultivated age. Iphigenia possesses all the great traits of a classic heroine, with the delicacy and refinement of a lofty female character in the days of chivalry. The same remark may be made of nearly all the *dramatis personæ* that figure in the course of the action. To us, the poem has ever seemed like a tone of the ancient melodies, borne to our ears, softened and mellowed by the distance, from the noblest lyre of an elder Grecian age.

ART. VI.—*Fashionable Amusements*.—Tract No. 73, published by the AMERICAN TRACT SOCIETY

BUSINESS and recreation are the two great departments of life to which the principles of morality apply. Between these two departments, however, the public conscience is apt to make discriminations which can hardly be defended. It is much more strict with regard to the sins of amusement, than with regard to the sins of business. And this strictness, we think, is much misplaced, for several reasons; first, because the heinousness of transgressions is not to be determined by the sphere in which they take place—the utility of business is not to screen, the frivolity of pleasure is not to enhance the appropriate faults of either; secondly, because the department of business is much larger than that of recreation, and is on that account more important in a moral view; thirdly, because the sins of business, among the body of the people, are far greater than those of amusement; and fourthly, because the national propensity here, is, with some justice, marked as leaning to avarice rather than to voluptuousness. This mistake of the public conscience is a most serious evil, because it amounts with many to an almost total suspension of that faculty with regard to the whole conduct of their lives. Many are committing perfect abominations in business, who, at the same time, take great credit to themselves for their opposition to amusements.

We think it is the duty of the christian moralist to keep his eye upon both of these spheres of human pursuit. We are about to call the attention of our readers, in the present discussion, to the lesser department. Let them remember, however, that it is a fair portion of life; of that life which God has given for serious purposes, and all of whose employments, whether grave or gay, are conspiring to the formation of a character which is the great and momentous result. Futurity is thus to answer for our pleasures as truly as for our labors or our devotions. In views of the subject, however, that come short of that solemn reference, it has strong claims to attention. We have long regarded recreations as standing in a relation of great importance to social and national happiness and morality—far greater than is usually attached to it. We can by no

means confound the importance of the subject, with the levity of its title; or the effects of recreation, with the trivial aspects, under which it presents itself to superficial observation.

Let no one think, from referring to the character or source of the tract which we have named at the head of this article, that we are about to set ourselves in array for the defence of fashionable amusements; or of any other amusements, in the gross. The questions before us, are great questions of morality, and not points of sectarian difference. It is somewhat necessary at once to say this, and indeed to say a great deal more on the subject, because the impression is studiously kept up among the people of this country generally, and it especially prevails at a distance and among those who know least of us, that we, as a class of Christians, are strenuous abettors of all sorts of amusements. It may perhaps strike some of our readers with surprise, and may scarcely awaken any feeling in them but the sense of its absurdity, but it is strictly true, that multitudes in this country habitually regard us as a class of persons who have set ourselves to take off all restraints from worldly levity, who are opposed to all deep religious seriousness, who are bent upon laughing away life as we can, who, dreading the thoughts of death and futurity, and paralyzed at the presence of affliction, endeavour to cover them up and keep them out of sight, as much as possible.

In truth, some among us whose habits of mind make them even too serious, many whose studies wear them down to almost perpetual languor and exhaustion, many more whose reflections, grappling with questions that scarcely offer themselves to the advocates of a fixed and unalterable creed, carry them to the most earnest and solicitous inquiries after better views, and a still larger number whose rational consideration and religious tenderness lead them to feel as if seriousness were the least and easiest, or rather the most unavoidable of all attainments—many of all these classes among us, we say, will think this a very strange charge. And yet, after all, it is not very strange; certainly not in a community that has received so strong an infusion of Puritanism as this in which we live. The more liberal and rational expositor of the duties of life, as we regard him, has always been subject to the misconstruction of those who think less freely and wisely. But in a community, which originally owed its very existence to a religious

impulse, where the whole power originally was a religious domination, and all that power was brought to bear, often in the shape of express enactments, against what are called genteel amusements, it is not extraordinary that the slightest leaning towards a more liberal construction of them, should have brought along with it the implication of utter levity and indifference towards all religion. The bare association of ideas on this point, is too strong for the intelligence and freedom of most minds; and they cannot help feeling as if the mere presence of fashionable recreations, utterly abused as they have been, and as some of them still are, must banish away all good impressions, as if the very sound of the viol were a spell to destroy all religious reflection, as if the figures stamped upon cards were the very dialect of the evil one, and the theatre his very temple. A class of Christians, whose ministers are not preaching, and whose professors are not protesting without qualification against these things, may expect to suffer much odium on this account; and the Episcopalians may thank the Orthodoxy of their creed, and the kindly amalgamation of sects in these days, that they are not sharing this odium with us.

We hope there is some force in words;—and if there is, we would use it all, to say with the utmost explicitness, that we do not approve at all of some of these amusements called fashionable; that we do not approve, in any sense, of the spirit that too commonly pervades them, and that we have many things admonitory to say concerning the use that is to be made of the most unexceptionable of them. We think it extremely desirable that we should say such things—desirable that we should discriminate, and say what we approve and what we do not approve. This is important, not only with reference to our own defence, but still more with reference to the state of feeling that exists among ourselves. There are consciences among us, we believe, that need direction; cases of conscience which we are bound to do what we can to settle. ‘Happy is he that condemneth not himself in that thing which he alloweth.’ We are afraid there are many who want this happiness; and who might have it, in many cases where they want it, if they would *think* more than they do. Our recreations, like all our pursuits, must be sustained upon a conviction of their rectitude, or they never can be safe, or really useful, or proper, in any sense that should satisfy reasonable beings. It is often asked, as if the question furnished a decisive objection to certain

amusements, 'Can you pray for the presence and blessing of God, when entering upon them?' Now we say, if you cannot offer such a prayer upon the threshold of any proposed recreation, you should religiously abstain from it. Even if we thought the recreation a proper one, we should say this. No man should ever go beyond his reflections, or against his conscience. If a scruple or a doubt bar up the way to an entertainment, he should pause and wait till it is removed. If there be any drudgery of conscience, we say decidedly, Work it out; work in the mill-house, rather than go one step into the field of pleasure, till your own mind open the way.

But what need, it may be asked, what need of removing scruples, when the general propensity of men is to take liberties? We answer that it certainly is not our main, still less our ultimate design, to remove scruples. But this is not our only answer. For we think that the very reasoning implied in the questions just stated, is altogether bad and wrong and injurious. We do not feel the need of any such policy in the exposition of their moral duties to an intelligent people. We would speak sincerely; and we believe that we can make our sincerity understood. The time, the age, the spirit of society requires it. Come out boldly, we would say to the man who undertakes to instruct us; tell us the plain truth, and, upon that truth, establish the rules of holy living. Besides, and still further, we believe that the very way to make the conscience truly faithful and thorough, is to remove needless scruples from it; that the very path to a true strictness of moral principle is the path of liberal reflection. We promise ourselves at some future time, to show how entirely one and the same thing are true liberality and true strictness, true liberty and the most complete subjection to conscience; but the course of our reflections at present, can only be generally and indirectly illustrative of this point. The truth is, that no man is such a slave as the 'free liver;' none such a bondman as the rash and unscrupulous votary of pleasure;—but we cannot now enlarge upon this topic.

We have said that the questions before us are great questions of morality. We cannot discuss them as if they concerned this party or that party in religion, though we have referred to this bearing of them. We cannot ask whom we shall please, or whom we shall displease. Our views are not to be bounded, or bent, to such respects as these.

We wish to call the attention of our readers to the singular, and, as we think, the unfortunate treatment of the whole subject and business of recreation, in this country. Nowhere else in the world, unless it were for a brief period in Scotland, has such a mark been set upon amusements as here. Even the severity of the Spartan discipline came short of the rigors of Puritanism; for public games and sports were among the very institutions of Lycurgus. In other countries, a kind of sanction has been given to amusements by the Church. Its holy days associated with the rites of religion so much of entertainment, that the very meaning of the phrase became changed to what is now understood by the word, holidays. We do not wish, indeed, to see the fête of St Louis, or of any other saint, celebrated on Sunday as it is in Paris; but we do not hesitate to say, that we could wish something of the same innocent entertainment, on some other days, might be provided for the people, and recognised among them as right and proper.

There is, in fact, a singular inaptitude in our people to amuse themselves, and to do this innocently and usefully. Whether it arises from the influence of the Church, or from the operation of republican institutions, or, what we are more inclined to believe, from the pressure of public opinion on every individual, from the dread of imputed indecorum, the fear of one another, which, we are inclined to think, prevails here more than anywhere else in the world—amenable as we all are, without any protecting barrier of rank or caste, to public opinion, and dependent for offices and honors on the popular breath—from whatever it arises, we believe it will not be denied, by any reflecting man, that the fact is as we state it. Our people do not know how to set about, innocently and usefully, amusing themselves. In Europe, there are a thousand harmless domestic games or gymnastic exercises, to while away the tediousness of a winter's evening, or the occasional leisure of a summer's afternoon. But our amusements are too apt to be drinking, carousing, mad frolic or monstrous excess. They are also very expensive. The 'play-day' with our people, is a day of much expense; and they seem to have no conception of any other way of passing it. A French family will calculate to a *sous*, what a day's amusement shall cost, calculate it with the utmost economy; and they will go forth into the gardens and public places, and have a happy day, without being obliged at evening to remember the adage about 'the fool and

his money.' Our tastes are not so simple. There is the same difference between us in this respect, as there is between French cookery and ours; we do not make the materials go a third part so far. So it is in the other. We have waste, mispense, exhaustion, riot, where we might, if we understood it, have economy, frugality, simplicity, pleasure. What causes they are among us which have made amusements, to so great an extent, occasions of resistance to public sentiment or domestic restraint, occasions of fear, stealth, and consequent recklessness and excess, it behoves our christian moralists, preachers, parents and rulers, deeply to consider.

We are greatly dissatisfied with the treatment which this subject has received from the pulpit. It has been considered, in fact, as forbidden ground to the preacher. It has been common to dismiss amusements from the pulpit, and especially what are called fashionable amusements, with one sweeping sentence of condemnation; to look upon all such recreations as the sinful way of the world, as leading through a region of life proscribed and accursed; to look upon them as not only making no part of religion, but as incapable of having any connexion with it. According to the prevailing notions of many christian people and preachers, to make regulations for such recreation would seem to be something like making regulations for vice. For they regard it as a thing so far from being to be regulated, that it ought not to be tolerated. And one of the leading questions which they are ready to put as a test of piety is, 'Will you renounce the vanities of the world?'—meaning by these, not the graver, and no less hurtful vanities of the worldly and avaricious heart, but gaiety, dress, dancing, &c. And he who can talk solemnly and sorrowfully of these, is thought to give one of the clearest evidences of being a Christian.

We have indeed our fears and cautions to suggest; but still it appears to us, that these views and this treatment of the subject of recreation, are both very unjust and very injurious. Undoubtedly there are amusements that are sinful, such as gaming and all those which are enjoyed at the expense of cruelty to animals. And there are others which are made sinful by abuse. But it is equally true of the pursuits of business, that some are wrong, and others are abused. And we might as justly lay one as the other, under the ban of the pulpit, and talk against it as the sinful way of the world, and shut it out from the lawful course of a Christian's life.

We said, that this treatment of recreation is injurious. It is so in various ways. Men must and will have amusement of some kind. It is an irresistible dictate of their nature to seek relief and recreation from their toils. Now to proscribe everything of this sort, is to plunge them into a kind of necessity of violating their conscience. It does so, that is, if they yield to such instructions. But it is more likely, that they will not, and if they do not, then the teacher loses influence. He will be regarded, and with some reason, as a sour misanthrope, or a weak enthusiast, ignorantly or angrily condemning the lawful and cheerful pleasures of life. Suppose, for instance, it were maintained—and there have been religionists gloomily and mistaken enough to maintain it—that to laugh is to commit a heinous sin. Now the propensity to this is known to be natural and irresistible. The precept that forbids it, must be violated, and must therefore unavoidably injure the influence of him that teaches, or the conscience of him that is taught.

There is another injury done by this opposition to the genteel and decent amusements of society, resulting from the fact already alluded to; viz, that men must have recreation. If you drive them from one sort of entertainment, they will resort to another. If you deter them from parties of decent and well-behaved people, if you teach them that the sound of the viol is an abomination, and that to move to that sound, a very natural and innocent impulse, seen in children, seen on the parade ground, seen, we had almost said, at church, for men rise at the call of music—if you teach them, we say, that this is a heinous crime, you may expect to find them in the wrestling ring, in the bar room, or engaging in all the vicious courses and vulgar sports of our out-of-door holidays. And, indeed, it is worthy of remark as a striking inconsistency, that some parents who are rigidly set against all the polished recreations of society, do not hesitate to expose their children to all the debasing intercourse and influences of the training field, the shooting match, or the election season.

There is still another injurious consequence of this mode of treating recreation. As it is utterly excluded from the plan of a good and religious life, it does not fall into the course of religious instruction. We cannot have it introduced into our pulpits, for instance, without explanation and apology. Thus, little or nothing is done by religion to regulate and guard the

mind, in its seasons of amusement—little or nothing is done for it, in those very seasons when it most needs guidance and care, when it is most off its guard; and when, too, we may add, it is receiving some of its deepest impressions, for men are most influenced, where they are most interested; and the interest which many take in their amusements, and especially many young persons, is such, that nothing in life has an equal charm. There is nothing which they expect with so much eagerness and agitation; there is nothing which they leave with so much reluctance; there is nothing which they reflect on with equal pleasure. How much does this bad state of mind show at once the neglect and the need of rational and pious direction! Such it shall be our endeavour to offer in the following discussion, to which we particularly ask the attention of our youthful readers, and of those who are charged with the parental care.

1. We think it desirable, then, in the first place, that the use of recreation should be founded on something better than vague impulse, or a compliance with fashion. Is recreation right and proper? We are inclined to say that there are many to whom it is the most difficult of *duties* to suffer, or to induce themselves, to be amused. The mind needs this relief. And many of the studious and the thoughtful, many who are silent and dull, many who sit in their solitary places, would be essentially benefited by yielding more freely than they do to the influences of social intercourse and gaiety. Well, no doubt, on the other hand, that in many more, the propensity to recreation is too strong. The question, now, is not about modes and degrees, but about the thing itself. Is it right?

This is the question which is discussed in the tract, which we have placed at the head of this article. It is discussed, indeed, with reference to particular amusements, and we shall soon notice the argument in that view. But there is a spirit and implication pervading it and many other religious writings, which are of more consequence than the distinct arguments made use of. There is a wrong view taken, as we think, of life, of duty, and of human nature. It is the too exclusively solemn view; not too solemn, but too exclusively of this character. Serious indeed is this life; serious, vast, momentous is the work, to be done in our own minds, for which this life is given. We will not admit, that any religionists go beyond us,

in their views of this solemn trial of character. No language can tell how serious and perilous it is. We will say as many solemn things, as any others can say, of the stupendous trust which is committed to every human being in the requisite 'keeping of his own heart.' But it does not follow, that the best way to meet this probation, to discharge this trust, is to bend the mind, without interruption, to labor, to thought, or to devotion. The more intensely the mind is engaged in either of these employments, the more will it need relaxation.

There must and should be relaxation, then, of some kind. Now let us pursue this admission into detail. The tract before us condemns, without a word of qualification, all fashionable amusements. We are not much concerned to defend them; we think they are attended with many dangers; but the objector had better take ground which he can maintain. What is he to say, if the advocate of these amusements reasons with him thus? 'You do not condemn the sports of your children. You do not object to their practising gymnastic exercises. And if their movements should resolve themselves into the form of a dance, and if an instrument of music in your parlour were used to direct their steps, I see not how you are to object to *this* amusement, in the simple form now proposed. But this is a fashionable amusement. Again; you do not forbid a game of *draughts* or of *chess*. And upon the same principle, you cannot condemn *cards*, independent of gambling. But this, again, is a fashionable amusement. Once more; you do not proscribe all acquaintance with pure and chaste dramatic productions. But what it is intrinsically right to read, it cannot be intrinsically wrong to hear read or pronounced, or to see performed. And therefore the theatre, another fashionable amusement, is wrong only in the abuse.' It is, indeed, abused, and *so* abused; it is a fountain of so much ruin, it is the receptacle of such infamy—there is, as it seems to us, such a needless catering for the grossest appetites, there is such an unseemly and shocking vicinity of innocence with the most shameless corruption, that we can speak of the theatre, in its present state, only in terms of utter reprobation. We seriously think that good men ought to do something to purify this amusement, or to forsake it entirely.

But *purification*, as we judge, is the work at which good men should labor, with regard to things which are wrong only in the abuse. If they adopt any other principle, we know not

where they are to stop, till they have swept away, alike, all human recreations and employments. The work which the christian moralist has to do, with society, is not to send forth indiscriminate denunciations, but to point out evils and dangers—is not to destroy and overwhelm, but to correct and reform.

In descending to these details, we have scarcely departed from the general object of this part of our discussion. We wish our readers, and our youthful readers especially, to reflect on this subject, to consider the proper end of recreation, the just place it has in the order of life, the subservience which is required of it to the great purpose of life, its strict connexion with duty, and the close discriminations of conscience with which it is to be pursued. We wish them to consider recreation, not as something to be stolen, or partaken of as if it were a guilty pleasure, not as something to be connived at and kept out of the sight of conscience—but as something to be fairly, openly, and honorably enjoyed, so far as it is right, and no farther—something to be subjected, like every other part of life, to the test of sober reason and enlightened purity. We desire, that the strictest principles and maxims of religion may be applied by them to their amusements, as much as to anything else they engage in; that their watchfulness, their christian fidelity, their prayers, may extend as much to these, as to the graver cares of business and occupation.

There is a feeling, too commonly prevailing, we fear, even in well regulated minds, that recreation is a kind of neutral ground in life, that reflection and religion have nothing to do with it, that to include it in our prayers, to speak of entering into it with the fear of God, would be a kind of sacrilege. It is considered by some as an escape from reflection. It is sometimes called, in a questionable sense, we suspect, ‘a relaxation from duty.’ Some are attached to it under the very notion, perhaps, that there is no religion, no unwelcome seriousness in it. It is moreover apt to be valued for itself alone. It is not only no part of duty, but no preparation for it. It is used for its own sake, and is therefore often carried to such excess as to unfit, rather than prepare the mind for the more substantial pursuits of life. Now against these notions of recreation, as utterly useless, or utterly frivolous, and especially as alien to religion, we must object with plainness, and we cannot help doing so with earnestness. Amusement, pursued with such

notions, is what no religious man can, or ought to approve. And we repeat, therefore, as an observation that may open to us more just, enlarged and liberal ideas, that recreation is a part of the order of life, a part of the ordination of Providence. 'To everything there is a season,' says the Wisdom of Solomon; 'and a time to every purpose under the heavens; a time to weep and a time to laugh, a time to mourn and a time to dance.' He must mean, if this is the language of Solomon, and if it is the language of some other person in the dialogue, it is still true, that there is a time for every *lawful* purpose; a time ordained in the plan of Providence. It is sometimes asked—'Could you do such and such things, if you were going to die, this week or this day?' The question may be put, if any one pleases, but it is nothing to the purpose. That is not the time for amusement, nor for many other things that are proper in the midst of life and health.

But still there is a time for recreation. It is an appointment for our nature as truly as the more solemn behest that calls us to die. If we possessed the nature of angels, we might not need it. But the constitution of our bodies and the frame of our minds are both imperfect. Neither can bear perpetual labor. We have before referred to this as an irresistible impulse, and an unavoidable necessity; but we now argue that it is an evident ordination of Providence.

The same thing is taught to us in the bounties of Providence. They are not confined to our absolute wants. They are multiplied in a thousand gratuitous favors. They cluster, not in the substantial products only, but in the delicate and rich fruits of the earth. They relieve us in the vicissitude, they regale us in the bloom and fragrance of the seasons. Heaven, has not confined us to mere labor, nor stinted us to mere supply. The arm of Providence is stretched out, not only to sustain the feeble and helpless, but to succour the weary and to guide the languid into the paths of recreation. It causes us to lie down in green pastures. It leads us beside the still waters. It restores the soul that is bowed down and heavy through manifold cares.

If, then, recreation is demanded by the constitution of our nature, if it is provided for in the system of life, if Heaven designed amusement for us no less than business, let us not snatch it with haste, or with tumult of the spirits; let us not pursue it with doubts and misgivings; let us embrace the

offered relief, so it be lawful, with a calm mind and a clear conscience.

2. Having thus defended the propensity of recreation, in general, let us consider, more particularly, under what restrictions it is to be pursued. What kind of amusements may be safely recommended?

None, it should be answered, which will necessarily injure ourselves; none which demand the banishment from our minds, of the great purposes and duties, and of the solemn destination of human life; none, moreover, which must be enjoyed at the expense of others' peace or welfare; none, therefore, whose essential food is vanity, whose sole object is a selfish gratification, or whose highest success is a triumph over ignorance or indigence, over any defects of sense, beauty or fortune, which may be attached to our associates. We are allowed no pleasures, which surrender the birthright of intellect that Heaven has bestowed upon us, and degrade us to the condition of brutes; nor any degree of sensual indulgence that will obscure the clearness of our conceptions or enfeeble the vigor of our faculties. We are allowed no pleasures that assail the honor or peace, the conscience or virtue of our neighbour.

Nor are we obliged to resort to such for entertainment. We are not driven to the company of those who sit late at the wine, or of those who are chained to the gaming board, and who, though they call it pleasure, are working out a harder task than that of the slave at the oar. We are not compelled to enter the lists with those votaries of fashion whose illustrious ambition it is to rival each other in splendid dresses or equipages, or those votaries of sport, whose glorious enthusiasm hangs upon the whip and spur. There are pleasures, simple, pure and rational, which tread lightly upon the bosom of the earth, and leave no stain upon the fair works of God—pleasures, which need not the aid of bustle or show to set them off—which are noiseless, because they are full of satisfaction. They are abroad in the green fields of summer. They are pleasures that build their sanctuary amidst the scenes of home. They wander in the regions of knowledge and literature and taste. They linger in the interviews of friendship, and friendly conversation. They waken and echo to the harmonies of music. Of such pleasures, nature and life and society are full.

Without further particularizing, we shall add one or two *general* remarks, on the kind of recreations that may be recom-

mended. One is, that they should be suited to our character, circumstances, pursuits, and period of life. We should consider what our minds can bear, what our condition can afford, what our pursuits require, and what becomes our age. The gay in heart should beware of frivolity; the feeble in virtue, of fascination; the scrupulous, of wounding their conscience; the rash and careless, of forgetting it. The poor should not rival the expenditures of the rich, the opulent should remember the lessons of temperance, and the embarrassed in their affairs should not forget the claims of justice in the demands of fashion. And as to the pursuits of life, it might be a good rule, to aim at some *contrast* between our occupations and amusements. The sedentary and studious need activity and exercise; and they are bound, as a sacred duty, to seek them. On the other hand, it seems not expedient that those who spend their days in active labors, should habitually spend their evenings in bustling amusements—that their business and their leisure should alike carry them abroad; for, then, where shall the body find relief, or the mind improvement? For the active and industrious Providence seems to appoint intellectual entertainment, the cultivation of taste, reading, as appropriate recreations; and, indeed, if they would not lose the intellectual in the corporal nature, if they would improve their minds, if they would grow in knowledge, these resorts are as necessary as they are appropriate. At least it is certain that one's own family should have the most of *his* leisure, whose business commonly takes him from it. It may be some such person to whom this subject, perhaps, will seem to have no application. 'I have no concern with recreation,' may be his reflection, as he turns over these pages,—and when it is said, that all men must have amusement, I, at least, am an exception. I spend the day about my business, and pass the evening quietly with my family.' Yes, but this is his recreation, kindly provided to relieve the toils of life. Recreation is not necessarily gaiety or trifling. And let it be suggested to such an one, whether he might not add to his evening pleasures, some intellectual entertainment, the reading of history, or the acquisition of general information, or the perusal of some works of religious direction and excitement, and thus contribute to his own best improvement and happiness, and show his gratitude and respect for the noblest, the intellectual, the spiritual gifts of God. Does not the mind

demand so much in comparison with the outward part for which he is ever laboring?

Another general remark on the kind of amusements to be pursued, is, that they should be as far as possible *domestic*. This, indeed, has been in some measure implied, but it needs particular consideration. It is an unfortunate notion with which young persons are too often suffered to grow up, that amusement is not to be found at home. It is identified, in many minds, with going abroad, with dress, and tumult and publicity. This state of mind is, perhaps, too obvious, too well understood to need further illustration; but it is at the same time, too serious an evil to be passed over lightly. Every relaxation of attachment to home, is the loosening of another of the ties that bind the heart to all its virtuous, worthy and kind affections. Home is the scene of our most substantial duties, of our best feelings, of our discipline and preparation for the mansions of heaven. He whose home is dull and irksome is either a very unfortunate or a very depraved man. Let us beware, then, how this impression steals upon the minds of our children. Let their principal and most pleasing amusements be found within our own dwelling. The sports of childhood and youth, reading, music, &c.—these are domestic pleasures; and so may be others, which they commonly seek elsewhere, and to which large assemblies are thought to be necessary. Let us take care that they think not the most enviable happiness is abroad. Let innocent and rational entertainment be familiar to them. Let them not say, as if it were a strange thing, ‘We have had a happy day, or a happy evening at home.’ Give them the domestic virtues, and they will have begun well; but if these are neglected, the very basis of rectitude and purity is wanting.

3. Having spoken of the propriety of recreation, and of some of the lawful sources and modes of it, we shall now, in the third place, offer a word or two on the dangers that attend it.

The first general danger is that of vitiating and perverting the mind. This applies especially to some of the more public and popular amusements of the day, to the recreations of large parties and assemblies. The youth is there ushered into notice, and exposed to the dangers either of attention or neglect, both of which may do equal injury. In the one case a hurtful vanity may be awakened; in the other, a no less hurtful envy.

The good and kind affections may be sacrificed for a matter of dress, or of etiquette. The simplicity of the character may be lost in a love of admiration. An odious and ugly affectation may deform the manners and deprave the mind. But what is worse than all this, there is danger of a miserable, slavish and sinful bondage to the world's opinions and fashions. It is too often forgotten, amidst scenes of fascinating amusement, that life has any higher object, that the charms of inward virtue and piety are brighter than all outward show; it is too often forgotten, that there is a great and good Being ever with us, whose favor is better than life and all its pleasures. Fashion erects its shrine and calls its blind and deluded votaries, and they bow down with a homage as base and idolatrous as if they worshipped an image. Opinion reigns over the crowds, that throng the places of fashionable recreation; and many there are, who are more anxious to please their fellow beings, than to please their Maker; who would shrink more from violating the etiquette of the world, than the command of the Almighty. The curse and blight of temptation never descends more awfully or more fatally, than when it thus comes amidst smiles and gaiety, amidst the forms of civility and fashion, and the sounds of music and pleasure. A being on whom the law of fashion has done its work, who lives only in the opinion of others and in an outward show—a being such as Chesterfield has described, with a repetition and detail that are sickening and loathsome, notwithstanding the unequalled ease and spirit of his language—a being actuated by only one desire, and that, to please—by only one care, and that for the exterior of life—such a being, whether man or woman, is as utterly, though not as visibly, degraded from the rank of humanity as the sensualist or the profligate; and if sensuality and profligacy do not set their mark upon such an one, it will only be—because they are not the fashion!

Another danger attending amusements is that of *excess*. We too commonly gain from education the false and injurious idea, that business is the drudgery, and that amusements are the pleasures of life. Hence we rush into the latter with eagerness; we are liable to be engrossed in them—to pursue them, not as a subordinate, but the principal enjoyment, and thus to pursue them to excess and exhaustion. Hence, also, anxious and agitating preparation, late hours, and dull mornings, to the prejudice alike of comfort, health, and business. We cannot help

speaking particularly of excessive and unseasonable appropriations of *time* to the purposes of recreation. The order of nature is repose in the night season, and invigorated action in the daytime. But to turn night into day, to make recreation or what ought to be such, a wearisome toil, and to give the hours proper for application, to sleep or to dull languor, is to break the harmonies of Providence. We ought to look at this subject as rational beings, conscious that life was given for great and valuable purposes, and desirous so to arrange its employments and pleasures, as best to accomplish its true designs. There is a time for everything ; there is a seasonable appropriation to be made of our time, for amusements. But it cannot ordinarily, we think, be very long. Three hours, we suspect, is as much time as most persons can spend together with profit and interest. If there is spirited conversation during that time it will exhaust ; if mere and light amusement, it is enough.

The suggestion here made does not apply, perhaps, to what are called fashionable circles ; and indeed where evening parties are very frequent, the hours allotted do not usually, it is probable, run much beyond the time specified. But there is another view of the waste of time, applying particularly to the habits of our cities, which carries it up to a much larger amount. Few of our young *men* in this country, it is true, are exonerated from the necessity of attending to some kind of business. It has not been possible yet to form here a *class* of those, whose lives are devoted to 'killing time,' under the notion of seeking pleasure. Far distant be the day when such shame on manhood shall be seen among us ! This may seem to be rather a serious opening for a suggestion with regard to persons of the other sex—and we do not intend to be so serious with them. But we ask, and leave it to others to answer, whether, with morning calls and evening parties, with late rising and the languors of exhaustion, with the cares of the wardrobe and the toilet, life is not, in one way and another, nearly consumed, by many, upon amusements?—whether, with some, the splendors and gaities of social exhibition and pleasure—we speak of the young—do not, either in preparation or enjoyment, form the very business, anxiety, fear, hope, and object of life ? Our question is asked, and we are aware that others can answer it better than ourselves. But we do say, that those whom Providence has exempted from the toils and cares which weigh upon many of their less favored sisters, are bound to give some

decided evidence of superior intellectual accomplishment. Whether they do, we again leave others to judge, being ourselves grave men, little experienced in matters of this sort. We can moralize, however, and this is what we are doing. And we must take upon us, in this character, to say to fathers and mothers, that, if a fair portion of the leisure time of their daughters, is not devoted to the cultivation of their minds, and that too, by some higher means than novel reading, no christian law can warrant the course they are pursuing. We might ask, indeed, if such a question did not carry its own answer, whether those to whom God has given leisure and means, should not do something to alleviate human want and misery—something to smooth the neglected pillow of sickness, to cheer the cold and desolate abodes of suffering poverty, to still the cries of half-famished children, and soothe the anguish that none will pity or care for—something to claim kindred for them with that noble band of devoted females, the Sisters of Charity.

Under the head of excess, we might mention that excessive estimation in which a connexion with fashionable society is held. Fashionable life abroad, as every one knows, has created an *imperium in imperio* in society, a barrier of caste, more difficult to break through than that of rank itself. The same tendency of things, only less fully developed, is seen here. The evil consists, not in the exclusion, but in the terms of the exclusion. It is not only exclusion, but the most arbitrary and unreasonable as well as bigoted exclusion—such, indeed, as with all our complaints of the religious world, is not to be found among any of its denominations. There is no sect like the sect of the fashionable. The standard of every other sect is always, at least, alleged to be that of truth or sanctity ; but of this, it is not even worth. It is wealth, equipage, the style of living ; or it is mere caprice ; or it is taste or manners, and these we will not object against—but it is always some extrinsic consideration. And it is not only thus heartless, but it is excessively selfish. The grand and governing principle of fashion is—*escape from the multitude*. It is this principle, we need not say, which explains the frequent changes of costume. The moment any form of dress falls from the nobler animals in the chase of fashion upon the apish multitude that is following after, it is degraded. What was before the ‘lion’s mane,’ by change, not in the article but in the wearer, comes to be considered as ‘calf-skin,’ fit only for ‘recreant limbs.’—The evil,

we allow, does some good, as most visible evils do. These frequent changes in dress create employment for millions; and every fabric is sooner or later, and by somebody or other, worn out. It is the selfish and dissocial principle only, that, in this connection, we object to. But the principle does much harm in other ways. To select one instance, for we cannot enlarge;—fashionable society, in its effort to escape from the multitude, has at length, in the old world, hit upon the notable device of turning the day into night. In everything else the silly multitude could come up with it. But business must be done in the day-time. And those who are exempt from this necessity, have found no theatre for their exclusive possession, but that which is surrounded by the curtain of darkness. Here indeed they have a region to themselves;—but the sickly dews of the night are descending upon it, and feverish excitement or wearisome exhaustion pervades its crowded assemblies, and its avenues to disease, langour and vice, are many, and they are thronged with pale and suffering victims.

Indeed, the evil of this excess—to return to the general view—the evil of this excess in recreation, whether in the time given, or in the eagerness with which it is pursued, does not terminate in itself. It leads to excess in other things. Undue excitement of this kind, arouses all the passions. The mind more easily becomes the victim of dissipation. The body, too, is exhausted, and is more ready to welcome the stimulating draught. It is thus that the path of amusement is sometimes found to be the broad way to destruction. The thoughtless, the gay, the bright and beautiful are there—and, to the inexperienced eye, all appears fair and inviting, because it sees not the dark retreats of guilt and chambers of iniquity that lie beyond. We hope this representation does not apply to any amusements among us. Of this, however, we are too inexperienced to be sure; and we are certain, at any rate, that in these more light and thoughtless hours, too much precaution cannot be taken against excess.

We have now completed the observations we intended to make on the subject of recreation. Little as it has attracted the attention of the moralist or the preacher, we must confess that there are few things that more effectually dispose us to reflection than a scene of amusement. It is not the outward dig-

nity or gravity of any situation that most fully developes the workings of human nature. The cottage witnesses the same passions as the throne. The gravest scene of business does not display a keener contrast of human interests and feelings, than the lightest scene of amusement. And it is because those who pass before us in the throng of pleasure, are so unconscious of all this—it is because the glare of splendor and dress and public display, so blinds them to these inward workings of pride and envy and jealousy and selfishness—it is because, that, while all are so eagerly seeking happiness, so many are thoughtless or ignorant of the true means—it is, in short, because of this contrast between the outward gaiety and splendor, and the inward *ennui* and dissatisfaction, between the outward grace of form and feature and the inward unloveliness, that we are often moved to reflection and even to sadness.

Nor is there any scene on which we are more ready to invoke the highest influences of piety. Nor is there any that more needs them. We see that it is the felt presence of God that is wanted to give its true dignity and calmness and joy to society—that it is needed for social man, in the midst of the crowd as much as it is for individual man in the solitude of his closet. We see that a cheerful and affectionate piety would spread new life and beauty through the assembly of the young, the prosperous and gay.

And this affectionate piety seems to us as suitable for such an occasion as it is needful. How striking is the display of divine goodness, which, at such a time, is before us! All this world's good is a profusion and splendor that almost captivates the senses—youth, and gaiety of heart, over which the shadows of earthly change have not yet come—the mind bright and buoyant, the step elastic that springs unconsciously from the earth it touches, the ear opened to the melodies of sound, the eye radiant with pleasure—no sickness yet, no heart-breaking sorrow, no blighting disappointment—the diseased, indeed, suffer, the bereaved mourn, the neglected and forlorn sigh and complain, but they are not here,—**HERE** is the company, the selected and favored company, as it were, of the joyous and gay! And shall they render no thanks to the Giver of all this? Shall they not hallow their pleasures in the love of Him who dispenses them? Who shall thank God, if not the young, if not the joyful, if not the favored?

Let these reflections come to us,—we say not in our happi-

est hours, for they are more retired hours, and piety *must* have part with them,—but let these pious reflections come to us, in the next happier hours of society. Let an incense go up from our dwellings, when the kind and the friendly, the cheerful and the favored are gathered there. Let *Holiness to the Lord*, be written, not on our temples and closets only, but upon all our habitations, upon all the places of our labor and of our recreation.

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- ART. VII.—1. *The Ancient History of Universalism: from the Time of the Apostles, to its Condemnation in the Fifth General Council, A. D. 553. With an Appendix, tracing the Doctrine down to the Era of the Reformation.* By HOSEA BALLOU, 2d. Boston. Marsh & Capen. 1829. 12mo. pp. 326.
2. *The Modern History of Universalism, from the Era of the Reformation to the Present Time.* By THOMAS WHITTEMORE. Boston. 1830. 12mo. pp. 458.

THESE volumes evince considerable research, and are written in a good spirit. They are, we conceive, unnecessarily diffuse, and for this, as well as for other reasons, are not likely to be read very extensively. We shall give, as succinctly as possible, the most important facts and authorities which they contain respecting the history of Universalism. Some of the information, and that especially which relates to the rise of the doctrine which denies a future retribution altogether, will be new to many of our readers.

In speaking of the Orthodox writers of the two first centuries, Mr Ballou admits that,—

‘ Nearly all allude to, or expressly assert, a future judgment and a future state of punishment: seven call it the *everlasting* the *eternal* fire or torment; but out of these there are three who certainly did not think it endless, as two of them believed the damned would be annihilated, and the other asserted their restoration to bliss. What were the views of the remaining four, upon this point, cannot be determined; since the circumstance just mentioned shows that their use of the word *everlasting*, is no criterion.’ *Anc. Hist.* p. 67.

The authority here referred to as in favor of a future restoration, is the Sibylline Oracles, generally supposed to have been christian forgeries of the second century, and therefore adduced by Mr Ballou as containing the views really held at that time, at least by the forgers.

‘They contain the earliest explicit declaration extant of a restoration from the torments of hell. Having predicted the burning of the universe, the resurrection of the dead, the scene before the eternal judgment-seat, and the condemnation and horrible torments of the damned in the flames of hell, the writer proceeds to expatiate on the bliss and the privileges of those who are saved; and he concludes his account by saying that, after the general judgment, “the omnipotent, incorruptible God shall confer another favor on his worshippers, when they shall ask him: he shall save mankind from the pernicious fire and immortal agonies. This will he do. For, having gathered them, safely secured from the unwearied flame, and appointed them to another place, he shall send them, for his people’s sake, into another and an eternal life, with the immortals on the Elysian plain, where flow perpetually the long dark waves of the deep sea of Acheron.”’ *Anc. Hist.* p. 54.

The two writers mentioned above as having held the doctrine of annihilation, are Justin Martyr, and Irenæus, the former of whom died A. D. 162, and the latter A. D. 190. According to Mr Ballou, Justin’s opinion concerning the future state of mankind was,—

‘That all souls, after death, are reserved in a certain place, probably the *Infernum* of the Latins, till the general resurrection and judgment; when the righteous, whether Christians, or such heathens as Socrates and Plato, shall reign with Christ a thousand years upon earth, and then be admitted to the celestial mansions; while the wicked shall be condemned to a punishment which he frequently calls *everlasting*. In another place, however, he states his opinion upon this last point more particularly, and represents that the wicked will be, eventually, annihilated: “Souls,” says he, “are not immortal I do not say that *all* souls will die. Those of the pious will remain [after death] in a certain better place, and those of the unholy and wicked in a worse, all expecting the time of judgment. In this manner, those which are worthy to appear before God, never die; but the others are tormented so long as God wills that they should exist and be tormented Whatever does, or ever will, exist in dependence on the will of God, is of a perishable nature, and can be an-

nihilated so as to exist no longer. God alone is self-existent, and by his own nature imperishable, and therefore he is God; but all other things are begotten and corruptible. For which reason, souls both suffer punishment and die." *Anc. Hist.* pp. 57, 58.

Irenæus seems also to have entertained the same general expectations respecting the dead. He supposes,—

‘That souls are, after death, reserved in some invisible place, the *Infernum* of the heathens, whither Christ went and preached after his crucifixion, delivering from sufferance those who there believed. At the end of the world, which was then very near at hand, all were to be raised, and brought to judgment, when the just should be admitted to a thousand years’ reign with Christ upon earth, preparatory to endless bliss in heaven; but the unjust should be sent into *inextinguishable* and *eternal* fire. Here, he appears to think, they will be annihilated: he contends that souls or spirits, like all other created things, depend entirely on the upholding providence of God for their continuance in being, and that they can “exist only so long as he wills. For,” says he, “the principle of existence is not inherent in our own constitution, but given us by God. He who cherishes this gift, and is thankful to the Giver, shall exist forever; but he who despises it, and is ungrateful, deprives himself of the privilege of existing forever.”’ *Anc. Hist.* pp. 64, 65.

We give these extracts not because we regard them as very satisfactory or decisive, but because they afford some glimpses of the manner in which the early Christians thought and reasoned on this subject. Clement of Alexandria, who flourished about the beginning of the third century, is commonly accounted the first writer of eminence and respectability who can be fairly claimed as a Universalist. ‘It is manifest throughout his works,’ says Daille, ‘that Clement thought all the punishments that God inflicts upon men, are salutary, and executed by him only for the purpose of instruction and reformation. Of this kind he reckons the torments which the damned in hell suffer.’ Such was probably his real belief, though it is to be gathered rather from the spirit and general tenor of his writings, than from any explicit and positive declarations. The following passages from his *Stromata* are as much to the point as any which have yet been adduced.

“Wherefore, since the Lord descended to hell for no other purpose than to preach the gospel there, he preached it either to all, or only to the Jews. If to all, then all who believed there,

were saved, whether Jews or Gentiles. And the chastisements of God are salutary and instructive, leading to amendment, and preferring the repentance to the death of the sinner ; especially as souls in their separate state, though darkened by evil passions, have yet a clearer discernment than they had whilst in the body, because they are no longer clouded and encumbered by the flesh." Again he says, "Now all the poets, as well as the Greek philosophers, took their notions of the punishments after death, and the torments of fire, from the Hebrews. Does not Plato mention the rivers of fire, and that profound abyss which the Jews call Gehenna [hell,] together with other places of punishment, where the characters of men are reformed by suffering ?" *Anc. Hist.* p. 73.

Cotemporary with the last mentioned Father, but belonging to the Western or Latin Church, was the celebrated Tertullian. He is understood to have been the first christian writer, who expressly asserted that the torments of the wicked will be of 'equal duration' with the happiness of the good. It is painful to notice the ferocious exultation, with which his imagination dwells on the prospect.

"You are fond of your spectacles," said he, in allusion to the Pagans ; "there are other spectacles : that day disbelieved, derided, by the nations, that last and eternal day of judgment, when all ages shall be swallowed up in one conflagration—what a variety of spectacles shall then appear ! How shall I admire, how laugh, how rejoice, how exult, when I behold so many kings, worshipped as gods in heaven, together with Jove himself, groaning in the lowest abyss of darkness ! so many magistrates who persecuted the name of the Lord, liquefying in fiercer flames than they ever kindled against Christians ; so many sage philosophers blushing in raging fire, with their scholars whom they persuaded to despise God, and to disbelieve the resurrection ; and so many poets shuddering before the tribunal not of Radamanthus, not of Minos, but of the disbelieved Christ ! Then shall we hear the tragedians more tuneful under their own sufferings ; then shall we see the players far more sprightly amidst the flames ; the charioteer all red-hot in his burning car ; and the wrestlers hurled, not upon the accustomed list, but on a plain of fire." *Anc. Hist.* pp. 80, 81.

We now approach an interesting epoch in the history of Universalism, the publication of Origen's book *De Principiis*, about A. D. 230. In summing up what is known of the state of the doctrine at this period Mr Ballou remarks ;—

‘It appears, then, that of the orthodox Christians, some believed the eventual salvation of all mankind, after a future punishment for the wicked; while others, again, held the doctrine of endless misery. This diversity of opinion, however, occasioned no divisions, no controversies nor contentions among them; and both sentiments existed together in the church without reproach. If we may hazard a conjecture, the generality of the orthodox had not any fixed nor definite opinion on the subject. That there was a future state of suffering, they all agreed; but whether it were endless, or would terminate in annihilation, or whether it would result in a general restoration, were probably points which few inquired into. Such, we may suppose, was the case with the orthodox churches.’ *Anc. Hist.* pp. 83, 84.

As for the early heretics, they appear to have believed generally in a final restoration, a doctrine essentially interwoven with the Gnostic philosophy respecting the soul. According to this philosophy all souls were either parts detached from the soul of the universe, or emanations from the divine mind, which, after certain transmigrations in the case of wicked men, would eventually find their way back to their original abode. Mosheim gives the following account of the faith of the Basilideans, on this point, with which that of most of the other Gnostic Christians appears to have agreed. ‘The souls that paid obedience to the precepts and injunctions communicated to them from above, might expect, upon the dissolution of the body, to regain their original seats in the blissful mansions; but those who neglected availing themselves of the proffered instruction, were destined to migrate into other bodies either of men or brute animals, until their impurities should be wholly purged away.’ It is remarkable, that, forward as the Orthodox of those days were to point out and denounce the supposed errors of the heretics, they appear never to have condemned their Universalism, of which, however, at least in regard to some of the heretics, they could not have been ignorant.

Universalism was first publicly condemned as stated and advocated in the works of Origen; and this, too, not until nearly a century and a half after his death, and not until his name had become peculiarly odious on account of other imputed heresies and blasphemies. Origen was born in Egypt A. D. 185 or 186, where he spent most of his life; but being driven into exile by the persecutions of his bishop Demetrius, of Alexandria, he passed several years in different cities of Asia, and died at

Tyre A. D. 253. Dr Lardner says of him, that 'he had the happiness of uniting different accomplishments, being at once the greatest preacher, and the most learned and voluminous writer of the age; nor is it easy to say which is most admirable, his learning or his virtue. In a word, it must be owned that Origen, though not perfect nor infallible, was a bright light in the church of Christ, and one of those rare personages that have done honor to human nature.' His contemporaries extol him in terms much less measured, by whom, and for some years afterwards, he seems to have been regarded, in the words of Jerome, as 'the greatest doctor of the churches since the apostles.' The following were his views of the future state, as given by Mr Ballou.

'In the resurrection, mankind will come forth with bodies, not of gross earthly matter, but of an aerial substance; and then the whole human race, both good and bad, will be subjected to a fiery ordeal in the general conflagration, with different degrees of pain, according to their moral purity or corruption. The righteous will quickly pass through this trial into the enjoyments of heaven; but the wicked will then be condemned to the punishments of hell, which consist both of inflicted pain, and of the remorse of conscience. These sufferings, though he calls them *everlasting*, Origen held, would be apportioned, in length and severity, to each one's wickedness and hardness of heart: for some, they would be shorter and more moderate; but for others, especially for the devil, they would necessarily be rendered intense, and protracted to an immense duration, in order to overcome the obstinacy and corruption of the guilty sufferers. At last, however, the whole intelligent creation should be purified, and God become all in all.' *Anc. Hist.* pp. 98, 99.

On this subject, however, it will be more satisfactory to most of our readers, to let Origen speak for himself. In his work *De Principiis* he says,—

"The end and consummation of the world will take place, when all shall be subjected to punishments proportioned to their several sins; and how long each one shall suffer, in order to receive his deserts, God only knows. But we suppose that the goodness of God, through Christ, will certainly restore all creatures into one final state; his very enemies being overcome and subdued." *Anc. Hist.* pp. 86, 87.

He expresses the same doctrine more at length in his answer to Celsus.

“The Stoics say that when the most powerful of the elements shall prevail, then will come the universal conflagration, and all things be converted into fire; but we assert that the Word, who is the wisdom of God, shall bring together all intelligent creatures, and convert them into his own perfection, through the instrumentality of their free will and of their exertions. For though among the disorders of the body there are, indeed, some which the medical art cannot heal, yet we deny that of all the vices of the soul, there is any which the supreme Word cannot cure. For the Word is more powerful than all the diseases of the soul; and he applies his remedies to each one, according to the pleasure of God. And the consummation of all things will be the extinction of sin; but whether it shall then be so abolished as never to revive again in the universe, does not belong to the present discourse to show. What relates, however, to the entire abolition of sin and the reformation of every soul, may be obscurely traced in many of the prophecies; for there we discover that the name of God is to be invoked by all, so that all shall serve him with one consent; that the reproach of contumely is to be taken away, and that there is to be no more sin, nor vain words, nor treacherous tongue. This may not, indeed, take place with mankind in the present life, but be accomplished after they shall have been liberated from the body.” *Anc. Hist.* pp. 113, 114.

A multitude of passages might be cited to the same effect, but we shall content ourselves with adding the following from his Commentaries on the Epistle to the Romans.

“The word of the gospel in the present life, purifies the saints, whether Israelites or Gentiles, according to that expression of our Lord, *Now ye are clean through the word I have spoken unto you.* (John xv. 3.) But he who shall have spurned the cleansing which is effected by the gospel of God, will reserve himself for a dreadful and penal course of purification; for the fire of hell shall, by its torments, purify him whom neither the apostolic doctrine nor the evangelical word has cleansed: as it is written, *I will thoroughly purify you with fire* (Isa. i. 25). But how long, or for how many ages, sinners shall be tormented in this course of purification which is effected by the pain of fire, he only knows to whom the Father hath committed all judgment, and who so loved his creatures that for them he laid aside the form of God, took the form of a servant, and humbled himself unto death, that all men might be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth.” *Anc. Hist.* p. 118.

It should be particularly noticed that Origen, like other early

Universalists, uses freely the expressions 'everlasting fire,' 'everlasting punishment,' &c., as they are used in Scripture, without any explanation. This proves that these expressions, or rather the corresponding expressions in Greek, their vernacular tongue, were not understood by them to signify an absolute perpetuity. In advancing his sentiments on this subject, too, he never appears to do it in the way of controversy, as if they were, or ever had been, generally disputed. Neither does it appear that during his life time his Orthodoxy was ever called in question, though on account of some offences in matters of discipline he had many bitter enemies, who would have been eager to proclaim his errors if any had been suspected. About fifty years after his death a violent attack was made on some of his opinions by Methodius, bishop of Tyre, but his Universalism is not included among his supposed heresies, and escapes without a censure. Subsequently to this, and about A. D. 310, a formal and elaborate Apology for Origen, was written by Pamphilus and Eusebius, presbyters of Cæsarea, and the latter the well known father of ecclesiastical history. In this work they arrange the charges brought against him by his enemies under nine heads, the seventh of which is, that 'they calumniously attack him on the resurrection of the dead, and the punishment of the impious; accusing him of denying that torments are to be inflicted on sinners.'

'When they come to defend him against the latter item in the seventh charge, that is, against the charge of having denied all future punishment, they select, among several other testimonies from his works, two distinct paragraphs, in which he had as usual spoken of torments to be hereafter inflicted by fire; but in which he, at the same time, represented them as altogether remedial: "We are to understand," said he, "that God, our physician, in order to remove those disorders which our souls contract from various sins and abominations, uses that painful mode of cure, and brings those torments of fire upon such as have lost the health of the soul, just as an earthly physician, in extreme cases, subjects his patients to cautery." "And Isaiah teaches that the punishment said to be inflicted by fire, is very needful; saying of Israel, *The Lord shall wash away the filth of the sons and daughters of Zion, and purge the blood from their midst, by the spirit of judgment, and the spirit of burning.* (Isa. iv. 4.)" &c.

'This testimony from Origen, like a thousand other passages which might have been selected from his writings, was, indeed, an effectual refutation of the particular charge brought against

him; but it was, at the same time, a proof that he regarded future punishment as purifying and salutary. Had this sentiment been obnoxious at that day, Pamphilus and Eusebius would rather have avoided such passages, than have obtruded them, thus unnecessarily, upon the attention of his captious enemies; lest in defending him from an accusation so easily refuted, they should bring upon him one that could never be removed.' *Anc. Hist.* pp. 157, 158.

Meanwhile other doctrines advocated by Origen had become more and more odious to many in the church, particularly those respecting the trinity, and the preexistence of souls; and a strong party had arisen against his followers, embittered not a little by personal jealousies and political reasons. Nevertheless it was not until A. D. 394, in an angry letter from Epiphanius, bishop of Cyprus, to John, bishop of Jerusalem, that we find their Universalism publicly assailed; and then, too, only that exaggerated feature of it, which relates to the salvation of the devil. Epiphanius complains, among other things, that;—

“Origen, the renowned doctor, dared to teach that the Devil is again to become what he originally was, to return to his former dignity, and to enter the kingdom of heaven! O wickedness! who is so mad and stupid as to believe that holy John Baptist, and Peter, and John the Apostle and Evangelist, and that Isaiah also, and Jeremiah, and the rest of the prophets, are to become fellow-heirs with the Devil in the kingdom of heaven!” *Anc. Hist.* pp. 213, 214.

The enemies of Origen appear now to have been in the ascendant, and they soon afterwards procured a condemnation of his obnoxious sentiments by a synod at Alexandria, then by the Roman Pontiff, and lastly by a synod at Cyprus. These, it is believed, were the first public acts of the church directed against Universalism.

“All the formal records of those proceedings have long since perished; but from cotemporary authority we learn that the tenet which gave most offence in the Alexandrian synod, was this: “that as Christ was crucified in our world for the redemption of mankind, so he would taste death, in the eternal state, for the salvation of the Devil.” This *two-fold* death of Christ, though sometimes intimated by Origen, was by no means one of his fixed opinions; and it can have been only from an ungenerous zeal to take the utmost advantage of his suggestions, that it was inserted in the present charge. It also appears, that in addition to this particular, his doctrine of “the salvation of the devil and his an-

gels," was expressly condemned in some of these public decrees, either at Alexandria, Cyprus or Rome; and likewise another notion, which cannot, with so much justice, be ascribed to him, "that in the distant ages of eternity, the blessed in heaven will, by degrees, relapse into sin, and descend into the regions of woe, while, on the other hand, the damned will rise to the mansions of purity and joy: thus constituting, by perpetual revolutions, a ceaseless alternation of happiness and misery." These, we are informed, were the principal errors now condemned; and they were probably alleged to justify the sentence which was passed, forbidding his works to be read, and placing him on the list of heretics. But, what is remarkable, it is, at the same time, certain that his doctrine of *the salvation of all mankind*, was not condemned, and that some of the Orthodox continued to avow it in the church with impunity.' *Anc. Hist.* pp. 230, 231.

As a proof of the correctness of the last suggestion we find, that—

'Augustine—about twenty years afterwards, reasons with those *merciful brethren* among the Orthodox, who held the salvation of *all mankind*. He says they urged the superior benevolence of their doctrine as a proof of its truth; and he exposes their inconsistency in using this argument, by daring them to extend it, like Origen, to the salvation of the devil and his angels. For this, adds he, the church has condemned him; and they, of course, dare not go to the same extremity.' *Anc. Hist.* p. 231.

It was not until the Fifth General Council, held A. D. 553, at Constantinople, that the doctrine of a final restoration of the wicked, in connexion with Origen's other distinguishing tenets, was formally condemned as heretical by the supreme judicatory of the Catholic Church. From that time consistent Catholics have been obliged to adopt, as part of their creed, these words of the decree with which it concludes.

"Whoever says or thinks that the torments of the demons and of impious men are temporal, so that they will, at length, come to an end, or whoever holds a restoration either of the demons or of the impious, let him be anathema. Anathema to Origen Adamantius, who taught these things among his detestable and accursed dogmas; and to every one who believes these things, or asserts them, or who shall ever dare to defend them in any part, let there be anathema: In Christ Jesus our Lord, to whom be glory forever. Amen." *Anc. Hist.* p. 299.

We have thought it best, for the sake of perspicuity, to give

a connected history of the waning of Origen's popularity and Orthodoxy, and of the fate of Universalism as advocated in his writings, without turning aside to notice the other supporters of the same doctrine, who arose from time to time among his contemporaries and followers. It is certain that until the close of the fourth century this opinion was still held and avowed by many among the most eminent Orthodox Fathers in the East. To multiply testimonies, would lead us beyond our limits and purpose in this review; but some of them are so remarkable and decisive, that they ought not to be passed over in silence. Here we would remark, once for all, that we have not verified all the citations which we have taken from Mr Ballou's work; but so far as our examination has gone, we have found him sufficiently accurate.

Titus, bishop of Bostra, A. D. 364, according to the reluctant confession of Tillemont, 'seems to have followed the dangerous error ascribed to Origen, that the pains of the damned, and even those of the demons themselves, will not be eternal.' In his book against the Manichæans he says, that—

"The "abyss of hell is, indeed, a place of torment; but it is not eternal, nor did it exist in the original constitution of nature. It was made afterwards, as a remedy for sinners, that it might cure them. And the punishments are holy, as they are remedial and salutary in their effect upon transgressors; for they are inflicted, not to preserve them in their wickedness, but to make them cease from their wickedness. The anguish of their sufferings compels them to break off their vices." *Anc. Hist.* p. 169.

Gregory, bishop of Nyssa, is another high Orthodox authority in favor of Universalism, as Daille is constrained to admit. This distinguished Father, who died A. D. 394, asks, in a treatise on the declaration of the apostle, 'Then shall the Son also be subject unto him who put all things under him'—

"What, therefore, is the scope of St. Paul's reasoning in this place? That the nature of evil shall, at length, be wholly exterminated, and divine, immortal goodness embrace within itself every rational creature; so that of all who were made by God, not one shall be excluded from his kingdom. All the viciousness, that like a corrupt matter is mingled in things, shall be dissolved and consumed in the furnace of purgatorial fire; and every thing that had its origin from God, shall be restored to its pristine state of purity." *Anc. Hist.* pp. 187, 188.

We give a passage from another of his works, together with some remarks on his use of the term 'everlasting.'

"I believe," said he, "that punishment will be administered in proportion to each one's corruptness. For it would be unequal to torment with the same purgatorial pains, him who has long indulged in transgression, and him who has only fallen into a few common sins. But that grievous flame shall burn for a longer or shorter period, according to the kind and quantity of the matter that supports it. Therefore, to whom there is much corruption attached, with him it is necessary that the flame which is to consume it, should be great, and of long duration; but to him in whom the wicked disposition has been already in part subjected, a proportional degree of that sharper and more vehement punishment shall be remitted. All evil, however, must, at length, be entirely removed from every thing, so that it shall no more exist."——

'Like the earlier Universalists, Gregory freely applied the word *everlasting* to future punishment: a circumstance which, probably, has betrayed some critics into the hasty conclusion, that he sometimes denied the doctrine of Universal Restoration, and asserted that of endless misery. A remarkable use of that phrase occurs in a passage where he alludes to the ultimate fate of such as have become confirmed in debauchery: "Whoever," says he, "considers the divine power, will plainly perceive that it is able, at length, to restore, by means of the *everlasting* purgation and expiatory sufferings, those who have gone even to this extremity of wickedness.'" *Anc. Hist.* pp. 189–191.

So thought some of the most respectable Greek Fathers; but among the Latins, Universalism, if it ever prevailed there, had for the most part, long before this, shrunk up and disappeared in the Catholic doctrine of purgatory. The majority seem early to have inclined to the opinion that true Catholics, if they died with the stain of unrepented guilt on their souls, might still expect to be purified by purgatorial flames, and restored to holiness and felicity. But heretics, the excommunicated, and all infidels were doomed to endless woe. Some among them, like Arnobius of Sicca, advocated, it is true, the doctrine of annihilation; for, in his large work against the Gentiles, he maintains that the wicked will hereafter 'be thrown into torrents of fire, amidst dark caverns and whirlpools, where they shall at length be annihilated, and vanish in perpetual extinction.' The prevailing opinion in the West, however, appears to have accorded on this, as on most

other subjects, with that of Cyprian, Lactantius, and Augustin, who held that the torments of a portion at least of the damned, would be strictly speaking interminable. Jerome committed himself in favor of a final restitution in his earlier writings, in consequence probably of his studies and long residence in the East; but when this was afterwards urged on him as an inconsistency in one so bitterly opposed to Origenism, he disavowed the sentiment. Like many of his cotemporaries he seems to have begun his opposition to Universalism, not so much from hostility to that doctrine, as to the other alleged errors of Origen, with which it was associated. We shall give his first, and probably his unprejudiced convictions on this subject, as set forth in his Commentaries, published about A. D. 388.

“Now, in the restitution of all things, when Christ, the true Physician, shall come to heal the body of the universal church, torn at present and dislocated in its members, then shall every one, according to the measure of his own faith and knowledge of the Son of God, assume his proper office, and return to his original state; not, however, as some heretics represent, that all will be changed into angels, or made into creatures of one uniform rank. But each member shall be made perfect according to his peculiar office and capacity. For instance: the apostate angel shall become such as he was created; and man, who has been cast out of paradise, shall be restored thither again. And this shall be accomplished in such a way, that all shall be united together by mutual charity, so that the members will delight in each other, and rejoice in each others’ promotion. Then shall the whole body of Christ, the universal church, such as it was originally, dwell in the celestial Jerusalem, which, in another passage, the Apostle calls the mother of saints.” Again, Jerome says, “The apostate angels, and the prince of this world, and Lucifer the morning star, though now ungovernable, licentiously wandering about, and plunging themselves into the depths of sin, shall, in the end, embrace the happy dominion of Christ and his saints.” *Anc. Hist.* pp. 198, 199.

Pelagius must be regarded as the most rational and liberal divine of his day; but he was not a Universalist. In a confession of faith, written early in the fifth century, he affirms ‘that there is one life for the saints, but rewards different according to their labors; as on the other hand the punishments of wicked men shall be according to the measure of their sins.’ Still he expressly maintains, ‘that we shall forever

remain such as we shall be once made after the resurrection.' Even he, too, though he rejected the doctrine of original sin, was so far misled by the stress then beginning to be laid on the Catholic sacraments, that he considered baptism essential to the salvation of those who died in infancy. His system, however, did not allow him to suppose that unbaptized infants, dying free alike from original and acquired guilt, would be punished forever, or at all; but only that they would have no title to the positive rewards promised to Christians, that they would not be heirs of the kingdom of heaven. He seems, therefore, to have believed in a middle state between heaven and hell, into which infants dying unbaptized, and virtuous heathens, would be admitted, and where they would be forever fixed. With the Latins generally, he understands the Greek words commonly translated 'everlasting,' 'forever,' &c., as signifying an absolute eternity. The question, however, arises, whether such men as Lactantius and Augustin were as competent to decide the true import of difficult and ambiguous expressions in the Greek, a foreign language, as Origen and Gregory, to whom this language was their mother tongue.

The following summary of the views entertained at this period by Orthodox Christians respecting future punishment, and the final extent of salvation, will conclude what we have to say of the ancient history of Universalism.

1. The most rigid among them believed that none would hereafter be saved, except those who died in the true faith, and in the exercise of godliness; and most, if not all of these held, for the less deserving saints, a mild purgatory, by which they were to be thoroughly cleansed, before their admission into heaven. Such were the sentiments of the famous Augustine, the oracle of the western church. 2. Another class held, in substance with the more ancient fathers Lactantius, Hilary, Basil and Ambrose, that all would finally be saved, who continued to the last in the catholic faith and discipline, whatever were their moral characters; but that such of them as lived wickedly should suffer a long excruciating trial by fire in the future world, before their reception to bliss. This, probably, was the common, the popular belief; and Jerome must be numbered among its *professed* advocates. 3. Others believed that all would eventually be saved, who had been baptized in the catholic church, and had partaken of the eucharist, into whatever crimes, errors and heresies they might afterwards have fallen; alleging in their support, the declarations of the Saviour, that whoever eateth of this bread, shall live forever, and

the remark of the apostle, that the church is the body of Christ. 4. There were some of the Orthodox, who, though they held, agreeably to the decision of the late councils against Origen, that the devil and his angels would suffer endless punishment, believed, nevertheless, that all mankind, without exception, would be saved; the wicked, after ages of torment in hell. 5. The last class of the Orthodox, which was undoubtedly small, held that God had indeed threatened future misery on the impenitent, but that the saints, at the great judgment day, would so earnestly intercede with the Almighty in behalf of the world, that all mankind, even the impious and the infidels, would be saved, without any suffering at all; while the devil and his angels should be abandoned to endless torture. To prove the right of God to remit his threatenings, they adduced the judgment denounced, but not executed, upon Nineveh.

'All this variety of opinion appears to have been tolerated in the church; and it is natural to suppose that there were some who still held in secret, with Origen, that all intelligences, including the apostate angels, would ultimately be reconciled to God.' *Anc. Hist.* pp. 248, 249.

It is no argument against a disputed doctrine, that it was pronounced heretical by a general council of the sixth century, or that no traces of its prevalence can be found during the long night which gathered over the christian world, after the church of Rome had gained an entire and undisputed ascendancy. Universalism reappeared at the first dawn of the Reformation.

'In England, Langham, Archbishop of Canterbury, convened a council in A. D. 1368, and with the advice of his divines, gave judgment against thirty propositions which were taught in his province. Among them "the following opinions were condemned: 1. Every man ought to have the free choice of turning to God, or from him; and according to this choice he will be saved or damned. 2. Baptism is not necessary to the salvation of infants. 3. No person will be damned for original sin only. 4. Grace, as it is commonly explained, is an illusion; and eternal life may be acquired by the force of nature. 5. Nothing can be bad merely because it is forbidden. 6. The fruit that Adam was forbidden to eat, was forbidden because it was in itself bad. 7. Man is necessarily mortal, Jesus Christ included, as well as other animals. 8. All the damned, even the demons, may be restored and become happy. 9. God cannot make a reasonable creature impeccable, or free from a liability to sin. It was an honour to the age and to the country," says Priestley, "to produce such sentiments as these; but it was but a sudden blaze in the midst of much

thick darkness, and, as far as appears, was soon extinguished." *Anc. Hist.* pp. 317, 318.

Among those who by way of distinction are commonly called the Reformers, Zuingle has always been understood to have gone farther than the others. He has even been charged with Universalism by the Catholics, but of this no sufficient evidence is adduced, though his views on this subject were unquestionably more rational and moderate than those which generally prevailed at that time. In an abstract of his doctrine presented to Francis I., he says ;—

"I cannot believe that God will involve in the same condemnation, him who shuts his eyes to the light, and him who unavoidably lives in darkness. I cannot believe that the Lord will cast away from him nations whose only crime it is never to have heard of the gospel. No, let us abjure the rashness of setting bounds to the divine mercy. I am persuaded that in the heavenly assemblage of all the creatures admitted to contemplate the glory of the Most High, we shall see not only the holy men of the Old and New Covenant, but also Socrates, Aristides, Camillus, and Cato ; in a word, I am persuaded that all good men who have fulfilled the laws engraven on their consciences, whatever were the age or country in which they lived, will enter into eternal felicity." *Mod. Hist.* p. 6.

Proper Universalism, however, was now springing up among the German Anabaptists, as appears from the celebrated confession of faith drawn up by the Protestants, and presented to Charles V. at the diet of Augsburg. The framers of it maintain in the seventeenth article,—

"That Christ shall appear in the end of the world to judgment, and that all the dead shall be raised ; that to the pious and elect he will give eternal life and happiness, but that impious men and the devil he will condemn to torment without end." Herein, they say, "they condemn the Anabaptists, who maintain that there shall be an end to the punishments of the damned and of the devils." *Mod. Hist.* p. 15.

The obnoxious doctrine appears to have spread ; for we find it noticed and condemned again in the fortytwo articles of religion, drawn up in England by Archbishop Cranmer, A. D. 1552, and published under the authority of Edward VI. According to this creed, 'they also deserve to be condemned, who endeavour to restore that pernicious opinion, that all men

(though never so ungodly) shall at last be saved, when for a certain time, appointed by the divine justice, they have endured punishment for their sins committed.' When the articles were revised in the reign of Elizabeth, and reduced to the thirtynine now held in the English church, this passage was omitted, and no notice whatever was taken of Universalism. From that time, therefore, it has not been considered an ecclesiastical offence in that communion, to hold and avow the doctrine of final restoration; and this has actually been done by some of its brightest ornaments and highest dignitaries.

The volume before us professes to give but a very meagre and unsatisfactory account of the progress of Universalism in the other countries of Europe. It is remarkable, that the Dutch Remonstrants, as well as the Polish Unitarians, adopted in the beginning very nearly the same language in speaking of future punishment, which was used by the Orthodox. Episcopus, however, dissented so far as to maintain, in his *Responsio ad Questiones Theologicas*,—

“That very intense suffering cannot and ought not to be otherwise understood than as it is commensurate to the greatness of the transgressions. For one suffering is necessarily greater than another, as the sins are not equal. If you say eternal suffering cannot be rendered commensurate with temporal transgressions, then I say, That suffering from the burning fire may be called eternal in three respects: 1. Inasmuch as that fire always burns most intensely, and this burning will be connected with a most intense suffering. 2. Inasmuch as fire will burn and produce suffering until it shall be consumed; in which sense the fire by which Sodom and Gomorrah were burnt, is called eternal, Jude 7th verse, and everywhere in the Prophets that fire which burns as long as it can, and has any fuel, is called inextinguishable. 3. Inasmuch as, that fire being extinct, the consciousness of wickedness and of crimes will burn the criminals, and an eternal hopelessness of obtaining joy, will follow. But how God is to inflict this sensible punishment, or this eternal suffering, is to be left to him. For it suffices to say, that God, the most just and wise Judge, will punish none without their deserving it, nor beyond their merits. In determining the kind of eternity, let every one enjoy his own opinion.” *Mod. Hist.* pp. 137, 138.

Le Clerc was more explicit.

‘He had essentially weakened the foundation of endless misery by maintaining, that there is no term in the Hebrew language which expresses of itself eternal duration, and that Holam, and

the other words rendered everlasting, signify a concealed and unknown extent of time, either in reference to the commencement or termination of the thing to which they are applied. Speaking of the doctrine of future retribution, he says, "It is enough that Christ's judgment will be conducted on definite and well-known laws, so that its justice shall be seen by all. For the great diversity of crimes there will be a proportional variety of punishments, whatever they consist in; and the same will be the case with rewards, there being no less a difference in the merits than in the crimes of individuals. But if the eternal duration of either appear to any one repugnant to the divine goodness and justice, he should seek to solve the difficulty by means of the different degrees in punishments and rewards. If after all, eternal punishments inflicted on finite creatures for finite sins, should be judged incapable of being reconciled with the divine justice, it would not thence follow that we must doubt the truth of the gospel, or call the divine justice in question, because they appear repugnant to right reason. It would be better, if absolutely necessary, to resort to this solution: that on account of human depravity, God may be said to have threatened more than he will execute, as he can, by his own sovereign authority, remit punishments to mankind; or else that *Eternity* may be considered an indefinite duration, to which God hath placed no limits known to us, the word sometimes signifying an *age*." *Mod. Hist.* pp. 139, 140.

Since that time the doctrine of the proper eternity of hell torments, has been gradually fading away before the progress of civilisation, and biblical and theological science, until at length among the continental Protestants of all denominations, it may be accounted almost an universally exploded dogma. We give as authority for this the following extract from Dwight's *Travels in the North of Germany*.

"The doctrine of the eternity of future punishment is almost universally rejected. I have seen but one person in Germany who believed it, and but one other whose mind was wavering on this subject. Many of them acknowledge that the New Testament seems to inculcate this doctrine; but they find it, as they say, so irreconcilable with our ideas of the infinitely benevolent Being, whom God has revealed himself to be, that if they believed in his perfections, they must reject the doctrine. Some contend that it is not even apparently announced. To those texts which are generally believed with us to involve it, they give a different explanation in their interpretation; finding, as they believe, philological difficulties in the way. Some few would meet the

arguments of those who believe it, by asserting, that the oldest manuscript of the New Testament, is of the sixth century ; and that, during the Arian and other controversies which agitated the church from the age of the Apostles until that time, there is not only a possibility, but a probability, that some errors have made their way into the text. Others affirm, as one of the orthodox professors who is considered to be eminent for his piety, told me respecting himself, that this doctrine evidently appears in the New Testament, but that his heart could not receive it, unless he were to change his views of the character of God that we now enjoy but a single ray of Revelation in comparison with the light which will burst upon our view in the future world ; and that when we come to behold the glory of God, as it will be revealed to us, he believed that this apparent difficulty in his moral government would be explained." *Mod. Hist.* pp. 132, 133.

We return to England. And here we are admonished that our limits will permit us barely to notice such individuals as have, for any cause, made themselves remarkable in the annals of Universalism. Richard Coppin is mentioned among the earliest confessors of this doctrine, and the following account of his persecution will show in what light an avowal of it was regarded at that time.

'The clergy, finding that his labors drew many of their people away, made complaint against him, and obtained a warrant to bring him before a Justice of Peace, on an accusation of blasphemy. He was bound over to the next Assizes at Worcester, where he was tried before the Lord Chief Baron Wilde. In the indictment, he was charged, among other things, with believing that "all men whatsoever shall be saved, and that there shall be no general day of judgment." He made his own defence, avowing and proving his belief in Universal Salvation, and maintaining that men are judged on the earth, by the power of Christ's spirit and truth. The jury rendered a verdict of blasphemy ; but the Judge differing from them, Coppin was continued under bonds to appear at the next Assizes. On his second trial he was charged with holding three principal errors, the second of which was, "That there is no heaven and hell but what is in man." To gratify his accusers, the Judge bound him over to appear at Oxford Assizes to answer to these charges, which he did on March 10th, 1652. The Jury once more declared him guilty, to the equal dissatisfaction of the Judge as before. He stated if the indictment were true, the prisoner was guilty of nothing, for as it respected the first and last articles, there was no act of Parliament that would apply to them ; and although the law forbid a

man to avow that there was no heaven nor hell, the prisoner had not broken it, as he manifestly believed there was both a heaven and a hell, though his views of them differed from public opinion on that subject. The fact was, the jury were awed by the Priests who followed them, contradicting the words of the Judge, advising that they should pay no attention to them, nor to the prisoner's defence, and importuning them to bring him in guilty. They went out again, but returned with the same verdict. The Judge perceiving the malice of the prisoner's accusers, and the manifest ignorance of the jury, and being willing himself to do justice, took bail of Coppin to appear at the next Assizes, to the great disappointment and mortification of his enemies, who had been determined on his destruction. When he appeared again before the Court, they, who had declared they would follow him even unto death, did not come forward; and the Judge therefore ordered the prisoner to be set at liberty.' *Mod. Hist.* pp. 65-7.

An anonymous work appeared about the same time, bearing the following title;—'Of the Torments of Hell; the Foundations and Pillars thereof discovered, searched, and shaken and removed. With infallible proofs that there is not to be a Punishment after this Life, for any to endure, that shall never end.' The author was a Trinitarian and a believer in salvation by grace alone; and he and Coppin are claimed by Mr Whittemore as holding to no punishment whatsoever in the future state. This, however, he does not make certain, or even probable. It sounds much more like a calumny of their enemies, or a misconception of their friends, originating probably in their denial of a day of general judgment, and of the existence of such a place as hell, or of real burnings.

It is known that Cromwell chose his chaplains from among ministers of different persuasions, his dark and powerful mind cajoling and using them all, and probably, at least in the days of his prosperity, despising them all. Of this number was Jeremy White, to whom we are indebted for one of the earliest publications in favor of the restoration of all things. He was a Trinitarian, and a strenuous assertor of predestination, election, and reprobation; and prized his views of the final happiness of all mankind the more highly, because they enabled him, as he thought, to reconcile those tenets with the goodness of the Supreme Disposer.

The name of Archbishop Tillotson is one which would do honor to any cause, and he is, we suppose, fairly to be reckoned among Universalists, though of a peculiar kind. He admit-

ted that endless punishment is threatened against transgressors, and also that the *threat* of endless punishment is consistent with divine justice, and even an act of goodness and mercy, as its object is to deter men from evil. Still he thinks that it is not necessary to believe that this threat will be executed to its full extent; for, says he, in his sermon on this subject—

“After all, he that threatens hath still the power of execution in his own hands. For there is this remarkable difference between promises and threatenings, that he who promiseth passeth over a right to another, and therefore stands obliged to him in justice and faithfulness to fulfil his promise; and if he do not, the party to whom the promise is made is not only disappointed, but injuriously dealt withal. But in threatenings it is quite otherwise. He that threatens keeps the right of punishing in his own hand, and is not obliged to execute what he hath threatened any further than the reasons and the ends of government do require; and he may without any injury to the party threatened, remit and abate as much as he pleaseth of the punishment threatened; and because that in so doing he is not worse but better than his word, nobody can find fault or complain of any wrong or injustice thereby done to him.” *Mod. Hist.* pp. 92, 93.

Again, in another place;—

“As for God,” he says, “let us not doubt but that he will take care of his own honor, and that he who is holy in all his ways, and righteous in all his works, will do nothing that is repugnant to his eternal goodness and righteousness; and that he will certainly so manage things at the judgment of the great day, as to be justified in his sayings, and to be righteous when we are judged. For notwithstanding his threatenings, he hath reserved power enough in his own hands to do right to all his perfections, so that we may rest assured he will judge the world in righteousness, and if it be any wise inconsistent either with righteousness or goodness, which he knows much better than we do, to make sinners miserable forever, *that he will not do it.*” *Mod. Hist.* pp. 94, 95.

What Tillotson asserts hypothetically, though probably his real belief, bishop Newton, of the same church, asserts positively and without reserve in a dissertation published after his death, on the Final State and Condition of Mankind. He holds, indeed, with the writer last mentioned, that ‘God hath threatened everlasting misery to the wicked, as plainly and positively as he has promised everlasting happiness to the righteous.’ But here he introduces the distinction, insisted on

above, between the obligation to fulfil a threat and a promise ; especially where, as in this case, the threat was obviously made only on condition of final impenitence. God made the awful threatening for the purpose of reclaiming the sinner.

‘ Now, “ if the sinner be reclaimed, the end is obtained, and the threatening is voided of course.” God threatened to destroy Nineveh. What was the reason he did not send that destruction ? “ Was it not because they repented, and by that repentance arrested the divine judgments ? ” Upon the same principle of justice, if the sinner repent, God will not inflict upon him the punishments he hath denounced. And in this the divine veracity can suffer no impeachment, for the threatening was made on this condition, or reservation.

‘ The Bishop, after very carefully expressing this opinion, proceeded next to show, what it manifestly behoved him to do, that repentance in hell is not impossible. He attacked zealously the common opinion that the future state of man is fixed and unalterable. The Scriptures used to prove this, said he, have no such meaning ; it is “ without any real foundation in Scripture, or in the nature and reason of things. To suppose that a man’s happiness or misery to all eternity should be absolutely and unchangeably fixed and determined by the uncertain behaviour of a few years in this life, is a supposition even more unreasonable and unnatural, than that a man’s mind and manners should be completely formed and fashioned in his cradle, and that his whole future fortune and condition should depend altogether upon his infancy ; infancy being much greater in proportion to the few years of this life, than the whole of this life is to eternity.”

‘ The Bishop then proceeded to show, that the repentance of the wicked in hell is not only possible, but probable and certain. In the first place, it would be impossible for them to exist in such torment without coming to a sense of their wickedness. Whether they will or not, they must be convinced by all their senses, by ocular demonstration, by every thing around and within them, of the justice and righteousness of God, and of the evil nature and effects of sin. In the world to come there will not be the same temptations to make them wicked ; and their senses all being quicker, punishment will be more insupportable. “ No creature can be so totally depraved and abandoned, as to hold out, under the most exquisite tortures, obstinate and obdurate unto all eternity. Some may persist for a longer, some for a shorter term ; but in the end all must be subdued, so that their punishment may more properly be called *indefinite* than *infinite*. In short, if they have any sense or feeling, any reason or understanding, any

choice or free will, they must one time or other, sooner or later, be brought to repentance ; if they have none of these, they are no better than stocks or stones, and as they cannot deserve, so neither can they suffer, any punishment." *Mod. Hist.* pp. 231-3.

We may observe, in this connexion, that Dr Watts, toward the close of his life, and Dr Macknight, though they could not find warrant in scripture for the certain expectation of this event, looked forward to it as a possible, as well as an infinitely desirable consummation. 'At the same time,' says the latter in his *Truth of the Gospel History*, 'I must be so candid as to acknowledge, that the use of the terms *eternal*, *everlasting*, and *forever*, in other passages of scripture, show that they who understand these words in a limited sense when applied to punishment, put no forced interpretation on them. Allowing that eternal punishments are really meant in the threatenings of the gospel, no man can deny that God has it still in his power to mitigate and modify his threatenings to what degree infinite wisdom sees fit.' William Whiston, also, who rejected utterly the doctrine of endless misery, assures us that Sir Isaac Newton, and Dr Samuel Clark, with both of whom he was intimately acquainted, agreed with him on this subject. He differed from Tillotson and Newton in maintaining, 'that the words used about the duration of torments in the New Testament, and all over the Septuagint, whence the language of the New Testament was taken, nowhere mean a proper eternity.'

'But he was not equally certain that all mankind will eventually enjoy endless happiness. The theory of the modern Destructionists he did not hold, for he had a hope, if not a weak faith, in Universalism. Remarking on Origen's view of the salvation of the devil and the damned, he says, "all that I can see any hope for is future to the world to come and to the next age, and must therefore belong to a still future world and future age, after the destruction of the bodies of the wicked in Gehenna, at the general resurrection. I mean, as the prophet Esdras seems to hint, that there may be in the utmost bowels of the compassion of the Almighty, another resurrection and another time of trial allotted to these miserable creatures somewhere, in which many or all of them may possibly be recovered, and saved at last by the infinite indulgence and care of their Creator. And God may still imitate his original goodness to Adam, when he was fallen." *Mod. Hist.* p. 104.

The Chevalier Ramsay, author of the *Travels of Cyrus*,

and Philosophical Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion, is chiefly remarkable as being a Catholic Universalist. He died in France, in 1743, and the warm patronage bestowed on him by Fenelon up to the hour of his death, who can hardly be supposed to have been ignorant of his friend's heresy, has even had the effect with some to bring the religious opinions of Fenelon himself into question.

Our attention is in the next place arrested by that amiable enthusiast, William Law, to whom we are indebted for one of the best and most popular devotional books in the language, the *Serious Call*. He was a Trinitarian Universalist, deducing his hope and belief on this subject, for the most part, from the fervid and exalted conceptions which he entertained of the divine love. In a letter to a friend he says ;—

“ You tell me that you cannot help thinking with Mr. S. that all partial systems of salvation are greatly derogatory to the goodness of God, but that you would say this to very few but myself. But, dear soul, why should you say this to me ? I have, without any scruple, openly declared to all the world, that from eternity to eternity nothing can come from God but mere infinite love. In how many ways have I proved and asserted, that there neither is nor can be any wrath or partiality in God ; but that every creature must have all that happiness which the infinite love and power of God can help it to.” “ It is my capital doctrine that God is all love, and merely a will to all goodness ; that he must eternally will that to the creature which he willed at his creation.” “ As for the purification *of all human nature*, I fully believe it, either in this world, or some after ages. And as to that of angels, if it is possible, I am glad of it, and also sure enough, that it will then come to pass.” *Mod. Hist.* p. 190.

The writer, however, who has probably done most to fix and define the tenets of modern Restorationists, is the well known David Hartley, an English physician, who died at Bath, in 1757. He was one of the purest and best men that ever lived, and is greatly admired and extolled as a philosopher, by all those who can bear his metaphysics. A belief in the doctrine of philosophical necessity is openly avowed, and everywhere involved and implied in his great work on the *Frame, Duty and Expectations of Man*. This enabled him to anticipate the final issue of the arrangements of Providence, in universal good, not as a contingency dependent on the freedom of the will, but as the consequence of fixed and immutable laws. The follow-

ing extract from a letter written to a sister, while pursuing the study of his profession, will show how early his mind was turned to this subject.

“But my chief studies are upon religious subjects, and especially upon the true meaning of the Bible. I cannot express to you what inward peace and satisfaction these contemplations afford me : you remember how much I was overcome with superstitious fears when I was very young ; I thank God that he has at last brought me to a lively sense of his infinite goodness and mercy to all his creatures, and that I see it both in all his works and in every page of his word. This has made me much more indifferent to this world than ever, at the same time that I enjoy it more ; has taught me to love every man and to rejoice in the happiness which our heavenly Father intends for all his children ; and has quite dispersed all the gloomy and melancholy thoughts which arise from the apprehensions of eternal misery for myself or friends. How long or how much God will punish wicked men, he has nowhere revealed, and therefore I cannot tell ; but this I am sure of, that in judgment he will remember mercy ; that he will not be extreme to mark what is done amiss ; that he chastens only because he loves ; that he will not return to destroy, because he is God and not man, i. e. has none of our foolish passions and resentment ; that his tender mercies are over all his works, and that he is even love itself. I could almost transcribe the whole Bible, and the conclusion I draw from all is this : First, that no man can ever be happy till he is holy, till his affections be taken off from this vain world and set upon a better, and till he loves God above all things, and his neighbour as himself. Secondly, That all the evils and miseries which God sends upon us, are for no other purpose but to bring us to himself, to the knowledge and practice of our duty, and that as soon as that is done, they will have an end.” *Mod. Hist.* pp. 214, 215.

The American of highest consideration, either for his learning or talents, who is often referred to as a Universalist, is Dr Chauncy, formerly of the First Church in this city. His conviction of the final and certain happiness of all mankind, was the result of a careful and thorough examination of the scriptures. Seven years of the best part of his life were given to this study, which he began without any suspicion that it would terminate as it did. His work on the *Salvation of All Men*, after retaining it in manuscript for a long time, subject to occasional revisions and corrections, he finally sent to some of his friends in London,

where it was published anonymously, in 1784. In the preliminary explanations he gives the following statement of his views.

‘Upon the whole therefore, what I mean to prove, in the following essay, is, that the scheme of revelation has the happiness of all mankind lying at bottom, as its great and ultimate end; that it gradually tends to this end; and will not fail of its accomplishment, when fully completed. Some, in consequence of its operation, as conducted by the Son of God, will be disposed and enabled, in this present state, to make such improvements in virtue, the only rational preparative for happiness, as that they shall enter upon the enjoyment of it in the next state. Others, who have proved incurable under the means which have been used with them in this state, instead of being happy in the next, will be awfully miserable; not to continue so finally, but that they may be convinced of their folly, and recovered to a virtuous frame of mind: And this, as I suppose, will be the effect of the future torments upon many; the consequence whereof will be their salvation, they being thus fitted for it. And there may be yet other states, before the scheme of God may be perfected, and mankind universally cured of their moral disorders, and in this way qualified for, and finally instated in, eternal happiness. But whether there are any other such states besides the next, or not; or however many states some of the individuals of the human species may pass through, and of however long continuance they may be;—the whole is intended to subserve the grand design of universal happiness, and will finally terminate in it: Inasmuch that the Son of God, and Saviour of men, will not deliver up his trust into the hands of the Father, who committed it to him, till he has fully discharged his obligations in virtue of it; having finally fixed all men in heaven, when God will be all in all.’*

Few readers of interesting biography are yet to be made acquainted with John Henderson, whose early attainments were so extraordinary, that when eight years old he taught Latin in Kingswood School, and Greek, at twelve, in Lady Huntingdon’s College at Trevecca, in Wales. He was afterwards sent to Oxford, where his proficiency was such, that he is said to have been able to converse with ease and fluency in ten different languages. He died in Pembroke College in 1788, at the early age of thirtyone, leaving a reputation clouded in some respects by his eccentricities, but of unimpeachable integrity and piety. The following argument from his pen, is given

* Chauncy’s *Salvation of All Men*, pp. 12, 13.

by Dr Drake in his Literary Hours, and is there said 'completely and unanswerably to refute what every man whose heart is not adamant, would wish to see refuted.'

"I lay it down as a maxim," says he, "to be doubted by few, and denied by none, that whosoever doth a thing, foreseeing the event thereof, willet that event. If a parent send children into a wood wherein grow poisonous berries, and *certainly* knows they will eat of them, it is of no importance in the consideration of common sense, that he cautions, forbids, forewarns, or that they having *free will*, may avoid the poison. Who will not accuse him of their death in sending them into circumstances where he *fore-knew* it *would* happen? God fore-knows everything—to his knowledge everything is certain. Let us suppose him about to create twenty men—he knows ten of them (or any number) will become vicious, therefore damned, thence inherit the unceasing penalty. Who doubts in such a case, that He *wills* the end, who, being all-mighty, and all-knowing, does that, without which it could not come to pass? But he hath sworn by himself, for he could *swear* by no greater, that he willet not the death of him that dieth; that is, he willet it not finally, or simply as death, or destruction irrevocable. And if it occur, it is a part of his economy of grace, a ministration unto life; for he hath declared that his will is, that *all should be saved*; therefore, the doctrine which forges a contrary will, falsifies supreme unchangeable truth.

"2. I lay it down as another indubitable maxim, that whatsoever is done by a Being of divine attributes, is attended by his goodness, conducted by his wisdom, and accomplished by his power, to a good end. Now all possible good ends may be enumerated under three words—HONOR—PLEASURE—BENEFIT; and every one to whom good can accrue from endless punishment, must be either *punisher*, *punished* or *fellow-creature* to the punished. Let us try every one of the former three, to each of the latter.

"1. *The punisher*. Would it be greater *honor* to the *punisher* to have his creatures forever miserable than happy? I will venture to say by proxy, for *every* heart, No. Would it be greater *pleasure*? No. And *benefit*, to him there can be none.

"2. *The punished*. Endless punishment can be neither *honor*, *pleasure*, nor *benefit* to them, though punishment on my scheme (for the purpose of producing repentance and reformation) will be of endless benefit.

"3. *The fellow-creatures* to the punished. It will be as *honorable* to them, as to have one of their family hanged! If they have *pleasure* in it, they must have a diabolical heart, and by the just searcher of hearts be committed to the place prepared for the devil and his angels. *Benefit*, they can have none, except safety;

and that is fully answered by the great gulf, by confinement till the reformation.

“As, then, unceasing torments can answer no possible good to any one in the universe, I conclude them to be neither the will nor work of God. Could I suppose them, I must believe them to be inflicted by a wantonness or cruelty which words cannot express, nor heart conceive. But let this be the comfort of every humble soul, that known unto God are all his works—the Judge of *all* shall do right, and he ordereth *all* things well. It hath pleased him to reconcile *all* things to himself. Therefore, to him shall *every* knee bow, and *every* tongue shall say, in the Lord I have strength, and I have righteousness.”’ *Mod. Hist.* pp. 241–3.

Robert Robinson was a Baptist, and his sect have a right to be proud of him as one of the most eloquent preachers of his day, and a man of extraordinary genius in other respects. He was visited at Chesterton, about 1788, by the celebrated Elhanan Winchester, then in England and spending part of his time in travelling about the country as a Universalist missionary. In a letter to a friend, he refers to the interview in the following terms;—

“Mr Winchester has been here and preached. I did not hear him. They preach and print against him. They pretend that God is of their temper, and will not bate a day of eternity. They never knew what criticism was, and they do nothing but chant *for ever and ever*. Poor honies! servants that know not what their Lord doth! Tell one of them, ‘There are twenty-five millions in France, and there is not one among them like you. Are all these doomed by their own Father to endless and unavoidable woe?’ They answer gravely, ‘Yes.’ Ask, what sort of a Father this is? They are never shocked; they never blush; but affirm, ‘This is wise, and just, and kind; and it will be more glorious to God, to save me, and damn them, than it would be to share eternal life amongst us: and we few, though we hate one another here, shall be the happier for the damnation of the rest.’ Barbarians! What arrogant madness inspires you? Are you the excellent of the earth?’ ‘O! my soul, come not thou into their assembly; to such, mine honor, be not thou united. Cursed be their anger, for it is cruel.’”

“Of the circumstances of his introduction to Mr Winchester, his biographer has preserved the following *jeu d’esprit*. “What,” said he, “are you the man who thinks that God Almighty will burn the old tobacco pipes till they become white again?” To which, there is a tradition that he added, “Well, this is better than to break them.”’ *Mod. Hist.* pp. 204, 205.

In opposing Universalism it has been common to insist much on the dangerous and immoral tendencies of the system; and some even of its avowed friends, from the Fathers downwards, have looked upon it rather as a doctrine for the few, than the many. Fear, it has been said, must govern the common people, and no fear is strong enough but the fear of literal and everlasting burnings, which ought, therefore, whether true or not, to be the exoteric faith. Very different from this, however, was the opinion of Mrs Barbauld, whose judgment on such a subject is entitled to peculiar deference, as well for the moderation and sobriety of her religious creed, as for her devotional taste. In an admirable essay on Public Worship, she observes,—

“ Above all, it would be desirable to separate from religion that idea of gloom, which in this country has but too generally accompanied it. The fact cannot be denied; the cause must be sought, partly in our national character, which I am afraid is not naturally either very cheerful or very social, and which we shall do well to meliorate by every possible attention to our habits of life; and partly to the color of our religious systems. No one who embraces the common idea of future torments, together with the doctrine of election and reprobation, the insufficiency of virtue to escape the wrath of God, and the strange absurdity which, it should seem, through similarity of sound alone, has been admitted as an axiom, that sins committed against an infinite Being do therefore deserve infinite punishment, no one, I will venture to assert, can believe such tenets, and have them often in his thoughts, and yet be cheerful.

“ Let those who hold such tenets consider, that the invisible Creator has no name, and is identified only by his character; and they will tremble to think *what* Being they are worshipping, when they invoke a power capable of producing existence, in order to continue it in never-ending torments. The God of the Assembly's Catechism is not the *same* God with the Deity of Thompson's Seasons, and of Hutcheson's Ethics. Unity of character in what we adore is much more essential than unity of person. We often boast, and with reason, of the purity of our religion, as opposed to the grossness of the theology of the Greeks and Romans; but we should remember that cruelty is as much worse than licentiousness, as a Moloch is worse than a Satyr.

“ The mild spirit of Christianity has, no doubt, had its influence in softening the ferocity of the Gothic times; and the increasing humanity of the present period will, in its turn, produce juster ideas of Christianity, and diffuse through the solemnities of our worship, the celebration of our Sabbaths, and every obser-

vance connected with religion, the spirit of amenity and sweetness, which is the offspring of literature, and the peaceful intercourse of society. The age which has demolished dungeons, rejected torture, and given so fair a prospect of abolishing the iniquity of the slave trade, cannot long retain among its articles of belief, the gloomy perplexities of Calvinism, and the heart-withering perspective of cruel and never-ending punishments." *Mod. Hist.* pp. 250-2.

Thus far we have spoken of the history of Universalism as an opinion held in all ages, and by individuals of almost every connexion and denomination. It remains for us to sketch rapidly the history of Universalists as a distinct sect. The principle on which the works before us were composed, is this; to account every man a Universalist who is known to have avowed the belief, that the time will come when all mankind will be happy. Perhaps this is not an unfair or unauthorised use of the term; but it has the effect with superficial readers, to give to those modern Universalists, who deny all retribution after death, some degree of countenance and authority from the illustrious names mentioned above. It cannot be stated too strongly, that, so far as doctrines are concerned, and the speculations on which they are founded, there is no affinity whatever between Restorationists of the Hartleian school, and those who affirm that all punishment will end with this life. Their notions of the nature and fruits of sin, are essentially different; their principles in the interpretation of scripture are essentially different; the spirit and character of their preaching are essentially different; and the moral tendency of their respective systems is also essentially different. In all these respects the English Unitarians, who are, for the most part, Hartleian Restorationists, can hardly be said to differ more widely from the Calvinists, than from those who maintain that all suffering will cease with the dissolution of the body. Right or wrong, therefore, those who hold this opinion, cannot claim as on their side, a single individual among the Universalists already named, every one of whom would probably have pronounced it dangerous, unscriptural and false. It is true, those who believe in a temporary punishment, and those who believe in no punishment for such as die in their sins, are to be found in the Universalist sect as it now exists in this country. That they have a right to associate in this way, nobody will deny; but the circumstance has the effect, nevertheless, to tempt many of

both parties to merge, as much as possible, and keep out of sight, the real and essential difference in their views.

The sect of Universalists, as constituted at present, is composed of three distinct classes of believers.

First, the Rellyan Universalists. These take their name from James Relly, who was originally a minister among the Calvinistic Methodists, but became a believer in the salvation of all men, by carrying a little further than his brethren the doctrines of atonement and imputed righteousness. He believed, 'that Christ was *united* to mankind in such a manner, that our actions are his, and his actions, sufferings, and exaltation, ours.'

'Thus, although Relly admitted the doctrine of partial suffering in the future state, he maintained that "the state of unbelievers after death cannot be a state of punishment, because Jesus Christ, who hath tasted death for every man, bare the chastisements of their peace, when the Lord laid upon him the iniquities of us all." He admitted the doctrine of misery in the future state only on the principle, that while in unbelief, men "know not, nor believe, that Jesus hath put away their sins by the sacrifice of himself; and therefore, they are oppressed with guilt and fear; and these are in proportion to their use or abuse of knowledge; to their receiving or obstinately rejecting the divine evidences and demonstrations of grace and salvation." But he looked beyond all evil and misery, whether in this or the future state, to a time of universal restitution, when all mankind will be brought to know the Lamb of God who hath taken away the sin of the world.' *Mod. Hist.* p. 279.

Being convinced of this doctrine, he began immediately to proclaim it, and soon collected a society in London, avowedly on this principle, and commenced stated worship. He succeeded, about 1770, in converting to his views John Murray, formerly, like himself, a Calvinistic Methodist, and well known in this vicinity as having been the founder among us of the Universalist sect. It is understood that the Rellyan Universalists have almost entirely disappeared in this country, and only a few societies exist in Great Britain. All the latter maintain the doctrine of the trinity, and make it a test of christian fellowship.

Secondly, the followers of Elhanan Winchester. When Mr Murray first came and established himself in Massachusetts, in 1774, Mr Winchester, then about nineteen, had just commenced preaching at Brookline, as a Free Will Baptist. Soon after-

wards he visited the Southern States, and resided there for some years, preaching at different places, and to great acceptance among his own denomination. He avowed his conversion to Universalism at Philadelphia, in 1780, having derived his convictions and peculiar notions on that subject, not from Mr Murray, who was a strict Relyan, but from Seigvolk and Stonehouse. His faith, like that of Rely, involved a belief in the doctrines of the trinity and atonement; but it differed essentially from that writer's in not building anything on a supposed union with Christ and imputed righteousness. According to his theory, sinners are to be punished after death; but all punishment will be disciplinary and remedial, and eventually bring about a restitution of all things. These conclusions he arrived at by considering the acknowledged character of God, and the declared universality of the christian redemption, in the light in which these subjects would be likely to be regarded by an Arminian. Twenty years ago these views of Universalism were, in this country, almost everywhere predominant in the sect; but their advocates are now supposed to be rapidly falling into the minority.

Thirdly, those Universalists who deny that we have any evidence of a retribution after death. The present ascendancy of this party is owing, for the most part, to the great influence and unwearied exertions of Mr Ballou of this city. From a letter addressed by him to Mr Whittemore, we find that it is now only about ten or twelve years since his own mind was fixed in regard to this controversy. To the question, 'What was the progress of your mind in regard to the doctrine of punishment in the future state?' he replies;—

“Respecting the doctrine of a future state of retribution, there was, in my youth, but little said. Universalists having obtained satisfaction that none of the human race would suffer endless punishment, thought they had sufficient reason to rejoice with exceeding joy, and to glory in the mercy of God. I never made the question a subject of close investigation until lately. When I wrote my Notes on the Parables, and my Treatise on Atonement, I had travelled, in my mind, away from penal sufferings, so entirely, that I was satisfied that if any suffered in the future state, it would be because they would be sinful in that state. But I cannot say that I was fully satisfied, that the Bible taught no punishment in the future world, until I obtained this satisfaction by attending to the subject with Br. Edward Turner then of

Charlestown. For the purpose of satisfying ourselves respecting the doctrine of the scriptures, on this question, we agreed to do the best we could; he in favor of future punishment, and I the contrary. Our investigations were published in a periodical, called the Gospel Visitant. While attending to this correspondence, I became entirely satisfied, that the scriptures begin and end the history of sin in flesh and blood; and that beyond this mortal existence the Bible teaches no other sentient state but that which is called by the blessed name of life and immortality.'

"When I sat down to reply to Br. Turner, who urged the passage in Peter, respecting the spirits in prison, I knew not by what means I could explain the text without allowing it to favor the doctrine of future sufferings. I had, at that time, no knowledge of any translation of the text, but the one in our common version. —But on reading the whole subject, in connexion, the light broke in on my mind, and I was satisfied that Peter alluded to the Gentiles, by spirits in prison, which made the passage agree with Isaiah 42d.'" *Mod. Hist.* pp. 437–8.

The particular tenets of this party in the Universalist denomination, may be seen in the following extract from Mr Balfour's Letters to Mr Hudson.

'On my system the question is not, how do men die, but in what state are they raised at the resurrection in the last day? Prove, Sir, that men are raised sinners, or will sin after this, and then talk of a difficulty to my system. I deny that the soul is immortal. I deny your intermediate state has any existence except in the imaginations of men. And I hope to show before I have done, that these, and the sufferings of the soul in a disembodied state, are opinions which originated in heathenism. Before you talk to me about an intermediate state, first prove such a state exists. Before you ask me how men that die in unbelief and impenitence are to be saved from the love, practice or punishment of sin, you must first prove they have got immortal souls, which need be saved from these, either by death or after it in a disembodied state. If any believe in the doctrine of immortal souls, and take them all to heaven at death, I leave you to settle this difficulty with them at your leisure. It is no concern of mine.

'Your difficulty is predicated on this, that many die in a state of unbelief and impenitence; they never lived in a holy life in this world, and consequently you take them to hell to bring them to faith and penitence there. You seem to intimate, as if I granted, that faith and obedience here, are absolutely necessary to partaking of the immortal life by Jesus Christ beyond death and the grave. But here lies another of your mistaken assump-

tions. If I believed this, I should exclude all infants, idiots, the heathen, and all who die in unbelief, from it. I maintain that faith and obedience are absolutely necessary to a participation of the privileges and blessings of Christ's kingdom on earth, and the enjoyment of the hope of future immortality in this life. But it is not faith and obedience, Sir, but being raised immortal in the resurrection, equal unto the angels of God, which fits men for the resurrection state. It is being children of the resurrection, not sons of God by faith in Christ Jesus, prepares men for this state of things. Without this, the believer is no more fitted for it than the unbeliever. And if faith and obedience here, be absolutely necessary, pray what degree of these entitle them to it? For the faith and obedience of some believers, can hardly be distinguished from the unbelief and disobedience of unbelievers.' *

The evidence is decisive, that the Universalists, as a sect, are rapidly spreading in every part of the United States. In New England alone, it is said that there are about two hundred and fifty societies, and above one hundred preachers. In the single State of New York the number of regularly organized societies is computed at one hundred and fifty, but the number of preachers probably does not exceed fortyfive. We give one more extract, as it contains curious and authentic information respecting the relative strength of the two parties, and their almost unanimous rejection of the trinity.

'In order to obtain the most satisfactory evidence concerning the numbers and views of the Universalists in the United States, I addressed a Circular to the principal Universalist clergy, requesting their answers to several questions, the last of which follows: "What proportion of the Universalists with whom you are acquainted, believe in the doctrine of punishment in the future state of existence? and what part of them are Trinitarians?" Knowing the use I was about to make of their communications, they returned the following answers on those points.

'From Rev. WILLIAM A. DREW, of Augusta, Me. "As far as my knowledge extends, I should think that a majority of our brethren would *not* affirm positively, as their settled belief, that there will or will not be punishment hereafter. The other half may be pretty equally divided on the subject. But of all this I cannot speak with certainty. Of the ministers, *five* are open disbelievers of any future punishment; *eight* profess to believe it, but most of them do not seem to be strenuous about it; and the

* Balfour's Letters to Hudson, pp. 32-4.

remainder are studiously silent on the question. It may be that this proportion quite nearly answers also to the laity on this subject."

'From Rev. GEORGE BATES, of Livermore, Me. He speaks of that part of the State which lies west of the Kennebec. "I find it somewhat difficult to answer your sixth question. I cannot judge of a man's peculiar sentiments, any further than they are declared; and as I have in all my public labours studiously avoided any direct statements on this point, in consequence of not being myself decided either way, the subject has not been sufficiently discussed to enable me with accuracy to pass judgment. I should, however, give it as my opinion, that believers in punishment in a future state of existence, are in the minority in this part of the State. With regard to the doctrine of the trinity, I believe there are very few who embrace it."

'From Rev. JOSEPH P. ATKINSON, of Meredith, N. H. "With the Universalists in the county of Strafford, I am considerably acquainted, and should give it as my opinion, that a large majority confine sin and misery to this transitory state. The societies with which I am particularly acquainted, are those in Meredith, Guilford and Gilmanton, and of these I know of none who extend punishment beyond the grave. As it respects the trinity, it being foreign from Universalism, there is but little said about it. I think, however, that the number is extremely small, if there be any, who believe it."

'From Rev. STEPHEN R. SMITH, Clinton, Oneida county, N. Y. "It is impossible to ascertain, with much certainty, the number of those who believe in a state of disciplinary punishment after death. There is, however, no doubt, that they are a minority of the order of Universalists in this State. My personal acquaintance extends to two thirds of the societies at least; and though there are believers in future punishment in all of them, yet, in general, they appear not to be as numerous as those who reject that doctrine. The same is unquestionably true of the preachers. But this is a subject on which very little interest is felt, and is seldom agitated by the preachers. Among the ministers, there is not one in the connexion with the Associations, who is a Trinitarian. And very few, not one of a thousand of the various congregations, is a believer in that doctrine. As a denomination they reject the trinity, and for this plain reason, it is their aim to be reasonable, as well as liberal."

'From Rev. AARON B. GROSH, Marietta, Lancaster county, Penn. "Persons who *call* themselves Universalists, believe, I compute, from one fiftieth to one twentieth part in punishment after death; but if we include others, (i. e. the Universalists among other de-

nominations) then those who believe in a state of punishment after death, are more than one half of the whole number. For I find many restorationists among the German Baptists, the Lutherans, and the Reformed Churches; the old Mennonists are nearly all such; and there are a few among the English people, particularly among those who are attached to no society. But very few will care publicly to own this *faith*, since the *name* is attached to it. I am also told that among the German Methodists, some believe in a final Restitution. In answering as to the trinity, I shall class the Arians among the believers in the divine unity. Of those who call themselves Universalists, I have found but one believer in the trinity, and he was a Relyan."

' From Rev. JOSIAH C. WALDO, Cincinnati, Ohio. "Mr. R. is thoroughly acquainted with the Universalists in every section of this country. He tells me *all*, with a few exceptions, are Unitarian Universalists. It is the fact in this city. The Restorationists, he says, are comparatively nothing. The number in this city you know, as well as I, is small. I have preached at Mount Pleasant, Hamilton, Oxford, Sharon, Mechanicsburgh, Franklin, Middletown, Sandusky city, Eaton, Dayton, &c. In all these places I have had crowded assemblies, especially at Dayton, where, I am told, our friends are building a house. A large majority with whom I became acquainted, are Unitarian Universalists." *Mod. Hist.* pp. 439-41.

We have now given, as much at length as our limits will permit, the history of Universalism as a doctrine, and of Universalists as a distinct sect. The question is sometimes asked, whether Unitarians are Universalists. To answer this question satisfactorily and understandingly, it will be necessary, in the first place, to state succinctly the various opinions which are held among Christians respecting the future condition of the wicked. In speaking of the different views of future punishment which prevail, we mean as respects its duration and intensity. The nature of this punishment, and the principles on which it is administered under the divine government, will only be adverted to incidentally now, though these are extremely interesting topics, and demand an ample and thorough discussion in the present state of theological inquiry. We may return to them on another occasion.

1. There are those who hold that the torments of the damned will be strictly speaking infinite in intensity, and eternal in duration. They understand literally those passages of scripture, which, in the common translation, speak of the future doom of

the wicked as everlasting or forever, and of the fire into which they are to be cast as unquenchable. They conceive, moreover, that a sin committed against God, an infinite being, must, in its own nature, be infinite, and therefore justify and require an infinite punishment or expiation. According to this hypothesis there is no ground for different degrees of punishment, because the slightest sin, if unatoned for, is understood to deserve and require an absolutely infinite one, that God's justice may be vindicated. At the day of judgment, therefore, all the non-elect, including incomparably the largest portion of the human race, are to be consigned, without discrimination, to infinite and endless wo.

2. Not a few, even among the Calvinists, shocked at this account of a future retribution, qualify it a little, in order to make it more rational, and more consistent with the divine justice and goodness. Rejecting the notion that all sin is infinite because committed against an infinite being, they believe that sin is of different degrees, and that there will be different degrees of punishment in the future world to correspond. They conceive, however, that the question whether men are to go to heaven or hell, is not to be determined by a mere difference in the degree of their outward obedience, but by a difference in the principle of their obedience. The proper principle of obedience is possessed by the elect only, and those who are without it, though they may differ in their degree of actual sin, cannot be said to have any true holiness. Accordingly, heaven and hell are not mere gradations in the future condition of man, but essentially different conditions, corresponding to the alleged essential difference between the characters of the elect, and the non-elect. Persons who hold these views commonly represent the least eligible place in heaven as not only better, but infinitely better, than the most tolerable place in hell. They also maintain, that the gulf which separates the righteous from the wicked, in a future state, will continue impassable through eternity, and remain forever the same, as at the general judgment.

3. Others, again, affirm that this theory is liable to the same objection with the one it is intended to supplant. It precludes the virtuous and devout heathen, like Socrates, and the virtuous and devout Deist, like Lord Herbert, from the hope of heaven; and any system that does this cannot be reconciled with the justice, much less with the goodness, of the Supreme

Disposer. The elect, as they are denominated, give no evidence of being actuated by an essentially different principle from that which influences other conscientious and good men. Every character, whether of the elect, or the non-elect, is a mixed character; and the good qualities of the bad man are really good as far as they go, just as the bad qualities of the good man are really bad as far as they go. Now a retribution, to be fair and equitable, must be regulated solely by what, on the whole, are the actual deserts of the individual; and it is thought that the difference in the actual deserts of no two individuals is infinite. At any rate, the difference in actual desert between the worst man who is saved, and the best man who is damned, is not infinite. Hence it is concluded, that the difference in their final condition ought not to be, and will not be, infinite. Heaven will be the portion of all those in whom virtue predominates over vice, and hell of all those in whom vice predominates over virtue. Still, it is contended that the actual condition of the worst man in heaven will differ from the actual condition of the best man in hell only by a shade, corresponding to the shade of difference which is all that exists between their actual deserts. Heaven and hell, according to this hypothesis, are merely different gradations in our future condition, separated from one another, not by a chasm, but only by a line. This description of believers, however, agree with the strictly Orthodox in thinking, that the rewards of the judgment day will be final; that whatever condition is assigned a man, according to his deserts at that time, will be his forever; that there is no probation after death.

4. A fourth class of Christians believe in the annihilation of the incorrigibly wicked. Like those already mentioned, they do not feel at liberty to expect that the future state will be probationary, that the sinner will have another opportunity for repentance and salvation. There are plain indications in scripture, as they conceive, that the doom of those who die impenitent will be forever fixed and immutable, whatever it is. Still, in their opinion, it does not consist with infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, to permit myriads of beings to exist through eternity for no other assignable purpose but to be eternally tormented. They think it much more rational, and more accordant with the letter and spirit of the New Testament, to suppose that the incorrigibly wicked will be annihilated. They hold, therefore, that the punishment of those who die in their sins,

will be strictly speaking eternal ; but then it will be a punishment, not of never ending misery, but of annihilation. It will be literally what the scriptures call it, everlasting destruction, the second death, the death of the soul, utter extinction.

5. There are many, however, to whom none of these views are satisfactory. Annihilation does not accord with their notions of the nature of the human soul, or the divine economy. Neither can they conceive, on this hypothesis, how the line would be drawn between those who are to continue to exist, and those who are to be cut off. They look on this life as preparatory to another ; but because this life is preparatory to another, they do not suppose that everything like moral probation, or moral change, must stop at the grave. This is often assumed, but they contend that it is a mere assumption, unsupported either by reason or scripture ; the texts commonly adduced in favor of it, admitting and requiring another construction. They regard it as essential to a moral being, in any state of existence, that he should have the liberty and the power of making himself better or worse ; and this liberty and power they therefore suppose the sinner will have after death, as truly as he has them now. Death will not so fix and seal the sinner's doom, that he cannot change his character, afterwards ; and every change in his character, no matter when effected, will be followed by a corresponding change in his condition. At the same time they admit that it is not certain that the sufferings of a future state will reclaim the sinner. On the contrary, reasoning by analogy from the effect which suffering sometimes has on the vicious in this life, they may make him worse. Suffering follows sin necessarily as a consequence, but it does not act necessarily as a remedy ; and hence a restoration of all men to virtue and happiness is at best but a contingency. In any event, it is contended that the sinner will be punished forever for his sins, partly by the recollection of them, which can never cease to be painful, and partly by the effect they have had, at least to retard his moral progress.

6. We have mentioned the different views entertained of the future condition of the wicked by five distinct classes of Christians, none of whom are Universalists ; for it is essential to Universalism to expect, as a certainty, and not as a contingency, the coming of a day when sin and suffering will cease. Universalism presents itself under two different forms, one of which is that held by the Restorationists, or Restitutionists, as

they are sometimes called. They think that God could have had no other purpose in creating man, than to make him happy; and that he will not allow himself to be foiled ultimately in this purpose in the case of a single individual. Some of this denomination concede that God has threatened the impenitent with endless woe, and the making of this threat, they contend, is perfectly consistent with his infinite wisdom and goodness, because it is necessary to deter men from evil. But though God has threatened endless woe, it does not follow that he will execute the threat, as he unquestionably has a right to remit it, if he pleases. They think that his goodness is a pledge that he will do so, as soon as suffering, according to its natural and necessary tendency, has reclaimed the offender. Others assert that the scriptural expressions commonly translated 'forever,' and 'everlasting,' and applied to the future punishment of sinners, do not mean eternal duration, but only a long and indefinite period. They deny, therefore, that God has ever threatened endless punishment, but only a limited punishment, which will be remedial in its effects, and eventually restore the sinner to holiness and happiness. Some ascribe the remedial efficacy of future punishment to the atonement or christian redemption, while others resolve it into the nature of punishment itself, and the known laws of the human mind; but all believe, according to the obvious sense of scripture, the uniform testimony of antiquity, the common sentiment of mankind, and the dictates of a sound philosophy, that there will be a future retribution, that the sinner will be punished for his sins after death. Another class, the Rellians, hold that sinners and unbelievers will suffer in a future state, until they understand and believe the truth, but that the suffering will not be, in any proper sense, penal, or retributive. All Restorationists, however, agree in this, that a time will certainly and necessarily come when sin and misery shall no longer exist in any degree.

7. The other form of Universalism excludes altogether the belief in suffering after death. It is a doctrine of very late origin, and is confined, we believe, almost exclusively to a portion of the Universalists in this country. Some of them appear to expect exemption from sin and suffering in a future state, in consequence of the atonement effected by Jesus Christ and the imputation of his righteousness. Others again appear to expect it as the consequence of the physical change wrought by the dissolution of the body. The seat of all sinful affection is, ac-

ording to them, in the body, and not in the soul or spirit. The body is, as it were, the garment of the soul, and our sins and the miseries attendant on them, are as impurities collected on this garment; and they will of course be laid aside, when the garment is laid aside. We believe, however, that now for the most part they reject the notion of an immaterial spirit and the natural immortality of the soul, and conceive that when the body dies, the whole man dies. They expect, nevertheless, a resurrection, and that we shall be raised immortal; but they do not suppose that we shall be raised in the same moral state in which we left this world. With them the resurrection is in some sense a recreation, and they suppose that all mankind, without any regard whatever to their conduct or character here, will be raised or recreated in holiness, and for a career of never ending happiness and glory.

After this rapid sketch and classification of the different opinions respecting the condition of the wicked in a future state, we are prepared to meet the question whether Unitarians are Universalists. That many Unitarians are Universalists, and that many Universalists are Unitarians is not denied; but it is denied that there is any natural or necessary connexion between the two systems. We can infer nothing from the fact that the Universalists, as a sect, are in this country almost unanimously Unitarians; for twenty years ago they were almost as unanimously Trinitarians. Besides, it should be considered that if at the present moment the Universalists, as a sect, are almost unanimously Unitarians in this country, they are as unanimously Trinitarians in England, and exclude Unitarians from christian fellowship. A Universalist may be a Unitarian or not, and a Unitarian may be a Universalist or not; but even where a Unitarian is a Universalist, there is no natural or necessary connexion between his belief in the strict unity of God, and his belief in universal salvation. We repeat it, there is no natural or necessary connexion between the two doctrines, in themselves considered. And if the question is intended to bear on the tendency of Unitarianism, it is believed that where this doctrine and its kindred doctrines have made one Universalist, Calvinism and its kindred doctrines have made twenty. There is one form of Universalism, indeed, that of Rely and Huntington, which seems, as has been pointedly said, to be nothing else but Calvinism run up to seed. It should also be remembered that Mr Ballou of this city, who may be regarded as the father of the last and most obnoxious

form of Universalism, was educated a strict Calvinist, and was converted and brought out in a Calvinistic revival, and received his earliest religious impressions and biases from that quarter.

Still it may be asked whether, in point of fact, Unitarians, as a sect, are not generally Universalists. In replying to the question in this form, it will be necessary to bring into view one of the principal points of difference between the English and American Unitarians, and the bearing which it has on the present controversy. In England the denomination adopt, almost unanimously, the metaphysical system of Hartley and Priestley. They are staunch believers in the doctrine of philosophical necessity, and, as a consequence of their peculiar philosophy, and not of their theology, are generally, we believe, Universalists of the Hartleian school. Some believe in the annihilation of the incorrigibly wicked, some consider the doctrine as undetermined, and content themselves with using the scriptural language on the subject ; but the majority are understood to expect, in the consummation of ages, a restitution of all things. They expect it, too, not as a contingency dependent on the freedom of the will, but as a necessary consequence of fixed and immutable laws. In this country, on the other hand, the metaphysics of Hartley and Priestley find but few friends in the sect, and almost none among the principal writers and young preachers. The principal reason, therefore, which induces the English Unitarians to become Universalists, not only fails in regard to us, but our high notions of the liberty of the human will, make it almost impossible for us to look forward to a universal restoration to holiness, except as a contingency. But the doctrine which allows us to hope a universal restoration to holiness as a bare contingency, is not Universalism. Some among the American Unitarians, those especially who adopt the Arian hypothesis, hold the doctrine of annihilation. Many consider that the scriptures have thrown an awful mystery over the future doom of the wicked, which they do not attempt to clear up. Those amongst us whose thoughts on this subject appear to be most distinct and consistent, suppose that the sinner, after death as well as before, will be a moral being, and capable, of course, of moral changes. They suppose he will still be free, and of course that he may become better or worse, but that his ultimate restoration to holiness is at best but a contingency. The future state is also sometimes represented by American Unitarians, as nothing but a

continuation of our moral progress, which it is the effect of sin to retard irretrievably. Every one will start in a future state, from that precise point in moral and religious progress, which he reaches in this life. Of course, as the sinner will be behind at the starting, he may be expected to continue behind forever, even though all are supposed to be advancing. This, however, is not Universalism, not even that form of it held by those who believe in the longest and severest purgatorial process. At the same time, we have no wish to conceal the fact, that some amongst us, highly respected for their genius and piety, are open and decided Restorationists.

Put the question, then, in another form, and bring it nearer home. Are the American Unitarians, as a body, Universalists, or inclined to Universalism? Having had considerable opportunities for ascertaining the state of opinion among this class of Christians, we answer, unhesitatingly, No. Accordingly, in the works now under review, they are not claimed, or acknowledged as Universalists, though the English Unitarians are. Highly respected individuals amongst us are, it is true, believers in the final salvation of all mankind on the principles of Hartley, or Chauncy; and persons of this description must certainly find more sympathy with us, even on this particular subject, than with those who deny all retribution in a future state. Nevertheless the great body of American Unitarians do not hold this doctrine, and never did hold it, neither are they verging toward it. If any changes of opinion are taking place among the principal writers, or the junior ministers, they are of a kind to lead them away still further from the belief, that the time will ever arrive, when all mankind will be saved by an invincible necessity, or when those who have sinned, and those who have not, will stand on precisely the same footing. In thus disclaiming Universalism, and every modification of proper Universalism, as the belief of the great body of American Unitarians, we hardly need say that we yield to none in the unmixed aversion which we feel for the Calvinistic doctrine of hell torments. Probably a large proportion of those who preach it, and a still larger proportion of those who hear it, never have a clear and vivid conception of what the doctrine means, or do not regard it as a reality, or soften it by some strange mental reservations. Considered, however, as literally true, and to be literally carried into effect, we look upon it, as, beyond all question, the most horrible dogma ever conceived or uttered by man.

ART. VIII.—1. *The Morals of Pleasure, illustrated by Stories. Designed for Young Persons.* By a LADY. Philadelphia. Carey, Lea & Carey. 1829.

2. *The Young Emigrants, a Tale. Designed for Young Persons.* By the AUTHOR OF MORALS OF PLEASURE. Boston. Carter & Hendee. 12mo. pp. 240.

WE cannot help expressing, as the present number is passing from our hands, the pleasure which we have derived from the perusal of these very entertaining and excellent books. The qualities that have attracted our attention are the entirely natural air that pervades them, sufficient entertainment, a clear moral, and the absence of all effort at display. The dialogues, especially of the first volume named, constantly sound in our ears, as if we had heard the very same things before. The entertainment is just enough to keep attention alive, without agitating the passions; and this we consider an admirable quality in books designed for young persons. The moral is, everywhere, singularly precise, as well as pure. And the absence of all ostentation, the entire simplicity, we think, must be obvious to every reader.

This last quality, which to us is the crowning grace, may be expected, indeed, to render these tales less striking to many. The veteran novel reader, and we have many such, who have no 'gray hairs' to be an 'honor' or an excuse to them, young people fallen into intellectual dotage but not from manhood or womanhood, for they never knew either and never will—such persons will probably pronounce the *Young Emigrants* to be 'no novel—and not worth reading.' There are no 'hair-breadth scapes,' nor 'imminent deadly breaches,' save what the rains have made in rough roads over the Alleghany Mountains—for thither the tale wanders. Nay, we correct ourselves; there is one escape, but the means provided is so very simple as to show a resolute purpose on the part of the author not to gratify any craving for mere excitement. There is another indication of the same purpose, in neglecting what the reader must see is a very fair chance for making a love-story. We are aware that it would have been very much out of place in a book designed for young persons; but still it is none the less a proof of talent, and the success none the less encouraging. For here, reader, is a clever duodecimo, a

tale, a real novel, that relies not a whit for its interest on the passion of love. We have sometimes thought of undertaking such a thing ourselves, when in a mood for doing something desperate; but here it is done for us. And it is demonstrated, and that is all we desired to do, that a tale of fiction, long enough to fill a considerable volume, may be interesting enough to carry the reader to the very end, without any love scene or lover. There is, indeed, some marrying at the end, but that is in as simple and natural a way as if it had happened to one of our neighbours.

In truth, there is a feeling, inspired by these tales, of *vicinity* to the things represented—narrated we had almost said—which gives them a very peculiar interest. We often forget that they are tales, and imagine that the things were said and done in the next village or the nearest city. This might be a dangerous quality, saving when, as here, it is in the hands of a refined taste.

But it is with the *Morals of Pleasure*, we confess, that we have been most entertained. The title is ambiguous, and we had sent for the work, in the expectation that it would give us some aid in the discussions we have attempted in this number on the subject of recreation; but we find the ambiguity very delightfully relieved, and our general object much better advanced, than it probably could have been by any grave essays. The *denouement* of the several tales is very happily brought about, by the intervention of several agreeable and innocent amusements. We do not propose to make any extracts, and in truth, we should scarcely know on what principle to make them, for there is a uniformity of excellence in these pages, that we scarcely remember elsewhere to have met with. We can only recommend them generally to our readers; to young masters and misses, if they would learn what pure sentiments, good manners and sprightly conversation are, at their period of life—to their parents if they would know how to entertain at once, and to improve them—and to all who desire to smile oftener than to sigh, and at the same time, to smile without offence to any virtuous or generous emotion.

THE CHRISTIAN EXAMINER.

NO. XXXIX.

NEW SERIES—NO. IX.

JULY, 1830.

ART. I.—*On the Future State of Man.* For the CHRISTIAN EXAMINER.

[Concluded from page 132.]

By the Moral Powers, which I now intend to consider with a view to the future state of man, I mean his Conscience and his Will. This subject implies two questions to be answered. First, whether the moral powers themselves are to be considered immortal endowments of man; whether in the life to come he will still be a moral agent, free to choose between good and evil, and responsible for his choice; capable of virtue, and liable to sin; a fit subject of reward and punishment. In the second place, I shall consider the question, whether the moral character which a person actually forms in this life, is likely to pass with him into another state of existence; and whether it will meet there with its natural consequences in a just dispensation of rewards and punishments. Accordingly, the immortality of the moral nature and character of man is the subject of my present inquiry.

Propensities like those with which nature has endowed animals in general to preserve themselves and their species, are implanted also in man. Man is prompted by his animal nature to seek means to support his life, and to avoid or avert whatever seems to endanger it. He is prompted also to impart the means of support he possesses, and to risk even his life, for his offspring.

But the animal is instigated to provide for itself, to sacrifice itself only for its offspring; while man is prompted, by the in-born revelation of his destiny in his heart, to spend all he has, to lay down even his life for his friends, and to see in every human being a friend and a brother. On the other hand, the animal is impelled to provide only what is necessary for itself and its young. But man is tempted to stretch out his hand after everything that comes within the ever extending grasp of avarice. Still more, while the lioness is constrained, by the law of her nature, to risk her life for her young, the human mother is able to strike dumb the voice of nature within herself, to expose and abandon her offspring.

Thus, every animal, so far as we know its species from observation and history, is irresistibly controlled by the same finite instincts. But man differs from the animal in two respects. First, there are impulses and designs in human nature, the object of which lies beyond the reach of animal instincts. In the second place, those impulses which man has in common with the animal, as well as those which are peculiar to himself, can be resisted and overruled by an uncontrollable power in each individual. The motives of action in man, are not, as in the animal, decisions of nature without appeal. They are mere pleadings of the divers animal and spiritual constituents of his nature. Their success depends on the sanction or veto of an absolute executive in the human soul,—the free will of each individual. This principle of freedom in the soul of man, which breaks, as it were, the mighty tide of instinct that directs all the motions of the animal as a living machine with undivided power, is the first constituent of his moral nature. In order to draw just inferences from this important fact, for the future as well as the present condition of man, it is necessary to attend to the part which is assigned to the Will in the gradual unfolding of his nature.

In the first manifestations of human nature, in the infant, we see no other living principle at work than what we perceive also in the animal; except that there appears in man no evidence of any specific instinct, like that which makes the young duck, as soon as it has burst its shell, launch itself confidently upon an untried element, and which generally assigns to each animal very early, its definite mode of existence. Instead of such a specific instinct, we find in man desires which the most complete gratification of animal appetites cannot satisfy. The

joy with which a child looks forward to a simple gratification of his senses, soon shows, by the partial disappointment which accompanies the actual attainment of his wishes, that the present and tangible was not the real and ultimate object of his soul. The curiosity of the child, also, which is not, like that of the animal, confined to a search after the means of subsistence, is one of the early indications of that power in man, which manifests itself by a tendency to unbounded action, and which we call the mind. This infinite principle in man, however, is so intimately connected with the animal life within him, that at first it appears only as an additional power and inducement to seek after a more complete gratification of the appetites and senses. It leads to the discovery of new means of subsistence, and increases the pleasures to be derived from those already known. Man refines upon the necessities of life, the common articles of food and of dress. He would have the house he lives in at the same time protect him against the discomforts, and secure to him the advantages of living in the open air. There is an infinity, partly real and partly imaginary, in the luxuries of life, because they are the results of the agency of the mind, for the benefit of the senses; and it is this more than the comforts and amusements themselves, which renders them objects of an absorbing interest to man. But in order to preserve him from forfeiting his highest claims to happiness, there arise in his soul desires after more perfect enjoyments than any gratification of the senses and passions can afford or promise. The spirit of truth, love towards all men, and devotion of the soul to God, spring up in the mind; and he perceives that the highest skies to which worldly advantages and honors may raise him, are far below the real heaven, after which the strongest energies of his soul are aspiring.

The desires of the mind, though gradually growing out of the animal propensities, are of a decidedly different character as soon as they are fully unfolded. According to his animal nature, man considers the present life as the whole of his existence, and self-preservation is the chief object of his desires. As a spiritual being, he considers this life only as a part of his existence, subordinate to his immortal interests, which is to be sacrificed, if necessary, for his highest happiness, which is founded on truth and justice, kindness and piety. His affections are not confined to those who have been kind to himself, but are extended to all who deserve his love. His desire of knowledge, when

a selfish principle, is restricted to those objects which are necessary or agreeable to his appetites and senses; but when a spiritual principle, prompts him to the pursuit of all truth. In his intercourse with men, the selfish principle leads him to consider them only as instruments of his own pleasure; but his spirit prompts him to consider himself only as one of them, and to seek his happiness in that of all. Thus, according to the gradual unfolding of his nature, the spiritual principle, by degrees, impels man to seek the springs of happiness beyond the necessities and luxuries of life. Whatever be his condition, his mind is constantly pressing onward after a more extensive sphere of action, a higher state of being, a prospect of true and lasting happiness.

There are some cases in which the highest longings of human nature do not come in collision with meaner interests; and in such cases, all men are eager to avail themselves of all that holy joy which good intentions alone can give. Generally, however, the gold of pure and solid happiness does not lie bare on the surface to surprise the fortunate finder. Truth, justice and love, demand of him who would reap their glories, to deny himself and take up his cross. A crown of righteousness is laid up for him only who is ready to be crowned with thorns. In these cases there arises a conflict in the soul between different principles of action, between spiritual and animal desires or passions. This contest in the human soul is not settled, as it is in the animal, by the irresistible control of instinct. For whenever different animal desires come in collision with each other, instinct regulates them in such a manner that the less important tendency always yields to that which is more essential. The animal quits its play without reluctance in order to satisfy its hunger; and in the same manner it leaves its food to defend its life, and risks its own life for that of its offspring.

But among the various animal and spiritual impulses, which agitate the soul of man daily and hourly, and, like so many pretenders, contend for the sole dominion over the whole, there is not one which nature has invested with the native sovereignty of instinct. The desire to take advantage of a good opportunity for acquiring wealth or power, is checked by the consideration that in making use of it, we should commit an act of injustice or unkindness toward others; and the wish to save another person's life is counteracted by the fear of losing our own.

In these and all similar instances, the person who is thus actuated by two opposing principles, feels that he is not compelled to follow his selfish, any more than his disinterested motives. It is a contest between two powers within him, which can be decided only by the interposition of a third independent power. This power, whose weight in the balance of human motives decides the competition between selfish and disinterested principles, is no other than his free agency, the choice and effort of his own will.

The power of choosing between selfish and disinterested desires, is absolute, in so far as the individual is at liberty to determine which of these two courses, marked out by his inclinations, he shall endeavour to pursue. But his choice is limited to the alternative. He must determine upon following the call of his spirit, otherwise the loud and immediate appeals of passion, drowning the small voice of reason, will carry the day in the wavering mind. Still more, the mere willingness of the spirit, is not sufficient to make up for the weakness of the flesh. The first act of the will, which consists in a mere choice, a wish or a vow to be good, must be followed out by actual exertion, by deep and persevering effort. The ploughshare must be pressed firmly into the ground that is overspread with noxious weeds. Otherwise, we till for the weeds, and not for the good seed, which will not take root on the surface.

Thus we see in man, at first, only the principle of animal life in operation. This, however, is soon aided and enlarged by the infinite essence of life, the mind. At last, the mind, for a time the servant of the body, claims the place which nature has assigned it, asserts its independence of the body, and mastery over it. But this victory of mind over matter in man, can be obtained only by the exertion of his own free will. Man is tempted by the selfish principle in his nature, to give himself up to the pursuit of the greatest happiness that can be obtained by the least exertion. He is prompted, on the other hand, by his own spirit, to strive after the greatest happiness to be obtained by the utmost exertion. The same principle which makes him desire a sphere of action beyond the necessities and the luxuries of life, prompts him, also, to use and exert his own will in resisting and overcoming the attractive power of appetite and sense, so far as it is prejudicial to his greatest happiness, which is founded on perfection; that is, on the free and harmonious exercise of all his powers. If a person obeys this

prompting or desire of his spirit to overcome the opposing appetites, his desire is converted into the greatest joy ; and if he disobeys it, it is changed into the deepest pain of which human nature is susceptible—the joy of an approving, and the pain of a condemning conscience.

Conscience, then, is that principle in man, which is manifested, first, by an impulse or desire to exert all the strength of his will, in preventing his appetites from interfering with the attainment of the greatest perfection and happiness, and then, by feelings of pain and pleasure adapted to the degree in which that impulse has been obeyed or neglected. The appetites, so far as they are opposed to the monitions of conscience, we call temptations. The willing obedience of man to his own conscience, we call virtue ; and the wilful disobedience, we call sin.

Conscience does not inform us whether the views of duty we form, are in themselves right or wrong. Conscience merely prompts us to exert our intellectual faculties to ascertain what is right, and then to use our active powers to do accordingly. Our moral joys or pains are infallible decisions only of this question ;—Whether, and how far we have exerted or neglected our faculties. In the same manner, virtue consists, not in doing what is in itself right, but in striving to perform what the individual conscientiously holds to be his duty. Accordingly the first part of a man's duty is to ascertain the whole of it ; and a right use of his reason for this purpose will teach him to aim, not merely at a conformity with the moral opinions of others, or consistency with his own, or to fashion his conduct according to any factitious principles, but to make human nature his constant study, and to remove every obstruction to the natural unfolding of all his faculties ; to restrict his appetites, that the intellect and the affections may follow their natural tendency to spread over, and to penetrate, like the light and the warmth of the sun, all created beings, and to rise in adoration to the Eternal Source of intelligence and love. Conscience, then, in bidding us to restrict the animal propensities by voluntary effort, does not tend to impair, but to enlarge our real power and freedom. As a wise friend, it advises us to lop off the lower branches of the tree of life, in order to secure its upward growth.

The animal, being governed by instinct, is of course neither liable to temptation, nor capable of virtue. The moral powers,

conscience and will, the power of free agency, constitutes the specific character of the human race, and forms, in every individual, the basis of personal responsibility. The animal is satisfied or dissatisfied with its condition; but man alone can be contented or discontented with himself. The glorious task of endless progress in perfection and happiness, is committed to his own free exertion.

Temptation is frequently considered as in itself an evil; in deed as the greatest of evils except sin. But this opinion seems to arise from an imperfect apprehension of the moral nature of man. Liableness to temptation is not a mark of imperfection in a created being, but the necessary means of the highest, that is, of moral perfection and happiness. For, without any temptation to do wrong, there could be no merit, no virtue, in doing right. Jesus Christ, too, was tempted by the prospect of earthly glory, and earthly suffering, to forsake his spiritual mission. Yet we do not consider this as an imperfection in him, but as a quality, without which he could not have become a pattern of perfection to all men. It is by sin, by yielding to temptation, that we are changed from glory to shame. But God has made us liable to be tempted, that we might be capable of virtue, and of moral happiness. Therefore I would say in the words of the apostle, 'My brethren, count it all joy when ye fall into divers temptations; for the man that endureth temptation shall be blessed in his deed.'

Ask yourself what is the object of your highest esteem in man. Is it what circumstances, parents and friends have done for him? Is it what God himself has bestowed on him, his noble talents and powers? In all these qualities you honor the giver, not the possessor. You do not esteem a man for that which others have done for him, but only for what he has done for himself; his own true merit. You respect him for having made goodness his choice, when he might have chosen and was tempted to choose, the opposite course. It is the free and strenuous effort of his moral nature to overcome all obstacles in the way to endless perfection, it is the glory of virtue, for which we esteem man in ourselves as well as in others; and the deepest and purest happiness of which man is capable, springs from that only sure foundation of self-respect. The man who withstands temptation, lays up in his own soul, treasures more than sufficient to ensure his happiness against the loss of all other means of enjoyment. Satisfied with the consciousness of deserving to be

happy, the christian martyr takes up his cross as a part of the glory that is set before him.

Liableness to Temptation, Conscience, and Free Agency, three principles of whose existence the consciousness of each individual affords incontestible proof, are the foundation of good and ill desert, and a righteous retribution, or dispensation of rewards and punishments. Conscience renders every one happy or unhappy, in proportion to his desert ; that is, the degree of faithfulness or unfaithfulness, with which he obeys, or disregards, its promptings. The mode in which conscience dispenses blessing and suffering, is the origin of our ideas of retributive justice. The rewards and punishments of conscience are just, because they are in perfect conformity to the nature and character of man.* They are just, in the first place, because conscience never requires an exertion to which the individual is not equal ; secondly, because the joys or pains awarded, are commensurate with his good or ill desert ; and thirdly, because its punishments and rewards are motives to strive after a higher state of perfection and happiness. This third characteristic of a truly moral retribution, is particularly important, as, without this, the rewards and punishments distributed by conscience, however correctly proportioned to past merit or guilt, would not be perfectly just, since they would not do justice to the infinite principle in human nature. The rewards and punishments which are the consequences of a satisfied or dissatisfied conscience, have another and a higher purpose than that of affording pain or pleasure for past virtues or sins. The pain by which conscience punishes a bad action, is an incentive to repentance and reform ; and the joy by which conscience rewards the virtuous deed, is an impulse to higher moral effort. There is no vice so abject, from which the voice of God within him, does not call back the sinner to virtue ; and there is no pain of conscience so great, that is not transformed into joy, if the sinner obeys its call. The kingdom of heaven returns to the heart, as soon as that of the world is excluded ; and there is joy in heaven over every sinner that repenteth. On the other hand, the peace by which conscience rewards every conquest of self, however glorious, or however humble, is not a luxurious repose, but a temporary invigorating rest, that calls for new and more valiant effort. The punishments of conscience are corrections ; that is, checks upon the

* Chr. Ex. N. S. No. XXXVI. pp. 396, 397.

wrong and promptings to the right course, which consists in striving after perfection ; and the rewards of conscience are encouragements to still greater attainments in excellence. Conscience, therefore, in all its promptings, bears witness to the power and destiny of man to rise, through his own free exertion, from any degree of vice, however low, and from any degree of goodness, however high, to higher attainments in excellence and happiness.

Of all the sources of pleasure and pain, conscience is the only one whose dispensations are always marked with perfect justice, even in the present state of existence ; and for this very reason it affords a standard for men in society, and a preconception of the consummation of divine justice in the life to come. This perfect justice distinguishes our moral from our adventitious pleasures and pains. Adventitious I call all the joys or pains that flow from other sources than a satisfied or dissatisfied conscience. The moral state of man does not depend on what is adventitious in his condition. His conscience chides him for a successful, as well as an unsuccessful falsehood ; and it rewards him equally, whether his honesty be followed by prosperity, or ruin. Nevertheless, there exists a natural connexion between moral and adventitious good or evil. They are parts of the state which Providence has assigned to man, and one generally leads to the other. Moral happiness springs from the highest exertion of the will ; adventitious happiness results from the most perfect use of all the other faculties of body and mind, and a condition in life suited to his wants and his powers. It is in striving after the highest adventitious good, that man is checked by the tempting influences of his appetites, which his conscience bids him to subdue, and thereby attain to moral satisfaction. This moral effort generally aids us in the pursuit of adventitious good, be it wealth, or knowledge, or the confidence of men ; and on the other hand, by yielding to selfish desires, we are more likely to bring upon ourselves adventitious evil. Now those sources of adventitious pleasure or pain, which are the natural result of moral effort or negligence, such as well deserved affluence or want, bear a moral character, which distinguishes them from all other adventitious good or evils, such as inherited wealth or poverty.

There is much adventitious good and evil in this world, that is enjoyed or suffered by men, without any good or ill desert of their own. But his moral nature bears evidence to the design of Providence, that man should make adventitious evils sources

of moral pleasure, by overcoming or enduring them with courage and resignation. For this purpose every good and every evil becomes to us a temptation, that it may be converted into a moral good. The man who has inherited a large property, is tempted to use it for luxurious ease, or to lock it up in his chest, while his spirit prompts him to employ it for supplying his fellow men, who are suffering from ignorance and poverty, with the necessaries of animal and intellectual life. There is no situation in life, prosperous or adverse, which man cannot make use of to change pain into pleasure, and pleasure into perfect happiness, through virtue. Thus the spiritual and moral nature of man shows the design of Providence, that all adventitious pain and pleasure should serve the purpose of a moral discipline.

The same design is manifest in the common course of natural events, and in society. It is a fact that virtue is generally rewarded by success, and vice punished by suffering. There are indeed many instances of undeserved joy and trouble. But they are few compared with the evidences of retributive justice in the world; and among them there is none, which, on the supposition that the present life is only the beginning of man's existence, cannot result in higher improvement and happiness. The natural feeling, therefore, which calls every human being to the relief of innocent suffering, and to the generous disdain of ill deserved prosperity, seems, indeed, to be a forerunner of a perfect judgment, that shall 'render to every man according to his deeds.'

In the education of children and in society at large, where men are called upon to determine the condition of their fellow-men, and to dispense rewards and punishments, they are bound in conscience to follow the same standard of retributive justice. Conscience demands such an organization of society, as will put means of support, improvement, and happiness, equally within the reach of all. The power to reward and punish should be exercised only to excite and strengthen, not to counteract, or supersede, the retributive judgment in the mind of each individual. Rewards and punishments, when suited to the moral nature of man, are calculated to awaken, by a natural association of ideas, the self-reproving and self-encouraging principle in the soul, which supersedes, in a moral point of view, all outward retribution. Disheartening censure and excessive praise are equally prejudicial to the harvest of moral excellence,

that prospers in the moderate temperature of a true christian discipline. Rewards and punishments, in order to be just, should be not only impartial, correcting and encouraging each one according to his deserts, without respect of persons; but calculated to do justice to the nature and infinite destiny of man. No reward, however well balanced in the scale of merit, no wreath of laurel or of olive, however well deserved, can truly benefit the receiver, unless it direct him to a higher object of exertion, to a crown laid up for him in heaven. On the other hand, all punishment that is not calculated for the improvement of the transgressor, is not just, in the highest sense of the word. No one, whose heart is full of true family affection, ever gives up a son or a brother, as lost to all hope of moral recovery. And he who stretches forth his hands to the whole human family, and says, Behold my mother and my brethren, the true Christian, never despairs of any child of God, but trusts that the wayward child may still return to Him who has eternal life, though he should thrice deny him.

If there are cases in which society is obliged, in its own defence, to exterminate a dangerous enemy of the rights of all, instead of endeavouring to correct him, such measures may be justified as acts of self-defence, but not as punishments or acts of corrective justice. For this requires that no other pain should be inflicted than what is necessary to overpower the criminal desire, and to remind the transgressor of a corrective principle, a court of justice in his own breast, which alone is qualified to answer the true end of a righteous retribution; that is, to restore the offender to society and himself. Every act of mere self-defence is a declaration that it is not in the power of the earthly judge to do full justice to the moral nature of the offender, without endangering the rights of all; and the spirit of justice looks up to a higher power, that can say to the malefactor on the cross, 'Today shalt thou be with me in paradise.'

Every punishment is an evil that would be a crime, if it were not necessary to check the criminal propensity of one who has wilfully infringed the rights of others. Accordingly any unnecessary evil inflicted for other purposes than that of correction, and any evil that exceeds the amount of what is accounted necessary for this end, is a crime committed by the punisher against the offender. No punishment is just but what

is founded on wilful transgression, and calculated to correct or reform the transgressor.

I shall be told by some, that correction of the offender is not the true, or at least not the only true object of punishment. It is intended as a terrifying or warning example for others. But if punishment be considered as an example for others, and this consideration should be allowed any influence upon the amount of suffering to be inflicted, I would ask, Is it meant to be an example of justice, or injustice? If of justice, then punishment is justified no farther than it is calculated, as a salutary evil, to secure society against the criminal disposition of the offender. If it exceeds this end, it will array all the natural and moral sympathies of men on the side of the punished; or if it operates at all as an example, it will only exemplify the doctrine, that the power of punishing is sufficient to justify its use.

This may suffice to show, that all correct ideas of retributive justice, are derived from the mode in which every one is rewarded and punished by his own conscience; that accordingly all rewards and punishments, in order to be just, must be adapted to the real desert of the individual, and calculated for his improvement.

I have said before, that there is no situation in the life of man which cannot be made subservient to moral improvement, since there is none which is not exposed to temptation. The selfish principle in his nature tempts him to use all that in any way belongs to him, to satisfy his appetites and passions. Love of ease, or money, or honor, or power, contends in the soul of man with philanthropy and piety, for the use of his property, talents, knowledge, and every kind of advantage and excellence. There is no degree of merit so high as to place man beyond the reach of temptation, or to prevent him from rising still higher. And, on the other hand, there is no degree of vice so low, that man cannot, by his own will, degrade himself still more. There is an infinity in vice as well as in virtue, showing forth the exhaustless and incalculable power of the moral nature of man.

There are different degrees of temptation and of virtue. A man whose virtue is proof against a bribe in the shape of money, may be corrupted by flattery, or awed into wrong by authority. Thus there are three degrees of temptation and of virtue implied in this saying of Paul, 'Let him that stole, steal no more; but rather let him labor, that he may have to give to him that

needeth.* He who stole overcomes the lowest degree of temptation, by his virtuous resolution to steal no more. But though he has conquered the desire of dishonest gain, he is still subject to that of indolence, which is to be overcome by a higher effort, the determination to labor. Yet with all this he may be avaricious and a miser, laboring for himself only, not for others; and this third degree of temptation requires a still greater degree of moral effort, in order to add to the virtues of honesty and industry, that of charity. Our moral power grows by constant exercise, and what once required an effort, is rendered easy by habit. But the demands of conscience, and the temptations to disregard them, grow in proportion to our strength. The power and glory which a man has won by his merits, if it does not operate as an incentive to more glorious efforts, will prove a stumbling-block, and betray him either into criminal ambition, or indolent self-content.

I have endeavoured to give a succinct description of the moral powers of man, to show, how, by the cooperation of conscience and free-agency, by self-command and self-obedience, he is able to render himself worthy of existence and happiness, and to look upon every step in his endless progress, as in part his own work. Is it reasonable to suppose that the power of man to act according to his choice, to work out and to merit his own happiness, that his moral nature, which alone distinguishes him from the animal, and constitutes him the fellow worker with God, should be extinguished by death? Take all we have, and all we are, is there anything in human nature, on which we can rest our hope of immortality, unless it be the evergrowing power of virtue—the power to overcome temptation and to press on to the mark of the high calling of God, to godlike perfection? Can it be supposed that that principle in our nature, which enables and prompts us to sacrifice property, health, all the endearments of life, and life itself, should itself be subjected to death?

I shall be told by some, that the consequences of our moral efforts will remain forever, although there will be no more occasion for any farther exertion, in a state in which there is no temptation to be overcome. Those who have attained to a state of heavenly joy, will be conscious that they are still the same beings, and that their present happiness is the result of

* Eph. iv. 28.

their own virtue. They will either immediately be made as perfect and happy as man can be, or they will be carried on, by an irresistible and ever increasing impulse, to higher degrees of excellence and happiness.

Against this opinion I would observe, that the highest moral happiness does not result from the recollection of past virtue, but from actual moral exertion. If, then, in a future state all occasion for virtuous effort ceases, the vital principle, the very root of moral happiness, is cut off. If we are made to enjoy a felicity which we are not continually producing and deserving, if we are carried on to higher states of perfection by an irresistible impulse, we are no longer the same beings; and if we are still conscious of what we have been, we cannot help perceiving that we are not changed from glory to glory, but that we are transformed from moral agents into animals governed by instinct. By these reasons I am led to the conclusion, that there will be in heaven as well as on earth, opportunities to deserve, as well as enjoy happiness. There will be occasions for the exercise of every kind of virtue, of self-denial, of incorrupted justice, and perfect love casting out fear and sacrificing the greatest good we possess for the highest felicity to be obtained by virtue. If we believe in the immortality of our moral nature, we must suppose, that, in every successive stage of our existence, greater moral efforts will be required in overcoming greater temptations, and that thus endless felicity is to be gained by ever growing virtue.

Indeed, if we are right in drawing inferences for the life to come from what the present state has revealed to us of our nature, we may trust that opportunities of deserving what we enjoy, will not only continue to exist, but increase in number and importance. The infant, being born in utter dependence on others for support and comfort, is evidently designed by Providence to be educated to depend on himself, on his own efforts in active life. Accordingly I believe that the whole present state of man, is designed to educate him for a still greater independence on outward circumstances, and for reliance on his own exertions for happiness in the life to come.

If we believe in man's immortality, we must suppose that man in a future state will essentially be the same being, and consequently a moral agent; that is, a being free to choose between the injunctions of conscience and the instigations of opposing appetites. As a moral agent he must still be liable to

be tempted by any advantage he possesses or expects, to neglect exerting himself for a higher but more distant good, and capable of rising above every temptation. He must still be able, by constant virtue, to enjoy, every moment of his existence, the highest happiness of which human nature is susceptible, which consists in moral satisfaction; and on the other hand he must be able to persevere in sin, and consequently in moral misery.

If man is an immortal moral agent, he must be able, at every moment of his existence, to turn from virtue to sin, and return to virtue. This is a principle founded on the moral nature of man, and therefore not confined to this life. This is set forth in scripture frequently and fully. Thus Ezekiel * says, 'The soul that sinneth, it shall die, but the man that doeth what is lawful and right shall save his soul alive.' The same prophet goes on to say, 'If the righteous man turneth away from his righteousness and committeth iniquity, for his iniquity that he hath done, shall he die.' 'Again, when the wicked man turneth away from his wickedness and doeth that which is lawful and right, he shall surely live, he shall not die.' The principle which is here so explicitly taught, belongs to the essence of man's moral nature, and must therefore apply to the future state as well as the present.

The power to choose between good and evil, cannot be destroyed by any act of its own; that is, by any choice and determination that may be formed. The most constant moral exertion does not preclude forever a relapse into sin. It only fits the mind for higher effort. It is, as I have observed, the first part of man's duty to ascertain the whole, and to act according to the result of his faithful inquiry; and no doubt every new sphere upon which man enters in his endless progress, will require on his part adequate moral exertions in directing his intellectual and active powers to know and to perform his ever increasing duty. And surely, He who created man a moral agent, will certainly open to him spheres of action adapted to his growing capacities.

On the other hand, faith in the immortality of the moral nature of man leads us to suppose, that, neither in the future nor the present life, man can sink so low as not to be able to rise again by the same power by which he has degraded himself.

* Chap. xviii.

Though he be dead in sin, he can rise again from his self-made grave, by the undying energy of his moral nature, aided by the active and enlightened sympathy of his fellow-beings, and the redeeming love of God. 'Come now, let us reason together, saith the Lord; though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be as white as snow; though they be red as crimson, they shall be as wool.' Only let it not be supposed that any artificial dye, or even the hot waters of repentance, can restore to the face that is flushed with crime, the native beauty of innocence. Nothing can cleanse the noble metal from its base alloy but fiery trials, a moral regeneration, wrought out by unwearied struggles, and resistance unto blood against the craft and violence of temptation.

The mountain path of virtue that leads to the glory of moral transfiguration, is accessible to the sinner as well as to the righteous. But while the just man ascends in the strength of holy joy, the sinner has to clamber upward under the load of his guilt; and if he delay throwing it off beyond the term of this life, his burthen will become a mountain load. Yet faith, the spirit of virtue, may then, even then, remove mountains. For who would doubt or limit the power and the goodness of Him, who has endowed man with this power to rise and to fall, and by his own choice to rise again from the lowest fall? This very gift of a free moral nature, implies the assurance that the gates of mercy will never, at least not forever, be closed against a penitent child, whenever and wherever the starving soul asks the bread of life of a father, whose mercy is greater than our sins, who is infinite in love as in power and wisdom.

From the previous considerations I do not see how any one, believing in the immortality of man's moral nature, can doubt that man will, throughout the eternity of his existence, retain the power to make himself, by his own choosing, an angel of light or darkness.

Man's conscience, also, will survive death to encourage and warn, to reward and punish, according to the same eternal principles of retributive justice. The state of happiness or suffering, which is the result of a satisfied or dissatisfied conscience, will still be distinct from, and superior to, all adventitious pleasure and pain.

But not only the moral powers of man, the moral character also which he has formed in this life, will enter with him upon the future. When all those external distinctions, great and

small, by which our condition in this world is determined, shall have passed away, our character, with all its lights and shades, will endure, and establish our standing in the future. Of all our possessions in this life, nothing will remain to us except what even now is most truly our own—our virtues and our sins. A record of our whole life will be laid open within us, from which at present our memory is able to quote only separate passages—a faithful record of our moral history, in which not a single event, not the slightest tendency of our will, is omitted. The character of man is never formed, but always forming. It is the natural and gradual working of that moral capacity which man brings with him into this world as an outfit for eternity.

I have spoken of the future state of the moral nature and character of man. My last question regards the external condition of man as a moral agent; I mean such adventitious good and evil, as bears a moral character. We have seen that in this life the condition of man, the state of his health, property, intellectual progress, and standing in society, are frequently, though not always, in conformity to his moral character. When we consider the nature of man and the elements of society, we perceive that it must have been the design of creative Providence that man's external condition should depend on his real worth, even in this life; but that this design was not carried into effect by absolute force, but entrusted to man as a free and responsible being. It is the abuse of this trust which frequently obscures the just design of the Creator. Therefore, when we see so much unfair dealing, deceit, and oppression among men in the life that now is, we look forward to that which is to come, as the great 'jubilee, when liberty shall be proclaimed throughout the world, and to all the inhabitants thereof, and every man shall return to his possession.'

Some are inclined to think, that, in the future state of man, there will be no enjoyments or pains besides those which consist in the approbation or disapprobation of his own conscience; that this alone is to be his heaven or his hell. But the pleasure we derive from improvement in knowledge, and the pain which results from ignorance, independent of our moral efforts or negligence, are not less real though they are inferior to moral happiness or misery. The same is to be said of the pleasure or pain we experience from the virtue and love, or the evil conduct and misery of others. These adventitious pleasures and

pains have a foundation in the nature of man, and belong to his immortal self. Still more, they are necessary to the exercise of his moral powers, and consequently to the attainment of moral happiness. There can be no virtue, or moral effort, without temptation to be overcome. Now there is no temptation in mere disobedience to the voice of conscience, no pleasure in wickedness as such. There must, then, be an intrinsic charm in those things which are contrary to conscience; otherwise there could never be in the soul a conflict of motives and a moral victory. On the other hand, the end of virtue is to obtain moral satisfaction by causing the spiritual desires to prevail over lower interests. But the spiritual, as well as the selfish desires, are not productions of man's own will; they are necessary for the exercise of it, whether for virtue or sin. Accordingly, it is to be presumed that there will be in the future life adventitious good and evil, selfish and spiritual pleasures and motives, distinct from moral capacities and attainments, though constantly cooperating with them in essentially the same manner as in the present state.

In examining the future condition of man as a moral agent, I shall consider, first, those adventitious pleasures and pains which man enjoys or suffers, independently of his own merit or demerit; and then those which he experiences in consequence of virtue or vice,—his future rewards and punishments.

As man is created with the desire of happiness, his own nature leads him to believe that its Author, in order to do justice to his own work, will let him suffer no more pain than what is necessary to his improvement and happiness. All men being created with essentially the same immortal capacities and desires, the same trust in divine justice leads us to suppose, that, in regard to the adventitious good and evil which is distributed among men without reference to their desert, a perfect equality will be observed. There is, however, in this world, much inequality in the natural condition of men; even if we do not consider the artificial distinctions of their own invention. True, we find in every individual the essentials of the same nature, implying the same immortal destiny. But they differ widely in the means to obtain the end for which all seem created—in natural advantages, bodily and mental faculties, and in the success or failure of their various undertakings. But there is an equalizing design apparent even in this diversity of natural gifts.

The different qualities and talents we discover in various individuals, seem to be designed to make up for the peculiar defects of each. Still more, God has implanted in every human soul a thriving branch of his own love for the whole human race, that each may find his own happiness only in the happiness of all; and especially of those who are least able to take care of their own interests. The partiality of a mother for the weakest of her children, is only justice in disguise; and the principle from which this feeling flows, belongs, in fact, to every mind that has not lost its natural tone.

Still there remains much inequality in the condition of men, which can be reconciled with the idea of overruling justice, only by considering the present state as but a part of the moral discipline to which all are necessarily and constantly subjected. In order to bring to light all the powers which are laid up in the nature of man, and to improve upon them by his own exertions, it seems necessary that he should pass through the school of adversity as well as that of prosperity. I have said that every good he possesses becomes to man, on the one hand a temptation to rest satisfied with this possession, and on the other an encouragement to use it as an instrument of greater excellence. Every evil becomes a temptation either to submit to it pusillanimously, or to be impatient under it; whereas misfortune might and should be an incentive to fortitude and pious resignation. Thus all adventitious good and evil is suited for moral improvement; and as this double discipline is necessary for all men, simply as moral agents, it is a natural consequence of our trust in the distributive justice of God, to believe that no individual will experience more pain, or less satisfaction, than any other. Each one, in his time, will receive his equal share of undeserved good and evil; and no one more than is necessary for his improvement.

This view solves all doubts with regard to the distributive justice of God, which arise from the unequal division of good and evil in this world. Whether a person receive his good things or evil things in this life, or in the future, does not affect the justice of the dispensation. Every one enjoys undeserved good, that he may acquire those virtues which can only be gained by the right use of prosperity, and suffers only so much evil as is necessary to acquire that moral strength, which is the fruit of a spirit rising above it. That all are not happy or unhappy at the same time, affords an opportunity for a third

class of virtues to spring up ; namely, on the part of the sufferers to see others enjoy without envy, and on that of the happy to deserve their blessings by imparting them to those who are in want. It is evident, moreover, that, by acquiring those virtues for which prosperity is the natural condition, we fortify ourselves beforehand against the temptations connected with want ; and the same is true when want comes before prosperity. For all temptations spring from one source, and all virtues are only different forms of moral excellence.

By the manner in which a person uses the good and evil he meets with, according or contrary to the injunctions of his conscience, he becomes a subject of retributive justice. He is rewarded and punished by his own conscience, and this retributive judgment, while it dispenses moral pleasure and pain, applies also to his external condition. He enjoys whatever external advantages he obtains by his moral efforts, more highly, and suffers for the sad consequences of his sins more keenly, because he feels that he deserves what he enjoys or suffers. On the contrary, his pleasures are marred, and his sufferings are soothed by the thought that he does not deserve them. The external condition of men in this world corresponds to the manner in which each one judges himself by his conscience, only so far as to convince us of the design of Providence, that whatever is imperfect in the dispensation of rewards and punishments in this life, is permitted, only that it may give rise to the virtue of bearing even injustice with equanimity, and that absolute justice will be rendered in the end by God's own judgment.

We believe in the retributive justice of God when we trust that God will judge every individual as he is judged by his own conscience, according to his good or ill desert. 'Say ye to the righteous that it shall be well with him ; for he shall eat the fruit of his doings. Wo unto the wicked, it shall be ill with him ; for the reward of his hands shall be given him.'* This principle, that every one shall be judged according to his deserts, which is so often set forth in scripture, and with indelible characters engraved upon the heart, implies the three above-mentioned qualities of retributive justice.

In the first place, God will reward and punish man only for such actions and omissions as depended on his own free will.

* *Isai. iii. 10, 11.*

A righteous retribution, or recompense adapted to the real merit or demerit of each individual, is inconceivable, unless he be considered as a free agent. You may as well attach merit and think of reward as due to the fig tree for bearing sweet fruit, or impute malevolence and award punishment to the hemlock for containing poison, as speak of good and ill desert in man, of virtue to be rewarded, and sin to be condemned, if every action and intention of man is predetermined by absolute necessity. A judge who should condemn a man because he is born blind, would be deprived of his office. He who should award the civic crown to him who had inherited the largest property, would be thought distracted. And is it possible to conceive that God should punish man because he has created and predetermined him to be wicked, or that he should reward him for being compelled to do right? It is evident that a belief in universal predestination, is in fact a denial of all that can be called reward or punishment, merit or demerit, virtue or vice, in this life as well as in the future.

But a righteous retribution supposes, not only that man is a free agent, but that the particular act, also, for which he is to be judged, should have depended on his own free will. Thus man is to be judged according to the degree in which he has exerted himself, or neglected opportunities of forming just conceptions of religion. But for the conceptions themselves which are the result of his faithful inquiry, whatever they be—for his creed, he deserves neither reward nor punishment. For it is indeed in our power to open or shut the eye of the mind to the light of truth, and to improve or spoil our vision; but it is not in our power to see things differently from what they appear to our senses or our understanding. That only which depends on our own choice and determination, is a proper subject of retribution; and to say that a person believes a thing because he chooses and is determined to believe it true, is as much as to say, that he does not believe it. Free agency, then, is the first requisite for a just retribution. All the promptings, the promises, and threats of conscience and of scripture, are empty sounds and signs, if man is not a moral agent, free to obey or disregard them. 'If I had not come and spoken unto them,' says Jesus, 'they had not had sin; but now they have no cloak for their sin.'*

* John xv. 22.

The second essential attribute of a just dispensation of rewards and punishments, consists in their being adapted to the good or ill desert of each individual ; that is, to the degree in which he has exerted himself, or wilfully neglected, to ascertain and perform his duty. Every one will experience as much good and as much evil, as his good or bad intentions have deserved according to the decision of his own conscience, which not only distributes rewards and punishments of its own, but contains the promise of a state of pleasure or pain adapted to our deserts. Reason and revelation establish the belief that the messenger of God in the soul of man, his own conscience, as it is the judge of his present conduct, is also the prophet of the life to come.

This principle, that rewards and punishments in the life to come, will be commensurate to the good or ill desert of each individual, involves two great truths. It asserts, in the first place, the necessary and eternal connexion between goodness and happiness, wickedness and misery. No doctrine is more clearly taught in scripture, or more powerfully insisted upon by the gospel of justice in our own hearts, than this ;—that they that have done good, shall come unto the resurrection of life, that is of happiness, and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation,* that is, condemnation to punishment. The doctrine that all men shall be saved from future punishment, whether they have done good or evil, contradicts the prophet in our heart. It is opposed to the belief in divine justice and a moral government of the world, and undermines the faith in immortality itself. For if we examine the experience of all ages and our own, we find that the most powerful motive for men to look forward to a life to come, consists in the sad contrast between the moral law and judgment within us, and the present state of the world, in which virtue so often is compelled to beg alms and existence of successful wickedness. The success of vice and oppression of virtue are reproaches against the Ruler of all Events, unless we suppose that God allows virtue to sow in tears, only that it may reap in glory ; and that he suffers the tower of pride to be raised so high, only that it may more surely attract the lightnings of divine justice. Vice indeed is allowed to hold out pleasures and to afford them for a time, so that man, by his own free effort, may deserve

* John v. 28, 29.

and anticipate the distant spiritual good ; but the future judgment, as a full revelation of perfect justice, will surely establish the principle, that his choice of the tempting present will as surely lead to greater future ill, as that his timely forbearance will be justified by satisfaction in the end. The artificial gratifications of sense and passion, contrived by men in this world to beguile their own reason with regard to the true state of their being, will then appear what they really are—unsuccessful attempts at a moral suicide. The wicked will in vain endeavour to appropriate to themselves enjoyments due only to the good. ‘The righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him.’

But the prospect of a future retribution implies not merely a decided difference in the end that is set before virtue and that which awaits wickedness. As there are many degrees of merit and of guilt, it is manifest that the same reason which we have for believing that virtue will be followed by happiness, and vice by misery, must lead us to infer that the degree of future enjoyment and suffering will be in exact proportion to the amount of merit and of guilt. ‘He that soweth sparingly shall reap also sparingly ; and he that soweth bountifully shall reap also bountifully.’*

The amount of joy and of suffering to be awarded, must be determined by the true end of rewards and punishments, which implies the third essential characteristic of a righteous retribution. If the above stated views of justice in general are true, they lead to the conclusion that the recompense, in order to be just, must be calculated for the moral improvement of man. The punishments must be corrective, incentives to repentance and reform ; the rewards must be impulses to higher moral effort. The punishments inflicted, and the rewards conferred, cannot be just without doing justice to the nature of man ; and consequently they cannot be calculated to destroy his free agency and capacity of infinite improvement, by depriving him of the possibility to rise, through virtue, from any degree of wickedness and misery to goodness and happiness, or from any degree of excellence to higher attainments in perfection.

Conscience, by its punishments, calls the sinner to repentance. It promises to him who is dead in sin, a moral resurrection ; while its highest rewards lead us humbly to acknowledge

* 2 Cor. ix. 6.

how far our proudest attainments are below the high mark of our calling. The conscientious parent punishes and rewards his child to improve him. Society, in dispensing rewards and punishments in the way of legislation, and by the approving or condemning expression of public sentiment, has or ought to have no other object than to remove all obstacles, and add new incitements, to the free unfolding of the powers, taste, and talents of its members, to rise to higher degrees, and thus to raise the standard of human excellence. Conscience demands and promises a condition that meets and strengthens the feelings of retributive joy and pain which it bestows, in being adapted to the good or ill desert of the individual, and calculated for his moral improvement. And this promise, which parents and society are called upon to realize, is it not the promise of the Author of conscience? We may rest assured, then, that the sentence of the Supreme Judge will not reverse, but confirm the precedent he has himself established in our moral nature, the verdict of our own conscience.

This view of the true end of a righteous retribution leads me to infer, that the duration as well as the degree of future rewards and punishments, will be determined solely by a regard to the true interest of the individual. Every one will receive as much enjoyment or pain, and for such a length of time, as he deserves, and needs for his moral improvement.

The gospel of Christ, in many passages, seems to be opposed to the view of future rewards and punishments, as means of moral improvement. In describing the future condition of the good and the bad, Jesus says, 'These shall go away into everlasting punishment; but the righteous into life eternal;*' that is, eternal happiness. I shall not attempt an explanation of every passage that relates to this subject; nor enter into controversy with those who seem more anxious to embrace the dead letter than the life giving spirit, and are intent upon finding out what is new in theory, rather than what is practical and eternal in the gospel of Christ. The great practical object, which is manifest in all that was revealed by Jesus of the life to come, seems to suggest the true explanation of such passages. The success of vice and the oppression of virtue in this world, seemed to give the lie to the truth that is asserted by conscience in all its promptings and

* Matt. xxv. 46.

judgments, that virtue must always be productive of happiness, and vice of suffering. Jesus came to save this truth and to establish the faith that is founded upon it. His object was to strengthen the commands of conscience, whose promises and threats proved insufficient to sustain the virtuous under oppression, and to restrain the oppressor by the certain prospect of a righteous retribution. Jesus promises everlasting happiness to the good, and everlasting misery to the wicked; but he nowhere says, that those who have been virtuous or vicious once, or for some time, shall continue to be so forever. This, indeed, would imply a contradiction, as present and continued goodness or wickedness does not consist in a mere habit acquired by past virtue or vice, but in actual moral efforts, or disregard of conscience. Now it is evident that the righteous, who are deemed worthy of eternal reward, are not those who have been righteous for some time, but have afterward become vicious; and that the wicked who will be condemned to perpetual suffering, are not those who have afterward repented and reformed. For it is said, 'If the wicked will turn from all his sins, and do that which is lawful and right, in his righteousness he shall live.' And again; 'When the righteous turneth away from his righteousness, and committeth iniquity, in his trespass and in his sin, in them shall he die.' The righteous, therefore, who shall be blessed forever, are those who persevere in well doing; and the wicked who are doomed to suffer forever, are those who persevere in vice. Blessing is here evidently made to depend on virtue, and suffering on vice; and the continuation of bliss or suffering on man's persevering in virtue or in vice. The great practical truth, then, contained in all those passages, is simply this; that perpetual happiness is the certain reward of persevering virtue, and perpetual misery the certain punishment of continued vice. This is true already in this life, with regard to our moral pleasures and pains; and will be true with regard to our condition in general, in the life to come. The perseverance itself, whether in virtue or vice, depends and must always depend, upon our own free will.

Angels may fall through sin; and if angels can fall, they can also rise again through virtue. When the rich man in the parable,* asked for himself only one drop of that abundance

* Luke xvi.

which the beggar Lazarus enjoyed, his request was denied, because he claimed a gratification he had not deserved. But though in his lifetime he had not treated Lazarus as a brother, there was a spark of true affection in his soul, an anxious thought of his five brothers in his father's house; and the torments which had not consumed, but brought to light this precious remnant of humanity in him, were surely intended to aid him in purifying his whole being. The shepherd will go in search of the sheep that has gone astray; and will a father's heart be inaccessible to the prayer of a penitent child, though it rise from the abyss of self-created misery? Nay, the son of perdition, with the undying worm in his heart, if he strive, and strain to the utmost all the immortal energies of his nature, to wrestle with his own fiendish self, and lay hold of the altar of refuge, the seat of unbounded mercy, will surely see the ray of salvation dawn upon the night of his despair, and the psalm of thanksgiving will burst from his heart,—‘If I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there!’

I would say, then, in the words of scripture, ‘Happy is the man whom the Lord correcteth.’—‘As a man chasteneth his son, so the Lord thy God chasteneth thee.’

The manner in which a person bears the rewards or punishments awarded to him, forms the subject of further retribution; and thus, not only is the present life a state of probation for the future, not only is the future a state of retribution for the present; but every moment is a preparation for the future, as it is the reward of the past. Our whole existence is a state of perpetual probation, and of continual adequate retribution. The perpetuity of the moral state of man, is a necessary consequence of the immortality of his moral being, the loss of which would imply that of his identity, and consequently of his immortality. For if we believe the soul of man eternal, we must suppose that throughout eternity he will be essentially the same being.

In this respect, also, will the divine judgment probably correspond with that of our own conscience;—that every one shall be judged, not only for single actions or omissions, but for the moral character he forms by a continued performance or neglect of his duty. We shall have to render an account for the moral progress we have made, or neglected to make, during certain seasons of probation. The present life is, to those who have experienced most of its vicissitudes, such a season

of moral probation, for which they will be called to an account in the judgments of God. Those who, by an early death, or by other circumstances, are prevented from forming a moral character in this life, will not be left without an opportunity of deserving, as well as enjoying, the happiness for which they were created. Thus, for every season of moral probation, man will have to look forward to a day of judgment.

If the above views of future retribution are correct, they establish a harmony in all the cases in which the power of dispensing rewards and punishments is exercised. All that is sacred and dear to man is secured by this invaluable trust, that God is just, that he will judge the world according to the same principles of retributive justice by which each individual judges himself through his own conscience; the same principles by which parents should be guided in the education of their children, and men in society. Man is to be judged only for such actions or omissions as depend on his own choice. His rewards and punishments are to be in exact proportion to his good or ill desert, and calculated for his moral improvement.

On the contrary, if we suppose that God will judge men in the future, according to different principles from those by which they do, or ought to, judge themselves in the present life, we destroy the natural connexion between our social duties and religion. If there be such a difference between divine and human justice, it is impossible that our various social relations should derive from religion that sanction and strength, which we justly consider as the invisible and eternal security of the life of man in society. How can the just man trust in God, how can the unjust fear him, if justice and morality are not essentially the same in heaven and on earth? It is vain to expect that a view to the life to come, will induce men to conform their present condition to the dictates of justice, if they suppose that God will judge men without regard to the ability of each individual to perform his obligations, and the degree of his merit or guilt; and that he will reward or punish them for any other purpose, or in any other manner, than what is calculated to do justice to the moral nature of his immortal children. The ancient Greeks and Romans, while their public affairs were regulated, in a great measure, by principles of justice, continued to worship a host of gods charged with actions which would have banished them from the sacred home of civil freedom. The gods they worshipped could be no longer to them standards

of conduct, models for imitation; and this want of a rational faith in the existence of sovereign justice, proved a more fatal enemy to the freedom of the ancient world, than all the successful craft and violence of its great tyrants. Such has been, and such must be, the fate of every nation whose ideas of the character of God and the duty and destiny of man are not more exalted than their own actual state of improvement; whose practical and living creed is not founded on the belief that God is just, and will do justice to the free and ever-growing nature, and the moral character of man.

Is it said that the scriptures frequently speak of divine justice in terms which do not agree with the essential requisites of perfect human justice? The scriptures establish and enforce the eternal principles of retributive justice; but they are often clothed in figurative language, calculated to render them plain and impressive, particularly to the primitive hearers and readers of the word. But these figurative illustrations were surely not intended to be taken for the eternal truths themselves, and thus to become instruments of a strange idolatry of scripture words and images.—The race of Greece was run when those noble pioneers of knowledge and freedom, instead of consulting the revelation of truth and of glory in the inexhaustible resources and endless strivings of the soul, worshipped their own greatness and the idol representatives of their passions and fancies. And the doom of Christendom is sealed, if Christians, instead of grounding their faith upon the simple principles of moral and religious truth which are promulgated alike in nature and scripture, insist upon worshipping the imagery of scripture language, and their own creed—thus setting up the temporary result of their own investigation, or indolent assent, as the unalterable, universal, and infallible platform of faith and practice.

These are some of the fundamental provisions of that charter of freedom which God has established in human nature. High in the firmament of the human mind, he has placed the sun of righteousness, to rise and to set at our own bidding. He has entrusted us with the great seal of our own destiny, with the power to establish our own perpetual misery by continuing in wickedness, or to lay hold on eternal life by perseverance in well doing.

In the foregoing observations on the future state of man,

I have endeavoured to consider all the constituent powers and most important manifestations of his nature. It was my intention to enter, and to lead my readers more deeply, into that revelation of the future state of man which every one possesses in his actual being. If our views of the life to come are founded upon what is real and essential in our present being, there is little danger of running into unprofitable dreams of a passive state of rapture or torment, without a moral object, and consequently without a satisfactory influence upon our present conduct. I have spoken separately of the body and of the mind of man, with its chief faculties, the intellect, the affections, and the moral powers. I have spoken first of the future state of each faculty by itself, and then of the attainments we make by exercising it in this life. This separate consideration of the various constituents of human nature, seemed necessary in order to be definite and distinct on each subject. But it is impossible to form a correct view of any part or power of man, without considering it in connexion with all the other faculties and attainments which centre in each human being as one immortal self.

I have not expressed in this article the opinions of any sect or party, but simply my own particular views.* However I may have failed of doing justice to the subject, I am conscious that my only object has been that which was expressed in the great question of Pilate. I now commit this humble effort to that spirit to which Christ committed the solution of that question.

ART. II.—*The Westminster Confession of Faith, with the Larger and Shorter Catechisms.*

WE place this book at the head of an essay upon early religious instruction, not because we mean to have any direct reference to its pages, but because we consider it the parent of most of the errors existing on that most interesting subject.

* The principles contained in this article I first advanced in a treatise 'On the Destiny of Man,' published 1823, in the two first numbers of the *Literary Journal of the University of Bale*.

At least we are not acquainted with any other work, which has had so extensive an influence, and we think it cannot fail to bear us out in any representations of erroneous practice on this subject, which we may feel obliged to notice.

Much has been said of late on the topic of education; and improvements are continually making in the adaptation of elementary instruction particularly to the infant mind. Yet there is one most important branch of instruction, which still seems enveloped in difficulty and darkness. The best mode of imparting religious and moral truth to children in their earliest years, is yet a subject of anxious inquiry. There must be a way, and there is undoubtedly a way, to bring up our children in the 'nurture and admonition of the Lord.' But what that way is, we believe is as yet as unsettled a question in intellectual and moral science as has ever been proposed. There cannot be one more interesting. For that there has been a general failure in giving children such religious impressions as exert a happy influence on their hearts and conduct, we think the experience of almost every one will bear witness. The cause of this failure may be a profitable subject of inquiry; and if it be found to exist in erroneous notions generally prevalent, an exposure of these errors is the first step towards the discovery we are so anxious to attain.

The whole bearing of the religious instruction of children, is, and ever has been, rather to keep them from sinning, than to inspire them with motives to virtue, and to aid them in its acquisition. This has given the subject its sombre and unlovely aspect to them; and the whole system of associations must be changed, before it can become a grateful one to the heart of a child. Most of us can remember, that our earliest religious impressions were the gloomiest we ever knew; utterly repugnant to our nature, ruinous to all our innocent enjoyments; and we have longed to deliver our own children from similar perversions. But how to make them feel religious sanctions without occasioning this distaste, has been a source of anxious, and we might almost say, fruitless experiment; nor have we received much assistance from the sermons, theories, and numberless other attempts to make the matter more easy.

To us it appears, that the grand difficulty lies at the very starting point. As we have intimated, the aim from the beginning should be, not to lay the foundation of religion in its terrors to evil doers, but in its encouragements and rewards to

those who do well. That its efficacy would thus be diminished, no one who has had any acquaintance with children, can suppose. For while all the ardor of their spirits is at once aroused by a motive which strikes them agreeably, it is but a sullen or unwilling, far indeed from a joyous obedience, which they ever give to a threatened punishment. Our meaning may be illustrated by a familiar example.

A child, so young as scarcely to be able to discern between truth and falsehood, speaks them indiscriminately. By way of correction, the parent begins by telling him it is wrong to lie, and he must not do it. But, forgetting the line upon line and precept upon precept which she bestows on his other faults, and looking on this in the child, in the same light that she would regard it in the man, she becomes seriously alarmed by its repetition, and determines to make a final effort to subdue it, not as she would do did she consider the sin against her own commands merely—by a resort to Solomon's advice, but by bringing before his quick imagination the awful tribunal of God, against whom the offence is committed. She takes him on her knee with tender concern, tells him first the story of Ananias and Sapphira, and then teaches him to repeat that hymn of Watts's, which represents God with his 'great book,' in which he 'writes every lie that children tell,' and ends with

'————— every liar
Shall have his portion in the lake
Which burns with brimstone and with fire.'

She has done her work indeed! The child, in deadly terror, never tells another lie. But alas! at what an expense has she laid the foundation of truth in that child's mind. She may labor to make him love his God, but she will labor in vain. He may strive in maturer life for that love which casteth out fear, but never, until the day when God shall wipe all tears from our eyes, shall he see him as he is; never, till that hour, will that mortal heart be free from the fearful impression. Thus a hearty dislike to the thought of God is unwittingly implanted with the earliest religious lesson that childhood receives; and when the parent discovers it, she sets it down as a legitimate inheritance from Adam and Eve. But the truth is, that, if children could love the picture of God which is first given them in this way, it would be the strongest argument we could have of their native depravity. For what must be the original constitution of a mind, which would turn with involuntary af-

fection to a being whose prevailing trait to them is power, whose favorite exercise of that power is the punishment of sinners, and whose image is ever before them, with his great book, where he writes down all their sins, and his dreadful lake of fire and brimstone, where he punishes them?

Is it said this is a partial and unfair statement; that every parent also presents the benevolent exhibitions of divine power? So they may, and so they undoubtedly do present them. But are they felt by their children as this is felt? By no means. The loveliness of all created nature has no power to charm them, while a scene like this is before their imaginations; and joyful would they be to hear, that such a potentate had withdrawn all his care from them, or to be assured that he had retired from his seat of judgment, and changed his lake into a fairer region. And can any one suppose they would be less likely to obey and love him after this relief to their minds?

We know it will be said, But is not this the gospel, and shall we not give our children a knowledge of the truth? To those who consider this language as figurative, we would say, that in giving it to their children, they do not teach them the truth; for they will understand in its most literal sense, what is only figuratively true. To those who consider it literal, we would point to our Saviour's example. He has sufficiently explained to us that young children are not subjects of the denunciations of the gospel; and to apply to them those terrors which he presented to the hardened sinners and accomplished hypocrites of that day, is a monstrous perversion of his example and teaching, and might well be attended by those pernicious consequences which have so abundantly followed from it. Here we receive a powerful condemnation;—‘Of such is the kingdom of heaven;’ and ‘Whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child,’ is explicit language, and, if it means anything, implies that a child's heart is not the abode of hellish passions, and no subject for hellish terrors, but that it is prepared by the hand of its Creator for all the happy influences of his religion.

Perhaps we have dwelt too long on this most glaring of all the errors with which this subject is embarrassed. There are others of a milder and less obvious character, which require our consideration. Although there may be some who have escaped this extreme, and many who do not resort to alarms

in the teaching of their children, we suspect that even they have felt, that the impressions they have given of God are far from inspiring filial love. One error of this sort is the confused and indefinite idea of God, which is forced into their minds by what seems to us the mere effect of acting according to popular custom, without a thought of its propriety. In all other departments of instruction, what is to be taught is reduced to its simplest elements, and imparted to the child as he is able to receive it. But with religion, everything is attempted at once. God's power, his omniscience, his omnipresence, his anger, his love, and his hatred, are all presented to him by turns, without a thought of what he is likely to make of all these terms, not one of which conveys to his mind any clear conception. All is done as if in this matter there was to be no progression, as if that science by whose light the human intellect is to be brought to its full developement, was to be opened at once to a child's feeble powers. But is it not manifest that this confused and incomprehensible abstraction, can never be the object of the affections of a child, even though it be attended by some just and affecting delineations of the divine character?

Nearly allied to this is the practice of teaching children 'the doctrines,' as they are called. This error tends to the same confusion as the last, and seems to originate in the same inconsiderate disregard of what a child is able to grasp. In advertising to it, we must notice a prevailing practice at the present day, of crowding children's books, of every description, with all the mysteries of the Calvinistic faith. It is not as differing from their writers in regard to these points, that we now speak. As to the doctrines themselves, they may be true or they may be false, their tendency may be salutary or it may be pernicious. This is a separate point, and one on which men differ. But in their relation to the present subject, we think every candid and discriminating parent will agree with us, that their truth or falsehood may be put out of the question. Whether true or false, they are alike injurious. To inculcate them, is to give incomprehensible matter for religion and as food for the infant mind and heart.

We have remarked, that the child's mind is treated as fit for the whole counsel of God, when all other subjects are simplified for it to the last degree, and to prove that it is so, we need but point to one of a thousand instances in the books to which we have alluded. It is a primer of Mrs Sherwood's; and we

choose this lady's writings as an example, because she is one of the most interesting writers for children with whom we are acquainted. Her style is simple and touching, her story well planned, her moral conspicuous, her characters natural, her incidents well chosen. She shows a perception almost miraculous of the motives which are apt to influence children, and has a rare skill in making the good attractive and the evil shunned; all, in a word, resulting in a powerful moral effect, and all made of no value to those who disapprove her doctrines, or are unwilling to abuse their children's minds by giving them words without knowledge. A technical and obscure theology is so intimately interwoven with the whole, that no reflecting parent, certainly no Unitarian parent, would be willing that his child should read her works. But to return to our subject and the primer. It begins with the A, B, C; advances as a child must advance, and finishes with a simple story of easy words, well divided to introduce him to the mystery of sentences, but in which the right preparation for heaven is communicated in this very edifying manner;—'Those who are wash-ed in the blood of Je-sus Christ, will be ta-ken to heav-en when they die; but those who are not, will be cast into out-er dark-ness.' It would seem like irreverence to set down, in plain terms, what a child's interpretation of this language would be; not to speak of the uselessness of such teaching for any practical purpose. But in truth, this is nothing, compared with the flood of absurd technicalities which is poured forth from the Sunday School Union press, in thousands of volumes measuring two inches by four, and containing from twelve to fourteen pages, detailing in the simplest language the history of a lamb or a violet, and at the same time artfully presenting the doctrines of original sin, total depravity, salvation by grace, the atonement, trinity, &c., and that, too, in good theological terms. In examining these infant manuals, we have been at a loss which most to admire; the skill with which all this august matter is incorporated into such a body, or the inconceivable folly of supposing that the mind of a child can thus be impressed with christian feelings, christian motives, or christian hopes.

To illustrate the absurdity of this practice, we need but exalt any other science to the importance of religion, and suppose it subjected to the same process. Let us take grammar, for instance, and imagine it to unfold truths all important to our welfare, and the first to be communicated to our children. What should

we say of the person, who, taking Murray's Abridgement for his manual, should begin with 'orthography, etymology, syntax, and prosody,' and should look for practical results from such explanations as 'common names of substantives stand for kinds containing many sorts, and for sorts containing many individuals under them?' But more than all, should we think it a sign of a corrupt nature, if this teaching were not agreeable to the taste of the child; and if under it his mind and heart should not expand into their full and beautiful proportions? Ah! well do we remember the despair with which we learned by heart this obscure treatise for the twentieth time, without the slightest idea of its application to any earthly purpose, and the grateful joy with which we welcomed the friendly kindness which first took compassion on us, and, by adapting the subject to our capacity, brought light out of darkness, and order from this confusion. And is not the analogy between these two cases perfect?

But the grand inconsistency of the religious teaching we have alluded to, is, that its very first lesson is a 'new heart.' But if this were a matter of easy acquisition—and we do not see how it can be attempted by a child—it might still be a question, whether it would not be easier, more natural and reasonable, if the teaching were adapted to the heart, rather than the heart to the teaching. The day will come, and we wish it might be hastened, when that which has so long been thought a natural barrier to the entrance of religion into the child's mind, will be found the work of man, not of God. The same being made the heart, that made the laws by which that heart should be governed. They are fitted to each other by a master's hand; and distorted indeed is that perception, which fails to see their perfect adaptation to each other. The religion of the gospel is the true element of our moral growth,—the principle by whose energy all the elements of virtue and moral beauty which constitute the human soul, are to be developed and matured. We must see this, and consider religion as something to be used for the accomplishment of an intelligent purpose, before we can know its real value and design. We are not to regard it as something tangible to be given to our children; but as the means in our own hands by which their purposes are to be made habitually virtuous, and their affections secured to such objects as are pure and elevating in their nature;—or, in other words, the means by which they may learn to love God, and obey his commands.

This, then, is the simple result of our religion ;—that love of God which leads to obedience. If, therefore, we can inspire our children with this sentiment, and give them a practical understanding of the christian law of duty, we have a sufficient basis for a christian character. Let us then confine ourselves to these two purposes, and strive to accommodate our instructions to their capacity of understanding, always bearing in mind the natural developement of their faculties, and the principle of improvement on which we depend in teaching them any other subject. Whatever religious impressions we attempt to make on their minds, without reference to these points, either by narratives from the bible or otherwise, tend to confuse them, and are detrimental. If this view be correct, we see that all the ‘distinguishing doctrines,’ as they are called, are alike unfit for our purpose. Even the acknowledged attributes of God must be unfolded to children gradually, and as we see they are needed to promote our ultimate design. By an injudicious use of truth, we may do as much injury as by false representations. By teaching truths really adapted to their age and wants, without a full consideration of the impression which associated circumstances will cause them to make on their minds, we may likewise defeat our own purposes.

For instance, if we first give children a sense of God’s omnipresence, to alarm them, this truth will not aid our endeavours to make them love him ; whereas, by making it their protection in fearful circumstances, or their encouragement in well doing, it will become a welcome and endearing truth. Our first object, as we have said, is to inspire a love of God. Then let our representations of his character be such as shall be captivating to the imagination of childhood. We must watch and improve every opportunity to create a decidedly pleasing idea of God in the child’s mind. It need not be an idea which would bear the test of metaphysical demonstration. It need not be free from associations of human form and person ; for the child will give the human or some other form to God. We must not feel as if we degraded the subject when we suffer it to be thus accommodated to the infancy of life. Is it not by images of sensible objects that the invisible things of God and heaven are communicated to men ? When all the gorgeous imagery of the new Jerusalem—gold, sapphire, and precious stones, is used to describe to us the heavenly country, as better calculated to impress us with a sense of its surpassing beauty

than any delineations of a spiritual nature would be, shall we hesitate to apply the same method to the child's understanding? Will a being who can as yet scarcely perceive the preeminence of truth over falsehood, receive any very captivating impression of God by being told of his moral perfections? But it may be said, Our first teaching is of his care. We would ask if even this may not be premature, so long as the very young child can conceive of no other agency in its supplies, than that of its earthly parents? We do indeed forget, in this matter, that our children are progressive beings; that the knowledge we wish to give them must be communicated by little and little; that its gradual development must be nicely adjusted to their opening faculties; that their imagination is first to be addressed, their affections next; and that the conscience and understanding are objects of later culture.

One of the first opportunities that a parent has, to communicate the idea of God to her child, is suggested by the child itself. Among its earliest delights are flowers. It reaches with avidity towards a blossom, and when possessed, tears it in pieces with what seems to us senseless folly; and we wonder, that, desiring it so much, it values it so little. But the child is wiser in his generation than we, and takes his enjoyment of the flower in the only way it can yield him pleasure. By and by he holds it in his hand for a long time, or sticks it in his shoes, or frolics about, wearing it as an enviable decoration. But soon a new capacity begins to dawn, and he says, Who made this flower? It is well if in our answer we can confine ourselves to the suggestion of wisdom intimated by the question, and when again he demands, Who is God? refrain from such a description of his works as shall overawe the little mind of the being that is now to receive its first impression. How natural to say—He made the sun and moon and the sky, the earth and everything you can see! And yet how injudicious! since at no age is the idea of inconceivable power unattended by dread. No; let the rose content us; it is enough. You may satisfy his curiosity to know how he made it, without being able to satisfy your own. Tell him that God made him; and he made the rose to give him pleasure. That he made it grow out of the ground; for God can do such things, though men and women cannot. Show him the beautiful color of the blossom, and tell him that no man could paint it so; but that God puts all these colors in the air, and that there he makes them shine on

the leaves and flowers, just as he thinks it best for their beauty, giving to some flowers one color and to others another. Tell him, too, that he gives the flowers their different odors, just as he gives them their colors, and does it all to please us. The material world furnishes the child with his first wonders, and furnishes you with ample materials for giving him pleasing impressions of its Maker. Aim at nothing further until this is done. It will prove the best foundation of filial love. And though it seem to you but a glimpse of his least magnificent attribute, and conveyed in language all unworthy of the subject, yet you may recollect that it is all the child can comprehend, and that it is a ray of that light, however feeble, which shall shine more and more unto the perfect day.

Then the duties of Christianity, how are they to be inculcated? This field in early life is very narrow. One or two precepts are all we can profitably apply to young children; and perhaps we need state no other as an example, than that they 'should do to others as they would that others should do to them.'—This, and others like it, they can be taught to understand and practise as soon as they begin to associate with other children. But this and other principles of action should be given them, not as matters of propriety, or of choice, but with authority, as admitting of no appeal. As they emerge from childhood, they will become fit subjects of that 'perfect law' under whose influence their character is to acquire its true value. And here occurs the grand mistake, which has always prevailed, of making this law spiritless and uninspiring, and thus unattractive to the youthful disposition. And is the genius of the christian law such as of necessity makes it unwelcome to the natural ardor of the youthful spirit? Is the character of its great teacher really destitute of those inspiring traits, which always recommend themselves to their quick and soaring imaginations? We think in both these cases we shall find that the fault lies neither in the subject nor in the being to be affected by it, but that they naturally possess a much happier adaptation to each other, than is generally imagined. We think the subject capable of assuming a very inspiring character to the apprehensions of youth.

The rules of christian duty should be imparted to children in strict connexion with the character of Jesus Christ. But nothing has suffered more than this very character, from mean and unworthy representations. Children are told that he was meek and lowly, and this is about the extent of

their notion concerning him. That it should not be very captivating, is not strange; for if they have any definite idea of these qualities, it is probably derived from some good old woman of their acquaintance, who suffers uncomplainingly, and who, though justly entitled to the praise of emulating her Saviour's spirit, is not the illustration best calculated to recommend him to their imitation or their respect. Let them but see him standing forth among men, his brow clothed with the mild majesty of the Prince of Peace, awfully unapproachable to the proud and hypocritical Pharisee from the open manliness and conscious purity which made him feel how awful goodness is,—yet saying to the sincere and timid, 'Come unto me, for I am meek and lowly in heart,' and we venture to say that the picture and sentiment together, will awaken a chord of pure and ardent feeling, if struck before the heart has become unstrung by perverted teaching. Let them see him invested with all power from God, and left to use it at his own pleasure. He can take the sovereignty of the world to himself. He can sway a universal sceptre over the nations. He can make kings bow, and princes yield him service, 'and exalt himself above the stars of God.' But behold! all the forms of human suffering are before him; the sick—and he can say to disease, Depart! the blind—to the sightless ball he can unveil the visible world; the afflicted—his word can raise the dead, and cause the widow's heart to sing for joy; the deaf—his voice can reach the ear which never heard a sound; the lame—he can bid him walk; the lunatic—he can say to the distracted elements of his brain, Peace, be still! He sees the bondage of cruel despotism blinding men's minds, and immortal souls brought under the slavery of degrading error;—he can open to them the light of heavenly truth. He sees the poor without a beam of mercy to cheer their adversity, with no hope but the grave;—he can tell them of a better country, even a heavenly. He can prove to them, and to all, that the grave shall give up the dead; for he has power to lay down his own life, and he has power to take it again. His choice is made. He enters on his work. He faints not, neither is weary. He scorns to waste an effort to provide for his own comfort. Though he has not where to lay his head, it matters not—he can make thousands of pillows happy, which have been long wet with unavailing tears, and this is rest to him!

Who will say that this representation is not for the spirit of

youth? It will waken an enthusiasm equal at least to any glow which ever followed the actions of the heroes of this world; and it will no longer seem to them a spiritless employment 'to go about doing good.' And then, where will you point them to a picture of the moral sublime, which shall kindle a warmer admiration than his example—the living letter of his instruction? 'Resist not evil.' No rule of his has been thought more abject than this. But let them see him at the close of his labors, when the crisis of his fate approached, contemplating that fate with mortal agony, as combining the most dreadful bodily torture with every wound to the spirit which an ignominious death ever inflicted,—yet, because he saw in it the consummation of his usefulness to mankind, going forth to meet it with a calm self-possession, unshaken by the prophetic view of all that awaited him; standing before an iniquitous judgment seat with the noble bearing which on another occasion had cast the rough soldiers at his feet, and in the face of mockery and insult thinking of no injury but that which those deluded and miserable beings were bringing on themselves;—and will an uncorrupted youth blush to be found imitating such an example as this? No—the principle thus carried out by him, will seem to him as it is—exalted, ennobling! But it must be taught before he has learned a different lesson from the world. And with such a view of the real greatness of our Saviour's character, how will he be likely to study the thousand incidents of his life, every one of which goes to aid this glorious impression! His last interview with his disciples before he suffered, what sort of feeling will it be likely to awaken in the heart of a generous youth? Not that sickly sensibility which overflows at the detail of disappointed love or ambition. It will be a deep-toned and healthful sympathy, so full of admiration of the disinterested fortitude displayed, that, were it not for the touching tenderness of his manner to his friends, the starting tear would be of high and gratified emotion, rather than of sorrow. And are these indeed the emotions of which the opening heart of youth shall be ashamed?—We shall search the world in vain for a subject half so inspiring. Let the young come to the contemplation of this sublime character free from unworthy prepossessions and mean prejudices, and it will be their delight.

It is manifest that the religious teaching of our children needs only to be subjected to a rational consideration, to become easy

and efficient. And it is time to give it a chance to act on the human character, and accomplish the work whereunto it was sent. Must it be the very last subject to be delivered from the errors of former ages? Certain it is, that, until it is rightly inculcated in childhood and youth, it will never have its true influence on individuals or society. Alas! where is the heart that is subject to the pervading light of Christianity? It does but touch the mountain tops, and glance an occasional doubtful beam upon the vallies. Many are the deep ravines which never felt its cheering warmth, many the deep forests which lift an impervious barrier to its rays, and great the extent of fallow ground not yet laid open to its quickening influence.

ART. III.—*A Memoir of the Rev. Edward Payson, D. D. late Pastor of the Second Church in Portland.* Portland, Shirley & Hyde, 1830. 12mo. pp. 444.

MANY of our readers must have seen, and all probably have heard of a little book, very popular among our Calvinistic brethren, entitled Scott's Force of Truth. It professes to record the workings of the author's mind on the subject of christian theology, and the motives which induced him to renounce the speculative notions of his early life, which he calls Socinian, for the rigorous tenets of another stamp, distinguished, by a curious misnomer, as the Doctrines of Grace. The work is plausibly drawn up; and the writer's impressions are cited as proofs of the truth and excellence of Calvinism.

From the confessions of Scott, nevertheless, it is apparent that, prior to his asserted conversion, he was careless of all religion. He saw the power of religious principle manifested in the life and conversation of his friend, Mr Newton; and, struck with the guilt of his own unfaithfulness in the contrast, both as a Christian and a minister, he opened his heart to the solemn counsels of so impressive a teacher, and received implicitly, along with his practical charges, his scheme of doctrinal divinity. Enthusiastic by temperament, his mind was a fit soil to nourish the growth of prejudice. He espoused with zeal the views of the 'evangelic' party of the church; and his studies and efforts were subsequently applied both to fortify in his own bosom the faith he had chosen, and to recommend and press it on the souls

of others. His *Force of Truth* was designed to promote the latter object ; and, published in a cheap and convenient form, it has been extensively circulated.

But much about the time that Thomas Scott became a convert to Calvinism, there was a change quite as marvellous, though in the opposite direction, which another mind was undergoing,—a mind at least equally conscientious, but of superior powers, cooler judgment, and far deeper erudition ;—we allude to the case of Theophilus Lindsey. He was vicar of Catterick in Yorkshire, and on entering the church had subscribed without question the established statutes of faith. But he did not afterwards shut up his convictions in the creed which he had acknowledged. He used his right as a Protestant, to examine scriptural truth for himself. The doctrines of the church he carefully collated with the statements of the Bible. For the better interpretation of the latter, he put in requisition the abounding stores of judicious criticism ; and, after diligent investigation, continued, not for a few weeks or months, but years, he was convinced that Unitarianism was the doctrine of the scriptures.

With these sentiments Mr Lindsey felt that he could no longer retain his connexion with the established church. Yet to relinquish his living, to be turned adrift upon a wide and heartless world, to encounter the expostulations of some, the contempt of others, the wonder of all,—these were severe trials. If disposed to follow examples too common among men, he might have administered a liturgy construed with mental reservations, and remained in the bosom of the church. But his conscience rose superior to all subterfuges, and, tearing himself from a beloved and affectionate flock, he committed his cause and the keeping of his temporal interests to the one adorable Being, in whom he reposed a believer's hope. Under the title of an *Apology*, he published the reasons which produced his change of sentiment, and an account of the sacrifices which it involved. This was followed by another work of equal merit, called the *Sequel*. The two books offer a masterly vindication of the great principles of Unitarianism ; yet while Scott's *Force of Truth* has passed through scores of impressions, Lindsey's *Apology* and *Sequel* have barely reached a second edition.

Let any one, however, compare the works and the circumstances which occasioned them, and say whether, if the authority of names can recommend a party, the advantage is not preem-

inently with that which enrols the name of Lindsey. We rejoice as we admit, that this excellent man rose afterwards to honor and preferment in the ranks of Liberal Dissenters. But when with a bleeding heart he left his humble charge at Catterick, he could not have anticipated the distinction he reached in later life. The congregation with which he subsequently became connected, did not then exist. Unitarianism was as yet in an humble condition. But Lindsey lived to behold a signal measure of success crowning his personal exertions. He saw the victorious march begun of those Liberal principles which have since been pressing with tremendous vigor on the old time-bowed theology of the Genevan school, and which are commissioned, we trust in God, to extirpate its influence from the entire Protestant world.

But it is not on the authority of names that we would rest the merits of any sect. We protest against the servile deference which is paid to them by too many in the religious community. And we have cited the case of Lindsey only to show, that the countenance, which the numerous memoirs put forth by the Calvinistic fraternity, may be thought to offer to the truth of their system, can be easily countervailed by the personal history of individuals of very opposite minds.

It was with pain we perceived, on inspecting the Memoir whose title we have placed at the head of this article, that the late Dr Payson must be added to the list of those, who, throughout an active ministerial life, have opposed Liberal Christianity, and asserted the exclusive excellence of Calvinism, with no competent knowledge of the weightier points at issue. His soul, from the dawn of its perceptions, was preoccupied with the tenets of the theology, which in the season of manhood he strenuously advocated; and he seems to have recoiled from adverse scrutiny, lest his faith therein might by any means be shaken or disturbed. In a biography compiled by a professed friend and admirer, the admissions of such a state of mind might be expected to be few; yet enough is offered to make good our remark.

In a letter written by this gentleman near the close of his preparatory studies for the pulpit, we find him saying,—‘One thing I wish not to be thought, and that is what is commonly called a *rational* Christian, an epithet which is almost synonymous with no Christian. Liberal divines are pretty much of the same character.’ *

* Memoir, p. 64. The emphatic words are printed as they were originally underscored. Of course, there can be no mistake as respects their intended application.

From this it might be inferred, first, that Christianity, in the writer's estimation, is an irrational scheme of doctrine, and though communicated from the Father of Lights, and addressed to creatures inspired with understanding, it is a mystery which falls not within the compass of their intelligence; and secondly, that free inquiry in matters of religion, expressed by the word *Liberality*, is no prerogative of mortals, although guarantied, we had supposed, both by Protestant and evangelical sanction. The writer of such a sentiment was in little danger of suffering from either of the imputations which he deprecated; and as for those who bear the reproach, they may console themselves with remembering that it was a greater than Calvin who came to preach deliverance to the captive, by unchaining the bondage of the mind, and whose apostle has said, 'That where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty.'

The effect of a rooted repugnance to investigation, in the bosom of the young theologian, as intimated in the foregoing extract, we have exhibited to us in a precious confession which occurs in his Diary of a later date. We wonder that it should have been made public.—'Sat up till 2 o'clock at night, talking with Mr — on religious subjects. Found that he had more to say in defence of Unitarianism than I could have *supposed*.' (p. 75.) This, coupled with other declarations which we forbear in this place to quote, sufficiently discloses the cloudy medium through which he was wont to look on a scheme of religion which he zealously combated through life, as though he had demonstrated its arrant falsity. But it is time that we introduce the subject of the Memoir more formally to the notice of our readers.

Edward Payson was born in Rindge, New Hampshire, in July, 1783. His father was pastor of the Congregational church in that village,—a worthy man of respectable endowments, and a staunch Calvinist. The mother was a rigid religionist of the same class. She took this son under her special tutelage, and 'though,' affirms his biographer, 'she was solicitous that he might be liberally educated, yet the supreme, the all-absorbing concern of her soul, was, that he might become a child of God.' Of course, she believed that this character could be formed only on Calvinistic rules.

The boy was tractable and affectionate, and, as he grew in years, displayed considerable quickness of penetration, though his turn of mind was more imaginative than exact. He was sus-

ceptible of strong and hasty impulses, and was rather the creature of feeling than of judgment. Both constitutionally and as the effect of training in domestic seclusion, he was reserved in his general intercourse. His affections wanted expansiveness from his youth up. They were driven in and exerted with great force, indeed, on his nearest natural kindred; but abroad, he seemed to walk as it were alone, holding little communion or sympathy with the mass of society. His manners were accordingly marked by an embarrassing shyness, which never left him, but which by no means implied a distrust of his own personal merits. On the contrary, we think it to be regretted that Mr Payson, when a young man, was not brought into more immediate contact with his fellows in years, that, measuring himself by them, he might have formed a truer estimate of reciprocal claims to consideration. The stripling, bashful and timid in the company of strangers, is not always the most self-diffident. If his habits be the result of a retired education, he is apt to overvalue himself with respect to qualifications and attainments in which others on comparison might be found materially to excel him.

In 1800, having completed his seventeenth year, Mr Payson entered Harvard College at an advanced standing, being passed as Sophomore. His tastes and habits having previously acquired a strong bias, no sensible change in his manners or deportment was wrought by his residence at the University. He lived for the most part aloof from his classmates; and from the testimony of his biographer, he does not appear to have signalized himself in the branches of study prescribed by the Faculty.—‘He was regarded,’ we are told, ‘as no more than a decent scholar by his associates and teachers at College.’—‘Nor is it remembered that there was any public recognition of distinguished merit in him at the time he commenced bachelor of arts.’ However, he was reputed at the University to be ‘a great reader,’—a distinction which the Memoir judiciously qualifies by observing, that he bore it in common with thousands who are not the wiser for their reading.

Shortly after leaving Cambridge, he took charge of an academy established in Portland, in which he continued for three years. We have understood that he owed this appointment mainly to the kind offices of the clergyman with whom he was subsequently associated as junior pastor, and of whose pulpit he became at length the exclusive proprietor. That friend little imagined that this act of benevolence was the first

step in a series of occurrences, which was to result in a personal calamity which has never since ceased to follow him with its disastrous visitations.

During the early part of his residence in Portland, Mr Payson displayed himself in a novel character. He entered with a zest 'as exquisite as the most hearty devotee,' into such 'amusements' as were fashionable or were deemed 'reputable.' What these amusements were, we do not learn. If they fell under the class of dissipations, then surely they were reprehensible. But these, we believe, would hardly be deemed 'reputable' among a people of such high moral sense as the inhabitants of Portland, and by no means would they have been tolerated in a preceptor of youth. If therefore by 'amusements' we are to understand the innocent pleasures of social and lively meetings, we think that an occasional indulgence in them continued through life, would have exercised a salutary influence on a temperament like that of Mr Payson.

We are no friends to religious austerity, and as for a monkish distaste to the social pleasures, we find no countenance for it, either in the precepts or the example of our Saviour. Jesus himself mixed daily and habitually in the world, chose unto himself a few bosom companions with whom he might open his soul in the freedom of intimacy, and at other times, whether as at the marriage festival in Cana, or seated as a guest at the table of an opulent publican, or as an occasional visitant in the well-loved abode of a friend in Bethany,—he indulged in the flow of generous sympathies, and honored and blessed the exercise of the social charities.

It was not long before Mr Payson relapsed into his former habits. He came at last 'to dread an invitation to a social party, though he had reason to expect there nothing directly offensive to his religious feelings.' And thus his mind, naturally somewhat morbid, was placed in circumstances not only unfriendly to the culture of inward cheerfulness, but conducive to dispositions at variance with the principles of enlightened philanthropy. His judgment of men and things was proportionately narrowed; and whatever other attainments may be conceded to Mr Payson, we certainly cannot assert for him the merit either of a candid survey, or even correct knowledge of the world.

Leaving his charge as teacher at Portland, Mr Payson, in August, 1806, returned to his father's residence in New Hampshire. He there devoted himself, in strict retirement, to the

initiatory studies for the christian ministry. In the spring of the following year he was deemed qualified for the responsible duties of his profession. Being presented as a candidate in form for the sanction of a pastoral association in his neighbourhood, he received from them a license to preach.

That he entered on the ministerial office with fervor of heart and purpose, is abundantly evident. That he had been diligent in appropriating the little time which he had allotted for preparatory work, is equally clear. But whether his studies were comprehensive or thorough, we have some reason to doubt. Among the notices of his life, our judgment is left to be formed from two passages,—one from the pen of the editor, the other from that of Mr Payson himself. The first, besides the valuable *Tracts of Watson*, names distinctly only the works of *Witsius*, *Stackhouse*, and *Jonathan Edwards*;—the second, writing to a friend, fifteen years after his entrance on the ministry, says, that the books which he had found most useful to him were, ‘*Edwards’s Works*, *Brainerd’s Life*, *Newton’s Letters*, *Owen’s Treatise on Indwelling Sin*, and *Thomas à Kempis’s Imitation of Christ*. Perhaps,’ he adds, ‘I ought to include in the list, *Baxter’s Reformed Pastor* and *Saint’s Rest*.’ He doubtless read other works, though we have no mention of them; but they were all, probably, of the same character.

Now with such preparatives we may well question whether any one could be pronounced a scribe duly instructed for the kingdom of God. We have it on the highest authority, namely, of Jesus himself, that a steward of the mysteries should ‘bring out of his treasury things new as well as old.’ In our reverence, therefore, for the teachers of elder days, we are not to discredit more modern aids for the judicious interpretation and exposition of the holy scriptures. Biblical criticism has risen to the rank of a science, the principles of which, to be well understood and applied, should be profoundly explored. Discoveries in this department of theology, have rendered obsolete and valueless a no inconsiderable portion of the divinity of the last and some former generations. Much learned rubbish has thus been thrown out, and new avenues opened up to the temple of Truth. And for the purpose of unfolding the gospel in its native simplicity, purity and grace, other lights must be sought and eyed than ever broke upon the minds of *Edwards*, *Brainerd*, or even *Thomas à Kempis*.

Mr Payson’s first effort as a preacher was made in Marl-

borough. We extract from his Journal the following account of his feelings and performances on that occasion.

'*Sabbath, May 24.* Felt thankful it was rainy. There were very few people at meeting, and I just got through without stopping. Spoke too fast and too low. Was a good deal depressed after meeting. In the afternoon did a little better, but still bad enough.' p. 110.

Three months after we find him at North Andover, in a pulpit then vacant by the death of the truly venerable Dr Symmes. His success at this time is thus briefly recorded ;—

'I had little assistance in preaching, and pleased neither the people nor myself.' p. 127.

These notices are interesting. Mr Payson, it is well known, acquired celebrity afterwards as a preacher. His style of oratory, indeed, was rather of the declamatory cast ; but it was for the most part awakening, and sometimes powerfully impressive. He possessed, it should be observed, several natural requisites for producing effect, both as a writer and speaker ;—namely, a vivid and discursive imagination, which was apt and frequently felicitous in its combinations ; great earnestness of soul and manner, and a voice of singular power in respect to clearness, strength and inflection. But from the foregoing intimations it is obvious that the accessory of skilful management, was wanting, at first, to give these advantages due effect. But, by dint of care and assiduity, he succeeded in so working upon the useful materials which he possessed, as to obtain a deserved reputation for pulpit power. But there was no paltry trick, no studied *finesse*, for the purpose of either setting off himself, or gaining a vulgar applause. Everything was natural and unaffected. There was a straight-forward energy of heart and purpose. Mr Payson was always himself.

The success of Mr Payson in this line of excellence at a later period, contrasted with his unpropitious beginnings, should be remembered by juvenile aspirants in quest of similar distinction. Let them not be discouraged by their early failures, but remember the value of the object to be gained. In their action and enunciation, let them correct the bad, and improve upon the good. Especially, let them throw the elevation and grandeur belonging to their themes into their public professional exercises, and display an ardor of solicitude that souls may be touched and roused and won ; and even with less capabilities

than in the instance before us, they will enjoy proportionate success.

From Andover Mr Payson went to Portland. He was invited to preach there at the instance of the Rev. Mr Kellogg, the gentleman who had befriended him in his vocation as preceptor, and whose people were contemplating the settlement of a suitable colleague pastor. His services on trial proved generally acceptable to the parish; and as Mr Kellogg was anxious to secure the fellowship of his labors, and lent all his aid to effect the object, even at considerable personal sacrifices, the plan of settlement succeeded, and before the close of the year 1807, Mr Payson was ordained junior pastor of the Second Church in Portland.

His father officiated at the ordination, and preached the sermon. He bade the son beware of infection from 'the infidel sentiments of the day,' and never to employ his powers as presbyter 'in raising the enemies of God and his truth to the pernicious eminence of teachers in the christian church.' A casual reader might consider such charges to be quite irrelative to the person and place. For what temptation could prevail on a minister of Jesus Christ, or where was the likelihood of opportunity, to set apart and ordain professed Deists and Atheists to the ministerial office? If such characters exist in our community, we apprehend that they would hardly covet the priestly robe, or the grace of clerical consecration. There was another meaning in the parent's admonition, to which the biographer makes significant allusion. The men of *infidel sentiments*, and who are *enemies to God and his truth*, we learn, *ex cathedrâ*, are Unitarians. Theirs, said the preacher, is another gospel in the shape of 'a lax theology which degrades the Saviour and flatters man.'

Now we have been taught to reverence filial piety quite as highly, perhaps, as the generality of our brethren; and it is because we reverence it, that we undertake to say, that there is another obligation at least equally imperative on the child of mature age with that of implicit submission to 'fathers after the flesh;'—we mean the duty of absolute subjection to the Father of Spirits, the duty of impartial interrogation, and solemn heed, of His most holy oracles. The youth, we admit, is required to observe and to ponder upon the counsels of an earthly parent. And why? Because of the weakness of the reasoning faculty, and the indiscretion incident to his age. But he re-

mains not always a youth; and if, when a child, he thought and understood as a child, on becoming a man he must put away childish things, and not servilely acquiesce in the lessons of faith derived from a parent equally fallible as himself,—lessons which that parent perchance inherited in the gross from an ancestor not a whit wiser or more considerate than either.

How faithfully Mr Payson acted in consonance with the instructions received on the day of his ordination, is recorded in the pages of his memoirs. Two years had not elapsed when an occasion arose, which illustrated the strength of the filial principle within him. A candidate of Liberal sentiments was invited to settle over the First Church in Portland. The two societies had been mutually estranged, chiefly on the ground of political differences, not independently, however, of some transient causes of local dissension. The leading members of each came at length to see and lament the unreasonableness of such alienation; and the settlement of a promising pastor over the old parish, was judged a favorable opportunity for the adoption of measures conducive to future harmony. Mr Payson's conduct and views on the occasion are detailed by himself.

Referring to a request that he would give, in the name of the churches, the Right Hand of Fellowship to the pastor elect, he observed,—

‘It was made, no doubt, hoping either to stop my mouth, as Æneas did that of old Cerberus with this honey-cake, or at least to discover from my answer how I meant to conduct [myself].’ p. 187.

And what were the grounds of either of these conclusions? Why,—

‘One of the Deacons,’ he adds, ‘came to me, representing it as the wish, not only of Mr ———, but of the church, that *there might be harmony between the churches*, and that [therefore] I would give him the Right Hand.’ *Ib.*

Of course, then, Mr Payson must have uncharitably imagined that the deacon came to him with a tongue of falsehood. But this is not all. Later still he thus commented on the affair:—

‘The ordination is just at hand, and engrosses universal attention in town. The candidate is a fine scholar, has an amiable disposition, and has treated me in that *frank, open and friendly* manner’—no ‘honey-cake’ in this, we should suppose,—‘which is just calculated to win me over to his side. Add to

this, that both his society and mine are anxious that the old enmity between the two parishes may now be done away, since two young men are placed over them.' p. 188.

The path of christian duty would seem sufficiently plain even from this partial statement. The simplest wayfarer need hardly have erred therein. But the foolishness of men would fain be wiser than God. And thus, on the final trial, Mr Payson not only stood out against the earnest wishes of the combined flocks, in refusing to cooperate with the Council in the ordination, but raised his hand against the proceeding altogether. Not only did he evade all share in a small responsibility at most, of one sort, but he assumed to himself another of heavy and fearful burden. The account which we annex, and which strikes us as something too lightly penned, considering the seriousness of the subject, he subsequently transmitted to his approving parent.

'The ordination is over. I shall not trouble you with an account of the good-natured speeches which are made respecting my conduct. You can easily conceive of them.—It will only be a nine days' wonder to the good folks and gossips, who will lament in very pathetic strains that Mr Payson should have such bigoted, narrow, party views, and that there cannot be harmony and peace between the two churches.' p. 189.

We are sorry that his worthy biographer should have spoken with complacency of such deportment, and have sought to justify it on the narrow plea already exposed. To us it appears highly reprehensible. The devotion of the son to the 'solemn cautions' of a sire, however respectable, can only in this case be defended at the expense of his claim to the charity which, in the balance of the sanctuary, outweighs the knowledge of mysteries, and even the faith which can remove mountains. Mr Payson forgot one clause in his commission as a christian teacher; viz. to follow peace with all men. And while our hearts respond to the touching exclamation of the evangelic prophet,—How beautiful are the feet of those who preach glad tidings and publish *peace*!—we must lament that this minister of a gospel of reconciliation, went forth on his errand unshod with the preparation of an errand of grace and love. From a mind of this mould little of charity could be expected towards the great mass of mankind. In his pulpit he was wont to ply the rhetoric of unsparing denunciation. The soul

which quaked with the terrors of the law, he seldom soothed with the grace of the gospel. His dispensation of the word reminds us, not of the vernal shower and wholesome dew, refreshing as they distil, but rather of the descending hail, or sweeping tempest, which scatters and destroys.

In illustration of our remarks, we select the subject of a discourse, of which Mr Payson himself has given this brief synopsis ;—

‘I preached last sabbath on man’s depravity, and attempted to show that by nature man was, in stupidity and insensibility, a block ; in sensuality and sottishness, a beast ; and in pride, malice, cruelty and treachery, a devil. This set the whole town in an uproar.’ p. 164.

We have heard something of this sermon, and have been informed that in the following week, the salutation of ‘brother devil,’ was frequent between man and man in the streets of Portland. It gave just offence to some of Mr Payson’s best friends, and threatened awhile the permanence of his settlement. Remotely, it was one of the causes of a serious schism in his parish,—a portion of the congregation withdrawing with the senior pastor, and becoming incorporated into a third society, called the Tabernacle Church. But he set to work with characteristic ardor to repair the breach ; and by a complicated machinery soon put on foot, and which he busily moved for the purpose of stirring a ‘revival,’ he succeeded in fashioning abundance of converts to his mind. Even from the unpromising materials of ‘blocks and beasts and devils,’ he ‘turned them out’ with surprising celerity,—insomuch that certain of his brethren admonished him by message, ‘that he was making Christians somewhat too fast.’ But he heeded not the suggestion, and still toiled on, till his church was stocked with professors, and he saw his communion table thronged with guests.

In using this language, we would by no means be understood to discredit the sincerity of Mr Payson’s convictions, either of the fitness or rectitude of the measures which he employed. But we are struck with the palpable inconsistency between his doctrine and his doings. He uniformly taught, and doubtless believed, that all souls are totally depraved from the very birth. Of course, their conversion implied the acquisition of entire new natures. As well might an *Æthiop*

change his hue, or a wolf be transformed into a lamb, as a sinner, on the Calvinistic theory, by any human means be regenerated and come forth a saint. It must solely be the result of Almighty agency; and this Mr Payson was earnest in asserting. Yet he diligently planned and wrought out an instrumental process, supremely efficacious, as he conceived, for the recovery of lost souls. It is somewhat curious to find, notwithstanding, that the first experiment which he made of it, was unfortunate in its issue.

After due preparation, he met a portion of his flock one evening in the conference-room, assured of gathering in a goodly number of converts that very hour. But the Spirit moved not in answer to his invocations. Having waited awhile in vain, he abruptly left the meeting, and hastened back to the solitude of his study, to vent his indignant lamentations over the failure of his pious devices, and in view of the yet unconquered stubbornness of his people's hearts. We have in the Memoir a recital of the circumstances at large; and under the gloss which is there thrown over them, our readers may detect, with us, enough to authorise a parallel, more close than flattering, between the Portland Revivalist bewailing so natural a miscarriage and entering into a controversy with God respecting it, and the prophet who saw with anger the luxuriant gourd which rose in a night with promising shadow, suddenly struck and withered ere the noontide heat.

We are unable to follow the detail of Mr Payson's personal or pastoral history; nor is it needful. His biographer has traced it *in extenso*,—too much, indeed, in an untempered strain of eulogy,* but, qualified with the strictures which it is our aim to mete in the spirit of justice, an estimate may be formed from the whole of the merits of Mr Payson, as a minister and a man.—He lived, as he truly acknowledged, *ex tempore*, and yet accomplished much of professional labor. His zeal, worthy of a better cause, was unquenchable in his vocation. He showed a willingness to spend and be spent in concern for his flock, and for the diffusion of the faith wherein he had been bred. His varied and accumulated toils made

* Are there any who will think the following passage an exception?—'He [Mr Payson] was a man—a sinner; and it is well for survivors that he had faults, lest, in looking at him, they should lose sight of his and their Saviour.' p. 125.

large drafts on a constitution naturally none of the strongest. He overdid himself in the outset, and running with footmen was wearied,—much more so, when encountering the swelling of Jordan. As his cares multiplied, and he was brought forward a frequent champion of a cause which was beginning to be powerfully assailed, his health prematurely declined. His spirits suffered proportionate depression.

Prevailingly, the views of religion cherished by Mr Payson, were far from administering to him light and comfort. He walked for the most part in darkness, and his steps, like those of the Jewish fathers, led under the cloud and through the sea. At times, indeed, the feelings of his soul were strained to a preternatural pitch of excitation, but he seems even at such moments to have rejoiced with trembling. Soon the fair vision was eclipsed or gone, and his spirit again shut up in distressing gloom. One while, he would doubt of his salvation; at another, of the truth of his favorite doctrines, and occasionally, of the genuineness of all religion. As respects Calvinism, he confesses, in portions of his Diary and Correspondence, that it is a hard featured system; that it presented ‘difficulties, strong difficulties, both from reason and Scripture in the way’ of its admission; that ‘he wondered not that the unregenerate are so bitterly opposed to its doctrines and their professors;’ that at times he was ‘pulled about’ by the force of objections, and whilst he ‘felt’ that his tenets must be true, he ‘seemed to know it is impossible they should be so.’ He acknowledged, moreover, that he was often obliged to preach and write sermons when ‘doubting of everything and scarcely believing that there is a God.’ These conflicts he referred to the suggestions of Satan, without seeking a more rational cause for them in the intrinsic absurdities of a faith which continued to cloud his perceptions, but to which, nevertheless, he pertinaciously clung.

Mr Payson enjoyed a growing reputation with his party, to the period of his days. So strenuous and unshrinking an advocate of their cause, was tasked on various emergencies, and his power as a preacher became extensively known. In the year 1825, he was invited to remove from his Parish in Portland to the pastoral charge of the new church in Hanover Street, Boston; and in the winter following he received a call of settlement from the congregation in Cedar Street, New York. He refused both these applications, in a spirit of disinterestedness which advantageously displayed his attachment to his flock.

From Bowdoin College he was presented with a doctor's diploma in divinity; but in a letter to his mother, shortly after, he says of it,—‘I beg you not to address me by that title, for I shall never make use of it.’

Mr Payson was not exempt from some severe trials by bereavements and the pressure of other outward troubles; but these he appears to have borne with becoming magnanimity. His personal sufferings, during a long and painful decline, were sustained with a meekness and resignation truly exemplary. His labors were kept up till almost the close of his mortal career. He learned at length, like Cecil, to trust God rather than his own impulses, and in the events of Providence to await patiently the development of the divine will. The final scene took place October 22, 1827, when he sunk to rest after a ministry of twenty years, and in the fortyfifth year of his age.

Dr Payson—for we may honor his name with the title which in life he professed to abjure—expressed himself once as ‘longing for death to reconcile apparent contradictions’ in theology. We have seen that his acute mind saw difficulties in his religious scheme. We grieve that the biases of his education and the prejudices of his riper years, prevented his resolving those difficulties by a fair examination of the claims of another system, which, once comprehended and embraced, would have shed in his bosom, we doubt not, ‘a peace and joy in believing.’ Could his faith have escaped from its perplexing trammels, could he have contemplated the gospel in the mighty scope of its liberal and beneficent aims towards the human family, could he have seen the same paternal wisdom and mercy in its provisions as met his gaze when he looked abroad on the book of nature and of providence, had the golden thread of consistency been perceived and followed up, which combines reason with revelation, disposing their testimony in one harmonious whole, and directing the eye to a common Almighty Parent, alike one in person as in the plan of his dispensations,—his soul would have been cheered, sustained, and elevated, and his ministry would have proved a signal blessing to the church and the world.

As it was, with a capacity strong, but cramped in its operations; with faculties all respectable, yet wanting the appliance of a well regulated balance; with an education inju-

diciously planned and prosecuted to disadvantage; with a faith entailed and soul-subduing; with affections ardent, though straitened in their objects, and with views of duty mistaken in direction, and united to keen and stirring sensibilities,—Dr Payson spent his strength in a cause which can only prosper on the wreck of much that is precious, ennobling, and satisfying in religion. As a scholar, he was ingenious, not profound; as a preacher, more eloquent than instructive; as a Christian, sincere though uncharitable, and as a pastor, worthy of all praise for self-devotion and assiduity. The inflexible dogmatist, he fell in a hopeless effort,—a victim to his zeal in propping the weakness of a Gothic theology, which is crumbling in presage of a final overthrow. Should any of his personal admirers suppose, that, in thus undertaking to animadvert upon his life and ministry, we have been influenced by unfriendly feelings towards his memory, or that our minds have labored under a cloud of prejudice in respect to his religious opinions, which has prevented our duly appreciating his merits, we assure them that nothing can be further from the fact. We profess, and we cherish, unfeigned charity towards all men; but ours is a ‘charity which rejoiceth in the *truth*.’ To have suffered to pass uncensured some traits in his character and some acts of his ministry, which struck us as deserving particular reprehension, would be a forfeiture of our obligations as impartial critics.

Dr Payson himself had little respect and candor for his opponents, and his scorn of Unitarians was unqualified and undisguised. But in no vindictive spirit have we sought to retaliate on his memory, the wrongs which he inflicted on the Liberal cause and its supporters. The tone of rebuke has been softened by sympathy in contemplating the partial derangement of his mental organization, which was manifestly produced by the fanatical and gloomy tendencies of the doctrines he had imbibed, and which he betrayed on other occasions than that mournful night spent under the roof of his friend Mr Whelpley. We have said nothing of his ambition and love of supremacy, which made him to be regarded, by many of his professional brethren, as a Diotrepes among them. We are willing, in short, to drop a veil over the harsh and repulsive features of his character, remembering that if he was a Christian, still the christian is but a man.

For the errors of an honest heart, Dr Payson was entitled to indulgence. For the good which he thought and essayed, despite of imperfections, he will live in honorable remembrance. And in recompense for the trials which he underwent, and the virtues which they brightened, we trust he has entered on the heritage of the blessed.

With a faith inspired by the revelations of love, we follow his emancipated spirit into the world of light, and contemplate it joined to the host which none can number, composed of the wise and good of every sect, and age, and clime, where, no more with the films and through the mists of mortality, he discerns the lineaments of celestial Truth, but beholds, in their unclouded beauty, the radiant emanations of the infinite and All-perfect mind.

ART. IV.—*Catalogue of the Library of Harvard University, in Cambridge, Massachusetts.* Cambridge. E. W. Metcalf. 1830. 3 vols. 8vo.

2. *Bibliotheca Parriana. A Catalogue of the Library of the late Reverend and Learned Samuel Parr, LL. D. Curate of Hatton, &c. &c.* London, John Bohn. 8vo. pp. 725.

3. *The Library Companion; or, the Young Man's Guide, and the Old Man's Comfort in the Choice of a Library.* By the Rev. T. F. DIBDIN, F. R. S., &c. 2 vols. 8vo. London, 1824.

THE catalogue of a library, even with all the recommendations of such fair volumes as these, and the strong interest we may feel in the accumulating treasures of our college, or the curiosity, which some may have, to know what sort of books were collected by such a man as Parr—might seem but an unpromising topic for a review. And lest any of our readers should be alarmed at the first mention of such a project, we freely announce, that it is no part of our intention to take a survey of the pages before us; for this, we are aware, would be giving for a review a catalogue itself. We shall scarcely refer to the countless worthies, living and dead, whose names,

amidst endless degrees of fame and honor, are here set in order. Among them are divines, philosophers, historians, orators, and poets of Grecian and Roman and of modern name, whose deathless works are, and ever will be, read. And here, also, are fathers, commentators, lexicographers, grammarians, critics; nay, some too, who in their day might have passed among poets and even novelists, whose names have quietly gone down to oblivion, and the precious dust of whose volumes might never be disturbed, but for the diligence of a librarian like Mr Peirce, or the faithful search, from which nothing is hidden, of an 'Examining Committee.'

Of this class of books, which seem to take in a library the place which 'sleepers' hold among animals, except that they have within them no inherent principle of reanimation, every large collection must contain its proportion. Nor let them be counted worthless. They are, if ancient, the venerable, if modern, the decent monuments of their time. They record, if not the learning, at least the notions of their day. Many of them may have honorably fulfilled their destiny, by serving as hints and helps, pioneers and precursors of better books; and in some even of our public libraries, they are of signal use, by making a goodly show upon shelves that would otherwise stand empty.

Of such a show, however, the Library of Harvard College happily stands in no need. The catalogue before us exhibits a list of more than thirty thousand bound volumes, and of several thousand tracts. And we hasten to congratulate the friends of the University on the publication, just now completed, of this copious, well-arranged, and beautiful work, so long desired and so much needed. It is now forty years since the last catalogue was formed; and from that period, in 1790, when there were only twelve thousand volumes, additions have been continually making, which rendered indispensable a new and full arrangement. To the indefatigable industry, to the fidelity and learning of the present librarian, Mr Peirce, are we indebted for the very satisfactory execution of this arduous undertaking.* He has comprised it in three volumes, which, both for the treasures they exhibit, and the excellence of their arrangement,

* To the faithful and accurate inspection of the press,—a work of more delicacy and toil than by the uninitiated can easily be imagined—and to the intelligent cares of the former librarian, Mr Folsom, it is just to ascribe part of the value and correctness of these volumes.

to say nothing of the typographical beauty of the books themselves, do honor to him and to the University. To those, also, who, as members of the College, or connected in any manner with its interests, who by their duties or privileges, the offices they may hold, or the advantage of neighbourhood, can avail themselves of the benefits of its library, it will be an invaluable publication.

The two first volumes contain the catalogue of the whole library in alphabetical order, consisting, as we have said, of more than thirty thousand volumes. And notwithstanding its deficiencies and wants, it is pleasant to compare this fair and choice collection with what it must have been in its day of small things and of Cotton Mather, who, in a letter to a friend of the College in England, congratulates him, that they had at length 'got a library with some books to it.'

In the third volume, Mr Peirce has furnished us with a systematic index, or a classed catalogue of the whole. This laborious part of the work, he prefaces with this appropriate motto. '*Scire ubi aliquid possis invenire, magna pars eruditionis est.*'

The value of such an index must at once be apparent; and the faithful execution of it, as here accomplished, demanded nothing less than the indefatigable industry as well as extensive bibliographical skill of the librarian. With respect to the arrangement which has been adopted, there will probably be, as the editor himself remarks, 'a diversity of opinion; since every system of classification must be more or less arbitrary; and with all possible accuracy in the execution, works, in some respects of the same nature, will frequently be found under different heads.'

Notwithstanding this obvious difficulty, the work appears, as far as we have had opportunity to examine it, to have been managed with such exactness, that under the six great classes, within which the whole collection is arranged, and the numerous sections into which these, again, are broken, almost every inquirer may find the book of which he is in search.

Of the actual toil and labor of such a work, any reader, least conversant with such subjects, may form some notion from the fact, that under one division of the theological department, viz. that of parænetic, or exhortatory divinity, there are more than twentyone hundred distinct books or pamphlets, under the names of sermons, charges, &c. &c.

In the general preface to the whole work, the history of the present college library, from the period of the destruction of the original collection by fire, in 1764, is briefly given. And, as the library itself is almost wholly the fruit of individual munificence, an honorable notice is taken of its most prominent benefactors, of whom were the Hollises, and Hancocks, Shapleigh, Palmer, Boylston, and Gore, with other generous donors, yet living.* This preface, therefore, may be read with satisfaction by many, who have no occasion to consult the catalogue itself. That part of it, which relates to the present condition and immediate wants of the library, we commend to the attention of our readers.

‘Many of the books, however, which have been added to the Library for several years past, have been excluded from their appropriate places by the want of room. This want is now very sensibly experienced; and in a short time another apartment will be indispensably requisite. It is most ardently hoped, that means will at no distant period be furnished by the public-spirited friends of the University and of literature, to erect a new building for the exclusive use of this department, in some respects more eligibly situated than the present, and ample enough to accommodate a library, that shall rival the great repositories of learning in Europe, and correspond more nearly to what may be reasonably expected of the first Library in our country.’ *Preface to Catalogue*, p. xiii.

In adverting, also, to the deficiencies in the library itself, and at the same time to the extent and liberality with which its privileges are granted, in other words, to the large number of those who enjoy them, Mr Peirce thus remarks;—

‘In looking over the Catalogue, authors and others will discover many deficiencies, which they may often have it in their power to supply; and by doing this they will render a service, which will be gratefully acknowledged. All publications relating to this country are naturally expected to find a place in our library. It has already a greater number of works upon America, than are to be found in any other; still the collection is far from being complete; many works are wanting, especially of a recent date, all of which it is exceedingly desirable to obtain. A public library like this, is a particularly suitable repository for state papers, political, religious, and other tracts, reports and proceedings of

* Of the living benefactors, the names of the Hon. Israel Thorndike, and of Samuel A. Eliot, Esq., claim, as they have here received, a special mention.

ecclesiastical bodies and of societies instituted for various purposes, for local publications, occasional pamphlets, and public documents of every description ; it being a place, where they will not only have the best chance of being preserved, but will be accessible to all persons, who may at any time wish to consult them.

'The benefits conferred by the library are rendered as extensive as possible by the liberality of its regulations. A ready admittance, and the requisite information and facilities for examining and consulting the works, are afforded to all visitors. Books are loaned to all the Undergraduates, to the Members of the Theological and Law Schools, to all persons residing in Cambridge for purposes of study, to the Members of the Faculty, Corporation, and Board of Overseers, and to all regularly ordained Clergymen living within ten miles of the College ; and persons, not coming within the provisions of the law, may, by application to the Corporation, obtain the use of any books, which are proper to be taken from the Library. The privileges, granted to individuals, are not exceeded by those enjoyed at any other institution of a similar kind, and are believed to be in all respects as great as a due regard to general accommodation and to the preservation of the books would permit. These facts will, of course, be all taken into consideration in estimating the importance of augmenting the Library. A fund, from which so many minds are constantly drawing their chief supplies, to pour them again, with incalculable effect, over the whole community, should be as rich, as munificence and zeal for the promotion of learning can render it.' *Preface to Catalogue*, p. xv.

From this brief notice of the catalogue of the most extensive of our own libraries, which its value and importance seemed to demand, we will now turn to one of the best private Libraries in England ; viz. that of the celebrated Dr Parr. His collection was indeed a very remarkable one, whether we consider the character of the owner, one of the most learned scholars and singular personages of his time, or the narrowness of the means with which so extensive a library was purchased. The catalogue itself is a royal octavo of more than seven hundred pages, adorned with one of the best engravings we have seen, of the Doctor ; and it numbers, as we think has been stated in other publications, about ten thousand volumes. Many of them were undoubtedly the gifts of his numerous correspondents and friends, of whom no man could boast of more. But the greater proportion were unquestionably of his own procuring ; and some of

them, for their extreme rarity, would seem to have required for their purchase an income far more abundant than Dr Parr, except at the very close of his life, was able to command. Indeed, for a very considerable term of it, he was no stranger to the perplexities of a straitened condition; but his biographer relates, that even at that time, he always contrived means to buy the books he wanted, and finally left a collection, which, not indeed for beauty, or splendor of outward appearance,—for many of the volumes, as we are told also of the books of Dr Johnson, were worn and moth-eaten—but for scarceness, curiosity, and, what is much more to the purpose, for their intrinsic worth, excelled some of the magnificent collections of dukes and princes.

This library, like all his other acquisitions, and in truth, everything that belonged to him, was a matter of great pride and delight to Dr Parr. ‘For many years before his death,’ says the editor of his catalogue, ‘it was his anxious wish, that it should remain entire, and that it should, in consequence, be purchased by some opulent and liberal nobleman, or, preferably, by some public body. “The world,” he was used to say, “would then see what sort of a collection of books had been made by a country parson.”’ He considered his books, as did the mother of the Gracchi her children, as his jewels; and was ostentatious both in his praises and exhibition of them. ‘He was also in the habit of marking on the fly-leaf of any particular book something relative to the work or the author, which suddenly occurred to his mind. These remarks,’ continues his editor, ‘it must be acknowledged, were sometimes committed to paper without sufficient reflection, and sometimes, perhaps, in a fit of spleen.’

All this was unquestionably true. For, notwithstanding the intention and the vigilance of Dr Parr’s executors to prevent it, some specimens of these notes were fraudulently taken from the catalogue while it was yet in manuscript, and without any sanction on their part, nay, even against their remonstrances, actually made their appearance in a periodical publication. It was their design that the printed catalogue itself should be purged of such objectionable comments; for they wished to suppress what by its severity or bitterness might give pain to living witnesses or their friends; but they lament that some unguarded and hasty expressions still remain,—expressions, we may add, which, with the egotism and pomposity they discover, are altogether characteristic of their author. Some of the notes, how-

ever, are only amusing, while they show at the same time his learning and bibliographic ardor. We shall transcribe a few specimens, some to mark the rareness of the books, some the vanity and wit of their owner, freely leaving to our readers their judgment of each.

“ Porson's (Richard) Letters to archdeacon Travis, in answer to his Defence of the Heavenly Witnesses, 1 John v. 7.

“ The gift of the fearless author.—Inimitable and invincible.” S. P. pp. 87, 688.

‘ Priestley's (Dr Joseph) Theological Repository, consisting of Original Essays, Hints, Queries, &c. calculated to promote Religious Knowledge, 6 vol. 8vo.

“ These six volumes were given by Dr Priestley to my late *sagacious and serious* Wife, Jane Parr.” S. P. p. 87.

‘ Justiniani Institutionum, seu Elementorum, Libri quatuor, a J. Baptista Pisacane in Carmina heroica redacti, folio, *Neapoli*, 1694.

“ Dr Parr thinks this the scarcest book in his library. He saw it about forty years ago in White's Catalogue, and eagerly secured it. He never saw it in any other Catalogue; he never found a scholar who knew its existence; he has in vain inquired for it in the University Libraries, and the Libraries of collectors. The learned Mr Hamley, of New College, Lady Oxford, and at her request Mr Windham, the English Minister at Florence, and the Russian Minister, who was a collector, could not find it in Milan, Florence, Venice, and other parts of Italy. Mr Blunt, the ingenious son of a Birmingham surgeon, was for several years busy in inquiring at the libraries and booksellers' shops in Paris, but could not hear of it. At length, Mr Hobbs Scott, in 1819, rummaging some old neglected books in the back room of a bookseller at Rome, met with it. The bookseller knew not its value. Mr Scott paid a few shillings, and brought the book to Hatton. Dr Parr then gave his other copy, as a rarity, to adorn the library of his honored friend and patron, Mr Coke, of Holkham.” p. 489.

‘ Cowper's (Wm.) Poems, 2 vol. 8vo. 1795.

‘ This copy is rendered highly interesting by the following autographs. On a fly-leaf in the first volume is written :

“ Given by me to the Flower of the Church, Dr PARR. JANE ELIZABETH OXFORD.

“ I stole this book from Lady Oxford. S. PARR. June 15, 1798. Signé *Jekyll*, et plus bas FRANCIS BURDETT.

“ I hereby certify the aforesaid felony of the aforesaid Dr Parr, for which he has been allowed his charges. THOMAS (Lord) ERSKINE & his mark; WILLIAM SCOTT (Lord Stowell.)” p. 516.

‘ Short Account of Emmanuel Swedenborg and his Writings, 1787.

“ Very entertaining. Swedenborg was an amiable fanatic.” p. 609.

'Dr Snape's Sermon preached at the Parish Church of St Mary at Hill.

To this sermon is appended the following singular note in Dr Parr's hand-writing, from which it would appear, that he had preached the sermon to his own parishioners, as indeed he often did the sermons of others.

"If there had been any real, or even seeming necessity, I could with ease have composed a sermon upon this present occasion. But I believe that you will be sufficiently instructed and edified by the discourse, which I am going to deliver to you. It is written with great clearness in the diction, great judgment in the matter, great seriousness in the spirit, and is in all respects worthy of the learned and pious author, Dr Andrew Snape, Provost of King's College, who preached it." p. 622.

'Dodd and Locke's Common-place Book to the Bible.

"The unfortunate Dr Dodd was executed by the barbarous interposition of Lord Mansfield." S. P.' p. 684.

'Fellowes's (Rev. Robert) Religion without Cant, or a Preservative against Lukewarmness and Intolerance, Fanaticism, Superstition and Impiety. Svo. 1801.

"The Gift of the Author.—Dr Parr justly, and therefore greatly, values the various learning, the deep reflection, the elegant diction, and the rational, unfeigned, and sublime piety of his friend, Robert Fellowes." pp. 48, 685.

'Henry's Exposition of the Old and New Testament.'

"A book much esteemed by half-Methodists." S. P.' p. 685.

'Trinity—a Collection of curious Tracts on the, 5 vol. small 4to.

"My most learned friend, the President of Magdalen College, possesses the same rare work; but what work, fit for a Scholar and a Theologian, does he not possess and understand?" S. P.' p. 689.

'Thucydides Hudsoni, folio. Oxon, 1696.'

"There is in my library scarcely any book I prize so highly as this. My reasons are, it is the very book in which I first read Thucydides, at Emmanuel College; it contains a few marginal notes of mine, which are of no value; I gave it to my learned pupil John Wright; it was sold after his death. I was anxious to recover it, and for many years I made many fruitless inquiries. June 27, 1816, I attended a Visitation of Bishop Parsons, at Northampton. I there met Mr Rose, a clergyman quite unknown to me. After dinner, he said he had a book of mine. 'What?' said I. He answered, 'Thucydides by Hudson, and it has some MS. notes of yours.' I told him my piteous tale. He most politely and kindly gave me the book." S. P.' p. 694.

'Jones's Greek and English Lexicon.

"I have examined this Lexicon again and again; and I have no hesitation in pronouncing it the work of a man of sense and a man of learning. The usefulness is indisputable; and my hope is, that it will be extensively known and highly valued." S. P.' p. 698.

'Rivarol—Discours préliminaire du nouveau Dictionnaire de la Langue Française.

"This book was given to Dr Parr by his beautiful, witty, sagacious, truth-speaking, warm-hearted, and unfortunate friend, Mrs A. Green, of Lan-Saint-Frede, Monmouthshire. The eloquence is brilliant, but the principles are most pernicious." p. 699.

'Salmasii (Cl.) de Hellenistica Commentarius, 12mo. Lugg. Bat. 1643.

"In point of curious learning, I assign to this book the next place to Bentley upon Phalaris." S. P.' p. 699.

'Vossii Aristarchus. Accedunt de Vitiis Sermonis et Glossematis Latino-barbaris Libri Novem. Amst. 1685.

"This book Dr Parr read at College, and there is no book to which he is more indebted for his knowledge of the Latin language." p. 701.

'Garmanni (L. C. F.) de Miraculis Mortuorum Libri tres; quibus præmissa Dissertatio de Cadavere et Miraculis in Genere, Opus physico-medicum, 4to. Dresd. et Lips. 1709.

"A scarce and curious book, very fit to be consulted on the Controversy which is now going on in Germany about the reality of Christ's resurrection." S. P.' p. 705.

'Junius's Letters, 2 vol. 12mo. 1772.

"The writer of Junius was Mr Lloyd, Secretary to George Grenville, and brother to Philip Lloyd, Dean of Norwich. This will one day or other be generally acknowledged." S. P.' p. 407.

'White (J.) Diatessaron, sive integra Historia J. C. Græce.

"The gift of the learned Dr White, who ingenuously reminded me of what I had forgotten, that the dedication was written by me. Every candidate for orders should be well versed in this Diatessaron; and every reader of the New Testament will derive from it the greatest advantage; for it collects the facts of the gospel into a clear historical form." S. P.' p. 690.

'Serveti (Michaëlis) de Trinitatis Erroribus Libri. VII.

"*Liber rarissimus.* I gave two guineas for this book." p. 97.

And again;—

"Servetus was burnt for this book. He might be a Heretic, but he was not an Infidel. I have his Life in Latin, written by Allwörden, which should be read by all Scholars and true Christians." S. P.' p. 688.

The following pompous note, affixed to a Latin work, sounds exceedingly like our Doctor.

'Conringii (Hermannii) de Civili Prudentia Liber unus.

"Dr Parr has been instructed by this work of Conringius." p. 705.

And again of another (*Orthographia Romana*) it is set down,

"Dr Parr highly values this book."

'*Histoire du Sociniaisme, divisée en deux Parties, ou l'on voit son Origine et les Progrès que les Sociniens ont faits dans differens Royaumes de la Chrétienté; avec les Caractères, les Aventures, les Erreurs, et les Livres de ceux qui se sont distinguez dans la Secte des Sociniens*, 4to. Par. 1726.

"A most scarce work, for which Dr Priestley, when writing the *History of Christianity*, advertised two years without success. It was given to me by the learned Dr Johnstone of Worcester." S.P.' pp. 55, 56.

'*Casauboniana*, a J. C. Wolfio, cum Ejusd. Notis, 12mo. *Hamb.* 1710.

"This very scarce book belonged to the learned Dr Matthew Raine, Master of the Charter House School, and upon April 10, 1812, was given by his accomplished brother, Jonathan Raine, to Dr Parr, who at the request of that brother, and of Mr Russell, now Master of the Charter House School, had written a Latin Epitaph for his much respected friend, Dr M. R. the predecessor of Mr Russell. The very learned Dr Routh has a copy of the book, and was told by the celebrated collector Mr Heber, that he believed the copies in England not to exceed five or six." S. P.' p. 292.

'*Rapin's History of England*, translated by Tindal, 2 vol. folio. 1732.

"This book formerly belonged to my father. It is imperfect; for it does not contain the *Dissertation on Whigs and Tories*. As a child I read through these volumes several times; it was the first book of English History I ever read." S. P.' p. 416.

'*Ars Sciendi sive Logica*, studio J. G. 12mo. *Lond.* 1781.

"Dr Parr and Sir William Jones first learned Logic from this book." p. 424.

'*Grant's (Mrs) Sketches of Life and Manners*, 2 vol. 12mo. 1810.

'Presented to Dr Parr by the Duchess of Gordon, who has thus written in the fly leaf.

"Dr Parr did not steal this book, though he may steal whatever Jane Gordon has, except *Jane Montague*. Leamington, 1820." p. 520.

'*Toulmin's Memoirs of Bourn of Birmingham*.

"Bourn's son, Samuel, was a masterly writer, profound thinker, and the intimate friend of Dr Parr at Norwich." p. 704.

'Hollis's Free Thoughts, consisting of Remarks occasioned by Dr Paley's Reply to Hume; Hypercritical Strictures on certain Passages in the Critical Review; a Letter to a Friend; the Reflections of a Solitary; and Thoughts on a Future State, 1812.

"Mr Hollis gave Dr Parr his 'Apology' in the year 1809, and in the summer of 1812, he sent him his other works. Mr Hollis leads a studious and blameless life at High Wycombe, Bucks, where Dr Parr sometimes visits him. He is confessedly an unbeliever, but he never writes prophanelly; he is charitable and respectful in his judgment upon the character of Christians; he devotes his time and his fortune to doing good; and, be his errors what they may, Dr P. is bound by the principles and spirit of Christianity, to love and to honour such a moral agent as Mr Hollis."

'In another note is:

"Dr Parr knew Mr Hollis personally, and considered him one of the most serious, upright, and benevolent of human beings. They often conversed upon the most important subjects; and whatsoever be the errors of Hollis, he supported them with much ability, and without any taint of acrimony or profaneness." pp. 572, 3.

'Letters to Gibbon, by G. Travis, with an Appendix, 1784.

"Travis was a superficial and arrogant declaimer, and his Letters to Gibbon brought down upon him the just and heavy displeasure of an assailant equally irresistible from his wit, his reasoning, and his erudition: I mean the immortal Richard Porson." p. 601.

Among these books is also a set of more than two hundred volumes of modern Latin, which in the manuscript are headed "*Books of Pleasantry*, most of them very rare, and very expensive." And again, "All expensive except one, and that not a very cheap one." And of this class is one book, entitled '*Prolusiones Poeticæ, or Poetical Exercises*,' by Bancroft, of whom Dr Parr writes;—

"An honest man, but a furious bigot, and from the violence of his prejudices, became a maniac." p. 497.

And of another work,—

'Joci G. du. V. Senatus Aquensis Principi Avenioni, 18mo. 1600,

"This book bears the name of the unfortunate Dr Thistlethwayte, once Master of Wadham College, whom God forgive." p. 504.

'Hervey's Meditations and Contemplations: 25th edition, with the Latin Verses translated. 12mo. Edinb. 1772.

"This book was the delight of Dr Parr when he was a boy, and for some time was the model on which he endeavoured to form a style." p. 438.

'Sancroft's (Archbp.) *Predestined Thief; or a Dialogue between a Calvinistic Preacher and a Thief condemned to the Gallows*, translated from the Latin, 1814.

"The *Fur Prædestinatus* was republished and translated in 1813, in consequence of the execution of a Calvinist at Northampton. He denied the fact at the gallows. He had been encouraged in presumption and self-delusion by a Calvinist teacher. The Calvinists in Northamptonshire took up his cause, and attacked the judge and the jury. Their attack was repelled by the testimony of the offender's attorney, who lived at Wellingborough, and who, in justice to the laws of his country, published the criminal's private confession made to him in Northampton gaol. One Huffey White, a notorious offender, was hanged at the same time, *but did not deny his own guilt.*" S. P.' p. 604.

'Letters of William Wilberforce on the Doctrine of Hereditary Depravity, by Cogan, 1806.

"Excellent.—Cogan's Arguments are unanswerable, and Wilberforce very discreetly made no attempt to answer." p. 552.

'Codex Theodori Bezae Cantabrigiensis, Evangelia et Apostolorum Acta complectens. Quadratis litteris Græco-Latinis editit, Codicis Historiam præfixit, Notasque adjecit F. Kipling. 2 vol. royal folio. Cantab. 1793.

"This beautiful edition of Beza's Testament was given to me, spontaneously and politely, by order of the Vestry of the Unitarians in Birmingham, soon after I had written an English inscription for Dr Priestley, for the monument erected in the Unitarian Chapel." S. P.' p. 4.

"In a variation of the same note, Dr Priestley is called "an eminently great and truly good man;" and Dr Parr's most "respected, injured, calumniated friend." p. 681.

Bagshaw (Ed.) *Dissertationes Anti-Socinianæ*, in quibus probatur, 1. Socinianos non debere dici Christianos; 2. Solam rationem, quo fundamento nituntur Sociniani, ad percipienda Fidei Mystera non sufficere, 12mo. Lond. 1657.

"Et gens quæ infausti placitis addicta Socini

"Christianos inter vix meritura locum est."

"Dr Parr directed these verses to be transcribed from the Poems of Adrian Reland. But in defiance of the Poet, who was ingenious, and of Bagshaw, who was dull, Dr Parr will not erase the Socinians out of his Catalogue of Christians." S. P.' p. 17.

'Belsham's Epistles of Paul the Apostle translated, with an Exposition and Notes, 2 vol. 4to. 1822.

"This excellent work of Belsham was given to me by the writer. I do not entirely agree with him upon some doctrinal points; but I ought to commend the matter, style, and spirit of the preface; and in my opinion the translation does great credit to the diligence, judgment, erudition, and piety of my much respected friend." S. P.' p. 21.

Of a collection of Modern Greek books also, he says,—

“I assign a particular place to the following works: for I never saw them in the possession of any scholar.” S. P.’ p. 59.

But it was not only of printed books, that Dr Parr’s library was composed. Of manuscripts also, usually, from their scarceness and value, to be found only in public depositories, he had collected not a few. Among these we find ‘a manuscript of St Chrysostom, never yet used by any editor, in four volumes folio;’ and another on the Immortality of the Soul, respecting which there is the following notice;—

‘This is the work of the immortal Sir Matthew Hale, and was never published. It was given to Dr P. by his sagacious and most highly respected friend, F. Hargrave, Esq. Dr Parr hopes, that after his death, both the foregoing manuscripts will be purchased for some College Library, in Cambridge.’

Dr Parr himself, we are informed, presented them, some time before his death, to Emanuel College, Cambridge.

On the whole, this catalogue exhibits as remarkable a collection, as was perhaps ever formed by a private individual for his own use, and without fortune. We may agree with his biographer, that his library was of itself a monument of the intellectual courage and capacity of Parr. ‘It was begun,’ he tells us, ‘when he was a boy at college, and when the price of a book deprived him of some other need, or comfort. It continued to accumulate, when he was bowed down by penury and opposition. Whatever else he wanted, he always found money to buy books; and the sums, which he expended in the year 1824, when his life was waning, show, that his ardor in the cause of letters was inextinguishable.’

Among the literary projects of Dr Parr, it was long a favorite one to write, upon a large scale, the life of his celebrated cotemporary, Dr Johnson. He was not satisfied, it would seem, with the various and copious memoirs that had been already published of him, and had read and laid by, in a particular part of his library, a great number of scarce and learned books, of which it was his intention to make use in this work. Though, as he laments, ‘amidst his cares, his sorrows, and his wants,’ he failed of accomplishing his purpose, he lets us see something of the preparation he had made for it, in all which he betrays, as was certainly not unusual with him, his

vanity of learning. We forbear giving the catalogue, which is by no means inconsiderable; for the names of many of the works, we fear, might be strange to some of our readers. But it surely is no difficult task to string together the names of uncommon books; and we cannot but suspect, that, in the great science and mystery of bibliography, many a bulky volume has been commended by title, whose pages have never been read. From this folly of pedantry, Dr Parr, notwithstanding his solid and various attainments, was by no means free. He was much addicted to that annoying practice, scarcely less offensive to good manners than to social comfort, of quoting, and that pompously, from books. Indeed, it might be literally said of him, that he 'lisp'd' in Greek—this probably being the infirmity of his classic, as it was of his native tongue; so that, to a plain English gentleman, like Sir Roger de Coverly, who loved a fair share in conversation at home, and begged of his friend to provide him a chaplain that would not insult him at his own table with his Latin and Greek,—the Curate of Hatton, with all his learning, must have proved a most troublesome inmate.

It will be readily admitted, however, that pedantry is not the besetting sin of scholars at the present day. Education is now too generally diffused, to make learning, or at least a good reputation for it, a very prominent distinction. And though of these days of journals and periodicals, it may be more than suspected, that reviews are read in a measure vastly exceeding the books reviewed, yet so generally are the means of knowledge diffused, that scarce any one may now with impunity make a show of more than his neighbour. The laws of good breeding, moreover, are so well understood, that, as Miss Edgeworth has somewhere remarked, it is deemed decorous rather to allude, than to quote; in other words, to take for granted, what some perchance might unwillingly find proved, that those with whom they converse, have read as much as themselves.

To this general diffusion of literature, the multiplication of bibliographical works, such as that of Dibdin before us,* serv-

* One of the most remarkable works mentioned by Dibdin as a treasure to be prized by any possessor, is the very first book named in Dr Parr's Catalogue. It must have been the same copy described by Dibdin, being purchased by Dr Parr of the same bookseller, only a few months before his death. It is the Polyglott Bible of Elias Hutter—'It ranks,' says the bookseller, 'among the very rarest books in bibliography. There does not appear to exist a single complete copy in

ing as faithful guides to the initiated and inexperienced, or, as he says, to the old and to the young, in the choice of a library; the copious and well arranged catalogues, which it has become customary, with foreign booksellers, annually to put forth, in which we sometimes see, not the titles only, but accurate notices of many thousands of volumes; together with the establishment of literary associations, Lyceums, scientific lectures and journals, adapted to practical purposes and to the mass of readers,—have essentially contributed. To this may be added, the vast multiplication, and thence, combined with other causes, the greater cheapness of books themselves. This has been more and more observable for the ten years past, till now, with the reductions that have followed with the general depression of trade, the acquisition of even an extensive library, is brought within the ability of scholars of moderate means.

We rejoice in the multiplication among us of good libraries, private and public. Of our dwellings, they are among the choicest and most becoming,—though if, perchance, the housewife be curious, or, yet worse, if the abode is to be changed, they may prove the troublesome, decorations. Of our colleges, they are the appropriate treasure and glory.

Of many of the universities of Europe, the libraries are very extensive. That of Cambridge, in England, is numbered at one hundred thousand volumes. The celebrated Bodleian Library, in Oxford, said to be the largest in the world, if we except the Vatican at Rome, and the Royal Library in Paris, is usually stated at four hundred thousand volumes, besides its rich treasures in manuscripts. Its outward appearance, however, indicates no such extent, and might tempt us to the suspicion, that there is somewhat of fallacy in these estimates of large collections. In Germany, it is true, books are multiplied to great numbers; and from the cheapness in the style of printing, and a wise preference, by those who hold the direction of their academic affairs, of utility to show, it is not uncommon to find immense libraries in that country. By a recent intelligent traveller it has been stated, that within thirty-one public institutions, either of their universities or of their

any of the foreign public libraries. In England, the one now submitted, is decidedly unique. "Such is its amazing rarity," says Clement, "that to obtain the work complete would be an acquisition requiring the lives of two or three men; owing to its having been printed at the private expense of Hutter, at different periods, and but very few copies struck off." p. 1.

capital cities, are to be found no less than three millions three hundred thousand volumes, or an average to each of about one hundred and nine thousand; the largest of which, as he remarks, contains more literary resources of this kind, than all the collegiate and university libraries of the United States.*

We shall not indulge in any unprofitable or discouraging contrasts between our own and foreign institutions, sometimes made with a show of wisdom, but not with a sufficient discrimination of the differences in the condition of our people. Neither will we intimate, what might seem a gratuitous distrust upon the matter, that it is much easier to count up, than to find, three or four hundred thousand volumes; nor that, of this vast collection, seldom, we believe, found upon earth, no small proportion may be only fit food for moths and dust, needing much space, but yielding little profit. Neither will we detain our readers to observe what has been well observed by another, 'that it is not by means of huge libraries, that discoveries will be made, for the benefit of mankind;' or that 'a taste for literature is not necessarily promoted by an accumulation of books, however excellent.' But we presume no one will doubt, that in good public libraries, we of this country are yet lamentably deficient. In truth, some of our colleges and literary institutions exhibit in this respect a spectacle of deplorable poverty, which, were it only for appearance sake, we should hope might be improved.

To return to the library of Harvard College, the welcome publication of whose catalogue has invited these remarks, we here repeat our wishes for its growth and prosperity. Though in comparison with most others of our libraries, and especially with the libraries of other colleges in the country, it holds a preeminent rank, it must be remembered, that of itself, it is small, and wants much to constitute it the complete library of a university. We rejoice in what has been recently done by its government in liberal appropriations towards this object, and to learn that large additions to its stores may shortly be

* Dwight's *Travels in Germany*; from whom also we learn, that of the numerous libraries of their universities or large cities, that of Göttingen, consisting of three hundred thousand; of Dresden, the capital of Saxony, of two hundred and forty thousand; of Berlin, of one hundred and eighty thousand; and above all, of Munich in Bavaria, containing four hundred thousand,—are the most celebrated. But it is to be remembered, that to make these extraordinary numbers, pamphlets, duplicates, and everything printed, however small, is counted.

expected. Still, it has many and great deficiencies. It wants a large fund for its regular annual increase, even in those branches, as of theology and of ancient classical literature, in which it is most abundant. In oriental and in modern literature, very much remains to be supplied. But its most pressing want is, now, that of a suitable edifice for the accommodation and security of the whole. As is intimated in the preface to the catalogue, and in the full report upon this subject, made at a recent meeting of the Overseers, the present building, though, in its interior, yielding to few of the kind in appropriateness, and even venerableness of aspect, is yet in constant exposure to destruction by its neighbourhood to the inhabited colleges, with their multitude of fires. The bare possibility of such a calamity is sufficient to awaken attention, and even to justify alarm. We hope, that with the aid which is needed, measures may be adopted to secure so desirable an object.

Nor may we, in passing, omit the mention of the library of the Theological School in Cambridge, if indeed it may be called a library; for we almost fear, that the number of its shelves will not be found much inferior to the number of its books. From the privileges, which the members of this School share, in common with other students, in the library of the University, the deficiencies of their own institution in this respect are not so severely felt. But separated as the Theological School is from the College, and inconvenient as must be a daily resort to the public library, we earnestly wish to see this great want supplied. We commend it to the attention of those, who regard with favor this ancient school of the prophets, and who hope from it the fulfilment of those great and holy purposes which our fathers contemplated, when, in founding Harvard College itself, they consecrated it to 'Christ and the Church.'

We look upon the libraries of Cambridge and the Athenæum in Boston, as among the very choicest of our public treasures. Their prosperity is equally an object of public interest; for they furnish the means of light and knowledge, and thence of valuable improvements too, not to students and professional men only, in theoretic science, or learning properly so called, but for the most valuable practical purposes, to the whole community. The facilities of access and of use, granted at Cam-

bridge to as great an extent 'as a due regard to general accommodation and the preservation of the books will permit,' by extending the numbers of those who want, show the necessity, also, of increasing the supply. The library should be such, that every person, pursuing an important subject, writing a book, or consulting only personal gratification, may be able to find within it the very thing he is seeking. Multitudes of books, which to the unlettered eye might seem but so much learned or unlearned lumber, are continually needed for reference; and many a valuable project may be defeated, or many an excellent work lost to the world, for want of such assistance. It will not be doubted, in these days, that the interests of these institutions are worthy of the patronage of the liberal and wise; or, to use the words of the preface which we have before quoted—'that a fund, from which so many minds are continually drawing their chief supplies, to pour them out again, with incalculable effect, over the whole community, should be as rich as munificence and zeal for the promotion of learning can render it.'

ART. V.—*A Treatise on Crimes and Indictable Misdemeanors. Second Edition, with considerable Additions.* By WILLIAM OLDNALL RUSSELL, Esq., of Lincoln's Inn, Sergeant at Law. London, 1828. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 683, 828.

THE design of this valuable work is to dispose, in appropriate arrangement, 'the principles of the common law, the statutes and the decided cases relating to every offence which may be made the subject of prosecution by indictment, except high treason.' The first edition appeared in London in 1819, and was reprinted in this country, with additional notes of American decisions, in 1824. The first volume of a second English edition was printed in London in 1826, and contained, in an appendix, the act for improving the administration of criminal

justice in England [7 Geo. 4. ch. 64.], passed on the 26th of May of that year; but the publication of the second volume was delayed, with the professed design that when it was published it should contain, 'in proper arrangement, the important statute consolidating the law relative to theft,' which was then before parliament. This act passed on the 21st of June, 1827 [7 and 8 Geo. 4. ch. 29.], and the second volume of the work before us was issued from the press, we believe, not until the last year, although it bears the imprint of 1828.

It is not our intention to speak of the value of this work to the profession for whose libraries it is chiefly designed, nor to discuss its merits as a standard authority; for this is well settled by the respect it has received from courts of law. Nor shall we be led away from our present design, by the more agreeable task of examining the great improvement of the criminal code, both in its principles and practice, by the recent statutes prepared by Mr Peel; * nor even stop to pay the tribute of merited respect and admiration to that eminent statesman, whose enlightened humanity and sound practical good sense, combined with uncommon industry and unconquerable perseverance, gathered from the wastes and deserts of the law, over which genius and learning are not always willing to travel, this proud memorial of his usefulness and worth. Our object is to offer some general remarks on the subject of criminal law, principally in connexion with its agency in preserving the morals of a people, and maintaining public character.

No one doubts that the good order and security of society depend materially on the efficacy of its criminal code. Other causes have their operation, and higher motives of action are drawn from the precepts of religion and the obligations of morality. To do right because it is right, to regulate the conduct in obedience to the dictates of conscience and the will of God, is certainly the noblest, as it is the purest spring of human actions; and in the eye of Heaven, nothing has the character of virtue, which proceeds from a less elevated origin. But the security of man in civil society depends on motives, only so far as they influence actions. In reference to the moral character of an individual, we ask *why* he has performed an action that is submitted to our notice, but in reference to society, the question is rather *what* has he done. Bad passions and bad feelings, con-

* 7 and 8 Geo. 4. ch. 27, 28, 29, 30, 31. 9 Geo. 4. ch. 15-23.

finned within the breast of any one, are causes of his own unhappiness. It is only when they burst the restraints of human laws, that the community becomes affected, and feels itself bound to exert its control.

The motive, which fairly considered is the lightest, too often has practically the greatest effect; and the reason of it is well expressed by an eminent divine. 'One principal cause of the feeble hold, which subjects of religion have upon the mind, is the fancied remoteness of their objects, and the spiritual nature of the subjects of religious contemplation. What is immediately perceptible, tangible, pleasurable, or profitable, excites more emotion than any of those spiritual truths, which a man must study his own heart in order to understand.'*

Education is a restraint on the commission of crime. It raises its objects above the temptation that might seduce them, or furnishes motives and means to resist its operation. But education is necessarily limited. There are those in every community who have neither time, nor means, nor capacity to enjoy its advantages. An intellectual darkness, thicker and grosser than ever gathered upon Egypt, has settled on their minds; and while the age in which they live is an enlightened one, and the community of which they form a part is polished and refined and cultivated and improved, they are in coverts where the light of learning cannot reach them. Education is also limited in its influence. It sometimes sharpens the intellect and blunts the moral faculties, in a manner altogether unaccountable; and seems, in raising a man above the influence of one class of temptations, to expose him with more danger to another. Education is not virtue.

Public opinion does much to preserve the public tranquillity. Many who do not fear the guilt of crime, tremble at its disgrace, and are honest from a sense of shame, rather than a principle of integrity. Public opinion is, indeed, a powerful protector, wherever its influence is rightly directed. As far as its authority extends, its sanctions can be enforced. But not only are there many members of every community wholly beyond its influence,—many who have no respect for, and hardly any knowledge of any other sentiment than what is generated by profligate companions; but in society at large

* Buckminster's Sermons, the new volume, p. 118.

public opinion is in a good degree to be purified and made salutary by the operation of the laws. The enlightened members of the state entertain a respect for the laws, which itself influences the public opinion, on the subject matter of the law, as well as on whatever is analogous in principle or tendency. But public opinion sometimes tolerates what the laws denounce, and becomes the most formidable enemy to the morals of society, or is so unsettled as to do them but little good. We have lately discussed its operation in our communities, and should now repeat rather than retract anything we have advanced regarding its importance, and the resistless weight with which it moves. But with all its consequence everywhere, and its vast power in such a state of society as ours, it would be a most dangerous substitute for the authority of the laws. We the more insist on this, because though no one, that we know, would go so far as to abrogate the entire criminal code, and rely on the protection of public opinion, there are many who would confide this or that part of it, to so insecure a protection. There are some of our most esteemed and respected fellow citizens, of sound learning and generally of good judgment, who, in particular instances of vital importance to society, would abrogate the penalty of the law, and trust to the good sense and integrity of the public mind.

For example, the preservation of the christian sabbath as a day of rest and relaxation from labor, as an appropriate day for the discharge of those religious duties which other vocations interfere with on other days of the week, and for a recognition of those obligations, which, if indeed they ought to be always present to the mind, would soon be effaced unless brought periodically under review—the observance of the sabbath is in all christian countries, to some extent, secured by positive enactment and the penalties of a criminal law. We do not mean to touch the question about holy time. We admit, for the present, that all time is equally holy. We do not meddle with the inquiry, to us indeed a very plain proposition in the affirmative, whether the Supreme Being commands, or the christian religion requires, any appropriation of time for religious communion and the public worship of God. We suppose that no Christian of any creed, that no statesman of any party, that no philanthropist of any school, would deny that the separation of one day in seven from the ordinary business and

cares of the world, is as important to the well-being of society, as its revenue, its magistracy, or its military force.

But what would be the condition of things, if the rights of the public in this respect were not enjoined by positive law? We answer, that in our opinion the result would be an increased disregard to any essential distinction in the general employments of society, between one day and another. Labor would, more than now, be carried on by those who had not means or inclination to enter into any calculations of profit beyond their immediate and pressing wants. The profligacy of a low class would more eagerly seek places of wasteful dissipation, and the ministers of vice, who feed high their love of gain, by taking advantage of the base passions of base men, would riot in a license, which no law existed to control. Over such men principle has no power. They laugh at it. Opinion has no influence. The opinion they regard is that of their own class. This it upholds, and praises those most, that most daringly set at defiance the obligations of morality. While the world lasts, we suppose the christian sabbath will be religiously observed by the pious and well disposed, whether there be law of man's making, or whether there be not. But in the absence of law, it would only afford something worse than idle time to those who feel no obligation of conscience to observe it. On such must be laid the enforcement of law. As the case now stands, it is with infinite difficulty that any restraint is imposed on many classes of people. Violations of the positive law which enjoins what religion and morality enjoin, are not unfrequent. Sometimes they are punished, sometimes they escape; and the chance of escape leads to repeated attempts to infringe its provisions, while the higher sanctions, derived from duty to God and man, are treated with levity and contempt.

We have taken this subject for an illustration, not that it is the most forcible or apt, but because upon this, in particular, intelligent and high-minded men have at times expressed a different opinion. We have heard it doubted if the law should have anything to do with the observance of the sabbath. We have heard men, who feel most sensibly the necessity of a due regard to the day, and are aware of its immense importance to all the interests of society, advocate a reliance solely on the good sense and good feelings of the community. We have heard from the pulpit, in language of impas-

sioned eloquence which left no doubt of the preacher's sincerity and conviction,—from the pulpit even we have heard it urged, that the civil arm should not exert itself to enforce, by prosecutions and penalties, the cessation of secular employment on the first day of the week ; and we accounted for the fact, by reflecting that the preacher was not a practical man. Had he visited the poor and ignorant and depraved and abject population of our great cities, had he known the indulgences which a less needy and more worthless class allow themselves on the return of the day, how eagerly the haunts of dissipation are visited, how daringly inroads are made on the decencies of life ; had he seen the disposition which prevails, to take every possible chance for gain, and the restiveness which is manifested under the slightest control, he would not doubt that it is the positive prohibition and penalties of the law, alone, which, in many cases, shut up shops and places of idle resort, and keep down the example of riotous amusements ; or that, were these restraints removed, the devotions of the serious, and the solemnities of the thoughtful, would be disturbed by obstreperous mirth and profligate carousal.

With the faith of men we do not desire to meddle in the way of coercion. Far be it from us to maintain, that human law should control the dictates of conscience. With religious tenets we deprecate all interference by civil authority ; but for the good order and peace of society, legal provision should most certainly be made. For the civil interests of the state, its magistrates are bound to be watchful and active. How far the cessation of labor and amusement should be required, is a question of expediency ; but when that is settled, the right and duty of the magistrate is perfect and plain ; and if he will not lend his own efforts to the influence of higher motives, he may be assured that those motives alone will not be found universally to answer the purpose he proposes.

But our main position may be established without resort to controverted ground. The criminal code is one of the defences of society against vice. Now it is manifest that with all the guards which religion and education and public opinion and the laws of the land have provided, crimes are perpetrated and the peace of society is invaded. If all these means combined cannot, as certainly they have not eradicated the vices of mankind, no one of them can be spared ; for each, we suppose it is uni-

versally admitted, does something towards so desirable an end.

It is our object, then, not so much to speak of the importance of the criminal code, as of its condition, the character it has and ought to have, the difficulties which obstruct its execution, and to suggest whatever occurs to us as an improvement in its general features.

The criminal code prohibits such actions as, in the judgment of the sovereign power, are injurious to the state; provides for the arrest and trial of any who are suspected of violating its provisions, and punishes with appropriate penalties whoever is convicted of offending against the laws. Its object is to preserve the peace of society; and its means of accomplishing this object, is to punish, and thereby, if possible, reform the guilty; to strike a salutary terror into the minds of those who might be endangered by the impunity of vice, and to prevent the commission of offences by a practical illustration of the truth, that the way of transgressors is hard. It necessarily varies in its details in the different States of our confederacy, and in the statutes of the United States; but its general character throughout our country is in all essential respects the same. With two exceptions, it has grown up by successive, but not very methodical arrangements, as time and opportunity allowed, or more probably as some immediate exigency seemed to demand. The learned and profound investigations of Mr Livingston, have given to Louisiana, and the laborious industry and wisdom of the Legislature of New York, have secured to that State more judicious and regular systems, and brought a high order of intellect to the consideration of a subject, which directly concerns the happiness of multitudes, and oftentimes the character of society.

The first remark we have to make on the condition of the criminal code, is, that it is an error to take its operations as an index to the moral character of a nation. Yet this is almost the only standard to which writers on this branch of statistics, are in the habit of referring. We find it invariably the case that the record of convictions is adduced as evidence of the quantity of crime. But it hardly furnishes an approximation to the fact. Crimes are perpetrated, and no prosecutions ensue; the offenders are unknown, or elude pursuit. Again, prosecutions are instituted, and the accused party is discharged, not because a crime has not been committed by

some one, but because the person charged is not proved guilty according to the rules of law. Nor are these defects uniform or nearly so. Detection depends on the degree of vigilance exerted by the police, which is greater or less at different times; on the skill, ingenuity, and perseverance, which hunts through the coverts of iniquity, and seizes on fugitive offenders. It depends on the rapidity of pursuit, on the thoroughness and extent of it, and of course on the pecuniary means which are supplied for the purpose.

We secondly remark, that institutions for the execution of the criminal code, are too frequently considered of importance in proportion to the number of convictions which occur, as the nets of the fowler are valued by the game he is enabled to capture. In pursuance of this most erroneous notion, courts and their appendages for the prosecution of criminals, are sometimes thought to be less necessary, as the number of cases within their jurisdiction is diminished. It is forgotten that they are of the nature of citadels for defence, and that their most important object is attained, when they prevent aggression by the display of a force that would certainly overwhelm it.

Men who live in the habitual commission of crime, if they do not bring the intellectual powers into proper exercise, and so are not to be considered wise men, are yet, as a class, not to be treated as fools. It is not politic to regard them as destitute of a fair proportion of intelligence. There are many miserable dolts among them, but the *class* is not deficient in natural talents or acquired information. Indeed, it is frequently ingenuity misapplied, which has led them from the path of honesty. Good citizens make an unfortunate mistake, when, in forming the laws, or preparing the mode of administering them, they consider depraved and lawless men as beings of inferior capacity. It is not so. The public prisons are tenanted by at least an average portion of human intellect, and often by men of a character of mind eminently fitted to exert a commanding influence in any society of which they are permitted to be members. Such men calculate with accuracy the general chances of detection. They have as regular an estimate of the hazards of their mode of life, as a merchant has of the winds and storms of the ocean, or the risks of commerce. When the history of their lives is disclosed, we turn with disgust from the repetition of crimes and the depth of

iniquity, which are unfolded ; but we ought to learn the more practical truth which these felons' speeches never fail to disclose to us, how feeble, namely, they have found the barriers of the law ; how often they have committed atrocious crimes without being suspected ; how often they have been suspected and not taken ; or taken and tried, but have contrived artfully to escape through the meshes of the net which enclosed them. The competency of the judicial tribunals, the vigilance that is to bring them to the bar, the care and accuracy with which the forms of proceedings against them will be arranged, the possibility of buying off witnesses, or the means they may have of deceiving a jury by false evidence or purchased sophistry, are as regular items in the account current of their chances, as any that are entered in the ledger of honest employment.

The object most desirable is to obtain the means of detecting the guilty person,—a branch of our inquiry which we shall presently consider. But we remark in this connexion, that the careful organization of the criminal courts, with the proper means of immediate pursuit known to be at their command, is quite as useful, to say the least, in preventing crimes, as it ever could be in punishing them. But in regard to the punishment which is to be inflicted, the mildest that is not so trifling as to be laughed at, is more likely to be efficacious, than that severer discipline which is threatened without being applied.

Our community is averse to capital punishments. These are adopted by the criminal code, and in certain cases we have no doubt are warranted by the laws of God, and required by the stern necessity of public preservation. But whenever they are decreed, a strong sentiment of commiseration is excited. The executive is beset for a pardon, be the guilt of the party what it may, and in case of an execution, we are sometimes left in doubt which receives the greater share of public condemnation, the magistrate or the criminal. Something of the kind is found in all cases of conviction. Popular feeling is adverse to severity, and where a discretion is allowed, judges have found it wise not to go to the extent of their power. The reaction of the public mind, in cases of any excitement, is extraordinary, and much more powerful than one not accustomed to watch its movements, would suppose. The first account of crime excites indignation. People are on the

alert, and a detestation of the offence rouses them to a general pursuit, or whatever other effort is required to detect the suspected party. He is taken and put on trial, and there begins to be an inclination to doubt his guilt. He is convicted, and he excites sympathy. He is punished, and his sufferings create commiseration. Humanity laments over his misfortunes. Generosity is awakened. His humbleness and helplessness disarm resentment. What good can be done by the exercise of power on a wretch already rendered incapable of doing further injury to society? He has connexions, a family, a wife, children, and perhaps other dependants, and his disgrace throws its darkness upon them. Their misery, great enough by the fact of his guilt, is aggravated by the disgrace of its penalty. Every blow inflicted on him, draws blood from the hearts of his innocent offspring. Every day's confinement to which he is subjected, deprives them of the means of subsistence. While he is in prison, they are in poverty; while the state punishes him, food must be provided for his family, or they must starve in the streets. This with a vast number is the language both of feeling and of fact. It is difficult to find an answer to it. The common law of Providence involves the innocent in the punishment of the guilty, but the extent of this communion is oftentimes man's work. We say guilt must be punished, and innocence protected; but we have not the means of accomplishing both. If we discharge the convicted felon, we encourage a herd of prowling wolves to drink the blood of our children, or riot on the plunder of our property. If we punish him, we draw tears of anguish from hearts pure, perhaps, as our own, and seem to be exerting the whole weight of society on a being, bound, fettered, and helpless, too insignificant for resentment, or too dull for reproach. In this dilemma is the judge of a criminal court often placed, when to be just is to appear cruel to one class, and to be merciful is to be unjust to another.

Undoubtedly, that law would best answer its purpose, which should take early measures for preventing the opportunity of crime, and extend its cordon of observation round the deluded and unprincipled part of the community. But when this may not be done, such punishment as may not bring odium on the law itself, and of course a mild and moderate system of penalties, is most to be commended as a sanction for the criminal code. Not only must cruelty be avoided, but nothing en-

couraged that looks like vengeance, or even severity. The terror of the law is inspired by a different principle. Its certainty is more efficacious than its weight. When there is a great probability that the punishment that is threatened will be awarded, and that what is awarded will be inflicted, although this may be small, and wholly inadequate as a retaliation for the wrong done to society, there is a better hope that the object will be secured.

The power of pardon has a direct connexion with the criminal code, and it is not to be inferred from what we have said, that we join with those who think it should be never, or very sparingly exercised. It may seem singular, after what we have already remarked with regard to the difficulty of executing the sentence of the law, that any should be found to resist its remission. Such contradictions, however, are not unfrequent on a subject which is of daily recurrence, and appears so plain to common apprehension, that most men speak about it in a manner somewhat dogmatical. But so it is. While a constant clamor is raised against the common course of proceedings in relation to the punishment of criminals, an outcry not less perplexing is made as to the exercise of pardon. The executive is importuned by applicants for clemency, while abroad there are those of some influence and weight, who are not satisfied with any relaxation of the sentences which from time to time are pronounced by courts of law.

The power of pardon has in some parts of our country been greatly abused. In Pennsylvania, one chief magistrate is said to have released eleven hundred criminals. In New York, it was customary to pardon the old convicts, to make room for new ones, in a prison not large enough to contain all. This was little less than a repeal of the criminal code. In Massachusetts more discrimination has been made, and we think with good effect. The pardoning power has its appropriate limits, beyond which it cannot be carried without injury; but the power is an indispensable part of the system of criminal law, which, without its liberal exercise, would be a cold, and dreary, and stern infliction of severity and suffering, at which all feelings of humanity would revolt, and even the rigid principles of justice turn aside in disgust. To repentant guilt let the hand of mercy be readily extended. Let it remove from the oppressed heart the punishment which has already had its perfect work. Let it restore the child of error to the path of

duty, chastened by the perils he has passed, and bound to virtue by gratitude for that kindness which visited him in prison, and restored him to liberty. Let it alleviate a severe sentence and remit an unjust one. Courts are obliged to act by general laws, by circumstantial evidence and established forms. These may in particular cases bear severely, and perhaps oppressively; but the judge cannot always exert his power for their alleviation, or according to the peculiarities of different offenders. The force of temptation, the seductions of bad company, the pressure of misfortune, the wrong direction of the mind by want of early education, or parental discipline, or kind friends, cannot always enter into the consideration of a judge, even if, as rarely happens, they are made known to him. The different character and condition of offenders of apparently the same class, the state of mind which renders the same penalty so different in its effects on different individuals, must be beyond the cognisance of a judicial officer; but the intelligent and careful dispenser of clemency regulates these inequalities. Each case is before him with its palliatives and its aggravations, and in those in which the operation of general principles have been too stern, or where peculiar circumstances present a claim for mercy, it is wise and just, as well as humane, that he should have the power of forgiveness.

Upon the criminal, too, this power of pardon is the influence that draws him back to society, and connects him with the virtuous and the worthy. It is the little light that throws a cheering ray upon the darkness of his solitude, and sheds a kindly warmth on the coldness of his cell. Without it he could hope nothing. 'The world is not his friend, nor the world's law.' All that chance of amendment which springs from good feeling and a softened mind, would be lost forever. The only hold society has upon a culprit, is in his feeling that there is yet a living sympathy in his misfortunes,—a belief with which he is impressed, that the power which punishes is just, but not vindictive, and however rigorous, is never cruel; that there is yet in operation a benevolence that would delight to bring him back to the path of virtue. There are no other means of amendment. If these fail, if they cannot soften the heart, and melt the obduracy of hardened guilt, it will be in vain to expect reformation by any human exertion. We believe they do, and much more frequently than is generally supposed; but good resolutions are overcome by new temptations, and the de-

sire to do well vanishes before the allurements and necessities of the world.

None probably think of abridging the constitutional power of pardon, which everywhere in our country is lodged in some department of government. But the desire to curtail its free and liberal exercise amounts to the same thing. With some opportunity of observation, we are satisfied that the power of pardon judiciously exerted, is, not less than the power of punishment, indispensable for the good of society, and vastly more beneficial in its tendency to reclaim the deluded and misjudging violaters of the law. And it does not lessen this conviction to be told that this power cannot be exerted, and therefore does not operate, on every transgressor. It is enough that it exists, and can be exerted in any case, and will be in many. Some, therefore, must, and all may be its objects. The chance is open to every one. The self-exertion, which controls chance and begets favor, is practicable, and there is a good motive to practise it. The mind, thrown back upon itself by the sufferings it experiences, has a double inducement to reform; it is impressed at once by the penalty of guilt and the reward of amendment.

Nor are our views changed by the fact, that the records of our prisons frequently show that they are tenanted by many, who have once been pardoned. It proves only that the discretion of the chief magistrate was in such instances wrongly exerted; and this is not wonderful. He is obliged to depend on the information that is given him, and is too often guided by extraneous influence, interested solicitation, and resistless importunity. Society, also, must take something of the reproach to itself; for the convict is pardoned indeed, but his pardon merely gives him liberty to go from the solitude of his cell into the more dreary solitude of a crowd that avoids him. The curse of the felon hangs upon him, and because he can get no employment, and can neither beg nor borrow, he is compelled again to steal.

With all the objections, which have been made to a liberal exercise of the pardoning power, we hope to see it freely, but judiciously exerted. In the whole subject of the treatment of criminals there is nothing that is entirely what we could wish; but this branch of it is certainly not the most revolting, with whatever difficulties it is supposed to be connected. If mercy be sometimes poorly repaid by the gross ingratitude

of its objects, it is oftener encouraged by its rewards. It is the regenerating spark which brings to new life the erring and deluded offender, warms in his bosom the better sentiments of virtue, and excites him to repentance and reformation.

In our remarks on the criminal code, we ought before to have mentioned that we have reference to that of Massachusetts, which, like most of the States, is built on the English common law. In most of its principles, its forms of proceedings and rules of evidence, it remains unchanged. The amendments it has received chiefly relate to the punishments, which have been, with as much wisdom as humanity, made less rigorous and severe. The most important change in this respect was adopted in the year 1805, when confinement in the State Prison was substituted for those corporal scourgings, brands, and exposures in the pillory, formerly awarded.

Trial by jury is everywhere secured by provisions of constitutional law, but is not in all cases practically enjoyed. In Massachusetts, for instance, a man may be deprived of his wife, his children, his fortune, and his character, by the judgment of a single judge, acting without a jury, and often when his opinion cannot be revised by the other members of the Supreme Court.* The case we refer to is under the law of divorce; a law most unwisely contrived to multiply cases for its own operation.

On application for divorce, the investigation of the crime on which the libellant's right depends, is conducted before a single judge, who decides without a jury on the question of fact; and this he is authorised to do, not only on testimony given by witnesses in open court, but by depositions of persons whose character and appearance he cannot by possibility know. When, in his opinion, the libel is sustained, he decides who shall have which, and how many of the children. He determines the ability of the convicted party to pay alimony, and fixes its amount. When the character of the condemned party is thus decided to be infamous, and his children are removed from him, and his property is forfeited, and his wife is divorced, he has not even the poor satisfaction of knowing that it was by verdict of his peers, or even by the deliberate judgment of all his constitutional judges.

It is no answer to say this power has never been abused. The actual administrators of this law are entitled to, and pos-

* *Mass. Laws*, 1820. Ch. 56.

sess, our highest respect; and while the greatness of the trust confided to them makes them wisely cautious, it should have had a similar effect on the makers of the law. Whenever its operation is brought to bear on some member of the more influential class of society, it will be a subject of very serious complaint. We have known hard cases, where the solicitude of the bench to do right, could not always accomplish it. Our dissatisfaction is not diminished by the consideration that a law, so important and anomalous, was made for the exigency of a single case, and that a whole system was imposed on the community for the benefit of a single family; a mode of legislation that can never escape reprobation. But our motive especially in noticing it here may be found in its tendency to encourage divorces. The ease and rapidity with which a dissolution of the marriage contract can be obtained, and the collusions, which, under the existing laws, can be practised to obtain it, are not light matters of consideration, either to the moralist who regards the manners, or to the civilian who is concerned for the general interests, of society.

The right of trial by jury is also taken away in such cases as fall within the enlarged jurisdiction of justices of the peace.* It is true, that a right of appeal is reserved to the party convicted, and on the trial of such appeal the case passes under the revision of a jury. But this is the most tantalizing of all judicial mockeries. It indeed keeps the word of promise to the ear, but breaks it to the hope. On the statute book all looks fair and constitutional. There appears to be no oppression, no injustice, no usurpation. But how is the fact? The appeal is given on conditions that can hardly ever be complied with. The poor man has not the means, the ignorant has not the knowledge, and the innocent has not the time, which the statute requires. The process is too summary, the judgment too speedy, the sentence too sudden, to allow the benefit of provisions, which the Bill of Rights declares shall be 'granted freely, completely, and without denial.' And the result proves this. Of more than one thousand cases decided under this statute in the city of Boston, not five have been carried before a jury by process of appeal.† We do not doubt that all these cases were

* Mass. Laws, Ch. 82, of 1822.

† During seven years and a half there were received in the Police Court of the city of Boston, 15,449 complaints of offences under the laws. We have not the means of ascertaining how they were disposed of. Probably they terminated in some of the following ways, viz.

decided correctly on the evidence before the court. Possibly a jury might have come to the same results; and had the same magistrates pronounced a final judgment in all cases of homicide or felony that occurred during the same period, it is not supposable that they would in any one instance have been designedly wrong. But this is not a proper foundation for criminal law. It does not comply with the direction of the Bill of Rights, which provides, that 'the legislature shall not make any law that shall subject any person to a capital or infamous punishment, except for the government of the army or navy, without trial by jury.'

To take away a trial by jury, except on impossible conditions, and from persons whom it is known beforehand cannot comply with the conditions, is an evasion of public duty. It is a deception which can satisfy the conscience of no honest man, and must have been introduced by mistake, and is suffered to remain through mere inattention.

We have supposed the magistrates who execute this law, to be intelligent and upright; and we do not mean to retract that testimony of our respect, when we suggest our apprehensions that they may be sometimes led into error. For who are the persons on whose testimony complaints are often made and judgments awarded? They are the retainers of the police, constables, and constables' deputies, and the deputies of deputies, and so down. And who are the objects of the law, but exactly that unfortunate and miserable class, upon whom oppression could be most easily exerted? The theatre of a justice's court is too small, the spectators are too few, the actors are too humble for the performance of so serious a tragedy. There is wanted a wider field of observation. What is done, should be done before the community. It should be

1. The complaint was dismissed without further process.
2. The defendant could not be found;
3. Or was discharged, not being proved guilty;
4. Or was ordered to appear before some higher tribunal, the case being beyond the final jurisdiction of the examining magistrates.
5. Judgment was pronounced against the party accused.

From some other sources we learn that about twelve hundred of the above cases were remitted to a higher tribunal. Sixty appeals were claimed from judgments; but, after some inquiry, we can find but one of this number, in cases under the enlarged jurisdiction of justices, where punishment by imprisonment was imposed; which proves, we think, a most extraordinary satisfaction on the part of the accused persons, or what in our opinion is much more probable, an entire inability to obtain a trial by jury.

subjected to the salutary influence of public opinion ; and that influence is well kept up by a jury, who are the representatives of all the people in courts of law. Without their agency no very considerable jurisdiction should ever be exercised.

This subject is of vastly more importance than it may seem to be, to superficial observers. The right of trial by jury is justly esteemed invaluable ; but in the worst times there were comparatively few men, who suffered for the want of it. The moral benefit is of equal moment, and operates extensively on all that class of the community most to be affected by criminal law. The higher penalties are rarely called for. It is the recurrence of little crimes and little punishments, which constitutes the mass of business for a court ; and the great body of those, whose minds and manners are to be influenced by the operation of the laws, are consigned for good or for evil to the humblest departments in the administration of justice.

The criminal code is wanting in that completeness and symmetry of parts, which are the marks of a regular system. It resembles those ancient fabrics of Gothic architecture improved by modern taste without regard to their original construction. It would extend this article too far, to notice in detail the proofs of this position, but we may rest it on the general fact, that the code has never been systematically arranged with a view to any definite results. Something has been done at one time, and something at another ; but alterations have been made for temporary purposes by permanent provisions, projected without regard to the existing law, and often in language singularly inartificial, untechnical, and hard to be understood. It would not escape the animadversion of a legal critic, that the forms of indictment, the subject of evidence, the admissibility of confessions, or the manner and circumstances of receiving them, are left to the regulations of ancient common law.

But we pass from this branch of our subject, which would carry us beyond the bounds we are desirous of prescribing to ourselves, to say something of the difficulties in the *execution* of the criminal laws.

We first remark, that the ambiguity of their language, is one cause of insuperable difficulty. Every one has heard of a law for lighting the public streets, in a neighbouring State, which first provided for lanterns, and then for candles to be put in them, and yet failed of its purpose, until it was enacted that the candle should be lighted. A mistake of an opposite nature was

made by one of our own eminent jurists, who drafted a law to prevent the sale of any lighted fireworks, an article, which, in such a condition, nobody ever wanted to buy. The meaning of the plain phrases 'sailing to a foreign port,' and 'from any harbor in the United States,' gave rise to endless discussions under the embargo laws, and furnished excuses for conniving at evasions of the statutes.

Something of this ambiguity is doubtless unavoidable. But there is an unpardonable negligence in the phraseology of laws, which ought not to be tolerated. And it would be easy to remedy it. The expense of prosecutions on an ill-worded law, is vastly greater than would be incurred by paying competent persons for a careful revision of it. At such a suggestion the pride of the legislature takes immediate alarm. What! are not we, the representatives of the people, capable of doing the public business? Are not the lawyers of the General Court as competent to frame a law, as any other members of their profession? Undoubtedly they are. But they have neither the time, nor the inclination, nor do they feel the responsibility, which such a work requires. At any rate, after the experience of more than half a century, it is certain the evil exists, and we speak to practical men when we say, that it is unwise and unthrifty to proceed on theoretical principles which have always deceived us. Every government has certain law officers whose time might be commanded for this purpose. The criminal code, if it has any pretence to the character of a system, is to be modified with a knowledge, not only of the effect of proposed alterations on the part under consideration, but of the entire system with which they are to be incorporated. Of the general design and tendency of rules and principles, the people by their representatives, are not only the best, but unquestionably the only judges; as they are what fortresses or ships of war should be constructed for national defence, or what edifices should be erected at public expense, for the ornament or convenience of the country. But, as in these latter cases, artists and architects would be employed under their direction, to carry any general plan into execution, we do not see why the same aid may not be useful in the technical construction of the laws, unless, indeed, to erect a market-house or build a revenue-boat, be harder than to frame a body of public law. If the law has acquired the complexity of a science, either reduce it to plain and elementary principles, or use its

technical language with precision. The system ought to be made practicable, either by a simplicity which requires no skill, or by the use of such skill as its want of simplicity demands.*

A more serious difficulty in the way of executing the laws than the ambiguity of their language, and one for which no remedy has ever been suggested that in itself is free from objection, meets us at the threshold. We allude to the commencement of a prosecution. The law never moves of its own accord. Its precepts, its officers, its authority, its penalties, all remain quiet, by something more than a mere *vis inertiae*, until set in operation by some extraneous power. The arrest of a delinquent, which is its first efficient movement, is to be preceded by a charge under oath, which anybody may make, who has knowledge of the facts, but which nobody is obliged to make. The exceptions to this position need not now detain us. The necessary security, which is here provided for innocent parties, has a serious operation in screening the guilty, and retards, and frequently defeats, the whole design of the law. The oath and complaint are not certainly to be dispensed with; but the inquiry is a very important one, when and by whom it ought to be made.

In cases in which public opinion, or individual interest is strongly excited, all is found to answer very well. If a murder is perpetrated, or violence is inflicted on the person of a citizen, or property is stolen, there is generally an alacrity of pursuit after the offender, and somebody stands ready to seek the aid of the laws. But that multitude of cases, which regard the peace, comfort, and good morals of society, without being particularly injurious to any one more than another, and those acts which become criminal only by positive prohibitions, remain notorious, but unpunishable, till some private inconvenience, greater than the trouble and vexation of undertaking to prosecute, induces somebody to volunteer in moving the majestic silence of the laws. Hence it is, that while the community is known to abound in places of abandoned profligacy, where mind, manners, morals, health, and property are daily and hourly sacrificed, the proprietors of the establishments are en-

* The distinctions between prosecutions and *qui tam* actions are singularly confounded in the Massachusetts laws. The statute, ch. 143, of 1804, has several omissions and a great want of accurate distribution of prohibitions and penalties. The statute, ch. 134, of 1828, seems intended to expend its power in threats which there is no means of enforcing.

abled to fatten on the heart's blood of their victims, and maintain themselves, with very little hazard, in a shameless and disgraceful impunity. Liquors are sold without licence, to the great encouragement of intemperance and its host of calamities; gaming houses are maintained; places of ill fame congregate their nightly assemblies of depraved and dissolute inmates; lottery offices are kept open; personal, obscene, and blasphemous libels are published; minor offences are permitted; the laws of the market, of the road, of police—of vast consequence as a whole, though seemingly insignificant in detail—are violated; little frauds and small felonies are committed upon suffering citizens little able to bear them, and the seeds of iniquity thickly scattered in the community, because it is not the particular duty of any one to take care of the public soil.*

We have alluded to certain cases, in which that which is the business of anybody, and therefore never done, becomes in some degree the duty of a particular officer. Thus the chief magistrate of large cities has generally some agent to enforce the execution of the laws, 'not only before complaint, but without complaint.' But the duty of such officer is always limited to police regulations, and is moreover controlled by such higher motives for indulgence, that his office is in a great degree useless. Consequently, police regulations are the most frequently, openly, and daringly violated; and while, now and then, what relates to health and personal convenience, is rigidly enforced, the more dangerous contaminations of the moral atmosphere, seem to be reckoned as among the necessary impurities of the city air.

To excite a vigilance that may be effectual, the legislature

* Impunity is not confined to these smaller acts. The law against challenging to a duel, has been repeatedly violated in a manner as notorious as any incident of public history, with no movement on the part of the law. Indeed, a duel was actually fought within the limits of the city of Boston, in view of divers good citizens of the Commonwealth, and one of the parties shot through the body; but the civil authorities were as silent as the grave. Sundry others, less public, but quite as well known, have occurred with the same death-like stillness on the part of the public authorities. At the moment we are writing, the legislature have received the report of a committee detailing gross fraud, and something that looks rather worse than mere fraud, without intimating the least disposition to turn over the offending parties to the judicial tribunals. This negligence is not found only among us. It is not uncommon in other parts of the country, nor rare in the history of the nation from which we have borrowed our law; though, where political questions are not concerned, it is but justice to say, endeavours are made, in flagrant instances, to insure the more certain march of justice.

has in some cases rewarded the obnoxious task of an informer, by dividing with him the penalty inflicted on a convicted party ; and though this does not impose a duty, it furnishes a motive to prosecute. In some cases it has had a good effect, but as a general principle is liable to very serious objections. It diverts the object of a prosecution from public good to personal emolument, generally draws a very inferior class of agents into the public service, and brings on the law itself the stigma of a mercenary spirit, discreditable to its character, and, in a free state, unfriendly to its influence. It further most commonly raises a question in the public mind, whether it be not better that an offender escape, than that an informer make money by telling of his crime. Men, who, as legislators, have proposed this reward, or as citizens have approved of it in the abstract, as being a salutary provision of the law, are often found very hostile to its practical operation, in the very cases in which it was intended to operate. The legislature itself constantly vacillates, now offering and now retracting its bounty, as the impunity of flagrant guilt, or the profits of a busy informer, seem from time to time to be most deserving of rebuke. Interested men find it very easy to direct something like public indignation against the agents who are invited by the public promises of the statute book, to perform an ungracious, though very often a necessary task. Take, for example, the case of licensed houses under the laws of Massachusetts. To place these establishments under legal control, was the early and constant policy of the State ; and, to insure an impossibility of evading the law, a heavy penalty was imposed on offenders, and one half of it given to the informer. When the desolating calamity of intemperance began to excite an increased degree of solicitude, attention was directed to places where its means were illegally obtained ; and the law, set in motion by the inducements provided in its terms, had an immediate and salutary vigor. But the consequences of its activity were no sooner perceived to be, that, besides closing the unlicensed shops, it was made profitable to those who had become obnoxious by giving information, than the provision for dividing the penalty was repealed. The effect, of course, is, that this most desirable law is left to take care of itself ; and, against the common sense of the community—hostile to all encouragements for intemperance, in open ridicule of the labor of societies formed for the promotion of good morals in this regard,

and against all those reasons of a public and important character, which demand the rigid enforcement of its penalties, it is constantly, extensively, and notoriously violated with impunity. Men of respectability, engaged in an honest calling, conform to its provisions; but that worthless class it was intended to restrain, treat its denunciations with impudent contempt.

In one or two cases, the law officers of the Commonwealth, are directed to prosecute offences against certain laws; a provision which either means nothing, or, being introduced with great ignorance of the established mode of proceeding in criminal cases, can come to nothing. It is the duty of these officers to prosecute all crimes, when a prosecution is practicable, and there needed no direction to them to do this as to any particular class. The only prosecutions they can conduct, are those, the means of which shall be furnished them by witnesses knowing to the facts, and ready to testify to these facts before a jury. It would argue great folly to suppose that the attorney-general could draw an indictment on his own knowledge, and be at the same time witness and counsel for the Commonwealth. The statute which directs him and his colleagues to prosecute, gives no means of procuring the information on which the very first measure of a prosecution must be founded. It certainly does not expect him to go himself into the purlieus of crime, nor does it empower him to employ or pay others for such domiciliary visitation. Its only use is to keep up an expectation of activity, which must necessarily be fallacious; and it holds its place in the statute book only by a strange mistake, both as to the object to be obtained, and the legal means of obtaining it.

A more effectual mode of enforcing the laws, is through the intervention of a grand jury. They are under oath 'diligently to inquire, and true presentment make, of all such matters and things as shall be given them in charge;' and the practice here is, invariably to give them in charge the whole criminal code. Their numbers prevent any personal odium, and their obligation, to keep the Commonwealth's counsel, their fellows', and their own, if observed, shuts out the means of directing it. They are the people's representatives, and are entrusted with the people's rights in the administration of justice. From this body, therefore, might be expected to come a complaint against every open violation of law, with directions where to find the precise evidence to maintain their charge in the form required

by the provision of the Bill of Rights. In practice it is not so. Either the successive members of this body do not possess the requisite information, or do not feel bound to communicate it. The case of an indictment at the voluntary suggestion of a grand jurymen, is exceedingly rare. The law is left to its course, and deeds of evil, which the interest or feelings of an aggrieved party do not bring to light, are permitted to sleep in the tranquillity of oblivion.

If the community were better informed of the defects of the criminal law, many of their complaints would cease, or be directed only against themselves. Strictness and clemency are equally the causes of dissatisfaction, and often with different classes at the same time. Sometimes there are too few prosecutions, and sometimes too many. Sometimes the expense of proceedings, or the insignificance of the culprit, it is said, should stay the arm of the law, although the power to restrain, is as little the subject of discretion, as that of commencing a prosecution. Again, the clamor is equally obstreperous, that a more comprehensive operation does not include every possible culprit. Some would have the lightning of the law wither on the instant, this or that class of offenders, while over the heads of these very victims there are others quite willing to have its innoxious thunders roll safely at a distance. In all these cases it is forgotten that the public will has seen fit to fix the whole penal code, like the bucket of a public well, which at one time swings idly in the air, and at another cannot be moved with sufficient rapidity to satisfy the thirst.

We add another remark, which we trust will be candidly received. If the community feel any interest in the due execution of the criminal law, they should give their countenance to those officers by whom it must be executed. The efficacy of its operation depends in a good degree on the exertions of the representative of the State. He is called upon to strip off the disguise of artful imposture, to lay bare the fraudulent deceptions of knavery, to expose the pretences that would conceal crime, or detect the sophistry that would defend it; and in doing this he surrounds himself with enemies who find in his interference their liability to punishment. He may truly say, *Quonam meo fato fieri dicam, ut nemo his annis viginti, reipublicæ fuerit hostis, qui non bellum, eodem tempore, mihi quoque indixerit? Nec vero necesse est quenquam nominari, vobiscum ipsi recordamini.*

The men who live in violation of the laws, have a common sympathy with each other. Sharpers, gamblers, panders to the unlawful appetites of the young, the dissolute and the prodigal, lottery dealers, *et id genus omne*, see only one obstacle to their security. Men whom the humanity of a jury discharges from conviction, which everybody but a technical jury knows to be merited, or on whom the lenity of a judge inflicts a fine instead of sending them to prison, affect an appearance of innocence, by blustering about the oppression of the laws, and show their gratitude for an escape through the instrumentality of a legal doubt, by pretended indignation that their innocence was suspected. Such men are more powerful than is generally supposed. Under various pretences, they consort with better citizens. They are voters, and throw their weight into the scales of an election; or are writers, and move the power of the press.

A series of public prosecutions were recently conducted in the city of New York, tending to disclose a complicated system of chicanery and fraud, and involving men of influence and property. After immense difficulties, verdicts were obtained and judgments pronounced, which were reversed by the high Court of Errors and Appeals. The discharge of his duty in these cases, brought on the law officer all that hostility in a notorious manner, which, in a less observable form, is the constant consequence of similar exertions. But the public sentiment threw over him its impenetrable shield, and the merchants of that opulent city recorded the estimation of his services by a donation of plate. Such great occasions rarely occur, and the reward can as rarely be deserved. But the spirit which dictated it, is always in request. The same protection is necessary against a malignant and revengeful temper, which, failing of success upon the laws, turns its rage upon their ministers, in the hope that if it can beat down the sentinel, it may carry the citadel.

ART. VI.—*Lectures on the Inspiration of the Scriptures.* By LEONARD WOODS, D. D., Abbot Professor of Christian Theology in the Theological Seminary, Andover. pp. 152. Andover, M. Newman. 1829.

THE Professor of Theology in the Andover Seminary will excuse us, we trust, if we postpone his claims, for a while, to the less agreeable task of dealing with adversaries who are assailing us with weapons far different from those which he uses. With this remark to guard against even a momentary misapprehension, we shall take up the matter of our thoughts *ab origine*.

One of the evils of controversy, is, that men are driven by it into extremes of opinion. The sound and sober conclusions at which they arrive in calmer times, are made to give way to extravagant positions, injurious to the minds of those who hold them, injurious to the cause of Christianity, and favorable only to the attacks of its enemies. Inquiry is pursued under many undue biases indeed, but especially under the bias of a wish to put opponents and adversaries in the wrong. New tests, not only of practical religion, but of Christianity itself, are set up, in order to exclude unwelcome opinions from the ground of our common faith, and the maintenance of such opinions from the credit of cherishing its virtues.

It is of some importance, at such times, to look to the foundation of our faith, and to call to mind its most judicious and able defenders, to point to the old and firm landmarks and standards, in order to show that these periodical freshets of theological zeal, which bear away 'the wood and the hay and the stubble,' are not powerful enough to remove those landmarks and standards;—to show that they will spend their force and pass away, and leave all that is weighty and strong in our religion, just where it was before. We say it is of some importance. It is not of such importance as if we were defending the very ground of our faith and hope. It is only pointing with our finger, and showing where the foundations are. He who feels his house to be strong and firm, cannot be disturbed if his neighbour, with misplaced zeal or benevolence, should tell him that it is all decaying and sinking beneath him. He may listen to him with an incredulous smile, and may good naturedly go around with him from pillar to pillar, and show him that

what he apprehends to be fatal defect, is the mere rubbish that surrounds them.

It might awaken a stronger feeling, if that neighbour should evidently take pleasure in the alleged unsoundness, if he should exult in the downfall he predicted, and if he should pertinaciously insist upon the point manifestly with the design to injure the property in the great market of public opinion. But still the feeling would be a calm one, and would be only strengthened into a firmer and more fearless confidence. He would perhaps put his hand upon the foundation or upon the pillar, and shake it, with the most careless exertion of his strength, that he might show it to be safe.

It is for all these reasons, that we shall task ourselves for a few moments to examine the totally unauthorised and groundless character of the charge now pressed against us, of being, notwithstanding our christian profession, ourselves Infidels. But for the same reasons, we cannot anticipate that we shall awaken in ourselves much zeal on the subject. We cannot, as we have said on a former occasion, fairly descend into the arena of argument; we cannot seriously put ourselves in contest at this point of recent attack; for, with our professions, it would seem to us a moral indecorum so to do. We must take our stand aloof from this, and simply point out to our prying opponents, whether friendly or unfriendly, their mistake.

We lay our hand strongly, then, upon the foundation—the Bible. We say, *THERE is a communication from Heaven.* *There* is light supernaturally communicated, and attested, to those Heaven-commissioned prophets and apostles, who, in their turn, have simply, naturally, each after the manner of his own age, his own style, his own peculiar habits of thought and feeling, imparted it to us. *There* are truths recorded, beyond the human reach of the men who delivered them, and they are truths dearer to us than life.

Right or wrong in our conviction, this is what we believe. We are not reasoning now with infidels; if we were, we should undertake to show them that we are right. But we are expostulating, we cannot reason, with those who deny us the credit of the faith we profess; and we say to them, again, Right or wrong, this is what we believe. Our opponents must pardon us, if we seem to them to speak loftily in a case like this. We put it to them, whether they could do less in similar circumstances. If the Catholics, or if we ourselves, were seriously

and perseveringly to lay the charge against them, of being infidels in disguise, we ask them if they could consent gravely to argue upon it? We put the case to their own feelings, and we say to them, as they would say to us or to others, in a change of circumstances—with all our solemn professions before them, with all our preaching and our prayers in the name of Christ, with all our labors to illustrate the holy scriptures, with all our publications, our books, our commentaries—with all these things before them, we say that the charge they bring is not *decent*; and in common decency, we cannot descend to argue the point with them.

The only decent allegation which they could bring, is, that our views tend to produce infidelity. On this point we should be at issue with them, and should be willing to reason. We are at issue with them, indeed; for we say that their own views much more tend to produce infidelity. Nay, we seriously believe that it is our system, with thinking minds, that will prove to be the only sufficient defence and barrier against utter unbelief; and this is one great reason why we are anxious for its prevalence. We are perfectly willing to admit, at the same time, that no speculative views are, with all persons and in all circumstances, an effectual preservative. We admit that some Unitarians in foreign countries have become infidels. But do not our opponents know, that many Calvinists, many Orthodox persons, not in other countries alone, but in this also, have become infidels; and that multitudes of Catholics abroad, believers in the trinity, and the atonement, and many kindred points of doctrine, have fallen into utter disbelief of the christian revelation? Doubtless there is a medium somewhere, which is perfect truth and secure faith; and we believe,—without arrogance we hope, since it is a matter of simple sincerity and consistency so to believe—that we are nearest to that medium.

It seems to us not a little extraordinary, and it illustrates indeed the observation with which we commenced these remarks, that while our Orthodox brethren are charging us with these disguised and subtle errors, they do so completely wrap themselves up, as to all the difficult points of this controversy concerning inspiration, in general implications with regard to their own faith in the scriptures, and that they push those implications to an extent so utterly indefensible—so utterly unauthorised, at any rate, by many of the highest standards of their own churches.

And we must add that it seems to us a fact still more irreconcilable with candor and good faith, that while, with a view to show what our faith, or as they will have it, what our unbelief is—while, we say, for this professed purpose, they take brief sentences and disjointed members of sentences here and there from our writings, they altogether suppress the strong and full declarations we make of our belief in a supernatural communication to the inspired teachers of our religion; that they never tell their readers or hearers, that we ‘earnestly contend for this faith’ against unbelievers, and profess to find in it the highest joy and hope of our being. This, we must remind them, is an utter violation of all the received courtesies of religious controversy. For a reasoner to charge upon opponents his inferences as their faith, has long been branded as one of the most inadmissible practices in controversy. But pertinaciously to do this, in the face of the most deliberate protestations to the contrary, and without noticing such protestations; and this, too, before communities that either have not the means, or will not use them, of learning the truth, is a conduct for which we would gladly see any tolerable apology. For if he who ‘robs us of our good name,’ does an inexcusable action, what shall we say of him, who, without affording us any remedy, robs us of the name we most honor and value? We will not say what; we regret the necessity of saying thus much.

But we would invite those from whose lips the charge of infidelity so easily falls, to forsake the convenient covert of general implication, and to tell us, in good truth, what they themselves believe, on some of the matters of accusation that seem to them so weighty.

In laboring to fix upon us the charge of infidelity, they quote from us as proof, the statement, that ‘the inspired penmen wrote in conformity with the philosophy of their respective ages—in conformity therefore with some portions of natural and metaphysical philosophy, that are false.’ We ask if they themselves believe any otherwise? Do they believe that the sacred writers foresaw the discoveries of modern science? If they had this foresight, these matters would not have been left for discovery.

Again, we have said, ‘it cannot be denied that there are some slight discrepancies in the evangelical narratives;’ and this, too, has been quoted as evidence of our unbelief. But can it be denied? Does any intelligent student of the scriptures—do

our accusers deny it? We confess that we are surprised to read a citation like this, because we considered it as a conceded point, in some of our best and best authorised books of evidences, that there are such discrepancies, and because it is argued by our christian apologists, as it was by ourselves, that these discrepancies give additional credit to the evangelical witnesses, by showing that there could have been 'no collusion among them.'

One further extract. We remarked that 'unbelievers have derived more plausible and just objections from the prevailing theological assumptions with regard to our sacred books, than from any other quarter;' and then went on to say, that 'the attacks which are usually made upon the philosophy of Moses, the imprecations of David, the differences among the apostles, the obscurities of Paul, and upon instances of puerility, coarseness, and indelicacy in style, and inappositeness in illustration, are all of this nature.' These expressions, again, are quoted as confirmation strong of our infidelity. On each of these points we should like to put those who arraign us to the question, and to see where *they* stand. Do *they* believe in the philosophy of Moses? Do they reject the Copernican system in astronomy, and maintain with Moses, who wrote in conformity with Jewish astronomy, that the heavens are a solid concave, in which the sun, the planets and stars, like splendid balls of light, perform a daily revolution around the earth? The answer of the rational defender of a revelation to the infidel objection arising from this quarter, is easy. He says that Moses was not commissioned to teach philosophy, but religion. But of this answer our opponents deprive themselves, since to question the philosophy of Moses is with them a sign of infidelity.

Next, 'the imprecations of David'—do they undertake to defend them? Speaking of his enemy, David uses the following tremendous supplications;—'Set thou a wicked man over him, and let Satan stand at his right hand. When he shall be judged, let him be condemned, and let his prayer become sin. Let his days be few, and let another take his office. Let his children be fatherless, and his wife a widow. Let his children be continually vagabonds, and beg. Let the extortioner also catch all that he hath, and let the strangers spoil his labor. Let there be none to extend mercy unto him; neither let there be any to favor his fatherless children. Let his posterity be cut off; and in the generation following let their name be cut off. Let the

iniquity of his fathers be remembered with the Lord, and let not the sin of his mother be blotted out.' It is impossible not to say with Le Clerc, these are the words of a man 'full of excessive choler, and an extreme desire to be revenged. And yet,' says he, 'some famous divines have put in the title to this Psalm, that David, as a type of Jesus Christ, being driven on by a singular zeal, prays that vengeance may be executed on his enemies! But where,' he says, 'do they find that Jesus Christ does curse his enemies at that rate?' Another caption reads that 'David, complaining of his slanderous enemies, under the person of Judas, devoteth them.' But the truth is, all these explanations are perfectly gratuitous. They are worse than gratuitous; they sanction a wrong principle. Can it be right to curse any being, and so to curse him—to curse not only him, but his father, his mother, his children, and his whole posterity, for his sin? Indeed, there is no defence to be made of this passage. This *could* not have proceeded from the good and merciful spirit of God. It was the imperfection of David, thus to feel. It was the imperfection of a rude and barbarous age. It belonged to a period of early and erring piety to use such a prayer. And it does not disannul the evidence furnished by other portions of his writings, that the Psalmist derived an inspiration from heaven. Those lofty conceptions of the spirituality and glory of God, and those sacred and transcendent affections which he entertained, considering the period in which he wrote, seem to us, in their intrinsic character, to warrant the claim to more than human teaching. The Book of Psalms, as a whole, appears to us, the more we study it and the age in which it was composed, to bear marks of an elevation and purity that are supernatural. There is nothing more wonderful to us in its character, than that in an age when the universal reliance was on things material, when all the ideas of what is good, and happy, with the world at large, stopped at this point,—that the mind of David should have found its rest, its portion, its all-sufficiency, as it did, in God; that he should, in this noblest respect, have gone so far beyond the prevailing piety of every subsequent age. But we must not dwell upon this subject. Our reverence for the Psalmist is great; but we cannot be blind to the imperfection of such a passage as that which we have cited. When the imprecations of David are next alluded to, we hope there will be some attempt at an explanation of them into accordance with the received ideas of in-

spiration, or an honest confession of the hopelessness of the task.

We insist upon these instances, more than we should do with any reference that is personal to ourselves or others. They present difficulties, in truth, to the advocates of literal and plenary inspiration which we could wish them fairly to meet.

Our reference to 'the differences among the apostles,' it is said, is another argument to prove that we are infidels. But do they, we ask again, deny that there *were* differences and disputes among the apostles—differences and disputes in regard to their apostolic conduct and work? Did not Paul upbraid Peter at Antioch, for 'not walking uprightly according to the truth of the Gospel;'—for making in fact a false impression in his apostolic character? Did he not 'withstand him to the face, because he was to be blamed?' Did not Paul and Barnabas dispute at the same place, and was not 'the contention so sharp, that they departed asunder one from the other?'

Then as to 'the obscurities of Paul'—on what age of biblical criticism have we fallen, when it is denied, even by implication, that there are obscurities in Paul—'things hard to be understood'? On what age of common sense, when the mention of these obscurities is set down as confirmatory evidence to sustain the charge of infidelity? And further, if the style he has adopted is obscure and hard to be understood, is that style, as mere style, to be commended as anything more than a human composition? Are the words that compose it, either 'grammatically or rhetorically the best words?'—Still further as to the scriptural style, the allegation that there are instances of puerility, coarseness and indelicacy, has been referred to as bearing a skeptical aspect. But has any man ever read the Old Testament without finding such instances? To us, they have no more weight, and they furnish no more difficulty, as affecting the question of a divine communication, than the costume of that ancient age. We should as soon think of requiring good-breeding or politeness in the writers. Such phraseology belongs to the period, and its absence would take away one mark of truth from the record. But what the advocates of a literal and suggesting inspiration are to do with such instances, it passes our comprehension to devise. We beseech them to consider those instances,—it would be improper to quote them, we dare not refer to the texts—and to tell us whether they are ready to pledge the sense and delicacy of christian men for the propriety of such passages in

sacred books or any other books. We warn them, if they do confound the claims of revelation with the defence of such passages, if they dare to present themselves before the searching and free spirit of this age with such a defence, that they will have something to do with infidelity, besides conjuring up a phantom of it in the faith of their fellow Christians.

Lastly, 'inappositeness in illustration.' We would ask any man learned in the scriptures, whether he does not believe that the New Testament exhibits frequent instances of Jewish allegorizing?—and whether these instances do not conform to the principles of that mode of illustration?—and whether he accounts those principles to have been very strict, or exact, or logical? We will refer our hasty accusers to some of their own authorities. Dr Woods says, 'It is no objection to the inspiration of the scriptures, that they exhibit all the varieties in the mode of writing that are common in other works.' Other works, we suppose he means, of the same period, and indeed he instances under this observation the 'allegory.' Were the allegories of Jewish 'works' always exactly apposite? He maintains, we know, that there is a relevance; but does this amount to an exact appositeness? Bishop Atterbury says, 'The language of the East'—and he applies this observation to the scriptures—'speaks of nothing simply, but in the boldest and most lofty figures and in the longest and most *strained* allegories.' Dr Powell, Master of St John's College, Cambridge, says, in speaking of the writings of Paul,—'Lastly, he abounds with broken sentences, bold figures, and hard, *far-fetched* metaphors.'*

We introduce two or three criticisms of Dr Jahn, on some of the prophets, which we presume no one will call in question. Of Ezekiel, Dr Jahn, says, 'His tropes and images do not always exactly correspond with nature;'—of Zachariah, 'Many novel and elegant tropes and allegories occur, but they are not always quite in character with the nature of the things from which they are drawn.'† Can any critic maintain that there is in the scriptures an invariable 'appositeness of illustration?' If there is, then the language is not, as Dr Woods admits it is, 'completely human,' but perfectly divine.

But all this proves, say our reviewers, that 'in regard to some

* Dr Powell's Sermon on Inspiration.

† Jahn's Introduction to the Old Testament.

portions of the Bible, Unitarians no more believe the *ideas* inspired, than they do the words.' Once more, we ask, do *they* believe in the inspiration of every idea that is contained in the Bible? That is the implication conveyed by their words; but do they believe it? Do they believe that the Psalmist was inspired to say, 'O daughter of Babylon, that art to be destroyed. Happy shall he be, that rewardeth thee, as thou hast served us. Happy shall he be that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the stones.' Or when Solomon says, 'Be not thou one of them that strike hands, or of them that are sureties for debts,' do they believe that this injunction was inspired? Or when Paul uses this opprobrious language to the officer that struck him,—'God shall smite thee, thou whited wall!' do they account this to be the fruit of inspiration? 'Where,' says Jerome, speaking of this angry retort,—'where is that patience of our Saviour, who, as a lamb led to the slaughter, opened not his mouth, but answered mildly to him that struck him—"If I have spoken ill, convince me of the ill; but if well, why do you strike me?"'

Let us take an instance of a different character. Paul says to Timothy,—'Demas hath forsaken me, having loved this present world, and is departed unto Thessalonica, Crescens to Galatia, Titus unto Dalmatia. Only Luke is with me. And Tychicus have I sent to Ephesus. The cloak that I left at Troas with Carpus, when thou comest, bring, and the books, especially the parchments.' Now can any sensible man believe that these ideas were inspired? We presume not. Well, can any man believe—for this is the only tolerable supposition for our opponents—that Paul was *specially directed* to say these things to Timothy? They may believe so, but to us it seems a most unnecessary exaction upon our faith. We can believe that they were specially directed to state many things, which were derived, not from divine suggestion, but from memory—to state many things that were important as matters of fact and testimony—and that in this, the only possible sense, such things were inspired. But to suppose that Paul was divinely prompted to request that his cloak and books might be brought from Troas, and especially the parchments, looks to us more like an attempt to cast contempt on the doctrine of inspiration than seriously to defend it. We have opened at this moment on a passage of Dr Woods's Lectures, where he comments on this text. He says to the objector, 'I would ask him, what reason he has to think that the direction was unimportant either to the

comfort and usefulness of Paul, or to the interests of the churches.' To the interests of the churches, we suppose he means, *inasmuch* as it promoted Paul's comfort; and we answer, No reason. But is it to be thought that every request or direction of Paul's that concerned his own comfort, and, through that, his usefulness, was a matter of inspiration? We might as well say that when he asked for food at the daily board, he was inspired, as when he asked for clothing on the approach of winter; for the promise of divine guidance extended, it will not be denied, to what the apostles spoke, as much as to what they wrote. But to presume that this guidance was given in the minutest affairs of every day convenience and prudence, is not only an extension of the promise wholly unwarranted by the terms of it, as we think, but it is a stretch of inference which shows that the common theory of inspiration presses hard.

For ourselves, we feel no such pressure. Our minds are so much at ease in this argument, that we are ready to throw the little ball we have just been winding up, to our neighbours, for their further amusement. We cannot help referring those—we mean not the author we have just quoted—but those who are so fond of running out parallels between Unitarians and Infidels,—who have lately studied so hard upon 'Bolingbroke, Hobbes, Tindal, Morgan, Dodwell and Gibbon,'—referring them, we say, for it must cost a good deal of labor to hunt up so many references on both sides, to the new instances we have just given them, to be added to their useful catalogue. We warrant that Bolingbroke, Hobbes, Tindal, Morgan, Dodwell or Gibbon, or, perhaps, Paine, have quoted the same passages in objecting to Christianity, that we have quoted in objecting to the Orthodox views of inspiration. What a notable argument is it, and what notable minds must it be expected to operate upon! Unitarians believe some things that Infidels believe, and use some of the same methods of reasoning; therefore Unitarians are Infidels! But let us try a different application of this favorite argument, and see how it will stand. Orthodox persons believe in a providence; so do many Infidels, therefore the Orthodox are Infidels. The Trinitarians have departed from the simple unity of God, and conceive of three distinct principles, each of which is God; so did Plato; therefore Trinitarians are Platonists; they have forsaken Christianity, and, shocking to relate! have gone back to Heathenism. Calvinists decry human nature; so did the French philos-

ophers; therefore Calvinists are infidel philosophers. They are Necessitarians too; so were some of the ancient philosophers; and therefore, their system is a strange mixture of ancient and modern skepticism. The parallel might proceed, and thus it would be. 'Nay, but we make distinctions,' these several sects would say. We cannot help it; we do not see them; these meshes of sophistry are all broken and crushed before the step of this 'mighty and grinding dispensation' under which we are fighting the battle for truth. 'Well, but we profess to be Christians.' Ay, profess; no doubt you profess. 'That furthers your purposes for a while; you are 'Infidels in disguise;' you are on the way to a disclosure; and 'the sooner you come out,' the better.—'Ah,' our opponents will say, with a serious face after all, 'but can you shut your eyes to the great, historical fact, that some of the German theologians, a few years ago, speculated on some points as you do; and that they have now become Infidels?' The Catholic shall answer for us. 'Can you, Calvinistic Protestants, shut your eyes to the great, historical fact, that, but fifty years ago, the German theologians speculated in all respects as you do, unless that they speculated less freely, and that now, some of them are Infidels, and many of them Unitarians, and that almost all deny the scriptural obligation of the sabbath, the eternity of future punishments, and hold the Old Testament to be of authority inferior to that of the New?*' This is what we told Luther and his coadjutors long ago—told them so at the time. We told them, that they were plunging themselves, or their successors, at any rate, into infidelity. Nay, Holy Church deems but little better of you now, than that you are Infidels! It holds you outcasts from faith and hope,—and it ill becomes you to protest against this exclusion, so long as you are dealing out the whole measure of its severity against those who

* We wish, indeed, that those whose imaginations are so possessed with the resemblance which we bear to the Liberal Party in Germany—who have rung all the changes of argument, warning, and sarcasm, upon it, till we should think it could scarcely yield another note—we wish that they would look at the state of the *Orthodox* Party in that country. How easy would it be for us, if we were disposed to practise this lately perfected art of *seizing occasions*—to wage this petty war of comparisons, and allusions, and insinuations—to address ourselves, not to the reflections, but to the imagination of the people—how easy to retort, and to spread a vague horror against half of the *Orthodox* clergy of New England! But do we live at a period when there is no discrimination? Is the learning of Germany, with its hasty, though monstrous growth, to deter all the world from inquiry?

differ from you.' We commend the argument of the Catholic to those whom it may concern, and return to our discussion—only saying, as we pass, that the Catholic Doctors have more ground than they think for, to support the sophism by which they claim Protestant Christians as belonging to the one infallible and undivided church. Protestant Christians do indeed exhibit too many proofs of belonging to it; and this we say, not in the spirit of sarcasm, but of sober and sad reflection.

It is time to ask—since the term is so vaguely used and for such purposes—What is infidelity? Let the modern Orthodox luminaries of Germany, Storr and Platt, answer for us; for they answer wisely and with discrimination. 'The question,' say they, 'is not, Shall we believe the doctrines of Jesus under the same conditions that we believe the declarations of any other teacher, namely, provided our reason discovers them to be true; but the question is, Shall we believe the instructions of Jesus, under circumstances in which we would not believe any other teacher, who was not under the special influence of God. It is useless to speak of a *revelation*, if we attribute to Jesus no other inspiration than what the Naturalist will attribute to him, and which may just as well be attributed to the Koran, and to every other pretended revelation; nay, to all teachers of religion; that is, if we receive only those doctrines, whose truth is manifest to the eye of reason, and call them divine only because all truth is derived from God, the author of our reason.'* It is in this vague sense that some Infidels have called the scriptures divine; that Bolingbroke has denominated them 'the word of God,' and that Rousseau has seemed to acknowledge so much, in those eloquent testimonies of his, to the beauty of the scriptures and of our Saviour's character, which put the coldness of many christian teachers to shame. But now let the question be fairly stated;—Does, or did, any Infidel ever admit the divine, supernatural, miraculous origin of that system of interpositions and instructions, that is recorded in the Bible? And was anything ever heard of, in all the annals of theological extravagance, more monstrous, than to charge men, who devoutly and gratefully profess to receive the Bible in this supernatural character, with being Infidels?

Let not our brethren in the christian faith be shaken from their steadfastness, by this senseless cry, or the vague horror

* Bibl. Theol. § 16. II. 3.

which it is designed to spread abroad among the people. Let them examine the glorious temple of their faith, too clear in their perceptions, too strong in their admiration, to be disturbed by the slight appendages which the tastes and styles of different ages have gathered around it. Let them study the sublime and precious record of heaven-inspired truth, with a freedom, with a faith, with a feeling, that standeth not in the letter, but in the spirit.

We cannot think it a hard case to be classed in our faith on this subject, with such men as Grotius and Erasmus, with Paley and Burnet. And we are really curious to know, we wish that our accusers would tell us, what they are to do with such men. Erasmus and Grotius, Burnet and Paley Infidels! It is indeed a discovery in the christian world.

We shall now take up a few moments in making some further references of this nature; for it is time, as we have already said, to refer to some of the most able defenders of our faith, and to inquire whether their names, too, are to fall under this newly devised opprobrium.

St Jerome says, 'The prophet Amos was skilled in knowledge, not in language.' And then in a comment on the third chapter he adds, 'We told you that he uses the terms of his own profession, and because a shepherd knows nothing more terrible than a lion, he compares the anger of God to lions.' Did not Jerome, then, regard the language as 'purely human?' Did he regard it as 'rhetorically the best language?'

The learned Le Clerc, whose writings occupy a distinguished place in all our theological libraries, says, with a latitude of expression, indeed, beyond what we should use—'Thus, then, according to my hypothesis, the authority of the Scripture continues in full force. For you see I maintain, that we are obliged to believe the substance of the history of the New Testament, and generally,—all the doctrines of Jesus Christ, all that was inspired to the apostles, and also whatsoever they have said of themselves, so far as it is conformable to our Saviour's doctrine and to right reason. It is plain that nothing farther is necessarily to be believed in order to salvation. And it seems also evident to me, that those new opinions brought into the christian religion since the death of the apostles, which I have here refuted, being altogether imaginary and ungrounded, instead of bringing any advantage to the christian religion, are really very prejudicial to it. An inspiration is attributed to the apostles,

to which they never pretended, and whereof there is not the least mark left in their writings. Hereupon it happens, that very many persons who have strength enough of understanding to deny assent to a thing for which there is no good proof brought—(though preached with never so much gravity)—it happens, I say, that these persons reject all the christian religion, because they do not distinguish true Christianity from those dreams of fanciful divines.*

For the opinion that we are to look to the substance of the scriptures, and not to the letter—not to every exact mode of phraseology, let us see what countenance we have from Dr Lightfoot, by universal consent allowed to be one of the most learned and eminent men in the English Church. After saying that the evangelists and apostles used the Greek version of the Old Testament in their quotations from it, he speaks of that version in the following terms. 'I question not but the interpreters (the LXXVII.), whoever they were, engaged themselves in this undertaking (the translation of the Old Testament), with something of a partial mind, and as they made no great conscience of imposing on the Gentiles, so they made it their religion to favor their own side; and according to this ill temperament and disposition of mind, so did they manage their version, either adding or curtailng at pleasure, blindly, lazily, and audaciously enough; sometimes giving a very foreign sense, sometimes a contrary, oftentimes none; and this frequently to patronize their own traditions, or to avoid some offence they think might be in the original, or for the credit and safety of their own nation. The tokens of all which, it would not be difficult to instance in very great numbers, would I apply myself to it.'* Now admitting all, or anything of this to be true, is it possible to suppose that the apostles held the authority of the scriptures, as is now done, to depend on their verbal accuracy? There is reason, indeed, with Le Clerc, to denominate these views of inspiration, 'new opinions brought into the church since the death of the apostles.'

But our present business is with authorities. Bishop Atterbury, in his sermon on 2 Peter iii. 16, writes thus;—'For consider we with ourselves, what manner of men the apostles were in their birth and education, what country they lived

* *Essay on Inspiration.*

† Vol. 11. p. 401.

in, what language they wrote in; and we shall find it rather wonderful that there are so few, than that there are so many things that we are at a loss to understand. They were men (all except Paul) meanly born and bred, and uninstructed utterly in the arts of speaking and writing. All the language they were masters of, was purely what was necessary to express themselves upon the common affairs of life, and in matters of intercourse with men of their own rank and profession. When they came, therefore, to talk of the great doctrines of the cross, to preach up the astonishing truths of the gospel, they brought, to be sure, their old idiotisms [idioms] and plainness of speech along with them. And is it strange, then, that the deep things of God, should not always be expressed by them in words of the greatest propriety and clearness?’

Bishop Chandler says, speaking of Paul’s reasonings on certain points, ‘In all this he saith no more than that the *subject* of his mystical reasons, as they relate to Christ, was taught them by the Spirit; the *doctrines* were *divine*; yet the *means* and *topics*, from whence they were sometimes urged and confirmed, were *human*.’

The following observations from Locke’s Essay for the Understanding of St Paul’s Epistles, we presume no judicious critic will gainsay, and we see not how the inference is to be rejected, that the manner and style were altogether his own, and purely human, and plainly imperfect.

‘To these causes of obscurity common to St Paul with most of the other penmen of the several books of the New Testament, we may add those that are peculiarly his, and owing to his style and temper. He was, as it is visible, a man of quick thought, warm temper, mighty well versed in the writings of the Old Testament, and full of the doctrine of the New: All this put together, suggested matter to him in abundance on those subjects that came in his way; so that one may consider him, when he was writing, as beset with a crowd of thoughts, all striving for utterance. In this posture of mind it was almost impossible for him to keep that slow pace, and observe minutely that order and method of ranging all that he said, from which results an easy and obvious perspicuity. To this plenty and vehemence of his may be imputed many of those large parentheses, which a careful reader may observe in his Epistles. Upon this account, also, it is that he often breaks off, in the

middle of an argument, to let in some new thought suggested by his own words: which having pursued and explained as far as conduced to his present purpose, he reassumes again the thread of his discourse, and goes on with it, without taking any notice that he returns again to what he had been before saying; though sometimes it be so far off that it may well have slipped out of his mind, and requires a very attentive reader to observe, and so bring the disjointed members together as to make up the connexion, and see how the scattered parts of the discourse hang together in a coherent well-agreeing sense, that makes it all of a piece.'

We should not proceed with these quotations merely for our own defence; but we think they deserve attention on their own account, upon a subject so little understood, and so likely to attract further notice, as the character in which the scriptures are to be received as containing a revelation from God. We shall therefore make one or two extracts from Bishop Burnet, and Dr Paley, in addition to those given in a former article.

In his Exposition of the Thirtynine Articles, Bishop Burnet thus writes. 'And thus far I have laid down such a scheme concerning inspiration and inspired writings, as will afford, to such as apprehend it aright, a solution to most of these difficulties with which we are urged on the account of some passages in the sacred writings. The laying down a scheme that asserts an immediate inspiration which goes to the style and to every tittle, and that denies any error to have crept into any of the copies, as it seems on the one hand to raise the honor of the scriptures very highly, so it lies open, on the other hand, to great difficulties, which seem insuperable in that hypothesis; whereas a middle way, as it settles the divine inspiration of these writings, and their being continued down genuine and unvitiated to us, as to all that, for which we can only suppose that inspiration was given; so it helps us more easily out of all difficulties, by *yielding* that which serves to answer them, without weakening the authority of the whole.'

We give an extract from Dr Paley's chapter on Erroneous Opinions imputed to the Apostles, referring our readers, who would learn his views in detail, to the whole chapter. 'We do not usually question the credit of a writer, by reason of

* P. 88. 2d fol. Edition, 1700.

any opinion he may have delivered upon subjects unconnected with his evidence ; and even upon subjects connected with his account, or mixed with it in the same discourse or writing, we naturally separate facts from opinions, testimony from observation, narrative from argument.

‘To apply this equitable consideration to the christian records, much controversy, and much objection has been raised concerning the quotations of the Old Testament found in the New ; some of which quotations, it is said, are applied in a sense, and to events, apparently different from that which they bear, and from those to which they belong in the original. It is probable, to my apprehension, that many of those quotations were intended by the writers of the New Testament as nothing more than *accommodations*. Such accommodations of passages from old authors are common with writers of all countries ; but in none perhaps were more to be expected, than in the writings of the Jews, whose literature was almost entirely confined to their scriptures.’—‘Those prophecies which are alleged with more solemnity, and which are accompanied with a precise declaration that they originally respected the event then related, are, I think, truly alleged. But were it otherwise, is the judgment of the writers of the New Testament in interpreting passages of the Old, or sometimes perhaps in receiving established interpretations, so connected either with their veracity, or with their means of information concerning what was passing in their own times, as that a critical mistake, even were it more clearly made out, should overthrow their historical credit ? Does it diminish it ? Has it anything to do with it ?’*

It is well known, that the doctrine of inspiration has been exceedingly modified by the progress of biblical criticism, within the last half century. To this purpose we quote Jahn, in reference to the prevailing state of opinion in Germany. ‘Most of the Protestants formed a very strict idea of inspiration, and defended it as late as the middle of the eighteenth century. But after the publication of the learned work of Toellner on inspiration, in 1772, and of Semler’s examination of the Canon, 1771–3, many undertook to investigate the doctrine of inspiration, and gradually relaxed in their views of it, until at last they entirely banished the doctrine, so that at present but few admit it.’*

* Evidences, Part iii. ch. ii.

* Introduction to the Old Testament, § 23.

It would not be difficult to prove that there has been a similar, though not an equal, nor equally extended, progress of opinion in England. We have in a former article referred to Dr Powell and Bishop Marsh.

Dr Durell, Principal of Hertford College, Oxford, and Prebendary of Canterbury, said long ago, in speaking of the imprecations sometimes occurring in the Psalms,—‘How far it may be proper to continue the reading of these Psalms in the daily service of our church, I leave to the consideration of the legislature to determine. A Christian of erudition may consider these *imprecations* only as the natural sentiments of *Jews*, which the benign religion he professes, abhors and condemns. But what are the illiterate to do, who know not whence to draw the line between the Law and the Gospel? They hear both read one after the other, and, I fear, think them both of equal obligation, and even take shelter under scripture to cover their curses. Though I am conscious I here tread on slippery ground, I will take leave to hint, that, notwithstanding the high antiquity that sanctifies, as it were, this practice, it would, in the opinion of *a number of wise and good men*, be more for the credit of the christian church, to omit a few of those Psalms, and substitute some parts of the Gospel in their stead.’

Speaking of Paul’s manner of writing in his Epistles, Bishop Marsh says, ‘The erudition there displayed, is the erudition of a learned Jew. The argumentation there displayed, is the argumentation of a Jewish convert to Christianity, confuting his brethren on their own ground.’

Still more strongly, Dr Maltby, late preacher at Lincoln’s Inn, in his Sermons ;—‘Whatever doctrines connected with revelation, are clearly discoverable in the writings of St Paul, we receive with reverence and faith, as the will of God. But let us beware how we misunderstand the meaning of a writer, whose meaning from so many causes may be misunderstood. Let us discriminate when he is addressing his adversaries as a logician, and when he unequivocally expresses his own personal conviction.’*

The Quarterly Review, which has been considered as representing the sentiments of the English Church, in an article on Professor Buckland’s ‘*Reliquiæ Diluvianæ*,’ uses the following language. Addressing the friends of religion, it

* Maltby’s Sermons, Vol. I. p. 311.

is said,—‘ We would call to their recollection, also, the opinions formerly maintained, as to the plenary and even literal inspiration of scripture—the clamor raised against the first collections of various readings, in the copies of the New Testament, and still later against those of the Old.

‘ Well indeed is it for us, that the cause of revelation does not depend on questions such as these,—for it is remarkable that in every instance the controversy has ended in the gradual surrender of those very points, which were at one time represented as involving the vital interests of religion.’ *

But we have wearied ourselves, and our readers, we fear, with quotations. And truly what need of authorities? Let us quote Paul himself. So personal, so private many times, so peculiar always, so mixing up his natural feelings and interests with the ministration of the gospel, that one of the charms of his writings, is the charm of his own noble generosity and artlessness—how is it possible to think of him, in many of these passages, but as giving utterance to feelings entirely natural, in words and arguments purely human! Let us quote Paul, we say; and we may take a passage almost at random, and leave it to the judgment of our readers. ‘ Am I not an Apostle? am I not free? have I not seen Jesus Christ our Lord? are ye not my work in the Lord? If I be not an apostle unto others, yet doubtless I am to you: for the seal of mine apostleship are ye in the Lord. Mine answer to them that do examine me is his; Have we not power to eat and to drink? Have we not power to lead about a sister, a wife, as well as other apostles, and as the brethren of the Lord, and Cephas? Or I only and Barnabas, have we not power to forbear working? Who goeth a warfare any time at his own charges? who planteth a vineyard, and eateth not of the fruit thereof? or who feedeth a flock, and eateth not of the milk of the flock?’ †

We shall now leave the charge of infidelity, and shall enter upon a brief consideration of the Lectures which we have placed at the head of this article. We feel, in doing so, that we are breathing a new atmosphere, that we are passing from storm to sunshine, from a cloudy region to clearer light; and truly if we are to fall in any contest, we had rather be stricken down by the sunbeam, than by a driving mist. We see in

* Quarterly Review, No. LXVII. p. 142.

† Cor. ix. 1-7.

these Lectures the same fine and cautious discrimination, for which we have long considered Dr Woods as distinguished, and which, we believe, would render him eminent in any church; and though he has not cleared up our difficulties, though he has not, indeed, grappled with the difficulties that most press upon our own minds, yet, if we are wrong, we certainly should be more likely to be reclaimed, by his discriminating arguments, than by violent anathemas and wholesale denunciations. When will christian controversialists approach but so distantly to the kindness of our common faith, as to recognise the claims of common humanity, and to pay any tolerable respect to the sincerity and worth of their opponents!

We understand Dr Woods. We know that he is no temporizer. We hear him speak of dangers. Perhaps we admit that there are dangers,—perhaps we feel it,—perhaps we pray for light and safety, and fear lest we should stretch out a rash hand to the ark of God to save it from the hands of the Philistines. All this may be; for when or where was the speculative or moral path of any human being free from dangers?

Dr Woods commences with ‘remarks on the proper mode of reasoning, and on the nature and source of the evidence, by which divine inspiration is to be proved.’ In the course of these remarks, he introduces with approbation a passage from Dr Knapp, which, as containing some important discriminations, we will quote. ‘These two positions; *the contents of the sacred books, or the doctrines taught in them, are of divine origin*; and, *the books themselves are given by inspiration of God*, are not the same, but need to be carefully distinguished. It does not follow from the arguments which prove the doctrines of the scriptures to be divine, that the books themselves were written under a divine impulse. A revealed truth may be taught in any book; but it does not follow that the book itself is divine. We might be convinced of the truth and divinity of the christian religion, from the mere genuineness of the books of the New Testament and the credibility of their authors. The divinity of the christian religion can therefore be conceived, independently of the inspiration of the Bible. This distinction was made as early as the time of Melancthon.’

On this passage we have two remarks to offer. In the first place, according to the obvious distinction here adopted by Dr Woods, we could take refuge within the pale of Christianity, even though we believed much less than we do. In the sec-

ond place, believing *as* we do, we have no difficulty in admitting the doctrine of inspiration in the general terms here laid down.

We do indeed differ from the author of the Lectures when he goes into detail. We believe that the truths of our religion were inspired, and that the teachers of our religion were divinely directed and assisted to communicate them; but we cannot see that such an inspiration is, or need be, a pledge for the perfect accuracy or correctness of every word they wrote, or of every illustration or argument by which they enforced their message.

But this brings us to the question; and on this question Dr Woods lays down the following, and only safe, rule, and, as we may venture hereafter to remind him, the *only* rule. 'The single argument,' he says, 'on which I propose to rest the doctrine of inspiration, is *the testimony of the sacred writers themselves.*'

With this rule before him, and after clearing the way to his main subject by several qualifications, to which we shall soon have occasion to refer, Dr Woods adduces arguments for the inspiration, first of the Old, and then of the New Testament. And we confess, that, if we did not read the illustrations of his arguments, or if we were not aware beforehand that our views differed from his—that if we took his arguments just as they stand in their simple statement, we should never suspect that they were designed to establish a position different from that in which we ourselves stand.

The first argument, of course, for the inspiration of the Old Testament, is from the passages—'For the prophecy came not in old times by the will of man, but holy men spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost,'* and 'All scripture is given by inspiration of God.'† Now, not to insist upon learned or minute criticisms on these passages, from which we certainly think we should derive some advantages in the argument, let them be taken for all that they can reasonably be supposed to mean, or that, without straining them, they can mean at all. 'Prophecy' and 'all scripture' refer to the Old Testament as a whole, as a collection of writings; and those writings had a divine and supernatural origin. They had a higher origin than the will of man. They form a body of divine communications; they are

* 2 Peter i. 21.

† Tim. iii. 16.

the authorised records of a divine religion. Such a commentary surely satisfies the obvious meaning of these passages. But can it be inferred that Peter and Paul, when they use this language, intend to claim every sentence and phrase as of divine inspiration? These passages are precisely like those general declarations which we constantly make about the general character of books, when we have no intention to embrace every minute particular. We give a meaning to those texts, then, a very natural and a most important meaning, without involving ourselves in what seems to us the inextricable difficulties of defending every word in the Old Testament. Storr and Flatt say, in commenting on the passage in Timothy, 'It is certain from the declarations of the apostle Paul, that those books are in such a sense inspired and given by God, that they are to be regarded as of divine authority; and for this reason they are entitled to credence. And this is the precise idea of divine inspiration, which, in the days of Timothy, was instilled into the minds of all the Jews from their earliest infancy.' What Josephus says of the Jewish faith in their scriptures, we are perfectly ready to assent to; that they 'esteem these books to contain divine doctrines,' and he says nothing stronger in the whole passage,* to which the German theologians, just quoted, refer.—But even if it were admitted that the texts in question mean all that they can mean—that the words, 'prophecy,' and 'all scripture,' mean every truth, every idea, contained in the Old Testament, still it would not follow that those 'holy men' were indebted for their style, or for any direction of their style, to inspiration.

Dr Woods's 'next argument to prove the inspiration of the Old Testament scriptures, is, that Christ and his apostles treat them as possessing an authority entirely different from that of any other writings.' To this we give entire assent; and we yield to the inference so far as we think it can fairly go. 'But that it goes to the sanctioning of every word or idea in those scriptures, we cannot see reason to admit. Without attributing to them any such perfection, they possess to our minds just such an authority;—that is to say, an 'authority entirely different from that of any other writings,' and this must, to us, of course, be a decisive consideration.

The arguments which Dr Woods uses to prove the inspira-

* Against Apion, Bk. I. 8.

tion of the New Testament, are the following. First, 'that Christ, who had all power in heaven and earth, commissioned his apostles to act in his stead, as teachers of the christian religion, and confirmed their authority by miracles;' secondly, 'that Christ expressly promised to give his apostles the Holy Spirit to assist them in their work;' and thirdly, 'that there are many passages in the New Testament to show, that the writers considered themselves to be under the infallible guidance of the Spirit, and their instructions to be clothed with divine authority.'

Now we wish not to seem perverse or paradoxical to any one, certainly not to an author whose reasoning powers we greatly respect; but it appears to us that we can admit all these propositions, and we have no doubt, indeed, of their truth, without coming to the conclusion to which Dr Woods would guide us. We believe that Jesus authorised the apostles to teach his religion, that he promised them special aid, and that they considered themselves as teaching the great truths of his religion under a guidance which, with reference to those truths, was infallible; that they considered their instructions as clothed with divine authority; and yet, to the accomplishment of all this, to the *bare making of the communication*, we cannot perceive it to be necessary that there should have been any constant and miraculous interference with the natural operations of their own minds—any supernatural guardianship over their reasonings about the truths they were to deliver, or over their illustrations of it, over their comparisons, figures, or their phrases.

He who maintains that inspiration does extend to these things, should bring express proof; should bring 'the testimony of the writers themselves.' Now here it is, to our minds, that the argument of Dr Woods is essentially deficient. It is a negative argument; and a negative argument, certainly, against the strongest positive presumption. The sacred writers say, that they were directed to make the communication, that they were commissioned to preach the gospel; but here their testimony ends. They do not say, that they were, or would be, directed minutely in every phrase, figure, and illustration, *how* to preach it. On the contrary, they preach in a manner, to all appearance, perfectly natural to them. They preach as occasions arise, and their writings are mostly called forth by exigences of trial and danger in the state of the churches. And, therefore, the presumption is against the extension of inspiration contended for.

We are aware, indeed, that Dr Woods insists, that 'as the writers of scripture nowhere limit the divine influence which they enjoyed, to the thoughts or conceptions of their own minds,' so neither should we. But can this canon of interpretation be supported? God's interposition in aid of human virtue, is taught without any express limit. Is there, therefore, no limit? Does this interposition extend to the immediate and miraculous control or guidance of all holy affections? So men are said to be inspired to teach the truth. But can it be fairly argued from thence, that the inspiring influence extends, beyond the truths revealed, to the words of the communication? Besides, if there were *no* limit, then there must have been an instant suggestion or prompting of every word, and the sacred writer must have been the mere amanuensis or secretary, so to speak, of the inspiring influence. Does Dr Woods believe this? We presume not; since he allows that the inspired writers 'use their own style,' and only maintains that they are 'under such direction,' as 'certainly to be secured against all mistakes.'

The truth is, undeniably, that the act of composition, the act of selecting words in a sentence, is as necessarily free, as much the writer's own act, as the act of choosing right from wrong. The very business of writing or speaking, therefore, implies all the limitation we contend for. A man may write, indeed, from verbal memory, or from an express dictation of words, and this is a different case; and we deny not that a portion of the scriptures fall under this condition. Some of the prophecies, that is, some sentences, may have been written from express dictation. A portion of the discourses of our Saviour were undoubtedly written from an exact remembrance of the words. And yet it is easy to see that this recollection often extends only to the sense. The words vary; and it is a remark to which we invite particular attention, that they vary according to the style of each particular writer. John is repetitious; and the discourses of Jesus under his report, though everywhere showing the same great and unequalled Master, take something of the form of his peculiar style. The introductory phrase, 'Verily I say unto you,' has the adverb repeated in John—'Verily, *verily*, I say unto you.' The repetition never occurs in the other evangelists; in John, it is constant and habitual. And in short, if any one would understand how strong is the aspect of naturalness in all their writings, and of

peculiarity in each individual writer, we would ask him to read the writings themselves—not to reason about what must be, or ought to be, but to read the writings themselves. He would rise from this perusal with an argument stronger than we can express, against the doctrine of verbal inspiration, or of special guidance in regard to the style of writing, and modes of illustration.

To us it is singular that Dr Woods admits the whole force of this presumption, and yet denies the inference. In truth, we know not what he might not admit, and yet, with the mode of reasoning he adopts, maintain his theory. He might admit, that the Bible is full of the evidences of human imperfection, that it is full of mistakes in style, in figures, in illustration, and yet maintain, to use his cautious phraseology, that the Bible is 'just what God saw to be suited to the ends of revelation.' Why, the conclusion is one which we have no difficulty of admitting on our own principles. It was best that the communication should be left to be made just as it was made.

But let us see what Dr Woods does admit; and we must confess, too, our honest surprise at the main and leading answer which he makes to his own concessions. He admits, what it has been thought so great an offence in us to assert, that 'the language is completely human.' He admits, that 'in writing the scriptures, the sacred penmen evidently made use of their own faculties;' that 'the language employed by the inspired writers exhibits no marks of a divine interference, but is perfectly conformed to the genius and taste of the writers,' and that 'even the same doctrine is taught, and the same event described, in a different manner by different writers.' And his constant answer is—Very well; why not?—Why should not the writers compose, each one, in his own style and manner? Why should they not, indeed, we say; but is this the proper answer to the objection? The objection is, that the style is natural, and therefore is not supernatural. The answer, admitting as it does the first quality, should show how the style can possess the other—or, in other words, how the same style could have been formed under influences at the same time natural and supernatural.

Dr Woods does indeed say,—'Is it not evident that God may exercise a perfect superintendency over inspired writers as to the language they shall use, and yet that each one of them shall write in his own style, and in all respects accord-

ing to his own taste?' That is to say, is it not evident, that the thoughts may be perfectly free, and yet in their freedom, be perfectly controlled by an influence extraneous and foreign to them? To which we must answer,—No, certainly, it is not *evident*, even if it can be true. If it is evident, we wish that the Divinity Professor had shown it. We wish that he had taken us into that mysterious region, and disclosed to us the human mind acting freely under an absolute control—under a control so absolute as to secure the perfect accuracy of its operations. No man better than Dr Woods knows the way to this region, if there is any, or better knows there is no way.

Will he, then, approach it by analogies? Every analogy, we think, is fatal to his position. We quote a sentence from him, which he introduces in this connexion, and which, we think, is singularly unfortunate for his argument. The great variety, he says, 'existing among men as to their rational talents and their peculiar manner of thinking and writing, may, in this way, be turned to account in the work of revelation, as well as in the concerns of common life.' But have men any infallible direction in the common concerns of life?—or in the spiritual concerns of the soul, have they any? And yet in both divine aid is promised to the faithful, and promised without any limit. Till, therefore, some stronger proof is brought than the general promise of aid and guidance in teaching revealed truths, we cannot admit, against all the evidence that appears in the face of the record, that this guidance extended to the very form and phraseology of the communication. The nature of the action itself furnishes a limit.

'But,' it will be said, 'this infallible guidance in the mode of teaching, is necessary to insure to us a sufficient and satisfactory communication.' This, we cannot doubt, as we have said in a former article, is the great difficulty. 'Give us a perfect book,' we believe would be the language of our opponents, 'and we care not how it was made.' But is it right to make any *a priori* demand of this sort? We should rather say, 'Give us a glorious and unquestionable communication, and we are not solicitous as to the manner of it.' We do say,— 'Give us such a communication as it has pleased God to make, and we are satisfied.' We could place ourselves reverently before the shrine, not to call in question its form, or the materials of which it is composed, but to listen to the voice that

proceeds from it. We would listen to the oracle, not to criticise the tone in which it speaks, but to gather the import of what it utters. Let us drink of the 'waters of life,' and we complain not if they are brought to us in 'earthen vessels.'

But let us hear the objection. Upon the supposition, that 'as far as language is concerned, the writers were left entirely to their own judgment and fidelity,' Dr Woods says,— 'Here,' we might say, 'Paul was unfortunate in the choice of words; and here his language does not express the ideas he must have intended to convey. Here the style of John was inadvertent; and here it was faulty; and here it would have been more agreeable to the nature of the subject, and would have more accurately expressed the truth, had it been altered thus.' But how seldom should we find occasion to say this! How seldom *do* we find occasion! If a communication made by human hands, must needs be so precarious and uncertain, why does not this skepticism appear in our commentaries and our controversies? Why does it not extend to all other books? Why are we not in constant and grievous uncertainty about the meaning of our familiar authors, because they have not had the aid of inspiration to form or modify their style?

Why also do we not find it difficult to distinguish between the point which they labor to prove, and the illustrations and arguments which they bring to bear upon it? Let any one look into the writings of Paul or John, and satisfy himself, as we think he easily may, that there is no difficulty whatever in separating what he teaches on his apostolic authority, and what he puts forth in the shape of argument addressed to the reason of his readers.

The truth is, after all, we are inclined to believe, that the different views taken of this point, arise from the different views that are entertained of the substance of the communication. If we believed that the New Testament contained a fine, extended, philosophical, or metaphysical theory, we might be anxious for the infallibility of every phrase and word. But even then our anxiety would be hypercritical. The works of Aristotle and Kant need no such pledge in order to satisfy the student that he understands their principles. How much less is this pledge necessary to satisfy us as to a few great facts, doctrines, and principles,—all practical, all so plain that he 'who runs may read,' all designed for the comprehension of

the poor, the ignorant, and unlearned ! And how is it possible for our opponents, on their principles, to rely as they do, on uninspired translations of the sacred text ! How can they send out imperfect translations and detached books of this volume, as they do to the heathen ! Nay, if the infallibility of every sentence and word is so essential to the validity of the communication, all men must be learned, before they can be put in a proper condition to receive it. Neither would this help them ; for the learned differ as much as others. Infallible sentences avail nothing without infallible interpreters ; and these we cannot have. And while the learned thus differ, as they always have and always will, what reliance can there be for the body of Christians, but on the substance of the communication—what reliance, in fact, that is satisfactory, but upon those views of inspiration which we maintain ?

On this subject of the sacred style, we must beg our readers to have patience with us a moment longer. We have said in a former article, that human language is, from its nature, essentially fallible ; and it does appear to us, that if this point were fully considered, it would settle the whole question about infallibility in the *words* of this communication. All human language, when referring to what is intellectual, to what is spiritual, is but an approximation to the truth. Words are conventional signs of thought. They are not pictures, and if they were, they could be pictures only of external objects. They are symbols, and they bear no relation to our intellectual conceptions, but what they bear by common agreement. Now this point we press. Was this agreement ever, in any age or country, perfect and invariable ? Were there ever two persons, to whom words expressive of spiritual qualities—to whom the same words, though purporting the same things in substance, did not bear different degrees and shades of meaning ? How then can the idea of absolute infallibility be attached to such an instrument of communication ?

Suppose, for example, that a revelation were now made to us in the English language. It is perfectly evident, on the one hand, that so far as the matters of that revelation were simple and practical, it would convey to us all, substantially the same general ideas. Such our scriptures do convey to all who read them, even though they come through the medium of a translation ;—for it is to be kept in mind, that we have only a human translation, and all this question about verbal inspiration

neither avails nor concerns anybody but the learned—a fact of itself sufficient to show that the validity and authority of a revelation designed for all nations, *cannot* depend on verbal inspiration. But to return;—we say, on the one hand, that from an inspired communication in our own language, all would receive the same *general* ideas. The substance of the communication, if it were an intelligible one, could not escape them, on a diligent reading; and this would be sufficient for their moral instruction and improvement. But on the other hand, it is equally evident that the moment they went into the minutiae of meaning, the moment especially that they went into matters of speculation, there would be shades of difference in their conceptions. For what would they have to do in this more particular, definite investigation? They would have to become critics. They must resort to their dictionaries. And what would they find there? Some words with ten, some twenty, some forty meanings. What principle could they possibly adopt, that would lead them to an unerring and uniform selection? What principle would enable them to determine the precise shade of thought which one word receives from its connexion with another? There is none; there never has been any to the most honest and faithful interpreters who read the scriptures in their original languages; and all this solicitude about the perfect verbal accuracy, the verbal authority of the Bible, in our apprehension, is as useless as it is unphilosophical.

Let no one say, 'The question is not about words.' Indeed it is about words. It is about the vehicle of communication, about style, about the manner of writing. The mode of communication is the point in debate; and this includes phraseology, figures, metaphors, illustrations, allegories, arguments. The question is,—Did the inspired teachers take the body of divine truth communicated to them, and then faithfully, indeed, but naturally, humanly, in the free and unforced exercise of their own faculties, deliver that sacred truth—or, were they so controlled or constrained, or supernaturally guarded, in this work, that every sentence they delivered is intrinsically, philosophically, divinely accurate and infallible?

And it is a most important question. To us, at least, with our views, it is one of inexpressible interest. For it is with such an interest that we cherish our belief in the scriptures as containing a divine revelation. It is with the deepest solicitude, therefore, that we have long pondered this question. The

conviction has been forced on our minds that we could not, in any fairness or impartiality, ascribe to the scriptures, that kind of verbal, illustrative, or logical perfection, which by many is claimed for them, and we have felt unspeakable relief in the conclusion, that it is not at all necessary to their character as authorised records of a communication from Heaven. If others entertain a different opinion, we complain not—nay, we rejoice for them, in this, that they stand ‘upon the foundation,’ though fencing themselves around with barriers that seem to us to be needless. And we hope that they will not be very much displeased that *we*, too, feel the ‘rock of our salvation’ to be strong and secure beneath us.

There may be skeptics, cold or contemptuous enough to look with indifference or with scorn upon this transcendent, this all-inspiring interest which we feel in the spiritual objects, and hopes, and destinies of our existence. They may think ‘this intellectual being’ too poor a thing to be the subject of such wide contemplation, and of such intense and overpowering concern. Yet, what avails the feeble hand that would repress and bind down the very laws of our nature? Still the thought, the feeling, the desire invincible and immortal springs within us, and craves its proper, satisfying, soul-sufficing good. No created might on earth is like the energy of that inward and undying want; no earthly blessing is like that which supplies it; and no sigh of human despondency could be so mournful as that with which we should sink from the holy light that cheers us. We stand amidst erring creatures, ourselves clothed with imperfection and conscious of sin, and the vision of perfect truth and perfect beauty and saving goodness in the person of Jesus, is ‘a light come into the world’ that would otherwise be dark to us. We stand amidst shadows and mysteries, amidst trials and sufferings; and the revelation of a gracious and pitying Father in Heaven is strength, assurance, consolation, which nothing else can give. We stand upon ‘this shore of time’—the beloved, the cherished, the hallowed in our sorrows, have gone from us—and the gospel that bringeth immortality to light, that places them in immortal regions, and invites us thither, is a message sufficient to bear us in rapture through the very shadows of death. Tell us that ‘God hath spoken’ all this to us—and we cannot question the manner, we cannot be solicitous about the words,—we can only ‘rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory.’

ART. VII.—*Lectures on Future Punishment.* By EDWARD R. TYLER. Middletown. 1829.

WE have no disposition to criticise any sincere expression of opinion. We are ready to extend to others the same indulgence which we claim for ourselves. Instead, therefore, of saying anything respecting the merits of this work, we shall speak somewhat at large on the subject of retribution; not intending, however, to give it a full discussion, but to make some suggestions, without which, regarded in some form or other, it cannot well be understood. There are popular and dangerous errors respecting the relation of man to God and eternity, which interfere with all right discernment of the truth. They exist in the shape of loose and floating impressions, and have a greater influence upon the judgment and actions, than if they were more distinctly presented to the mind.

Many of the prevailing religious systems, which professed to explain this great relation, have been so incomprehensible and contradictory, that men have generally been driven to illustrations of their own. Whoever has conversed much with the unenlightened, knows, that they often consider themselves as servants of God. In some respects, this illustration is correct enough, and to a certain extent is sustained by the language of scripture. But they carry it quite too far;—so far, as to feel that they are doing his work and not their own, and therefore feel no personal interest in what they are doing, but only in the promised reward. They feel as if it were of no consequence what their heart is, provided they go through a certain round of duties; no matter whether they have love to God and man, or any religious principle whatever. This naturally makes their duty seem like restraint and oppression, and makes them feel as if they were not free, but indented to the service of God. This view of our relation to the Father of our Spirits is untrue. He directs us to labor for ourselves, and not for him; and unless we labor as if we were laboring for ourselves, not with a cold complaining reluctance, but with all the heart, it will be long before we reach that happiness which follows only the service inspired by love; which is not, in fact, a reward, but a natural consequence of fidelity to the Most High.

Again; there are those, and they are not few, who carry their maxims of business into religion. According to them,

heaven is a payment for service rendered. They, too, feel as if they were selling their service, simply because they expect to gain something by it at last. They imagine that accounts are kept, where they are credited with all the good they do, and that every good action is so much added to their just demands. When a man of this description wishes to know how he stands with respect to God and eternity, he counts what he is pleased to call his good deeds, and compares them with his offences. If he thinks that he has upon the whole done more good than evil, he is happy. Even if not, if his sins outnumber his good deeds, he supposes that he shall be rewarded for the good he has done, though he may be punished for his transgressions. Though he cannot secure the whole payment, he has yet earned a part. These impressions are degrading to christian duty and to God. There is no propriety in these estimates of value. It is not true that God hires or pays men for doing their duty. It is the disposition which makes the deed acceptable, and here the disposition is invariably wanting. It is not the scattered deeds that are to be picked up and compared; it is the character, the prevailing tone of character, which determines whether a man shall or shall not be numbered with the blessed.

Such, or similar to these, are the prevailing impressions of unenlightened men. But is there no illustration which will help us to comprehend the way in which future happiness is given, if we can say that it is given? Certainly there is; one which the scripture labors to impress—the relation of a father to his children. God gives us the power of forming characters for heaven, just as parents give their children the means of preparing for life. If the child values and employs his means of improvement, if he forms the character which his parent desires, respectability, usefulness and happiness, will, in ordinary circumstances, be the result of that character which his father gave him the means of forming. There is no debt nor credit here. This respectability and happiness are not a payment. If they are called a reward, it is one that follows, not one that is given, and the child is serving himself all the while, though it is true that his excellence does honor to his father, as the excellence of the just gives glory to God. Exactly in the same way has God given us power to form characters for another existence; and, that we may know what preparation to make, has afforded us clear, full, and glowing

descriptions of the better, even the heavenly country. Here it would seem that there could be no room for error; and men cannot sustain themselves in religious errors, without keeping out of view this relation, which is a key to all the mysteries which men have made or imagined in the word of God.

This representation is given in the scripture phrase, 'They shall eat the fruit of their own doings.' The fruit is not a thing given or added to the tree. It is as much a part of it as the blossom. Unless the tree is good, the fruit cannot be good. Precisely so does happiness follow a religious character, in the unalterable order of nature. Something of that happiness may be known in the present state. It follows hard on every good feeling we cherish, and every good deed we do. The low slave of passion can neither taste it, nor understand it. Take a thoughtless wretch from the street and place him in some house of God. There is certainly happiness there; there are a few at least, whose hearts burn within them, as they meditate on the wonderful works and kindness of God. But to him, it is dreary as the wilderness or the grave. This may help our imagination of the suffering of a soul thrown unprepared into a spiritual world. All its happiness came from material things, and how can it be otherwise than wretched, when the world and its passions are gone forever? Certain it is, that the happiness which flows from religious, kind, and generous affections, is the happiness of heaven. Perhaps, however, we cannot fully comprehend it, till we are raised higher above the world than ever yet we have been. We cannot expect, in the depth of the valley, shut in by rocks and forests on every side, to form any idea of the vastness and glory of nature. We must climb the mountain till the horizon spreads and the heaven towers. And nothing comprehensive, nothing inspiring can enter our ideas of religious enjoyment, till we rise so high, that the joys and sorrows of the world are no longer boundaries to our view.

Those who are disposed to regard future happiness as something incomprehensible, fortify themselves by such words as, 'Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered the heart of man the things which God hath prepared for them that love him.' They are not aware, perhaps, that these words are quoted from the Old Testament, and were said when life and immortality were not yet brought to light. St Paul immediately says, 'God hath revealed them unto us by

his spirit ;' that is, in Christianity. Immortality, perhaps, was known from the earliest time ; but it was like some cold star, unregarded, if seen, in the heavens, till later discoveries measured its periods, revealed its real greatness, and made it a guide to wanderers on the sea. We fully believe that future happiness is revealed and may be understood. But there is a mysterious importance attached to the change of death. What is it but a release from the body and its passions ? What is it but an incident in life, and by no means the most important ? To us it seems, that the soul passes from death to life, when it dismisses things present and gives the earnestness of its affections to intellectual and spiritual, and therefore to immortal things. Feeling that we are immortal, we shall not set our hearts on perishing things, to be answerable when we leave them. Feeling that we are immortal, we shall not look on death as a passing away from life, nor as the beginning of any new existence. In the change of death, the soul leaves the mansion of clay, but remains unchanged, for aught we can discover, in its attainments, affections and powers ; and the hour when it begins its immortal preparation, is the time when the corruptible puts on incorruption and the mortal immortality.

When our lives begin, then we begin a course of immortal improvement, which ends not at the grave. It is idle to say that there is a limit to mortal attainment. There is ; but this improvement has nothing to do with mortality. This is the immortal improvement of the immortal part of our nature. There are bounds to the vigor of the frame. Much as it can be strengthened by exercise, there is a limit beyond which it cannot go. And for a good reason ; it is mortal, it is meant to last but a few years. But the immortal was meant to endure and to grow in strength forever. Death, which crushes the powerful frame and palsies the mighty arm, has no power whatever over the soul. Released from its earthly bondage, it goes on in improvement with less resistance ; with no cares nor sorrows to weigh it down. Now if it be admitted that the only sure happiness of man comes from religious and intellectual improvement, it is evident that his happiness depends on his preparation. In this world the foundations of that improvement must be laid. In this world, the joy of heaven, therefore, must begin. This life is the childhood and youth of our existence. Death is but the putting away of childish things. It is like the moment when the vessel which has tried its

strength near the shore, leaves its pilot and the narrow limits of its harbor, and stands out upon the broad blue sea.

In all this, we hope we have said nothing mystical. Our meaning is simply to illustrate that view which makes future happiness a natural result of present improvement; which regards the future life as bearing the same relation to the present, which manhood bears to childhood. But it will be said, This is making our salvation depend upon ourselves. Most certainly it does depend upon ourselves. Immortality is gained and offered. It is wholly a gift of favor. It is a gift out of all proportion to human merit or human exertion. But since it is offered, it can be secured by all those who will prepare themselves to enjoy it; and 'whither they go they know, and the way they know.' God does not fetter his children. He uses all moral means to lead them to their true interest. He unfolds the brilliant vision of heaven before them, shows them the character it requires, and leaves it to themselves to determine whether it is or is not worth securing. If they love something else better, they of course surrender this hope. But if they go to form those characters from which happiness naturally springs, it is clear that they say for themselves and not another, whether they shall or shall not be happy. In this world there are many circumstances which may prevent the guilty from being miserable, and the just from being happy. But in another life there is no bar, no help, nothing whatever to interfere with the natural results of the characters we have chosen to form.

We regard this view of the future state as one which ought to be kept before the eyes of men. If they feel that God has given them power to be architects of their own happiness, they will feel a new responsibility, and it may be a new inspiration. They will hesitate before they become the destroyers of their own peace and welfare. How they become so, may perhaps be made clearer by an illustration like this;—Suppose that every enjoyment strictly belonging to this world, were struck at once from existence. Religious and intellectual enjoyment would still remain. But would not he who has given all to riches or pleasure, be left with nothing to engage his affections? Would he not be tortured with the curse of a vacant, self-consuming heart? Would he not be at once in the depth of suffering, by reason of his neglect or refusal to form that character which would have been in him a perpetual fountain of enjoyment,

though the world and its glory were passed away. So must it be, when the world and its pleasures have sunk in their ashes. All must be a dreary blank to those who loved it too well. But there will be no change to those who have already begun the march of improvement. They can still exercise and enjoy their heavenly affections, still delight in meditating on the works of God, and doing good to men. And thus advancing, they can pass, as from star to star, through the different stages of excellence ; for nothing less is meant, by being changed into the image of Jesus Christ from glory to glory.

This representation of the future state will serve to remove some standing objections to the doctrine of future retribution. There are many who cannot bear to hear that God punishes the guilty. And here it may be seen that there is no infliction on his part, and it is not proper to say that he punishes the guilty. He kindly reveals to men the great truth,—truth, whether they know it or not, that goodness leads to happiness, and sin to misery and shame ; and almost exhausts the resources of moral power to influence them to choose the character which alone can make them happy. Shall the son, who has refused to listen to every warning, turn upon his father, when he falls and suffers, and accuse him as the author of his wo? His father did all that moral power could do, to save him from ruin ; and if he says that it is unmerciful in a parent to let him suffer, he must see that it cannot be prevented ; it is the fruit of his own doings. It cannot be prevented without breaking up that whole order of nature which brings peace and happiness to the just.

Besides, ‘they err, not knowing the scriptures, nor the power of God.’ They are bound to show what power can be exerted to save them from the consequences of their own choice. We cannot imagine anything like compulsion in one mind acting upon another. We cannot *make* our child receive knowledge. We can use compulsion upon his body, we can bind him to his book ; but it is evident that compulsion cannot reach the mind. The difficulty is, that men have felt as if moral power were no power at all ; as if to deny that God acts on men by compulsion, were the same as taking his sovereignty away. But our ideas of divine power should at least be borrowed from the highest human power we know. We accordingly find that the energy God exerts upon the human mind, is different from that which he exerts upon the senseless

elements of nature. We find that in Christianity, called 'the power of God,' he employs argument, inducement, and persuasion, which, men are but just beginning to discover, are the most stupendous force which can be brought to bear upon the mind, and yet exert no more compulsion to bend it in one direction or another, than the moonlight shadow across the brook exerts to stop the flowing of its waters. We would speak reverently of the divine perfections. All we say, is, that we can conceive of no power which can break up this order of nature; no power which can make him rest from labor, who has refused to labor; no power, which can make him who has refused to be holy, enjoy that happiness which nothing but holiness brings. These things seem to be no subjects of power.

Even if there were such a power, it would prove nothing. It will readily be allowed, that no one can be permanently happy without being good. But who ever heard of such a thing as compulsory goodness? It is plain, that the only goodness which deserves the name, must be wholly voluntary. It implies the choice and consent of our own hearts. Compulsion can only tie up the hands from offending, or peradventure force them to do distasteful duties. But to refrain or to obey in this way, is neither a reasonable nor acceptable service; and exactly so far as constraint, or unworthy motives enter into our obedience, it loses its grace and value. Goodness in men is what they have made themselves, not what any power has made them. The power of God, Christianity, is one which we have full power to resist, if we will. The prize is offered, but never will be forced into our hands. If we cast it rudely away, the loss and guilt will be our own. If we make the preparation, we write our own names in the Book of Life, by the power which God has given.

Some may look forward to another world for an opportunity of forming that character, which they have refused or neglected to cultivate in this. Still the scriptures represent the future as a state of retribution. True, it is an awful thought that the consequences of our characters should endure through the ages of eternity, stretching out far beyond the grave. But they must endure so long as the characters remain the same; and difficult indeed will be the task to alter them, after we have here enjoyed the full sunshine of God's goodness, which leads to repentance, in vain. But it is impossible to do more.

than speculate on such a subject, where the scripture leaves us. It would be folly to depend on probabilities and chances, in a matter so momentous. We know that the child who has wasted the time of preparation for active life can never redeem it. He may repent, but he never can overtake those who started with him and improved their earliest and best hours. He never can stand where he might have stood.

But we shall be met with the charge, that we are ascribing the happiness of heaven to human merit. We have already said distinctly, that we consider immortality as a gift of favor; and we know not why human merit should cause so much alarm. But the reward, if we must call it so, is so infinitely beyond all possible human deserving, that if we deserve it as far as man can deserve it, it is evident that we shall not be the less indebted to the divine mercy. For we believe, that religion leads to happiness in the present life, in the same way, and to happiness of the same description, as in the life to come. It is every man's interest, whatever his destiny in life may be, to be good; and if it be said that there are cases in which the virtuous suffer, we say, while we acknowledge it, that if they were guilty, they would in the same circumstances suffer immeasurably more. Goodness has no right, then, to demand a future reward, and that such a reward is given, is wholly owing to the unmerited kindness of God.

But what is this reward but an extension of existence; an eternity added to the duration of life, under circumstances where the characters men have formed, shall inevitably lead to the results which follow them in the order of nature? Our Saviour says, 'Happy are the poor in spirit,' and they who cherish the other Christian virtues. Who will deny, that, if they cultivate the virtues, they are entitled to the happiness, or will say that such merit on their part, detracts from the gratitude they owe to God? But when we come to immortality—a thought vast, oppressive and overwhelming—a world, from which the world we dwell upon shall seem like the small globe of a cabinet, rolling far beneath our view—a world, where the withering sentence of mortality shall be lifted from all the pursuits and enjoyments of the just—it is idle to talk of human merit in view of such a reward as this. And yet surely there is no presumption in looking forward, with all the confidence which our nature will allow, from the place where we have labored, to the place where we shall rest forever from anxiety, sorrow, and sin.

We can imagine nothing so inspiring as the view we have given of the future state. We can, without much effort, conceive what a gloom was once cast upon all the pursuits of life, by the thought which sometimes prevailed in the most intelligent minds, that the way of wisdom, the path of virtue, and the irregular march of glory, all ended in the grave. And this imagination may make us feel, that Christianity has given new attractions to all the intellectual and moral pursuits of life, by assuring us that the grave is not their boundary; that we shall find it hardly an interruption in our never-ending way; that all once gained to our minds and hearts, is gained forever. But this inspiration is all destroyed by the thought of a mighty and mysterious change in death; by the thought of passing to a life unknown and unimagined; and the way of improvement is not one of pleasantness and peace, till we are assured that we shall walk in it forever. This makes us earnest in the pursuit of knowledge, especially the knowledge of God. It leads us to trace out his perfections in the magnificence of the heavens above, and the beauty of the world below. It makes us devoted to the service of our fellow men, whom we regard, not as the companions of a few days' way-faring, but as the associates of our immortality. It gives us a new impression of the value of scripture, teaching us to regard it, not merely as a staff meant to support us to the grave and there to be laid down, but as the source of immortal light, there being no excellence in the angels of the Son of God, the seed of which may not be found in the gospel. When the seal of immortality is thus set on everything good and great, we feel within us a new ambition. We gaze with new interest on the Sun of Righteousness, when we know that he is not risen merely to enlighten our pathway to the tomb, but that we may rejoice in his beams forever.

This view of future happiness as the result of character, is hardly less valuable in its power to remove false and pernicious hopes; hopes which only tend to mislead and destroy. How many there are who die with a firmness like that of the Christian,—some falling in the front of the battle, with seeming calmness, though their lives have been anything but good; some sustained by an iron pride, which the terrors of death cannot bow; some, in whom the excitement of disease is mistaken for the inspirations of Heaven, dying in triumphant gladness—passionate, because they dare not be rational—raptur-

ous, because their feeling must be tumultuous or nothing—entering with a triumphal march the valley of the shadow of death, though they have through all their lives been miserably unfaithful to their duty. Almost every public print brings us some disgusting narration of the death of the murderer, surrounded by ministers of religion, lifting up, on the scaffold, hands on which the blood he has shed is scarcely dry, and declaring his joy at passing from the most righteous doom of man, to the presence and blessing of God. When an insane delusion is thus preventing the course of human justice, and holding out the gallows as the surest path to glory, honor, and immortality, it becomes more needful than ever, to repeat, that the future destiny depends on the character formed on earth. The last hour of life is like any other hour. It is as possible to deceive ourselves in that, as in any other hour; perhaps more so, for the heart is less collected, more open to quick and violent emotions. The death proves little or nothing with respect to the life. The best men are sometimes depressed, and the most abandoned full of rapture. But there is no reason to think that a moment's feeling can alter the character. If not, it cannot change the sentence of God.

The consolations which this view of the future state gives to the mourning, are neither few nor small. It enables the imagination to follow the departed. They are not exulting in an aimless flight through the open fields of heaven; they are walking in the same path which they travelled here below, though exempt from its peculiar hardships and dangers. The old man who left us full of years, renews the childhood of his soul, restores the vigor which had begun to be weary and faint. The man who dies in the fulness of his strength, hardly suspends his intellectual labors and religious adoration. The child, whose eyes had hardly opened on the world, finds those among the happy who gladly supply the place of a parent's affection; who watch his unfolding powers, as they open in a promise never saddened by calamity nor profaned by sin. Thus a truth and reality is given to the delightful vision of heaven. It is the only representation that meets the full meaning of the words, 'He asked length of days of thee; and thou gavest it him; even length of days forever and ever.'

The great advantage of this representation, is, that it is directly practical. We say to those whom we would animate

in duty, not that they must persevere, for in a little while they shall lay down their burden ;—we tell them, not that they are finite and dying—we urge upon them that they are infinite and immortal ; that for all the practical purposes of life, they should regard themselves as immortal, and make a preparation widely different from that which a few years of existence would require. We speak not of death, but of immortality ; an immortality, in which the characters now formed shall endure, and nothing shall interfere with their just and natural results, forever. This inspires the young to add the beauty of holiness to the charm of childhood and of youth, and to look forward, not to manhood, but to eternity. And all, whatever their years may be, must regard improvement as something great and important, when they know that it shall outlast the world. We care little for systems ; but we think it essential to have it understood, that, after all that God has done, he entrusts our destiny to our own hands. If we refuse to prepare to enjoy immortal happiness, we take the consequences of that refusal ; with our own lips, as it were, we bid farewell to heaven and to Him.

